Michelle Renee Fairley v. Department of Corrections

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices:
Syllabus Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman
Mary Beth Kelly
Brian K. Zahra
Bridget M. McCormack
David F. Viviano
Richard H. Bernstein
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions:
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Corbin R. Davis
FAIRLEY v DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
STONE v MICHIGAN STATE POLICE
Docket Nos. 149722 and 149940. Decided June 5, 2015.
In Docket No. 149722, Michelle R. Fairley brought an action in the Court of Claims
against the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) after an MDOC employee driving an
MDOC vehicle ran a red light and struck her car, seriously injuring her. Plaintiff’s counsel filed
and signed a notice of intent to file a claim against MDOC in the Court of Claims; however,
plaintiff herself did not sign the notice, as MCL 600.6431(1) requires. Defendant moved for
summary disposition on the ground that the notice was defective for that reason. The Court of
Claims, James S. Jamo, J., denied defendant’s motion, ruling that defendant had waived this
argument by failing to plead it as an affirmative defense. The Court of Appeals, CAVANAGH,
P.J., and OWENS and STEPHENS, JJ., affirmed in an unpublished opinion per curiam issued June
10, 2014 (Docket No. 315594). Defendant applied for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court.
In Docket No. 149940, Lori L. Stone brought an action in the Court of Claims against the
Michigan State Police (MSP) for injuries she sustained when her stopped vehicle was struck by
two MSP patrol cars. Plaintiff filed a notice of intent to file a claim against the MSP in the Court
of Claims; however, the notice did not indicate that it had been verified before an officer
authorized to administer oaths, as MCL 600.6431(1) requires. Defendant moved for summary
disposition on the ground that the notice was defective for that reason. The Court of Claims,
David S. Swartz, J., granted the motion, ruling that, although plaintiff’s counsel had later averred
that he was a notary public authorized to administer oaths, that fact was not apparent from the
notice. The Court of Appeals, CAVANAGH, P.J., and OWENS and STEPHENS, JJ., reversed in an
unpublished opinion per curiam issued July 8, 2014 (Docket No. 314848), holding that
MCL 600.6431(1) did not require evidence of the oath or affirmation to appear on the face of the
notice and that a failure to comply with the procedural prerequisites of MCL 600.6431(1) was an
affirmative defense that is waived if not timely raised. Defendant applied for leave to appeal in
the Supreme Court.
In a memorandum opinion signed by Chief Justice YOUNG and Justices MARKMAN,
KELLY, ZAHRA, MCCORMACK, VIVIANO, AND BERNSTEIN, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting
leave to appeal and without hearing oral argument, held:
A notice of intent to file a claim against a department of the state under MCL 600.6431
that lacks any indication that it was signed and verified before an officer authorized to administer
oaths is defective and provides a complete defense that may be raised at any time by a defendant
entitled to governmental immunity. While MCL 600.6431 does not confer governmental
immunity, it establishes conditions precedent for avoiding the governmental immunity conferred
by the governmental tort liability act, MCL 691.1401 et seq. As a result, plaintiffs were required
to adhere to the conditions precedent in MCL 600.6431(1) to successfully expose defendants to
liability. The notice in Fairley was not signed by the claimant, and the notice in Stone did not
indicate that it had been verified before an officer authorized to administer an oath. The affidavit
of Stone’s attorney indicating that he was a notary public did not cure this deficiency because it
was untimely. Therefore, plaintiffs’ claims should have been dismissed.
In Fairley, Docket No. 149722, Court of Appeals judgment reversed; case remanded to
the Court of Claims for entry of an order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant.
In Stone, Docket No. 149940, Court of Appeals judgment reversed; case remanded to the
Court of Claims for reentry of its original order granting summary disposition in favor of
defendant.
©2015 State of Michigan
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices:
OPINION Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman
Mary Beth Kelly
Brian K. Zahra
Bridget M. McCormack
David F. Viviano
Richard H. Bernstein
FILED June 5, 2015
STATE OF MICHIGAN
SUPREME COURT
MICHELLE RENEE FAIRLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 149722
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendant-Appellant.
LORI L. STONE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 149940
MICHIGAN STATE POLICE,
Defendant-Appellant.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
MEMORANDUM OPINION.
We consider in these consolidated cases whether a claimant’s failure to comply
with the notice verification requirements of MCL 600.6431 provides a complete defense
in an action against the state or one of its departments. We conclude that a notice lacking
any indication that it was signed and verified before an officer authorized to administer
oaths is defective and, contrary to the Court of Appeals’ conclusion, is a complete
defense that may be raised at any time by a defendant entitled to governmental immunity.
Accordingly, and in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals in both Stone v Michigan State Police and Fairley v Department of
Corrections and remand the cases to the Court of Claims for reinstatement of the order
granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition in the former and for entry of an
order granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition in the latter.
The purpose of MCL 600.6431 is to establish those conditions precedent to
pursuing a claim against the state. One of these conditions provides:
No claim may be maintained against the state unless the claimant,
within 1 year after such claim has accrued, files in the office of the clerk of
the court of claims either a written claim or a written notice of intention to
file a claim against the state or any of its departments, commissions,
boards, institutions, arms or agencies, stating the time when and the place
where such claim arose and in detail the nature of the same and of the items
of damage alleged or claimed to have been sustained, which claim or notice
shall be signed and verified by the claimant before an officer authorized to
administer oaths. [MCL 600.6432(1).]
Plainly, then, unless a claimant’s notice is “signed and verified by the claimant before an
officer authorized to administer oaths,” a claim cannot proceed against the state. In both
cases here, plaintiffs claim that nothing in the statute requires anyone other than the
claimant to sign the notice and successfully argued in the Court of Appeals that
defendants’ arguments for summary disposition regarding notice were waived because
the plaintiffs’ alleged noncompliance with the statutory notice requirements was an
2
affirmative defense that was not timely pleaded. Alternatively, defendants, both state
agencies entitled to governmental immunity unless an exception applies, contend that
complainants must “strictly” comply with the notice requirements in order to proceed.
We conclude that failing to indicate anywhere on or with the notice that the document
was verified before an officer authorized to administer oaths falls short of “strict”
compliance and, as a result, plaintiffs’ cases must be dismissed.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
A. FAIRLEY v DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS
On March 11, 2011, plaintiff Michelle Fairley was injured in an automobile
accident after a Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) vehicle, operated by an
MDOC employee, ran a red light and struck Fairley’s car. Plaintiff faced life-altering
injuries—to the brain, neck, and back—as well as associated pain, suffering, and
emotional harm. Plaintiff’s counsel subsequently filed a notice of injury and intent to
hold MDOC liable in the Court of Claims. The parties do not dispute the timeliness of the
notice 1 or the propriety of MDOC’s designation as the responsible governmental
agency. 2 The notice plainly stated the facts surrounding the accident, including the
location of the accident and the parties involved. While Fairley herself did not sign the
notice, her attorney’s signature and the date appeared below the following disclaimer:
1
MCL 600.6431(3) provides, in pertinent part, that “claimant shall file with the clerk of
the court of claims a notice of intention to file a claim or the claim itself within 6 months
following the happening of the event giving rise to the cause of action.”
2
MCL 600.6431(2) likewise provides, in part, that “[s]uch claim or notice shall designate
any department, commission, board, institution, arm or agency of the state involved in
connection with such claim . . . .”
3
This notice is intended to comply with all requirements of the law
and all applicable statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations. . . . If you
believe this notice does not comply in any way with the notice requirement
of the governing bodies of the State of Michigan and/or MDOC, or with an
statute, ordinance, rule or regulation, you should immediately notify by
written notice. Any additional information required by statute[,] ordinance,
rule, or regulation will be promptly furnished.
After Fairley filed her complaint with the court, defendant responded with more
than 20 affirmative defenses. Although none of these defenses argued that plaintiff’s
notice of intent to file a claim was defective, defendant MDOC filed a motion for
summary disposition arguing that plaintiff’s notice of intent to file a claim failed to meet
the standards set out in MCL 600.6431(1). The Court of Claims denied defendant’s
motion for summary disposition, citing Kielb v Wayne State University Board of
Governors, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 2,
2012 (Docket No. 305927) in which the Court held that a defendant waives an issue of
noncompliance with MCL 600.6431 if it is not pleaded as an affirmative defense. The
Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion per curiam. 3
B. STONE v MICHIGAN STATE POLICE
Lori Stone injured her neck when her stopped car was struck by two Michigan
State Police patrol cars on May 19, 2007. Following the accident, Stone underwent
surgery to fuse two of her neck vertebrae.
Stone subsequently filed a notice of intent to file a claim with the Court of Claims.
As was the case in Fairley, the parties do not dispute the timeliness of the notice or that,
3
Fairley v Mich Dep’t of Corrections, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued June 10, 2014 (Docket No. 315594).
4
at the time of filing, this notice plainly stated the facts surrounding the accident including
the location of the accident and the parties involved. The notice concluded with the
statement “I declare that the statements above are true to the best of my information,
knowledge, and belief.” The notice, undated, was signed by plaintiff and signed and
“respectfully submitted” by her attorney, John Kline. Nevertheless, more than two years
after responding to plaintiff’s complaint, defendant filed a motion for summary
disposition arguing that the notice supplied by plaintiff’s counsel failed to meet the
requirements of MCL 600.6431(1). Specifically, at the hearing on the motion, defendant
argued:
What these notices are about is governmental immunity. It’s exactly
about putting up . . . restraints on cases that can be brought against the
State. The Supreme Court can’t be more clear, if you don’t meet the
requirements you don’t abrogate governmental immunity. And the issue
isn’t what verify or verification means, it’s what verify before an officer
authorized to administer oaths means, and there’s just no evidence
anywhere in this notice, the notice itself, that it was verified before an
officer authorized to administer oaths.
The Court of Claims agreed with defendant and signed an order granting summary
disposition in its favor. In an unpublished opinion per curiam, the Court of Appeals
reversed, concluding that the Court of Claims had erred and that the “the statute [MCL
600.6431(1)] does not . . . require that evidence of the oath or affirmation be on the face
of the notice.” 4 The panel further stated that a failure to comply with “purely procedural
4
Stone v Dep’t of State Police, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals,
issued July 8, 2014 (Docket No. 314848) p 7.
5
pre-requisites,” such as those enumerated in MCL 600.6431, was an affirmative defense
that must be timely raised or is waived. 5 The case is now before this Court on appeal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo a lower court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for
summary disposition. 6 Further, the meaning of the final provision in MCL 600.6431(1)—
requiring the notice to be “signed and verified by the claimant before an officer
authorized to administer oaths”—is a question of statutory interpretation, which we
likewise review de novo. 7 The primary goal when interpreting a statute is to discern the
intent of the Legislature by focusing on the most “reliable evidence” of that intent, the
language of the statute itself. 8 When legislative intent is clear from the language, no
further construction is required or permitted. 9
III. ANALYSIS
The issue in these cases is whether plaintiffs’ notices were “signed and verified by
the claimant before an officer authorized to administer oaths” and if not, whether an
5
Id. at 7, quoting Tyra v Organ Procurement Agency of Mich, 302 Mich App 208, 212-
213; 840 NW2d 730 (2013).
6
McCahan v Brennan, 492 Mich 730, 735; 822 NW2d 747 (2012).
7
Spectrum Health Hosp v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Mich, 492 Mich 503, 515; 821
NW2d 117 (2012).
8
Id.9
Id. at 534, citing Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119
(1999).
6
ineffective notice in a case involving governmental immunity must nonetheless be
pleaded as an affirmative defense or be waived.
Under the government tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq.,
governmental agencies are broadly shielded from tort liability. Here, the defendants are
two such agencies: the Department of Corrections and the Michigan State Police.
However, the accidents involving plaintiffs Fairley and Stone are alleged to fall within
the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity. 10 In accordance with MCL
691.1410(1), a claim satisfying an exception to governmental immunity against a state
agency must be “brought in the manner provided in [the Revised Judicature Act],”
including MCL 600.6431. That is, while MCL 600.6431 does not “confer governmental
immunity,” it establishes conditions precedent for avoiding the governmental immunity
conferred by the GTLA, which expressly incorporates MCL 600.6431. 11 As a result,
plaintiffs must adhere to the conditions precedent in MCL 600.6431(1) to successfully
expose the defendant state agencies to liability.
It is well established that governmental immunity is not an affirmative defense,
but is instead a characteristic of government. Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 198; 649
NW2d 47 (2002). “[I]t is the responsibility of the party seeking to impose liability on a
10
MCL 691.1405.
11
This is contrary to the Court of Appeals’ observation in Fairley that “the text of the
statute makes no mention of governmental immunity” and “rather than precluding the
filing of suit against the state . . . establishes procedures for doing so.” Fairley, unpub
op, at 2.
7
governmental agency to demonstrate that its case falls within one of the exceptions [to
governmental immunity].” Id. at 201. Furthermore, as we explained in McCahan:
[W]hen the Legislature specifically qualifies the ability to bring a claim
against the state or its subdivisions on a plaintiff’s meeting certain notice
requirements that the plaintiff fails to meet, no saving construction—such
as requiring a defendant to prove actual prejudice—is allowed.[12]
In MCL 600.6431(1), the Legislature has qualified a claimant’s ability to bring a
claim against the state by requiring that “the claim or notice shall be signed and verified
by the claimant before an officer authorized to administer oaths.” While the Court of
Appeals observed that “[t]he statute does not prescribe the kind of inquiry that must be
made nor does any language in the statute require that evidence of the oath or affirmance
be on the face of the notice,” 13 this Court’s decision in McCahan v Brennan provided
insight into the purpose to be served by the notice provision:
[T]he Legislature has established a clear procedure that eliminates any
ambiguity about whether an attempted notice is effective. A claimant who
complies with MCL 600.6431 need not worry about whether a notice was
properly received and processed by the correct governmental entity. By the
same token, state entities can be secure knowing that only timely, verified
claims in notices filed with the Court of Claims can give rise to potential
liability . . . .[14]
12
McCahan, 492 Mich at 746; relied on in Zelek v Michigan, unpublished opinion per
curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 16, 2012 (Docket No. 305191).
13
Stone v Mich State Police, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals,
issued July 8, 2014 (Docket No. 314848), p 7.
14
McCahan, 492 Mich at 744 n 24; see Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich
197, 212; 731 NW 2d (2007) (stating that “additional reasons . . . for requiring notice [in
cases involving governmental immunity] . . . include[] . . . creating [monetary]
reserves . . . reducing the uncertainty of the extent of future demands, or even to force a
claimant to an early choice regarding how to proceed”).
8
If a notice, such as those here, fails to show that it was signed and verified before an
officer authorized to administer oaths, how would a governmental entity be assured that
the notice, which seeks to impose liability, was actually verified? It is for this very reason
that MCL 600.6431 requires more than the mere act of verification and instead requires
some proof of that verification—that, as defendant states, “the notice bear an indication
that the signature was signed and sworn to before an officer authorized to administer
oaths.” 15
A. APPLICATION TO FAIRLEY
We are satisfied that there is no material factual dispute regarding the notice
submitted by plaintiff Fairley, as it is undisputed that she failed to sign the notice of
intent. Accordingly, plaintiff did not submit a notice “signed by the claimant” as required
by the plain language of the statute. Further, because the MDOC is a state agency entitled
to governmental immunity, we conclude that defective notice need not be pleaded as an
affirmative defense because defendants are presumed to be entitled to governmental
immunity, and the burden is on plaintiff to prove that one of the exceptions to
governmental immunity is applicable.
For these reasons, we conclude that plaintiff Fairley’s notice was insufficient to
maintain a claim against MDOC and, as a result, Fairley’s claim should be dismissed.
15
Moreover, as this Court stated in Rowland, common sense counsels in favor of this
outcome, given that “the Legislature is not even required to provide [any] exception to
governmental immunity, it surely has the authority to allow such suits only upon
compliance with rational limits.” Id. at 212.
9
Accordingly, the Court of Claims improperly denied defendant’s motion for summary
disposition.
B. APPLICATION TO STONE
We also reject plaintiff Stone’s notice for the similar reason that it was not clear
from the face of the document that it was verified “before an officer authorized to
administer oaths.” We are unpersuaded that the belated affidavit of plaintiff’s counsel
asserting his dual role as attorney and notary public can cure this deficiency. Plaintiff
Stone’s notice was either unverified but timely or untimely but verified, and in either
circumstance it fails to meet the conditions precedent to maintaining a suit against the
Michigan State Police. 16
For these reasons, we likewise conclude that Stone’s claim should be dismissed.
Accordingly, the Court of Claims properly granted defendant summary disposition and
the Court of Appeals erred by reversing that order.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Fairley, we hold that the lower courts erred by concluding that defendant was
not entitled to summary disposition based on the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the
notice requirements of MCL 600.6431(1). In Stone, we hold that the Court of Appeals
erred by reversing the Court of Claims’ ruling granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition on that same basis. Accordingly, we reverse both judgments of the Court of
Appeals. Because the notices supplied by each plaintiff failed to meet the requirements of
16
MCL 600.6431(1) and (3).
10
MCL 600.6431(1), plaintiffs failed to defeat the protection of governmental immunity to
which MDOC and the Michigan State Police are entitled. 17
In lieu of granting defendants’ application for leave to appeal, we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in Fairley and remand that case to the Court of Claims
for entry of an order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant. We also
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Stone and remand that case to the Court
of Claims for reentry of its original order granting summary disposition in favor of
defendant.
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
Mary Beth Kelly
Brian K. Zahra
Bridget M. McCormack
David F. Viviano
Richard H. Bernstein
17
Again, Fairley and Stone present questions of the adequacy of notice in a governmental
immunity case. Thus, and contrary to both Court of Appeals opinions, the outcome of
these cases is entirely separate from the analysis on statutory notice provisions in medical
malpractice actions found in Tyra v Organ Procurement Agency of Mich, 302 Mich App
208 (2013), oral argument on application granted 497 Mich 910 (2014); compare Costa v
Community Emergency Med Servs, Inc, 475 Mich 403; 716 NW2d 236 (2006) (involving
a medical malpractice claim against defendants entitled to governmental immunity).
11