People of Michigan v. Joseph William Miller

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices:
Syllabus Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman
Mary Beth Kelly
Brian K. Zahra
Bridget M. McCormack
David F. Viviano
Richard H. Bernstein
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions:
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Corbin R. Davis
PEOPLE v MILLER
Docket No. 149502. Argued April 7, 2015 (Calendar No. 4). Decided July 20, 2015.
Joseph Miller was convicted by a jury in the Leelanau Circuit Court of operating while
intoxicated (OWI), MCL 257.625(1), and operating while intoxicated causing serious
impairment of another person’s body function (OWI-injury), MCL 257.625(5), for an accident
that resulted when he grabbed the steering wheel of the car that his girlfriend was driving. The
court, Thomas G. Power, J., sentenced defendant to two concurrent terms of five years’
probation, with the first nine months to be served in jail. Defendant appealed. The Court of
Appeals, DONOFRIO, P.J., and SAAD and METER, JJ., in an unpublished opinion per curiam issued
March 11, 2014 (Docket No. 314375), affirmed defendant’s conviction for OWI-injury but
vacated defendant’s OWI conviction on the ground that it violated defendant’s constitutional
protection against double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals denied the prosecution’s motion for
reconsideration. The Supreme Court granted the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal.
497 Mich. 881 (2014).
In a unanimous opinion by Justice VIVIANO, the Supreme Court held:
The trial court violated the constitutional protection against double jeopardy by
convicting defendant of both OWI and OWI-injury. When read as a whole, MCL 257.625
expresses a clear legislative intent not to allow conviction of and punishment for multiple
offenses arising from the same incident except where explicitly authorized by the statute, and
MCL 257.625(1) and MCL 257.625(5) do not specifically authorize multiple punishments.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly vacated defendant’s conviction, but for the wrong
reason.
1. The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy protects against successive
prosecutions for the same offense and against the imposition of multiple punishments for the
same offense. The protection against multiple punishments is not violated if the Legislature has
specifically authorized cumulative punishments under two statutes; however, if the Legislature
has expressed a clear intention to prohibit multiple punishments, it is a violation of double
jeopardy to convict a defendant for both offenses in a single trial. If the Legislature’s intent is
not clear, courts apply the “abstract legal elements” test articulated in People v Ream, 481 Mich.
223 (2008), which focuses on the statutory elements of the offense to determine whether the
Legislature intended for multiple punishments. Under this test, it does not violate double
jeopardy protections to convict a defendant of multiple offenses if each of the offenses has an
element that the other does not.
2. The Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the Legislature did not express a clear
intent with regard to multiple punishments arising under MCL 257.625(1) and (5). Although
these provisions do not clearly evidence the Legislature’s intent when read in isolation, reading
MCL 257.625 as a whole indicates that the Legislature specifically authorized multiple
punishments for an individual who violates MCL 257.625(7) by driving with a minor while
intoxicated and, by that same conduct, also commits OWI-injury under MCL 257.625(5) or OWI
causing death under MCL 257.625(4). The fact that there is no similar provision expressly
authorizing multiple punishments for violating MCL 257.625(1) and MCL 257.625(5) indicates
that the Legislature did not intend to permit a defendant to be convicted of both offenses for the
same criminal conduct. Accordingly, the trial court violated double jeopardy by convicting
defendant of both OWI and OWI-injury.
Court of Appeals judgment affirmed on different grounds; case remanded to the trial
court for resentencing.
©2015 State of Michigan
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices:
OPINION Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman
Mary Beth Kelly
Brian K. Zahra
Bridget M. McCormack
David F. Viviano
Richard H. Bernstein
FILED July 20, 2015
STATE OF MICHIGAN
SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 149502
JOSEPH MILLER,
Defendant-Appellee.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
VIVIANO, J.
At issue before us is whether defendant’s convictions of operating while
intoxicated (OWI) 1 and operating while intoxicated causing serious impairment of the
body function of another person (OWI-injury) 2 arising from a single intoxicated driving
incident violated the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Michigan
1
MCL 257.625(1).
2
MCL 257.625(5).
Constitutions. 3 Although we agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that convicting
defendant of both offenses violated his double jeopardy protections, we disagree with the
reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals. In particular, the Court of Appeals erred
by not recognizing the clear legislative intent reflected in the plain language of the statute
precluding multiple punishments for OWI and OWI-injury. Accordingly, for the reasons
stated below, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision to vacate defendant’s OWI
conviction under MCL 257.625(1) on alternate grounds and remand to the trial court for
resentencing.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2012, while returning from a concert at which they had both been drinking
alcohol, defendant and his girlfriend got into an argument. Defendant grabbed the wheel
from his girlfriend, who was driving, causing the car to go off the road and strike a tree.
Defendant’s girlfriend suffered a broken collar bone and a concussion as a result of the
accident. Defendant had a blood alcohol level of 0.17 grams per 100 milliliters.
Defendant was charged with OWI and OWI-injury. A jury convicted defendant as
charged. The trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent terms of five years’
probation, with the first nine months to be served in the county jail.
Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court violated
the multiple punishments strand of the double jeopardy clauses by convicting him of both
OWI and OWI-injury. The Court of Appeals agreed, vacated defendant’s OWI
3
US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15.
2
conviction under MCL 257.625(1), and remanded the case for resentencing. 4 The
prosecution moved for reconsideration, arguing that the Court of Appeals’ analysis was
contrary to People v Ream, 5 but the Court of Appeals denied the motion in a summary
order.
The prosecution sought leave to appeal in this Court. We granted leave to
consider whether defendant’s convictions for both OWI and OWI-injury arising from the
same incident constitutes a violation of the multiple punishments strand of double
jeopardy under the United States and Michigan Constitutions. 6
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case presents questions of law regarding statutory interpretation and the
application of our state and federal Constitutions, which we review de novo. 7
III. MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS STRAND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .” 8 The Michigan Constitution similarly provides that
4
People v Miller, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued
March 11, 2014 (Docket No. 314375).
5
People v Ream, 481 Mich. 223; 750 NW2d 536 (2008).
6
People v Miller, 497 Mich. 881 (2014).
7
People v Gardner, 482 Mich. 41, 46; 753 NW2d 78 (2008); People v Nutt, 469 Mich.
565, 573; 677 NW2d 1 (2004).
8
US Const, Am V.
3
“[n]o person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy.” 9 The
prohibition against double jeopardy protects individuals in three ways: “(1) it protects
against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) it protects against a
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) it protects against
multiple punishments for the same offense.” 10 The first two protections comprise the
“successive prosecutions” strand of double jeopardy, while the third protection is known
as the “multiple punishments” strand. 11 Because defendant was convicted of and
sentenced for both OWI and OWI-injury arising from the same conduct at the same trial,
this case involves the multiple punishments strand of double jeopardy.
The multiple punishments strand of double jeopardy “is designed to ensure that
courts confine their sentences to the limits established by the Legislature” and therefore
acts as a “restraint on the prosecutor and the Courts.” 12 The multiple punishments strand
is not violated “[w]here ‘a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment
9
Const 1963, art 1, § 15. Although we are not bound to interpret the Michigan
Constitution consistently with similar provisions of the United States Constitution, “we
have been persuaded in the past that interpretations of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment have accurately conveyed the meaning of Const 1963, art 1, § 15 . . . .”
People v Smith, 478 Mich. 292, 302 n 7; 733 NW2d 351 (2007).
10
Nutt, 469 Mich. at 574.
11
Smith, 478 Mich. at 299.
12
People v Mitchell, 456 Mich. 693, 695; 575 NW2d 283 (1998); see also Brown v Ohio,
432 U.S. 161, 165; 97 S. Ct. 2221; 53 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1977) (“Where consecutive sentences
are imposed at a single criminal trial, the role of the constitutional [double jeopardy]
guarantee is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization
by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense.”).
4
under two statutes . . . .’ ” 13 Conversely, where the Legislature expresses a clear intention
in the plain language of a statute to prohibit multiple punishments, it will be a violation of
the multiple punishments strand for a trial court to cumulatively punish a defendant for
both offenses in a single trial. 14 “Thus, the question of what punishments are
constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of what punishments the
Legislative Branch intended to be imposed.” 15
The Legislature, however, does not always clearly indicate its intent with regard to
the permissibility of multiple punishments. When legislative intent is not clear, Michigan
courts apply the “abstract legal elements” test articulated in Ream to ascertain whether
the Legislature intended to classify two offenses as the “same offense” for double
jeopardy purposes. This test focuses on the statutory elements of the offense to
13
Mitchell, 456 Mich. at 695, quoting Missouri v Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-369; 103 S. Ct.
673; 74 L. Ed. 2d 535 (1983).
14
See Garrett v United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779; 105 S. Ct. 2407; 85 L. Ed. 2d 764 (1985)
(explaining “that the Blockburger rule is not controlling when the legislative intent is
clear from the face of the statute or the legislative history”); Hunter, 459 U.S. at 366
(“With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy
Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater
punishment than the legislature intended.”); Smith, 478 Mich. at 316 (“In interpreting
‘same offense’ in the context of multiple punishments, federal courts first look to
determine whether the legislature expressed a clear intention that multiple punishments
be imposed.”); Mitchell, 456 Mich. at 695-696 (“Where the issue is one of multiple
punishment rather than successive trials, the double jeopardy analysis is whether there is
a clear indication of legislative intent to impose multiple punishment for the same
offense.”).
15
Albernaz v United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344; 101 S. Ct. 1137; 67 L. Ed. 2d 275 (1981).
5
determine whether the Legislature intended for multiple punishments. 16 Under the
abstract legal elements test, it is not a violation of double jeopardy to convict a defendant
of multiple offenses if “each of the offenses for which defendant was convicted has an
element that the other does not . . . .” 17 This means that, under the Ream test, two
offenses will only be considered the “same offense” where it is impossible to commit the
greater offense without also committing the lesser offense. 18
In sum, when considering whether two offenses are the “same offense” in the
context of the multiple punishments strand of double jeopardy, we must first determine
whether the statutory language evinces a legislative intent with regard to the
permissibility of multiple punishments. If the legislative intent is clear, courts are
required to abide by this intent. 19 If, however, the legislative intent is not clear, courts
must then apply the abstract legal elements test articulated in Ream to discern legislative
intent.
16
Ream, 481 Mich. at 238 (explaining that “[b]ecause the statutory elements, not the
particular facts of the case, are indicative of legislative intent, the focus must be on these
statutory elements”).
17
Id. at 225-226.
18
Id. at 241.
19
See Mitchell, 456 Mich. at 695-696 (explaining that where the legislative intent is clear,
“ ‘a court’s task of statutory construction is at an end’ ”), quoting Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368.
6
IV. ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION
Subsections (1) through (8) of MCL 257.625 establish different categories of
operating while intoxicated offenses. In this case, we must determine whether double
jeopardy precludes defendant’s convictions of OWI under MCL 257.625(1) and OWI-
injury under MCL 257.625(5) arising from a single intoxicated driving incident.
MCL 257.625(1) provides:
A person, whether licensed or not, shall not operate a vehicle upon a
highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to
motor vehicles, including an area designated for the parking of vehicles,
within this state if the person is operating while intoxicated. As used in this
section, “operating while intoxicated” means any of the following:
(a) The person is under the influence of alcoholic liquor, a controlled
substance, or other intoxicating substance or a combination of alcoholic
liquor, a controlled substance, or other intoxicating substance.
(b) The person has an alcohol content of 0.08 grams or more per 100
milliliters of blood, per 210 liters of breath, or per 67 milliliters of urine, or,
beginning October 1, 2018, the person has an alcohol content of 0.10 grams
or more per 100 milliliters of blood, per 210 liters of breath, or per 67
milliliters of urine.
(c) The person has an alcohol content of 0.17 grams or more per 100
milliliters of blood, per 210 liters of breath, or per 67 milliliters of urine.
MCL 257.625(5) provides:
A person, whether licensed or not, who operates a motor vehicle in
violation of subsection (1), (3), or (8) and by the operation of that motor
vehicle causes a serious impairment of a body function of another person is
guilty of a crime as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), the person is guilty of a
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 5 years or a fine of
not less than $1,000.00 or more than $5,000.00, or both. The judgment of
sentence may impose the sanction permitted under section 625n. If the
vehicle is not ordered forfeited under section 625n, the court shall order
vehicle immobilization under section 904d in the judgment of sentence.
7
(b) If the violation occurs while the person has an alcohol content of
0.17 grams or more per 100 milliliters of blood, per 210 liters of breath, or
per 67 milliliters of urine, and within 7 years of a prior conviction, the
person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than
10 years or a fine of not less than $1,000.00 or more than $5,000.00, or
both. The judgment of sentence may impose the sanction permitted under
section 625n. If the vehicle is not ordered forfeited under section 625n, the
court shall order vehicle immobilization under section 904d in the judgment
of sentence.
As stated above, to determine whether defendant’s convictions of both OWI and
OWI-injury violated his double jeopardy rights, we must first determine whether the
Legislature expressed a clear intent regarding the permissibility of multiple operating
while intoxicated convictions arising from the same incident.
The Court of Appeals concluded, based on an examination of the plain language of
MCL 257.625, that the Legislature did not “evince a clear expression of any intent to
allow multiple punishments for the same offense.” 20 In doing so, the Court focused on
MCL 257.625(25) and (27). MCL 257.625(25)(b) defines “prior convictions” and
includes as part of that definition a violation of “[t]his section” or a “substantially
corresponding” local ordinance, federal law, or law of another state. MCL 257.625(27)
provides that “[i]f 2 or more convictions described in subsection (25) are convictions for
violations arising out of the same transaction, only 1 conviction shall be used to
determine whether the person has a prior conviction.” The Court of Appeals concluded
that the Legislature did not clearly state its intent with regard to multiple punishments
under these subsections because subsection (25) includes “as part of its definition of
20
Miller, unpub op at 4.
8
‘prior conviction’ a conviction from a foreign jurisdiction of a law that ‘substantially
correspond[s] to a law of this state,” which may allow multiple punishments for a single
transaction and thus subsection (27) merely “limit[s] how those multiple convictions are
to be handled with respect to calculating a defendant’s number of ‘prior convictions.’ ” 21
We agree with the Court of Appeals that MCL 257.625(25) and (27) do not
indicate a clear legislative intent with regard to the permissibility of multiple
punishments. While MCL 257.625(27) considers the possibility that a defendant could
be convicted of multiple offenses arising out of the same transaction, it is not clear
whether the Legislature contemplated these multiple offenses as arising solely under
Michigan law, the laws of another jurisdiction that “substantially correspond[] to a law of
this state,” or a combination thereof.
Despite the Court of Appeals’ proper analysis of these subsections, our review of
MCL 257.625 as a whole leads us to conclude that the Legislature did express a clear
intent with regard to multiple punishments arising under MCL 257.625(1) and (5). As
with any statutory interpretation, we must give effect to the Legislature’s intent by
focusing first on the statute’s plain language. 22 When statutory language is clear and
unambiguous, we assume that the Legislature intended its plain meaning and we enforce
the statute as written. 23 Here, MCL 257.625(1) and (5) are silent on the issue of multiple
21
Id.
22
Madugula v Taub, 496 Mich. 685, 696; 853 NW2d 75 (2014).
23
Id.
9
punishments and thus do not, when read in isolation, clearly evidence the Legislature’s
intent on whether multiple punishments are allowed.
However, we do not quarantine the text when interpreting statutes. Instead, we
must examine the statutory language as a whole to determine the Legislature’s intent. 24
In this respect, we find it significant that the Legislature specifically authorized multiple
punishments for some operating while intoxicated offenses in another subsection of the
statute. 25 MCL 257.625(7) creates a separate operating while intoxicated offense for
individuals who drive while intoxicated with a minor in the car (OWI-minor).26
Subsection (7)(d) provides in relevant part:
This subsection does not prohibit a person from being charged with,
convicted of, or punished for a violation of subsection (4) or (5) that is
committed by the person while violating this subsection. However, points
shall not be assessed under section 320a for both a violation of subsection
(4) or (5) and a violation of this subsection for conduct arising out of the
same transaction.[27]
Thus, under MCL 257.625(7)(d), the Legislature specifically authorized multiple
convictions and punishments for a person who commits OWI-minor and by that same
24
Id. at 698.
25
Although this argument was not made in the parties’ briefs filed in this Court or the
Court of Appeals, it was raised by defense counsel during oral arguments in this Court.
26
MCL 257.625(7) proscribes “operat[ing] a vehicle in violation of subsection (1), (3),
(4), (5), or (8) while another person who is less than 16 years of age is occupying the
vehicle.”
27
Emphasis added.
10
conduct also commits OWI-injury or causes “the death of another person” under
MCL 257.625(4) (OWI-death).
The specific authorization for multiple punishments contained in
MCL 257.625(7)(d) leads us to conclude that the Legislature did not intend to permit
multiple punishments for OWI and OWI-injury offenses arising from the same incident.
While subsection (7) expressly authorizes multiple punishments for certain operating
while intoxicated offenses, this authorization is limited to the circumstances described in
MCL 257.625(7)(d). And interpreting this subsection in the context of the statute as a
whole leads us to conclude that the Legislature intended to exclude all other multiple
punishments under MCL 257.625. 28 This implication is particularly probative of
legislative intent in this case because the express authorization of multiple punishments in
subsection (7)(d) involves one of the subsections under examination in this case,
MCL 257.625(5). The fact that the Legislature expressly authorized multiple
punishments for subsection (5) and a subsection other than subsection (1) demonstrates
that the Legislature did not intend to permit multiple punishments for violations of
subsections (1) and (5). 29 In other words, if the Legislature had intended to allow
28
Johnson v Recca, 492 Mich. 169, 177; 821 NW2d 520 (2012) (“ ‘We interpret th[e]
words in [the statute in] light of their ordinary meaning and their context within the
statute and read them harmoniously to give effect to the statute as a whole.’ ”), quoting
People v Peltola, 489 Mich. 174, 181; 803 NW2d 140 (2011).
29
See, e.g., Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich. 201, 210; 501 NW2d 76 (1993)
(“Courts cannot assume that the Legislature inadvertently omitted from one statute the
language that it placed in another statute, and then, on the basis of that assumption, apply
what is not there.”).
11
multiple punishments for subsections (1) and (5), it clearly knew how to do so, as
evidenced by the specific authorization in MCL 257.625(7)(d). 30 But neither
MCL 257.625(1) nor (5) contains similar language specifically authorizing the conviction
of and punishment for multiple offenses. Thus, in light of MCL 257.625(7)(d), the
omission of a similar clause providing explicit authority to convict a defendant of
multiple operating while intoxicated offenses arising out of the same incident in either
MCL 257.625(1) or (5) is a clear indication that the Legislature did not intend for
defendants to be convicted of and punished for OWI and OWI-injury arising out of the
same incident.
Further, to reach the opposite conclusion would violate our well-recognized rule
that we “must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause and avoid an interpretation
that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.” 31 That is, had the
Legislature generally intended to allow multiple punishments for every category of
operating while intoxicated offense arising from the same conduct, there would be no
need for the Legislature to specifically authorize multiple punishments for OWI-minor
and OWI-death or OWI-injury. To interpret MCL 257.625 as permitting multiple
punishments for other operating while intoxicated offenses would improperly render the
specific authorization under MCL 257.625(7)(d) surplusage.
30
See People v Houston, 473 Mich. 399, 410; 702 NW2d 530 (2005).
31
State Farm Fire & Cas Co v Old Republic Ins Co, 466 Mich. 142, 146; 644 NW2d 715
(2002).
12
Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the Legislature did not
“evince a clear expression of any intent to allow . . . multiple punishments for the same
offense.” 32 In light of the express statutory language permitting multiple punishments in
MCL 257.625(7)(d), the fact that MCL 257.625(1) and (5) do not contain any express
authorization for multiple punishments indicates that the Legislature did not intend to
permit a defendant to be convicted of both of these offenses for the same criminal
conduct. 33 Accordingly, we hold that the trial court violated the double jeopardy
prohibition by convicting defendant of both OWI under MCL 257.625(1) and OWI-injury
under MCL 257.625(5). 34
V. CONCLUSION
We conclude that defendant’s convictions of both OWI and OWI-injury for the
same intoxicated driving incident violates the multiple punishments prong of the double
32
Miller, unpub op at 4.
33
Because the Legislature evinced a clear intent with regard to the permissibility of
multiple punishments based on the plain language of the statute, the Court of Appeals did
not need to employ Ream’s abstract legal elements test. However, even assuming that
resort to Ream was necessary, the Court of Appeals did not apply Ream correctly because
it compared the elements of each offense as charged rather than focusing on the abstract
statutory elements of the two offenses, as required by Ream.
34
While plaintiff argues that there is no double jeopardy violation because defendant was
sentenced to concurrent, rather than consecutive, sentences and thus does not face
multiple sentences, we find this argument unpersuasive. A concurrent sentence does not
eliminate the potential collateral consequences of two convictions for the same offense.
See Ball v United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-865; 105 S. Ct. 1668; 84 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1985)
(including as examples of the collateral consequences of a second conviction as
potentially “delay[ing] the defendant’s eligibility for parole or result[ing] in an increased
sentence under a recidivist statute for a future offense”).
13
jeopardy clauses. Based on the plain language of MCL 257.625, the Legislature
expressed a clear intent not to allow conviction of and punishment for multiple offenses
arising from the same conduct, except where explicitly authorized by the statute.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals reached the right result when it vacated defendant’s OWI
conviction. 35 However, the Court of Appeals did so for the wrong reasons. Accordingly,
we affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision to vacate defendant’s OWI conviction under
MCL 257.625(1) on alternate grounds and remand to the trial court for resentencing.
David F. Viviano
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
Mary Beth Kelly
Brian K. Zahra
Bridget M. McCormack
Richard H. Bernstein
35
People v Herron, 464 Mich. 593, 609; 628 NW2d 528 (2001) (explaining that “it is an
appropriate remedy in a multiple punishment double jeopardy violation to affirm the
conviction of the higher charge and to vacate the lower conviction”).
14