DocketNumber: 75389, (Calendar No. 12)
Judges: Brickley, Cavanagh, Riley, Boyle, Williams, Archer, Levin
Filed Date: 11/24/1986
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
The opinion for reversal excepting this case from the application of res judicata appears to have two bases: (1) the doctrine of res judicata should not preclude the relitigation of Antoine’s
Ordinarily, preclusion is appropriate as to issues defined by application of legal rules to historic facts that were completed by the time of the initial decision, 18 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 4425, pp 242-264. Even if it is conceded, as the opinion for reversal suggests, that application of the doctrine of res judicata depends upon a weighing of the competing public policy concerns involved, we would conclude that the need for finality as to the paternity determination is compelling and that the doctrine of res judicata bars Travis’ attempt to disestablish his paternity of Antoine. Therefore, we would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
i
"The doctrine of res judicata operates to prevent the relitigation of facts and law between the same parties or their privies.” Socialist Workers Party v Secretary of State, 412 Mich 571, 583; 317 NW2d 1 (1982), citing Gose v Monroe Auto Equipment Co, 409 Mich 147, 161; 294 NW2d 165 (1980).
The doctrine of res judicata was judicially created in order to "relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.” Allen v McCurry, 449 US 90, 94; 101 S Ct 411; 66 L Ed 2d 308 (1980). The central goal of the doctrine’s application is to "free people from the uncertain prospect of litigation, with all its costs to emotional peace and the ordering of future affairs.” 18 Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra, § 4403, p 15.
A support order arising from a divorce decree constitutes an adjudication of paternity and establishes the defendant’s duty of support. Baum v Baum, 20 Mich App 68, 74; 173 NW2d 744 (1969). A party cannot withhold a defense to be used in the retrial of a paternity dispute when that defense could have been brought in the prior suit. Baum, supra; see Jacobson v Miller, 41 Mich 90, 96; 1 NW 1013 (1879). The doctrine of res judicata precludes this from happening. Baum, supra; Stewart v Stewart, 91 Mich App 602, 605; 283 NW2d 809 (1979); see also Anno: Effect, in subsequent proceedings, of paternity findings or implications in divorce or annulment decree or in support or custody order made incidental thereto, 78 ALR3d 846.
The opinion for reversal excepts the instant case from the general application of res judicata because of the operation of Lord Mansfield’s Rule
The opinion for reversal concludes that Travis did not concede the issue of paternity in the court below and intimates that the operation of Lord Mansfield’s Rule precluded Travis from litigating the issue:
Travis did not concede the issue of paternity. He sought to offer testimony on that issue at the pro confesso hearing, but the court refused to allow him to do so. While his failure to appeal made the decree final and, under the general rule of issue preclusion, the determination of paternity was "conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties,” he had not conceded the issue. [Post, pp 602-603.]
We agree with our colleagues that Travis did not concede the issue of paternity. They have, however, failed to explain why that fact makes the determination of paternity and support any less final. Lord Mansfield’s Rule precluded testimony of the husband and wife as to nonaccess to prove a husband’s lack of paternity. It did not preclude litigation of the paternity issue. As indicated above, Travis could have offered testimony of third persons as to nonaccess if such testimony were available. See Yanoff, supra.
Another reason why our colleagues arrive at this conclusion is to distinguish this case from Hlady v Wolverine Bolt Co, 393 Mich 368, 380; 224 NW2d 856 (1975), in which this Court held:
Plaintiff may not concede an issue, necessarily*587 determinative of and included in the judgment of this Court, and then, after another has successfully raised the issue she did not wish to contest, ask the Court again for relief. The doctrine of res judicata bars this from happening.
A review of Hlady, however, indicates that Hlady’s earlier concession of the issue was not the basis for precluding relitigation of the issue in that case. Indeed, the majority decision in Gose v Monroe Auto Equipment, supra, 161-162, teaches that the true rationale behind Hlady’s holding is the public policy concern requiring finality in workers’ compensation adjudications:
A compensation award represents " 'an adjudication as to the condition of the injured workman at the time it is entered.’ ” Theodore v Packing Materials, Inc, 396 Mich 152, 158; 240 NW2d 255 (1976), citing 58 Am Jur [Workmen’s Compensation, § 508]. Disability benefits "are a form of income maintenance for persons whose wage-earning capacity has been suspended or terminated. A claimant’s entitlement to such benefits depends on the circumstances at the time of application and payment.” Hlady, supra, 391 (Levin, J., concurring).
The requirement that he present all of his available claims in a single proceeding is consistent with this purpose of adjudicating the worker’s needs. The remedial character of the legislation, if affected at all by this rubric, would scarcely be enhanced by a construction which would authorize piecemeal compensation for an injury.
Surely, neither Hlady nor any other authority resolves the issue of res judicata on whether a party litigated or conceded the issue.
The opinion for reversal, in footnote 6, attempts at great length to clarify that its decision was not based on the fact that Travis never conceded the
[w]hether or not as stated in the opinion for affirmance, "Hlady’s earlier concession of the issue was not the basis for precluding relitigation of the issue in that case,” . . . Hlady made a point out of Hlady’s concession of the issue. Because Hlady emphasized Hlady’s concession of the issue, we have noted in the accompanying text that Travis did not concede the issue of paternity. We do not wish to be understood as saying that a person may relitigate an issue that he had an opportunity to contest on the basis that he did not concede the issue. [Post, p 603, n 6.]
This creates the impression that nonconcession of the issue may have been a factor in determining the applicability of res judicata. Concession or nonconcession of an issue has never been, and should not now be, a factor in determining the res judicata effect of a prior decision. If our colleagues do not base their decision on plaintiff’s nonconcession of paternity, the discussion in footnote 6 and
Further, after discussing Hlady’s concession, the opinion for reversal does nothing more to distinguish Hlady. The reason for that omission is that Hlady cannot be distinguished from this case. Both involve a factual determination accompanied by a subsequent change in law. Both involve a party to the prior determination seeking to change the earlier factual conclusion. In both cases, the plaintiff, aggrieved by the factual determination, could have appealed, but did not. The plaintiff in Hlady was precluded from relitigating the issue, as should be plaintiff here.
As pointed out earlier, the rationale behind Hlady is the public policy of requiring finality in workers’ compensation cases. That rationale is as compelling, if not more so, in the highly emotion-charged area of paternity determinations. One contested paternity proceeding is disturbing in itself. To force the party contesting the redetermination to go through that unpleasantness again is unfair, as well as an unnecessary burden on the courts.
The question for present purposes is whether the party seeking to relitigate had the opportunity to litigate the issue. The opinion for reversal appears to conclude that Travis did not have an adequate opportunity to litigate the issue of paternity because of the operation of Lord Mansfield’s Rule. This conclusion disregards the fact that the only evidence of nonaccess he could not offer was his or Lynel’s testimony. Every other manner of proof was available to him. The operation of Lord Mansfield’s Rule does not affect the finality of the paternity adjudication because its operation did not preclude the litigation of the paternity issue. See Thompson v Thompson, 572 SW2d 761, 763-
ii
The scope of the doctrine of res judicata depends upon whether the question arises in a subsequent action between the same parties and upon the same claim or upon a different claim:
In the former case a judgment upon the merits constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. In the latter case the inquiry is whether the point or question presented for determination in the subsequent action is the same as that litigated and determined in the original action. . . .
"The general principle announced in numerous cases is that a right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, as a ground of recovery, cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies; and even if the second suit is for a different cause of action, the right, question or fact once so determined must, as between the same parties or their privies, be taken as conclusively established, so long as the judgment in the first suit remains unmodified.” [United States v Moser, 266 US 236, 241; 45 S Ct 66; 69 L Ed 262 (1924). See also 46 Am Jur 2d,*591 Judgments, § 404, pp 571-573; Jacobson v Miller, supra, 93.]
The latter prong of the doctrine of res judicata has been referred to in this Court also as "collateral estoppel.” Jones v Chambers, 353 Mich 674, 680-681; 91 NW2d 889 (1958), quoting Partmar Corp v Paramount Pictures Theatres Corp, 347 US 89, 90-91; 74 S Ct 414; 98 L Ed 532 (1954); Senior Accountants, Analysts & Appraisers Ass’n v Detroit, 399 Mich 449; 249 NW2d 121 (1976). In this case, it is denominated as the general rule of issue preclusion.
The present proceeding to cancel child support and determine paternity involves the same parties and the same issue as in the prior divorce proceeding. Because this issue was adjudicated, the general principle of issue preclusion applies.
Our colleagues would skirt the application of this general rule on the authority of subsections 2(b) and 5(c) of § 28 of the Restatement of Judgments. Initially we note that subsection 5(c) is totally inapplicable to the case at bar. Subsection 5(c) provides in pertinent part:
Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in the following circumstances:
(5) There is a clear and convincing need for a*592 new determination of the issue . . . (c) because the party sought to be precluded, as a result of the conduct of his adversary or other special circumstances, did not have an adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial action. [Restatement Judgments, 2d, § 28(5)(c), pp 273-274.]
According to the commentary, this section should be applied only where there exists a compelling showing of unfairness, and it should not be applied simply on the basis that the first determination was patently erroneous. Id., p 284. In this case, that an erroneous determination was reached in the first litigation alone is an insufficient basis for applying the section. Nor has Travis established a compelling showing of unfairness. The facts indicate that Travis had an adequate opportunity to obtain a full and fair adjudication of the paternity issue in the original action, but that he failed to avail himself of that opportunity. Nor is it apparent why the incentive of Travis to litigate the issue should be any greater now by reason of special circumstances than it was at the time of the original divorce action.
We further note that illustration 11 offered by the opinion for reversal is not germane to this case. That illustration is in reference to subsection (4) of § 28, which would except from the general rule of preclusion those situations where there has been an intervening change in the party’s burden
We also find that subsection 2(b) is inapplicable to this case. Subsection 2(b) of § 28 of the Restatement of Judgments provides in pertinent part:
Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in the following circumstances:
(2) The issue is one of law and . . . (b) a new determination is warranted in order to take account of an intervening change in the applicable legal context or otherwise to avoid inequitable administration of the laws .... [Restatement Judgments, 2d, § 28(2)(b), p 273.][6 ]_
[a] rule of law declared in an action between two parties should not be binding on them for all time, especially as to claims arising after the first proceeding has been concluded, when other litigants are free to urge that the rule should be rejected. Such preclusion might unduly delay needed changes in the law and might deprive a litigant of a right that the court was prepared to recognize for other litigants in the same position. [Restatement Judgments, 2d, § 28, comment b, pp 275-276.]
Aside from the earlier expressed reservations regarding our colleagues’ decision, we are convinced that they have misapplied this exception to
At issue is Travis’ status in relation to Antoine and the rights and obligations that flow therefrom. A finding of fact in a divorce decree that a child was born of the marriage of the parties establishes the child’s paternity. Such a determination, if unappealed, is to be given conclusive effect. This rule must hold true even where the rules of evidence have changed between the prior and subsequent suits so as to allow the admission of testi
Finally, even if we were inclined to adopt the position of the opinion for reversal that res judicata sometimes does not bar relitigation of a factual determination decided in a prior case, we would not adopt the exception here. We believe that the best interests of this child, and all children whose rights will be implicated by the Court’s decision today, must prevail over any unfairness that may result to this plaintiff by denying his challenge of paternity raised nine years after entry of his judgment of divorce. Our colleagues are
There is no area of law requiring more finality and stability than family law: "Public policy demands finality of litigation in this area to preserve surviving family structure.” Ex parte Hovermale, 636 SW2d 828, 836 (Tex Civ App, 1982); McGinn v McGinn, 126 Mich App 689, 693; 337 NW2d 632 (1983).
Divorce, like marriage, is of concern not merely to the immediate parties. It affects personal rights*599 of the deepest significance. It also touches basic interests of society. Since divorce, like marriage, creates a new status, every consideration of policy makes it desirable that the effect should be the same wherever the question arises. [Williams v North Carolina, 325 US 226, 230; 65 S Ct 1092; 89 L Ed 1577 (1945).]
There is no more forceful example of the rationale underlying the requirement of finality of judgments than the chaos and humiliation which would follow from allowing former husbands to challenge, long after a final judgment has been entered, the legitimacy of children born during their marriages.
We would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Goodright v Moss, 2 Cowp 591; 98 Eng Rep 1257 (1777).
Even if plaintiffs concession or nonconcession of paternity was an issue, we believe that a strong argument can be made that plaintiff did constructively concede the question.
We note that plaintiff was represented by counsel throughout these proceedings and took the judgment of divorce awarded by the court. The record also indicates that, while plaintiff was precluded from testifying regarding paternity of Antoine, he was not precluded from offering other testimony and evidence such as blood tests. See People v Wiseman, 63 Mich App 137, 140; 234 NW2d 429 (1975); Serafin v Serafin, 67 Mich App 517; 241 NW2d 272 (1976), aff'd 401 Mich 629; 258 NW2d 461 (1977). Yet he made no attempt to do so. The record clearly establishes that, in the face of the court advising that Antoine had to be named in the judgment as a child of the marriage and that the weekly support order for Antoine would be $30, an amount more than twice that for Laura ($13.50), the plaintiff did not offer any other testimony or evidence or request blood tests or a continuance which would allow him time to bring forward testimony and evidence supporting his denial of paternity.
See n 10. The cases cited by our colleagues apparently in support of their conclusion that fairness dictates that the paternity issue be relitigated are not applicable to the case at bar. See n 8.
In Thompson, supra, the only case located on point, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals reached the same conclusion on the basis of collateral estoppel, the issue-preclusion prong of res judicata which is applied here.
See n 2.
There is considerable controversy concerning the appropriate cases for application of this exception. See, e.g., 18 Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra, § 4425; Restatement Judgments, 2d, § 28, Commentary, pp 285-287. It is reasonably clear from the Restatement that the exception should apply to principles of law formulated in abstract terms which are capable of application to completely separate factual situations. It is also clear that the exception should not apply where two cases present identical issues governed by the same general legal rules and present facts which are indistinguishable as measured by these rules.
Determining whether the exception should apply becomes more difficult where there has been a change in the facts or the rules of law governing the facts. Special reasons may exist making the issue-. preclusion aspect of res judicata inappropriate in a particular area of the law or substantial changes may have occurred in the legal climate suggesting a new understanding of the governing legal rules which require a different application.
Tax litigation presents a strong example of an area of law requiring flexibility in the application of issue preclusion where the governing laws have changed and separable facts are at issue. One argument advanced for limiting preclusion in this area is that preclusion might
Changes in the legal climate may justify relitigation in other areas of the law, such as civil rights, because of the greater concerns of public interest. However, "|j]ust as broad public interests may ease the way to reconsideration, so important private interests of repose or reliance may require that preclusion apply despite the clearest changes of the legal climate. 18 Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra, § 4425, p 263. A good illustration is the case of United States v Moser, supra, 242, concerning the status of a retired naval officer to receive certain retirement pay:
Where, for example, a court in deciding a case has enunciated a rule of law, the parties in a subsequent action upon a different demand are not estopped from insisting that the law is otherwise, merely because the parties are the same in both cases. But a fact, question or right distinctly adjudged in the original action cannot be disputed in a subsequent action, even though the determination was reached upon an erroneous view or by an erroneous application of the law. That would be to affirm the principle in respect of the thing adjudged but, at the same time, deny it all efficacy by sustaining a challenge to the grounds upon which the judgment was based. A determination in respect of the status of an individual upon which his right to recover depends is as conclusive as a decision upon any other matter. [Citations omitted, emphasis supplied.]
While we find that our colleagues’ application of the exception is incorrect in this case, our opinion should be read only as declining to adopt the exception on the facts and posture presented here. We express no opinion on the validity of the exception as applied to different circumstances.
The opinion for reversal cites two examples gleaned from the Restatement of Judgments which "indicate that the exception to the general rule of preclusion applies although the change of law concerns a factual question, the actor’s conduct . . ., or his status .'. . .” Post, 607, n 11. Neither example supports their position.
The first involves an agency bringing an action against a liquor wholesaler on the ground that the wholesaler violated a statute by selling only to himself. The court dismisses the action, holding that such conduct does not violate the statute. A higher court later determines that such conduct does violate the law. The agency is not precluded from once again bringing an action against the wholesaler.
The second example is similar. A nonprofit organization is denied a tax refund on the basis that it is not exempt as a charity. A higher court later grants a similar organization a charitable exemption. The first organization is not precluded from seeking a charitable exemption.
While illuminating, both examples are distinguishable from this case. Both illustrations involve institutional litigation where application of the change in the law exception is compelled by the need to promote consistency of law application by the institution. Moreover, neither illustration involves a factual determination sought to be relitigated. The parties are not attempting to change facts previously
We recognize that the distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is often hazy. Some issues cannot be clearly delineated as straight factual issues or legal issues. Often a question presented to a court is a mixed question of fact and law. With that in mind, however, the issue of paternity does not fall on the scale in the grey area of a mixed question of fact and law, but is clearly a factual determination. A man either is or is not the father of a child.
The opinion for reversal cites three cases, Settle v Beasley, 309 NC 616; 308 SE2d 288 (1983), Estate of DeRoy, 481 Pa 403; 392 A2d 1355 (1978), and In re Biddle Estate, 487 Pa 616; 410 A2d 782 (1980), in an effort to support its position. All of these cases are significantly distinguishable from the case at bar.
In Settle, the prior litigation was between the county child support enforcement agency and the putative father. In a different action on behalf of the child the issue of paternity was not precluded from litigation because the child, due to differing interests and incentives, was held not to be in privity with the county in the original action.
It is well-established in Michigan that a prerequisite for issue preclusion is that the former adjudication must have been between the same parties or their privies. In re Kozak, 92 Mich App 579, 581; 285 NW2d 378 (1979); Curry v Detroit, 394 Mich 327, 331; 231 NW2d 57 (1975). In the case at bar, this prerequisite is not in dispute. Travis is the same party that litigated the paternity issue in the prior divorce action.
In Biddle, supra, 621, and DeRoy, supra, 410, the courts allowed the adopted child to relitigate the issue of heirship on the basis of the well-established rule in Pennsylvania that "a rule of law made in the distribution of a portion of an estate is not binding upon a court in a subsequent adjudication relating to another portion.” While the predecessor to § 28 of the Restatement of Judgments was also used in both cases to justify reopening of the litigation, we note that the courts used the exception to fulfill the presumed intent of the testator not to exclude adopted children and to establish a legal relationship, not defeat it, as in the case at bar.
Our colleagues note the enactment of 1986 PA 107, MCL 722.714; MSA 25.494, which extends the statute of limitations for paternity-proceedings until the child reached eighteen years of age. The implication of this, of course, being that Lynel Hackley has an avenue available to her to obtain financial support from Antoine’s biological father. Taking plaintiffs allegations as true, that the biological father is known and participating somewhat in Antoine’s upbringing, we still reject our colleagues’ contention that Antoine will not be adversely affected by its decision. A paternity action against the biological father is likely to be costly and a drain on Lynel Hackley’s resources. Further, in a vast majority of cases, the biological father or his whereabouts may be unknown. The new paternity statute of limitations would be unavailing in those cases.
Finally, we disagree with our colleagues that their decision will not adversely affect Antoine because plaintiff has never acknowledged paternity or exercised visitation rights. They, while viewing their decision as merely piercing the "facade of legitimacy,” neglect to take into account the potential for embarrassment and humiliation that a determination of paternity may have on the delicate psyche of a child. Even in this case, such a proceeding is bound to have some effect on the child as well as the household in which she lives. Further, the possibility for an adverse effect in other cases is quite large. Where a man who has participated in the child’s upbringing and, generally, comported as the father, seeks to redetermine his paternity, the result is potentially devastating to a child who had considered the man to be the father.