McCORMICK v. CARRIER

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices:
Opinion Marilyn Kelly Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
Diane M. Hathaway
FILED JULY 31, 2010
STATE OF MICHIGAN
SUPREME COURT
RODNEY MCCORMICK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 136738
LARRY CARRIER,
Defendant,
and
ALLIED AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, INC.,
indemnitor of GENERAL MOTORS
CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
CAVANAGH, J.
The issue in this case is the proper interpretation of the “serious impairment of
body function” threshold for non-economic tort liability under MCL 500.3135. We hold
that Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich 109; 683 NW2d 611 (2004), was wrongly decided
because it departed from the plain language of MCL 500.3135, and is therefore overruled.
We further hold that, in this case, as a matter of law, plaintiff suffered a serious
impairment of a body function. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case to the trial
court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
This case arises out of an injury that plaintiff, Rodney McCormick, suffered while
working as a medium truck loader at a General Motors Corporation (GM) plant.1
Plaintiff’s job mainly consisted of assisting in the loading of trucks, which required
climbing up and around trucks and trailers, standing, walking, and heavy lifting. He
generally worked nine- to ten-hour shifts, six days a week.
On January 17, 2005, a coworker backed a truck into plaintiff, knocking him over,
and then drove over plaintiff’s left ankle. Plaintiff was immediately taken to the hospital,
and x-rays showed a fracture of his left medial malleolus.2 Plaintiff was released from
the hospital that day, and two days later metal hardware was surgically inserted into his
ankle to stabilize plaintiff’s bone fragments. Plaintiff was restricted from weight-bearing
activities for one month after the surgery and then underwent multiple months of physical
therapy. The metal hardware was removed in a second surgery on October 21, 2005.
1
The only defendant remaining at this point in the case is GM’s indemnitor,
Allied Automotive Group, Inc, because the parties have stipulated the release of the other
original defendants. For simplicity’s sake, the opinion will use “defendant” to refer to
this entity.
2
The medial malleolus is the bony prominence that protrudes from the medial side
of the ankle. Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (26th ed).
2
At defendant’s request, plaintiff underwent a medical evaluation with Dr. Paul
Drouillard in November 2005. He indicated that plaintiff could return to work but was
restricted from prolonged standing or walking. On January 12, 2006, the specialist who
performed plaintiff’s surgeries cleared him to return to work without restrictions. The
specialist’s report noted that plaintiff had an “excellent range of motion,” and an x-ray
showed “solid healing with on [sic] degenerative joint disease of his ankle.”
Beginning on January 16, 2006, plaintiff returned to work as a medium truck
loader for several days, but he had difficulty walking, climbing, and crouching because of
continuing ankle pain. He requested that his job duties be restricted to driving, but
defendant directed him to cease work.
Defendant required plaintiff to undergo a functional capacity evaluation (FCE) in
March 2006. The FCE determined that plaintiff was unable to perform the range of tasks
his job required, including stooping, crouching, climbing, sustained standing, and heavy
lifting. This was due to ankle and shoulder pain,3 a moderate limp, and difficulty bearing
weight on his left ankle. The report stated that plaintiff’s range of motion in his left ankle
was not within normal limits and that difficulty climbing and lifting weights had been
reported and observed.
In May 2006, Dr. Drouillard examined plaintiff again and reported that plaintiff
could return to work. Dr. Drouillard’s report stated that plaintiff complained of ankle and
3
Plaintiff had a pre-existing back and shoulder injury that is unrelated to the
incident in this case.
3
foot pain, but the doctor found “no objective abnormality to correspond with his
subjective complaints.” In June 2006, plaintiff also underwent a magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) test, which showed some postoperative scar and degenerative tissue
formation around his left ankle. At plaintiff’s request, another FCE was performed on
August 1, 2006, which affirmed that plaintiff could return to work without restriction and
was capable of performing the tasks required for his job. The report stated that plaintiff
complained of “occasional aching” and tightness in his ankle, but it did not appear to be
aggravated by activities such as prolonged standing or walking. It also noted that
plaintiff’s range of motion in his left ankle was still not within normal limits, although it
had improved since the March 2006 FCE.
Plaintiff returned to work on August 16, 2006, 19 months after he suffered his
injury. He volunteered to be assigned to a different job, and his pay was not reduced. He
has been able to perform his new job since that time.
On March 24, 2006, plaintiff filed suit, seeking recovery for his injuries under
MCL 500.3135. In his October 2006 deposition, plaintiff testified that at the time of the
incident, he was a 49-year-old man and his normal life before the incident mostly
consisted of working 60 hours a week as a medium-duty truck loader. He stated that he
also was a “weekend golfer” and frequently fished in the spring and summer from a boat
that he owns. He testified that he was fishing at pre-incident levels by the spring and
4
summer of 2006, but he has only golfed once since he returned to work.4 He stated that
he can drive and take care of his personal needs without assistance and that his
relationship with his wife has not been affected. He stated that he has not sought medical
treatment for his ankle since January 2006, when he was approved to return to work
without restriction. He further testified that his life is “painful, but normal,” although it is
“limited,” and he continues to experience ankle pain.
The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the basis
that plaintiff had recovered relatively well and could not meet the serious impairment
threshold provided in MCL 500.3135(1). The Court of Appeals affirmed, with one judge
dissenting. McCormick v Carrier, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued March 25, 2008 (Docket No. 275888). The majority held that, under
Kreiner, plaintiff’s impairment did not affect his ability to lead his normal life because he
is able to care for himself, fish and golf, and work at the same rate of pay. The dissent
disagreed, arguing that two doctors had determined that the impairment would cause
4
There are no facts in the record regarding the extent to which plaintiff fished
between January 2005 and January 2006 or the extent to which he was able to golf in the
period between the incident and when he returned to work, despite the arguments to the
contrary by both parties and the dissent. Defendant has alleged that plaintiff was able to
fish while he was not working, but the only factual support it cites is plaintiff’s statement
that he fished in the six or seven months after January 2006, which was when he was
initially cleared to return to work, and when he actually returned to work. Although
plaintiff’s counsel agreed in the arguments before the trial court that plaintiff had been
fishing, it was unclear as to what time period he was referring. In plaintiff’s brief to this
Court, he alleges that by the time of his deposition, he had “returned” to fishing with the
same frequency as before the accident, which suggests that plaintiff might be arguing that
his fishing activities were interrupted.
5
problems over plaintiff’s entire life and his employer had determined that he could not
perform his work duties, the main part of his “normal” life.
After initially denying leave to appeal, this Court granted plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration, vacated its prior order, and granted the application for leave to appeal.
McCormick v Carrier, 485 Mich 851 (2009).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews a motion for summary disposition de novo. In re Smith Trust,
480 Mich 19, 23-24; 745 NW2d 754 (2008). The proper interpretation of a statute is a
legal question that this Court also reviews de novo. Herman v Berrien Co, 481 Mich
352, 358; 750 NW2d 570 (2008).
III. ANALYSIS
The issue presented in this case is the proper interpretation of MCL 500.3135. We
hold that Kreiner incorrectly interpreted MCL 500.3135 and is overruled because it is
inconsistent with the statute’s plain language and this opinion. Further, under the proper
interpretation of the statute, plaintiff has demonstrated that, as a matter of law, he
suffered a serious impairment of body function.
A. OVERVIEW OF MCL 500.3135
In 1973, the Michigan Legislature adopted the no-fault insurance act, MCL
500.3101 et seq. The act created a compulsory motor vehicle insurance program under
which insureds may recover directly from their insurers, without regard to fault, for
qualifying economic losses arising from motor vehicle incidents. See MCL 500.3101 and
500.3105. In exchange for ensuring certain and prompt recovery for economic loss, the
6
act also limited tort liability. MCL 500.3135. See also DiFranco v Pickard, 427 Mich
32, 40-41; 398 NW2d 896 (1986). The act was designed to remedy problems with the
traditional tort system as it relates to automobile accidents. These included that “[the
contributory negligence liability scheme] denied benefits to a high percentage of motor
vehicle accident victims, minor injuries were overcompensated, serious injuries were
undercompensated, long payment delays were commonplace, the court system was
overburdened, and those with low income and little education suffered discrimination.”
Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 579; 267 NW2d 72 (1978).
Under the act, tort liability for non-economic loss arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, or use of a qualifying motor vehicle is limited to a list of enumerated
circumstances. MCL 500.3135(3). The act creates threshold requirements in MCL
500.3135(1), which has remained unchanged in all key aspects since the act was adopted.
That subsection currently provides that “[a] person remains subject to tort liability for
noneconomic loss caused by his or her ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle
only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or
permanent serious disfigurement.”
The threshold requirement at issue in this case is whether plaintiff has suffered
“serious impairment of body function.” The act did not originally define this phrase.
Accordingly, it initially fell to this Court to do so, and the result was a series of differing
opinions. In Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich 483; 330 NW2d 22 (1982), this Court held
that whether the serious impairment threshold is met is a question of law for the court to
decide where there is no material disputed fact. Id. at 502. It further held that in order to
7
meet the threshold, the plaintiff must show an objectively manifested injury and an
impairment of an important body function, which it defined as “an objective standard that
looks to the effect of an injury on the person’s general ability to live a normal life.” Id. at
505. This Court later in part modified and in part affirmed Cassidy in DiFranco, supra.The DiFranco Court agreed that a plaintiff had to suffer an objectively manifested injury,
but it rejected the Cassidy Court’s determination that the impairment needed to be
“important” and its definition of “important.” DiFranco, 427 Mich at 61-67, 70-75. The
DiFranco Court further held that whether the threshold is met is a question of law for the
court only if there are no material disputed facts and the facts could not support
conflicting inferences. Id. at 53-54.
In 1995, however, the Legislature intervened. It amended MCL 500.3135 to
define a “serious impairment of body function” as “an objectively manifested impairment
of an important body function that affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her
normal life.” MCL 500.3135(7). The Legislature also expressly provided that whether a
serious impairment of body function has occurred is a “question[] of law” for the court to
decide unless there is a factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of injury and the
dispute is relevant to deciding whether the standard is met. MCL 500.3135(2)(a). Thus,
the Legislature incorporated some language from DiFranco and Cassidy but also made
some significant changes.5
5
Some courts have broadly stated that the Legislature rejected DiFranco in favor
of Cassidy, see Kreiner, 471 Mich at 121 n 8, but that is an oversimplification. Some of
the language adopted by the Legislature was used consistently in both DiFranco and
8
This Court interpreted the amended provisions in 2004, in Kreiner. The question
before this Court is whether the Kreiner majority properly interpreted the statute, and, if
not, whether its interpretation should be overruled.
B. INTERPRETATION OF MCL 500.3135
The primary goal of statutory construction is to give effect to the Legislature’s
intent. Briggs Tax Serv, LLC v Detroit Pub Sch, 485 Mich 69, 76; 780 NW2d 753
(2010). This Court begins by reviewing the language of the statute, and, if the language
is clear and unambiguous, it is presumed that the Legislature intended the meaning
expressed in the statute. Id. Judicial construction of an unambiguous statute is neither
required nor permitted.6 In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d
164 (1999). When reviewing a statute, all non-technical “words and phrases shall be
construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the
language,” MCL 8.3a, and, if a term is not defined in the statute, a court may consult a
dictionary to aid it in this goal. Oakland Co Bd of Co Rd Comm’rs v Mich Prop & Cas
Cassidy, and the Legislature clearly rejected some elements of Cassidy. The similarities
and differences between DiFranco and Cassidy and the amendments to MCL 500.3135
will be discussed below to the extent that they are significant. Although the dissent
disagrees in the abstract with my statement that it is an oversimplification to state that the
Legislature merely rejected DiFranco in favor of Cassidy, I can only conclude that it is
unable to support this accusation with any specific, substantive arguments, given that it
fails to expressly address or reject my more nuanced analysis of each of the specific
phrases that the Legislature adopted or rejected from Cassidy and DiFranco.
6
This Court’s members disagree on when a statute is ambiguous. See Petersen v
Magna Corp, 484 Mich 300, 310-313 (opinion by KELLY, C.J.), 339-342 (opinion by
HATHAWAY, J.); 773 NW2d 564 (2009). We need not address that issue here because
MCL 500.3135 is unambiguous under any of the views.
9
Guaranty Ass’n, 456 Mich 590, 604; 575 NW2d 751 (1998). A court should consider the
plain meaning of a statute’s words and their “‘placement and purpose in the statutory
scheme.’” Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 237; 596 NW2d 119 (1999)
(citation omitted). “Where the language used has been subject to judicial interpretation,
the legislature is presumed to have used particular words in the sense in which they have
been interpreted.” People v Powell, 280 Mich 699, 703; 274 NW 372 (1937). See also
People v Wright, 432 Mich 84, 92; 437 NW2d 603 (1989).
1. A QUESTION OF LAW OR FACT UNDER MCL 500.3135(2)
The first step in interpreting MCL 500.3135 is to determine the proper role of a
court in applying MCL 500.3135(1) and (7). The Legislature addressed this issue in the
amended MCL 500.3135(2)(a), which states in relevant part:
The issues of whether an injured person has suffered serious impairment
of body function or permanent serious disfigurement are questions of law
for the court if the court finds either of the following:
(i) There is no factual dispute concerning the nature and extent of
the person’s injuries.
(ii) There is a factual dispute concerning the nature and extent of
the person’s injuries, but the dispute is not material to the
determination as to whether the person has suffered a serious
impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement.
Under the plain language of the statute, the threshold question whether the person
has suffered a serious impairment of body function should be determined by the court as
a matter of law as long as there is no factual dispute regarding “the nature and extent of
the person’s injuries” that is material to determining whether the threshold standards are
10
met.7 If there is a material factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of the person’s
injuries, the court should not decide the issue as a matter of law.8 Notably, the disputed
7
Notably, MCL 500.3135(2)(a) could unconstitutionally conflict with MCR
2.116(C)(10) in those cases wherein a court is required to (1) resolve material, disputed
facts with regard to issues other than the nature and extent of the injury, such as the
extent to which the injury actually impairs a body function or the injured party relied on
that function as part of his or her pre-accident life, or (2) decide whether the threshold is
met even though reasonable people could draw different conclusions from the facts. See
Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 161-162; 516 NW2d 475 (1994), and Henderson
v State Farm Fire & Cas Co, 460 Mich 348, 357; 596 NW2d 190 (1999).
Given that the allocation of decision-making authority between a judge and a jury
is “a quintessentially procedural determination,” Shropshire v Laidlaw Transit, Inc, 550
F3d 570, 573 (CA 6, 2008), this potential conflict raises questions as to whether the
Legislature may have unconstitutionally invaded this Court’s exclusive authority to
promulgate the court rules of practice and procedure to the extent that MCL
500.3135(2)(a) is merely procedural. See Perin v Peuler (On Rehearing), 373 Mich 531,
541; 130 NW2d 4 (1964). We do not reach this issue today because we conclude that
there are no material factual disputes affecting the serious impairment threshold
determination in this case. Notably, however, the division of questions of law and fact
between a judge and a jury is based on longstanding procedural rules, see Mawich v
Elsey, 47 Mich 10, 15-16; 10 NW 57 (1881), that are intended to promote judicial
efficiency. See Moll v Abbott Laboratories, 444 Mich 1, 26-28; 506 NW2d 816 (1993).
Whether MCL 500.3135(2)(a) serves a purpose other than judicial dispatch is not clear,
as the Legislature itself stated that the 1995 amendments were intended, in part, “to
prescribe certain procedures for maintaining [tort liability arising out of certain
accidents].” See the title of 1995 PA 222. And, of course, the scope of the rules
governing summary disposition are also supported—if not compelled—by the right to a
jury trial in civil cases. See, generally, Conservation Dep’t v Brown, 335 Mich 343, 346-
347; 55 NW2d 859 (1952), and Dunn v Dunn, 11 Mich 284, 286 (1863). Accord Byrd v
Blue Ridge Rural Electric Coop, Inc, 356 US 525, 537-538; 78 S Ct 893; 2 L Ed 2d 953(1958). Interestingly, the dissent states that it disagrees with the majority that there could
be a conflict between the statute and the court rule, but it also approvingly quotes
DiFranco for the proposition that reasonable minds can often differ over the threshold
issues in these cases.
8
This plain reading of the statute is not necessarily inconsistent with the Kreiner
majority’s interpretation of MCL 500.3135(2)(a), see Kreiner, 471 Mich at 131-132, but
neither the majority nor dissent in Kreiner discussed the constitutionality of this
11
fact does not need to be outcome determinative in order to be material, but it should be
“significant or essential to the issue or matter at hand.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed)
(defining “material fact”).
2. A “SERIOUS IMPAIRMENT OF BODY FUNCTION”
UNDER MCL 500.3135(1) AND (7)
In those cases where the court may decide whether the serious impairment
threshold is met as a matter of law, the next issue is the proper interpretation of MCL
500.3135(7). It provides that, for purposes of the section, a “serious impairment of body
function” is “an objectively manifested impairment of an important body function that
affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life.” On its face, the
statutory language provides three prongs that are necessary to establish a “serious
impairment of body function”: (1) an objectively manifested impairment (2) of an
important body function that (3) affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her
normal life.9
Overall, because we conclude that each of these prongs’ meaning is clear from the
plain and unambiguous statutory language, judicial construction is neither required nor
provision. As noted in footnote 7 of this opinion, however, the manner in which Kreiner
interpreted the statute may be unconstitutional to the extent that it requires a court to
usurp the role of the fact-finder. That issue is not presented on the facts of this case,
however.
9
The Kreiner majority first addressed whether the impaired body function was
important and then analyzed whether the impairment was objectively manifested. 471
Mich at 132-133. We find it more consistent with the statutory text to first address the
objectively manifested impairment requirement.
12
permitted. In re MCI, 460 Mich at 411. Notably, however, a dictionary may aid the
Court in giving the words and phrases in MCL 500.3135(7) their common meaning, and
where the language used in MCL 500.3135(7) was originally adopted and interpreted in
Cassidy and DiFranco, it may be presumed that the Legislature intended the previous
judicial interpretation to be relevant. Oakland Co Bd of Rd Comm’rs, 456 Mich at 604,
and Wright, 432 Mich at 92. As will be discussed within, where the Kreiner majority’s
interpretation of these prongs is inconsistent with the clear language of the statute, we
hold that Kreiner was wrongly decided. Most significantly, its interpretation of the third
prong deviates dramatically from the statute’s text.
a. AN OBJECTIVELY MANIFESTED IMPAIRMENT
Under the first prong, it must be established that the injured person has suffered an
objectively manifested impairment of body function. The common meaning of “an
objectively manifested impairment” is apparent from the unambiguous statutory
language, with aid from a dictionary, and is consistent with the judicial interpretation of
“objectively manifested” in Cassidy and DiFranco. To the extent that the Kreiner
majority’s interpretation of this prong differs from this approach, it was wrongly decided.
To begin with, the adverb “objectively” is defined as “in an objective manner,”
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1966), and the adjective “objective” is
defined as “1. Of or having to do with a material object as distinguished from a mental
concept. 2. Having actual existence or reality. 3. a. Uninfluenced by emotion, surmise, or
personal prejudice. b. Based on observable phenomena; presented factually . . . .” The
American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition (1982). It is defined specifically
13
in the medical context as “[i]ndicating a symptom or condition perceived as a sign of
disease by someone other than the person afflicted.” Id.10 The verb “manifest” is defined
as “1. To show or demonstrate plainly; reveal. 2. To be evidence of; prove.” Id. Overall,
these definitions suggest that the common meaning of “objectively manifested” in MCL
500.3135(7) is an impairment that is evidenced by actual symptoms or conditions that
someone other than the injured person would observe or perceive as impairing a body
function. In other words, an “objectively manifested” impairment is commonly
understood as one observable or perceivable from actual symptoms or conditions.
Notably, MCL 500.3135(7) does not contain the word “injury,” and, under the
plain language of the statute, the proper inquiry is whether the impairment is objectively
manifested, not the injury or its symptoms.11 This distinction is important because
“injury” and “impairment” have different meanings. An “injury” is “1. Damage of or to a
person . . . 2. A wound or other specific damage.” The American Heritage Dictionary,
10
See also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1966), defining
“objective,” in relevant part, as “publicly or intersubjectively observable or verifiable
especially by scientific methods: independent of what is personal or private in our
apprehension and feelings: of such nature that rational minds agree in holding it real or
true or valid.” It also defines “objective” in the context “of a symptom of disease” as
“perceptible to persons other than an affected individual.” Id. (italics omitted).
11
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals decisions that have gone beyond the plain
language of the statute and imposed an extra-textual “objectively manifested injury”
requirement, in clear contravention of Legislative intent, are overruled to the extent that
they are inconsistent with this opinion. See, e.g., Netter v Bowman, 272 Mich App 289,
305; 725 NW2d 353 (2006) (holding that “the current meaning of ‘objectively
manifested’ . . . requires that a plaintiff’s injury must be capable of objective
verification”.
14
Second College Edition (1982). “Impairment” is the “state of being impaired,” Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary (1966), and to be “impaired” means being
“weakened, diminished, or damaged” or “functioning poorly or inadequately.” Random
House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary (1998). These definitions show that while an
injury is the actual damage or wound, an impairment generally relates to the effect of that
damage. Accordingly, when considering an “impairment,” the focus “is not on the
injuries themselves, but how the injuries affected a particular body function.” DiFranco,
427 Mich at 67.
Further, the pre-existing judicial interpretation of “objectively manifested” is
consistent with the plain language of the later-adopted statute. In Cassidy, this Court
explained that the serious impairment threshold was not met by pain and suffering alone,
but also required “injuries that affect the functioning of the body,” i.e., “objectively
manifested injuries.” Cassidy, 415 Mich at 505. In other words, Cassidy defined
“objectively manifested” to mean affecting the functioning of the body.12 DiFranco
affirmed this and further explained that the “objectively manifested” requirement
signifies that plaintiffs must “introduce evidence establishing that there is a physical basis
for their subjective complaints of pain and suffering” and that showing an impairment
generally requires medical testimony. DiFranco, 427 Mich at 74.
12
Although the Legislature plainly rejected that it is the injury that should be
objectively manifested, as opposed to the impairment, the previous judicial construction
of “objectively manifested” is still relevant.
15
The Kreiner majority’s interpretation of this language was only partially consistent
with the plain language of the statute. It addressed this issue briefly, stating that
“[s]ubjective complaints that are not medically documented are insufficient [to establish
that an impairment is objectively manifested].” Kreiner, 471 Mich at 132. To the extent
that this is inconsistent with DiFranco’s statement that medical testimony will generally
be required to establish an impairment, it is at odds with the legislative intent expressed
by the adoption of the “objectively manifested” language from DiFranco and Cassidy.
Thus, to the extent that Kreiner could be read to always require medical documentation, it
goes beyond the legislative intent expressed in the plain statutory text, and was wrongly
decided.
b. OF AN IMPORTANT BODY FUNCTION
If there is an objectively manifested impairment of body function, the next
question is whether the impaired body function is “important.” The common meaning of
this phrase is expressed in the unambiguous statutory language, although reference to a
dictionary and limited reference to Cassidy is helpful.
The relevant definition of the adjective “important” is “[m]arked by or having
great value, significance, or consequence.” The American Heritage Dictionary, Second
College Edition (1982). See also Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary
(1998), defining “important” in relevant part as “of much or great significance or
consequence,” “mattering much,” or “prominent or large.” Whether a body function has
great “value,” “significance,” or “consequence” will vary depending on the person.
Therefore, this prong is an inherently subjective inquiry that must be decided on a case-
16
by-case basis, because what may seem to be a trivial body function for most people may
be subjectively important to some, depending on the relationship of that function to the
person’s life.
The “important body function” language was originally adopted in Cassidy, where
the Court stated that an “important” body function is not any body function but also does
not refer to the entire body function. Cassidy, 415 Mich at 504. This pre-existing
judicial construction of “important body function” is consistent with the common
meaning of “important.”13
For this prong, the Kreiner majority’s interpretation appears to be consistent with
the plain language of the statute, as it only briefly stated that “[i]t is insufficient if the
impairment is of an unimportant body function.” Kreiner, 471 Mich at 132.14 If,
however, the Kreiner majority’s position has been construed in a manner that is
inconsistent with this opinion, then we disapprove of those constructions.
13
Cassidy also held that the importance of a body function is an objective
standard based on its effect on “the person’s general ability to live a normal life.”
Cassidy, 415 Mich at 505 (emphasis added). As discussed below, however, the
Legislature specifically rejected the idea that the normal life evaluation should be
objective, and, thus, implicitly rejected Cassidy’s determination that whether a body
function is “important” could be objectively determined outside the context of the
person’s actual life. Notably, DiFranco is inapposite because it rejected the “important
body function” test. DiFranco, 427 Mich at 61-62.
14
The Kreiner majority also apparently agreed that this is a subjective, case-by-
case inquiry. Kreiner, 471 Mich at 134 n 19.
17
c. THAT AFFECTS THE PERSON’S GENERAL ABILITY
TO LEAD HIS OR HER NORMAL LIFE
Finally, if the injured person has suffered an objectively manifested impairment of
body function, and that body function is important to that person, then the court must
determine whether the impairment “affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her
normal life.” The common meaning of this phrase is expressed by the unambiguous
statutory language, and its interpretation is aided by reference to a dictionary, reading the
phrase within its statutory context, and limited reference to Cassidy.
To begin with, the verb “affect” is defined as “[t]o have an influence on; bring
about a change in.” The American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition (1982).
An “ability” is “[t]he quality of being able to do something,” id., and “able” is defined as
“having sufficient power, skill, or resources to accomplish an object.” Merriam-Webster
Online Dictionary, (accessed May 27, 2010). The
adjective “general” means:
1. Relating to, concerned with, or applicable to the whole or every
member of a class or category. 2. Affecting or characteristic of the majority
of those involved; prevalent: a general discontent. 3. Being usually the
case; true or applicable in most instances but not all. 4. a. Not limited in
scope, area, or application: as a general rule. b. Not limited to one class of
things: general studies. 5. Involving only the main features of something
rather than details or particulars. 6. Highest or superior in rank.” [The
American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition (1982).]
The sixth definition is obviously irrelevant, and the first definition of “general” does not
make sense in this context because a person’s “whole” ability to live his or her normal
life is surely not affected short of complete physical and mental incapacitation, which is
accounted for in a different statutory threshold: death. The other definitions, however,
18
more or less convey the same meaning: that “general” does not refer to only one specific
detail or particular part of a thing, but, at least some parts of it. Thus, these definitions
illustrate that to “affect” the person’s “general ability” to lead his or her normal life is to
influence some of the person’s power or skill, i.e., the person’s capacity, to lead a normal
life.
The next question is the meaning of “to lead his or her normal life.” The verb
“lead,” in this context, is best defined as “[t]o pass or go through; live.” The American
Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition (1982). Although the verb “lead” has many
definitions, some of which have similar nuances, this definition is the most relevant
because it expressly applies in the context of leading a certain type of life. Indeed, other
dictionaries provide a similar definition with the same context, using a “type of life” as an
example.15 Similarly, “life” has multiple meanings, but one specifically references the
context of leading a particular type of life, which is “[a] manner of living: led a good
life.” Id. Other definitions are similar, such as “[t]he physical, mental, and spiritual
experiences that constitute a person’s existence,” or “[h]uman existence or activity in
general.” Id. Given the contextual examples used in the dictionary, the common
understanding of “to lead his or her normal life” is to live, or pass life, in his or her
normal manner of living.
15
See Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary (1998), defining “lead”
as “to go through or pass (time, life, etc.): to lead a full life,” and Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary (1966), defining it as “to go through (life or some other period
of time): PASS, LIVE .”
19
Therefore, the plain text of the statute and these definitions demonstrate that the
common understanding of to “affect the person’s ability to lead his or her normal life” is
to have an influence on some of the person’s capacity to live in his or her normal manner
of living. By modifying “normal life” with “his or her,” the Legislature indicated that
this requires a subjective, person- and fact-specific inquiry that must be decided on a
case-by-case basis. Determining the effect or influence that the impairment has had on a
plaintiff’s ability to lead a normal life necessarily requires a comparison of the plaintiff’s
life before and after the incident.
There are several important points to note, however, with regard to this
comparison. First, the statute merely requires that a person’s general ability to lead his or
her normal life has been affected, not destroyed. Thus, courts should consider not only
whether the impairment has led the person to completely cease a pre-incident activity or
lifestyle element, but also whether, although a person is able to lead his or her pre-
incident normal life, the person’s general ability to do so was nonetheless affected.
Second, and relatedly, “general” modifies “ability,” not “affect” or “normal life.”
Thus, the plain language of the statute only requires that some of the person’s ability to
live in his or her normal manner of living has been affected, not that some of the person’s
normal manner of living has itself been affected. Thus, while the extent to which a
person’s general ability to live his or her normal life is affected by an impairment is
undoubtedly related to what the person’s normal manner of living is, there is no
quantitative minimum as to the percentage of a person’s normal manner of living that
must be affected.
20
Third, and finally, the statute does not create an express temporal requirement as
to how long an impairment must last in order to have an effect on “the person’s general
ability to live his or her normal life.” To begin with, there is no such requirement in the
plain language of the statute. Further, MCL 500.3135(1) provides that the threshold for
liability is met “if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body
function, or permanent serious disfigurement.” While the Legislature required that a
“serious disfigurement” be “permanent,” it did not impose the same restriction on a
“serious impairment of body function.” Finally, to the extent that this prong’s language
reflects a legislative intent to adopt this portion of Cassidy in some measure,16 Cassidy
expressly rejected a requirement of permanency to meet the serious impairment
threshold. Cassidy, 415 Mich at 505-506 (noting that “two broken bones, 18 days of
hospitalization, 7 months of wearing casts during which dizzy spells further affected his
mobility, and at least a minor residual effect one and one-half years later are sufficiently
serious to meet the threshold requirement of serious impairment of body function”).
Despite the fact that the language of the statute was plain, the Kreiner majority
deviated significantly from the statutory text in its interpretation of this prong. To begin
with, the Kreiner majority erred in its interpretation of the phrase “that affects the
person’s general ability” for two reasons. First, it selectively quoted only the dictionary
16
Although some of this prong’s text is derived from Cassidy, the Legislature
made important modifications. The Cassidy Court stated that the serious impairment
threshold “looks to the effect of an injury on the person’s general ability to live a normal
life,” Cassidy, 415 Mich at 505, and the Legislature rejected that the standard for “a”
normal life was objective.
21
definitions of “general” that best supported its conclusions. It gave one definition for this
word, “‘the whole; the total; that which comprehends or relates to all, or the chief part; a
general proposition, fact, principle, etc.;—opposed to particular; that is, opposed to
special,’” and then relied on definitions of “in general” and “generally” to conclude that
“general” means “‘for the most part.’” Kreiner, 471 Mich at 130, quoting Webster’s New
International Dictionary. Webster’s, however, offers 10 definitions of the adjective
“general,” many of which are similar to definitions quoted above from The American
Heritage Dictionary. Moreover, of these 10 definitions, the majority chose the most
restrictive, even though, as discussed above, it does not make the most sense in this
context. And, even then, the Kreiner majority looked to other forms of the word.
Second, the Kreiner majority stated that “[t]he starting point in analyzing whether an
impairment affects a person’s ‘general,’ i.e., overall, ability to lead his normal life should
be identifying how his life has been affected, by how much, and for how long.” Kreiner,
471 Mich at 131. Although other portions of the Kreiner majority opinion more carefully
stated that the test was the effect on a person’s general ability, this particular reasoning
could be pulled out of context to suggest that courts should focus on how much the
impairment affects a person’s life, instead of how much it affects the person’s ability to
live his or her life.
Further, the Kreiner majority significantly erred in its interpretation of “to lead his
or her normal life.” It relied on a dictionary to define “lead” as “to conduct or bring in a
particular course.” Notably, depending on how this definition is interpreted, it may have
a similar meaning to “live” or “pass” when “conduct” and “course” are given a certain
22
meaning. “Conduct” can mean “to behave or act,” and “course” can mean “[a] mode of
action or behavior” or “[a] typical or natural manner of proceeding or developing:
customary passage . . . .” The American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition
(1982). The meaning of “to behave or act in his or her typical or natural manner of
proceeding” may be similar to “living in his or her normal manner of living.”
Beyond this point, however, the Kreiner majority went astray and gave the statute
a labored interpretation inconsistent with common meanings and common sense.
Applying its chosen definition of “lead,” the majority concluded that “the effect of the
impairment on the course of a plaintiff’s entire normal life must be considered,” and if
“the course or trajectory of the plaintiff’s normal life has not been affected, then the
plaintiff’s ‘general ability’ to lead his normal life has not been affected . . . .” Kreiner,
471 Mich at 131. In other words, the Kreiner majority held that the “common meaning”
of whether an impairment has affected “the person’s general ability to lead his or her
normal life” is whether it has affected the person’s general ability to conduct the course
or trajectory of his or her entire normal life. This “common meaning” is quite different
from the actual statutory text in form and substance. Significantly, the Kreiner majority’s
interpretation of the statute interjects two terms that are not included in the statute or the
dictionary definitions of the relevant statutory language: “trajectory” and “entire.” Both
terms create ambiguity where the original statutory text had none, and the Kreiner
majority thus erred by selectively defining the words used in definitions of statutory
terms in order to shift away from the common meaning that the words have in the context
of MCL 500.3135(7).
23
As to the first addition, while “trajectory” is a synonym for “course” when
“course” is defined as, for example, “[t]he direction of continuing movement,” The
American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition (1982), it is not a synonym for
the definition of “course” that makes sense in the context of defining a “general ability to
lead his or her normal life.” When “conduct” is used with this definition of “course,” it
has the very different meaning of “[t]o direct the course of; control.” Id. The plain
language of the statute does not suggest that the Legislature’s intent was to address the
effect of an impairment on the person’s ability to control the direction of their life, as
opposed to its effect on the person’s ability to live in his or her normal manner of living.
Yet the majority managed to imply this meaning by inserting “trajectory” as a synonym
for “course,” thereby shifting the meaning of “course” from the most natural contextual
reading of the word. The use of “trajectory” and the suggestion that “course” should be
understood to mean “the direction of continuing movement,” instead of “a mode of action
or behavior,” creates ambiguity by implying a sense of permanence that is inconsistent
with, and does not make sense in the context of, the actual statutory language.
As to the second addition, the majority modified the statutory language “his or her
normal life” with “entire,” a modification that it apparently created out of thin air,17
thereby creating an ambiguity that had not previously existed in the statutory text. The
17
The Kreiner majority did define “in general” as “with respect to the entirety”
when interpreting “general ability.” Kreiner, 471 Mich at 130. But, even assuming that
it is proper to use the definition of the phrase “in general” to define the adjective
“general,” the Legislature used general to modify ability, not life.
24
word “life” has more than one meaning. As noted, it can refer to the meaning that would
be commonly understood to apply in the context of the statutory language, which is “a
manner of living.” It also can refer to “[t]he interval of time between birth and death;
lifetime.” The American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition (1982). The
differences are significant: whereas the first meaning refers to the day-to-day process of
living, the second is a finite measure that encompasses all of one’s time on earth.
Although “entire” could modify either meaning of “life,” it is probably more commonly
used to modify the second. Thus, by inserting “entire,” the Kreiner majority created an
ambiguity that is not present in the original statutory text because the second, finite
definition of “life” does not make sense in the context of the actual statutory language. It
would be unusual to refer to someone’s general ability to lead his or her normal
“lifetime” or “interval of time between life and death.” At best, this would seem to refer
to an effect on the person’s life expectancy, but this would not be a subjective inquiry,
and it is an impossible leap from any common understanding of the statutory language.18
At a minimum, using the modifier “entire” reinforces the general sense of permanence
that is also created by the insertion of “trajectory,” but which, as explained, is not in the
actual statutory text. Because the Kreiner majority created ambiguity where there was
none, and crafted a statutory interpretation that is, in effect, a judicially constructed house
of cards, we hold that it incorrectly interpreted the third prong of MCL 500.3135(7).
18
It is also to some extent accounted for in another threshold in MCL 500.3135(1):
death.
25
The Kreiner majority aggravated this error, and departed even more dramatically
from the statutory text, by providing an extra-textual “nonexhaustive list of objective
factors” to be used to compare the plaintiff’s pre- and post-incident lifestyle. These
factors are: “(a) the nature and extent of the impairment, (b) the type and length of
treatment required, (c) the duration of the impairment, (d) the extent of any residual
impairment, and (e) the prognosis for eventual recovery.” Kreiner, 471 Mich at 133.19
The Legislature has unambiguously defined the “serious impairment of body function,”
and the role of this Court is to apply the plain language of that definition, not to improve
it with a list of judicially created factors that are not necessarily based in the statute’s
text. In fact, at least some of the Kreiner majority’s factors have no basis in the statutory
text and are instead derived from its extra-textual and extra-definitional additions to the
actual statutory language, “entire” and “trajectory,” and serve to reinforce the ambiguity
that its interpretation of the third prong created, especially given that all of the factors
expressly or impliedly include a temporal component. Because the factors adopted by the
Kreiner majority are not based in the statutory text, and this Court’s role is to apply the
19
The majority correctly observes that I do not object to courts employing factors
when applying statutes in many circumstances. I certainly object, however, to courts
doing so in a manner that not only perverts the statutory language but is also unsupported
by, and inconsistent with, the legislative intent expressed by the statutory language, as the
Kreiner majority did.
26
unambiguous statutory language, not improve it, we hold that the majority erred by
adopting them.20
In summary, the Kreiner majority’s interpretation of the third prong departed from
the idea that a court “should not casually read anything into an unambiguous statute that
is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the
statute.” Kreiner, 471 Mich at 157 (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting). Indeed, as I remarked in
dissent, the Kreiner majority’s “interpretation” of the plain language of MCL
500.3135(7) was a “chilling reminder that activism comes in all guises, including so-
called textualism.” Kreiner, 471 Mich at 157. Therefore, we hold that the Kreiner
majority’s interpretation of this prong, including the list of non-exhaustive factors, is not
based in the statute’s text and is incorrect.
20
Indeed, the potential for the Kreiner majority’s interpretation to be read in a
manner that is inconsistent with the statute has been realized in lower court decisions.
For example, in Gagne v Schulte, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued February 28, 2006 (Docket No. 264788), the Court of Appeals held that a
plaintiff had not suffered a serious impairment of body function even though her knee
injury resulted in surgery and severe restrictions on her movement for a year after the
accident, indefinite continuing restrictions on her ability to perform her pre-accident job
and other activities in which she participated before the accident, and a permanent loss of
stability in her knee and an increased risk of osteoarthritis. The majority reasoned that
these impairments were insufficient to meet the threshold because she might someday be
able to resume some activities with a knee brace and “there is no evidence that this period
of decreased function affected her life so extensively that it altered the trajectory or
course of her entire normal life.” Id., unpub op at 2. Indeed, the majority’s reasoning
seemed to consider whether the plaintiff’s ability to control the direction of her entire life
had been altered, rather than her ability to live her life in a normal manner, given that it
found the threshold was not met despite evidence that the plaintiff had continuing
restrictions on movement, activities, and work, and medically documented long-term
damage.
27
3. STARE DECISIS: SHOULD KREINER BE OVERRULED?
To the extent that the Kreiner majority’s interpretation of the statute was
inconsistent with the foregoing approach, and departed from the legislative intent
expressed in the unambiguous language of the statute, we hold that it was wrongly
decided. Given this conclusion, the question is whether it should be overruled. We hold
that it should be.21
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, “principles of law deliberately examined and
decided by a court of competent jurisdiction should not be lightly departed.” Brown v
Manistee Co Rd Comm, 452 Mich 354, 365; 550 NW2d 215 (1996) (citations and
quotation marks omitted). Indeed, in order to “‘avoid an arbitrary discretion in the
courts, it is indispensable that [courts] should be bound down by strict rules and
precedents which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that
comes before them . . . .’” Petersen v Magna Corp, 484 Mich 300, 314-315; 773 NW2d
21
The dissenters’ stare decisis protestations should taste like ashes in their mouths.
To the principles of stare decisis, to which they paid absolutely no heed as they
denigrated the wisdom of innumerable predecessors, the dissenters now would wrap
themselves in its benefits to save their recent precedent.
Ironically, the very doctrine and approach that the dissent vehemently claims to
adhere to today, from Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), was not
so faithfully applied by the members of the dissent in the past. Indeed, the members of
the dissent have overruled caselaw without even paying lip service to Robinson, see, e.g.,
People v Anstey, 476 Mich 436; 719 NW2d 579 (2006), or after engaging in a cursory or
limited analysis of the factors that they claim fidelity to today. See, e.g., Wesche v
Mecosta Co Rd Comm, 480 Mich 75, 91 n 13 (2008); Al-Shimmari v Detroit Med Ctr,
477 Mich 280, 297 n 10; 731 NW2d 29 (2007); Neal v Wilkes, 470 Mich 661, 667 n 8;
685 NW2d 648 (2004); People v Hickman, 470 Mich 602, 610 n 6; 684 NW2d 267
(2004); Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 203 n 19; 649 NW2d 47 (2002).
28
564 (2009) (opinion by KELLY, C.J.), quoting The Federalist No. 78, p 471 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed, 1961). As the United States Supreme Court has stated,
the doctrine “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal
principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and
perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Payne v Tennessee, 501 US 808, 827; 111 S
Ct 2597; 115 L Ed 2d 720 (1991).
Despite its importance, stare decisis is neither an “inexorable command,”
Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558, 577; 123 S Ct 2472; 156 L Ed 2d 508 (2003), nor “a
mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision . . . .” Helvering v Hallock, 309
US 106, 119; 60 S Ct 444; 84 L Ed 604 (1940). Ultimately, it is an attempt “to balance
two competing considerations: the need of the community for stability in legal rules and
decisions and the need of courts to correct past errors.” Petersen, 484 Mich at 314. As a
reflection of this balance, there is a presumption in favor of upholding precedent, but this
presumption may be rebutted if there is a special or compelling justification to overturn
precedent. Id. at 319-320. In determining whether a special or compelling justification
exists, a number of evaluative criteria may be relevant, id., but overturning precedent
requires more than a mere belief that a case was wrongly decided. See Brown, 452 Mich
at 365.22
22
In Petersen, Chief Justice KELLY provided a non-exhaustive list of criteria that
may be considered, but none of the criteria is determinative, and they need only be
evaluated if relevant. See Petersen, 484 Mich at 320.
29
In determining whether Kreiner should be overruled, I find several evaluative
criteria particularly relevant: (1) “whether the rule has proven to be intolerable because
it defies practical workability,” (2) “whether reliance on the rule is such that overruling
it would cause a special hardship and inequity,” (3) “whether upholding the rule is likely
to result in serious detriment prejudicial to public interests,” and (4) “whether the prior
decision was an abrupt and largely unexplained departure from precedent.” Petersen,
484 Mich at 320. As applied here, on the balance, these criteria weigh in favor of
overturning Kreiner.
The first criterion weighs heavily in favor of overruling Kreiner because the
Kreiner majority’s departure from the plain language of MCL 500.3135(7) defies
practical workability. As discussed above, the majority took unambiguous statutory text
and, through linguistic gymnastics, contorted it into a confusing and ambiguous test.
Appellate litigation arising out of MCL 500.3135(7) has greatly increased since Kreiner23
and has resulted in confusion. To begin with, the lower courts’ application of Kreiner
has led to inconsistent interpretation of the statutory language, with similarly situated
23
In the six years since Kreiner was decided, there have been three times as many
Court of Appeals cases citing MCL 500.3135(7) as there were in the nine years between
when the amendment was enacted and Kreiner was decided. In the nine years between
when the amendment became effective and when Kreiner was decided, only 86 Court of
Appeals cases cited MCL 500.3135(7). As of May 27, 2010, in the six years since the
Kreiner decision was issued, there have been 254 Court of Appeals cases citing MCL
500.3135(7).
30
plaintiffs being treated differently by different courts.24 Further, some courts have
interpreted Kreiner to create a threshold that is higher than that in Cassidy or DiFranco,
primarily by reading the Kreiner majority’s interpretation of the statute to effectively
create a permanency requirement.25 As discussed, this is contrary to the legislative intent
expressed by the plain language of the statute. Because the Kreiner majority’s
interpretation of the third prong of MCL 500.3135(7) has created ambiguity where there
was none, and increased litigation and confusion, the first factor weighs heavily in favor
of overruling Kreiner.
Second, correcting the errors in the Kreiner majority’s interpretation of MCL
500.3135(7) would not present an undue hardship to reliance interests, and this factor
weighs in favor of overruling Kreiner. As this Court has explained when evaluating a
similar factor in the past, “the Court must ask whether the previous decision has become
24
For example, in Luther v Morris, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court
of Appeals, issued January 18, 2005 (Docket No. 244483), the Court held that the
plaintiff had suffered a serious impairment of body function where a dislocated elbow
caused her to miss 52 days of work and significantly interfered with her ability to
perform daily personal tasks for a while, but her life returned to normal within a couple
of months after the accident. In contrast, in Guevara v Martinez, unpublished opinion per
curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued May 24, 2005 (Docket No. 260387), the Court
held that there was no serious impairment where the plaintiff suffered a dislocated right
shoulder and a torn anterior rotator cuff that significantly interfered with his ability to
perform daily personal tasks for a couple of months and prevented him from continuing
work as a part-time construction worker during at least the surgery and multiple months
of rehabilitation. The outcomes in these cases are difficult to reconcile.
25
See footnote 20 of this opinion summarizing Gagne v Schulte, unpublished
opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued February 28, 2006 (Docket No.
264788).
31
so embedded, so accepted, so fundamental, to everyone’s expectations that to change it
would produce not just readjustments, but practical real-world dislocations.” Robinson v
Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 466; 613 NW2d 307 (2000). It further stated that this factor
applies to cases that if overruled “even if they were wrongfully decided, would produce
chaos.” Id. at 466 n 26. Kreiner is not “so” embedded, accepted, or fundamental to
expectations that chaos will result from overruling it. To begin with, Kreiner was
decided only six years ago, and, while it was the first opinion from this Court interpreting
MCL 500.3135(7), it was contrary to the plain text of the statute, which had been in place
since 1995. As the Robinson majority explained, people normally rely on the words of
the statute itself when looking for guidance on how to direct their actions. Robinson, 462
Mich at 467. Further, it is unlikely that motor vehicle drivers, and the victims of motor
vehicle accidents, have altered their behavior in reliance on Kreiner. As noted by the
Robinson majority, where a statute deals with the consequences of accidents, “it seems
incontrovertible that only after the accident would . . . awareness [of this Court’s
caselaw] come,” and “after-the-fact awareness does not rise to the level of a reliance
interest because to have reliance the knowledge must be of the sort that causes a person
or entity to attempt to conform his conduct to a certain norm before the triggering event.”
Id. at 466-467. Similarly, this statute generally involves motor vehicle accidents, and it
strains credibility to think that the average driver and the average future injured party
have altered their behavior in reliance on Kreiner.
The third criterion, the effect on the public interest, also weighs in favor of
overruling Kreiner. Although there may be policy arguments on both sides regarding the
32
costs and benefits of having a more or less difficult threshold for recovery under MCL
500.3135, our interpretation of the statute in this case is truer to the statute’s text than
that of the Kreiner majority, and, thus, our interpretation most closely reflects the policy
balance struck by the Legislature.26 In contrast, Kreiner altered the balance from that
intended by the Legislature by imposing extra-textual burdens to meeting the threshold,
and, as a result, it is difficult to argue that overruling Kreiner to restore the balance
intended by the Legislature would hurt the public interest (or that affirming Kreiner
serves it).
Finally, the fourth criterion is neutral. Kreiner was not an abrupt change from
precedent, but it did provide an interpretation of the statute that was not obvious from the
statute’s text.
On the basis of these evaluative criteria, we hold that Kreiner should be overruled.
4. SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIVE TEST
On the basis of the foregoing, the proper interpretation of the clear and
unambiguous language in MCL 500.3135 creates the following test.
26
The dissent devotes a significant amount of time conducting what is essentially
a policy analysis hypothesizing about the disastrous effects that this opinion will have on
the insurance industry and, thus, concluding that we are undoing the legislative
compromise that was the general backdrop of the no-fault act. While I am cognizant of
the legislative compromise, I am less convinced than the dissent that this Court’s role is
to conduct an independent policy analysis to determine whether the plain language of an
amendment adopted by the Legislature, 20 years after the no-fault act was originally
adopted, is inconsistent with the overall act’s general purposes. Even assuming arguendo
that it could be, I do not believe that broad statements regarding the general purpose of
the act’s adoption in 1973 trump the intent expressed by the Legislature in the plain
language of a later amendment to the act.
33
To begin with, the court should determine whether there is a factual dispute
regarding the nature and the extent of the person’s injuries, and, if so, whether the dispute
is material to determining whether the serious impairment of body function threshold is
met. MCL 500.3135(2)(a)(i) and (ii).27 If there is no factual dispute, or no material
factual dispute, then whether the threshold is met is a question of law for the court. Id.
If the court may decide the issue as a matter of law, it should next determine
whether the serious impairment threshold has been crossed. The unambiguous language
of MCL 500.3135(7) provides three prongs that are necessary to establish a “serious
impairment of body function”: (1) an objectively manifested impairment (observable or
perceivable from actual symptoms or conditions) (2) of an important body function (a
body function of value, significance, or consequence to the injured person) that (3)
affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life (influences some of the
plaintiff’s capacity to live in his or her normal manner of living).
The serious impairment analysis is inherently fact- and circumstance- specific and
must be conducted on a case-by-case basis. As stated in the Kreiner dissent, “[t]he
Legislature recognized that what is important to one is not important to all[;] a brief
impairment may be devastating whereas a near permanent impairment may have little
27
As discussed in footnotes 7 and 8 of this opinion, this provision may
unconstitutionally conflict with MCR 2.116(C)(10) in certain cases. If it does, then a
court should only apply MCL 500.3135(2) to the extent that it is consistent with MCR
2.116(C)(10). We do not reach this issue today, however, because there is no material
factual dispute over any fact necessary to determining whether the serious impairment
threshold has been met.
34
effect.” Kreiner, 471 Mich at 145 (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting). As such, the analysis
does not “lend itself to any bright-line rule or imposition of [a] nonexhaustive list of
factors,” particularly where there is no basis in the statute for such factors. Id.Accordingly, because “[t]he Legislature avoided drawing lines in the sand . . . so must
we.” Id.C. APPLICATION OF MCL 500.3135
Under the facts of this case, we hold that plaintiff has met the serious impairment
threshold as a matter of law.
To begin with, there is no factual dispute that is material to determining whether
the serious impairment threshold is met. The parties do not dispute that plaintiff suffered
a broken ankle, was completely restricted from bearing weight on his ankle for a month,
and underwent two surgeries over a 10-month period and multiple months of physical
therapy. The parties do dispute the extent to which plaintiff continues to suffer a residual
impairment and the potential for increased susceptibility to degenerative arthritis.
Plaintiff has provided at least some evidence of a physical basis for his subjective
complaints of pain and suffering,28 but defendant disputes whether there is persuasive
evidence of impairment beyond plaintiff’s subjective complaints. This dispute is not
significant or essential to determining whether the serious impairment threshold is met in
this case, however, because plaintiff has not alleged that the residual impairment, to the
28
The FCEs report that plaintiff’s range of motion in his ankle is not within
normal limits, and the MRI and two doctors’ reports suggest at least some scarring and
degenerative tissue damage around plaintiff’s left ankle.
35
extent that it exists, continues to affect his general ability to lead his pre-incident “normal
life,”29 the third prong of the analysis. Moreover, it is not necessary to establish the first
two prongs. Therefore, the dispute is not material and does not prevent this Court from
deciding whether the threshold is met as a matter of law under MCL 500.3135(2)(a).
The other facts material to determining whether the serious impairment threshold
is met are also undisputed.30 Before the incident, plaintiff’s “normal life” consisted
primarily of working 60 hours a week as a medium truck loader. Plaintiff also frequently
fished in the spring and summer and was a weekend golfer. After the incident, plaintiff
was unable to return to work for at least 14 months and did not return for 19 months. He
never returned to his original job as a medium truck loader, but he suffered no loss in pay
because of the change in job. He was able to fish at pre-incident levels by the spring of
2006 and is able to take care of his personal needs at the same level as before the
incident. There is no allegation that the impairment of body function has affected his
relationship with his significant other or other qualitative aspects of his life.
Next, in light of the lack of a factual dispute that is material to determining
whether the threshold is met, under MCL 500.3135(2)(a), this Court should decide as a
29
Plaintiff stated that his life is “painful, but normal.” He does not allege that any
residual impairment has a significant effect on his ability to participate in or enjoy
activities to the extent that he could before the accident.
30
If there had been other disputed facts that were material to this determination,
we would have to reach the question whether MCL 500.3135(2)(a) is unconstitutional to
the extent that it requires a court to decide material disputed facts as a matter of law. See
footnote 7 of this opinion.
36
matter of law whether plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of body function under the
three prongs in MCL 500.3135(7).
With regard to the first prong, plaintiff has shown an objectively manifested
impairment of body function. There is no dispute that plaintiff has presented evidence
that he suffered a broken ankle and actual symptoms or conditions that someone else
would perceive as impairing body functions, such as walking, crouching, climbing, and
lifting weight. Even 14 months after the incident, an FCE report observed that ankle pain
and a reduced range of motion inhibited these body functions. Thus, plaintiff has
satisfied this prong.
With regard to the second prong, the impaired body functions were important to
plaintiff. His testimony establishes that being unable to walk and perform other functions
were of consequence to his ability to work. Thus, the second prong of MCL 500.3135(7)
is met.
The next question in this case is whether the third prong is met, but we hold that
plaintiff has shown that the impairment affected his general ability to lead his normal life
because it influenced some of his capacity to live in his normal, pre-incident manner of
living. Before the incident, plaintiff’s normal manner of living consisted primarily of
working, for 60 hours a week, and secondarily his hobbies of fishing and golfing. After
the incident, at least some of plaintiff’s capacity to live in this manner was affected.
Specifically, for a month after the incident, plaintiff could not bear weight on his left
ankle. He underwent two surgeries over a period of 10 months and multiple months of
physical therapy. Moreover, his capacity to work, the central part of his pre-incident
37
“normal life,” was affected.31 Whereas before the incident he spent most of his time
working, after the incident he was unable to perform functions necessary for his job for at
least 14 months, and he did not return to work for 19 months.32 On the basis of these
facts, we conclude that some of plaintiff’s capacity to live in his pre-incident manner of
living was affected, and the third prong of MCL 500.3135(7) is satisfied.33
Because all three prongs of MCL 500.3135(7) are satisfied, we hold, as a matter of
law, that plaintiff has met the serious impairment threshold requirement under MCL
500.3135(1).
D. RESPONSE TO THE DISSENT
Despite the dissent’s length, it provides very little substantive disagreement or
criticism of the statutory interpretation presented in this opinion and very little response
to our criticisms of the statutory interpretation in Kreiner. Where the dissent does
actually address the substance of the opinion, its criticisms are often based not on the
31
As noted, it is unclear from the record the extent to which the impairment
affected plaintiff’s ability to fish in the first year after the incident or his ability to golf in
the first year and a half after the incident, or the extent to which he actually undertook
either activity in those periods.
32
It could be significant that plaintiff’s job has changed, even though his pay is the
same, but there is no evidence suggesting that this was an effect of impairment.
Therefore, this fact is not relevant to the “normal life” inquiry here.
33
Our analysis focuses on plaintiff’s pre- and post-incident activities and the
extent to which he was able to participate in them after the incident because those are the
facts in the record. The facts that the parties considered relevant in developing the record
were, no doubt, influenced by the Kreiner majority’s erroneous deviation from the
statutory language. As noted, however, many other considerations could typically be
relevant to determining how an impairment affects a person’s ability to live in his or her
pre-incident normal manner of living.
38
actual holdings of the majority opinion but, instead, on the dissent’s misunderstandings
or overgeneralizations of those holdings.
For example, the dissent complains that the majority “resuscitate[s]” my opinion
in DiFranco.34 As a result, the dissent resuscitates old criticisms of DiFranco and attacks
the majority for failing to recognize the Legislature’s intent, as expressed in the statute’s
legislative history, to reject DiFranco in favor of Cassidy.35 As is plainly evident in the
analysis, however, this opinion faithfully applies the text of the statute, even where that
text is inconsistent with DiFranco. The opinion fully recognizes the Legislature’s
adoption of Cassidy where the Legislature indicated an intent to do so through the text of
the statute and “resuscitates” DiFranco only in the narrow places where, similarly, the
statutory text indicates a legislative intent to do so.36
Additionally, the dissent’s comments on the majority’s lack of use of legislative
history are ill-founded on two levels. First, contrary to the dissent’s assertion that I have
34
The only explanation that I can discover for the dissent’s reaching this
conclusion is its baseless accusation that the majority is essentially reading the third
prong out of the statute. It is unclear to me, however, how reading and applying the plain
text of the statute, instead of enhancing and extending the statute through creative use of
a thesaurus and extra-textual factors, could equate to reading that language out of the
statute.
35
Interestingly, while criticizing the majority for supposedly reviving DiFranco,
the dissent also criticizes us for not going far enough in its revival by not adopting the
factors that I used in DiFranco.
36
It appears that the dissent itself does not actually believe that we are
resuscitating DiFranco, given that it so vigorously, albeit erroneously, argues that the
only difference between our decision today and Kreiner is that Kreiner adopted temporal
requirements.
39
“never questioned the utility of legislative history” and that “there is no principled
reason” not to use it in this case, I have repeatedly stated that legislative history should
only be used to interpret a statute when statutory language is ambiguous. See, e.g.,
People v Gardner, 482 Mich 41; 753 NW2d 78 (2008) (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting);
Bukowski v Detroit, 478 Mich 268; 732 NW2d 75 (2007) (CAVANAGH, J., concurring);
Lansing Mayor v Pub Service Comm, 470 Mich 154, 174; 680 NW2d 840 (2004)
(CAVANAGH, J., dissenting).37 The statutory language at issue here is not ambiguous.38
Second, even if legislative history should be used, our application of the plain language
37
To the extent the dissent insinuates that I have relied on legislative history to
interpret an unambiguous statute, it is reaching. None of the cases that the dissent cites
involves instances where I relied on legislative history to identify an ambiguity or give
unambiguous text a meaning inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. In most,
I merely emphasized that the legislative history confirmed the meaning in the
unambiguous text. See, e.g., Jackson v Green Estate, 484 Mich 209, 230; 771 NW2d 675
(2009) (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting); Koester v City of Novi, 458 Mich 1, 16; 580 NW2d
835 (1998); People v Sloan, 450 Mich 160, 183-184; 538 NW2d 380 (1995); Grand
Trunk Western R Co v Fenton, 439 Mich 240, 247; 482 NW2d 706 (1992).
38
The dissent references Judge Leventhal’s remark that using legislative history
for statutory interpretation is the equivalent of walking into a crowded room and looking
for one’s friends. Similar to my approach, however, this analogy has been used by
justices of the United States Supreme Court to explain why legislative history should not
be used to interpret clear and unambiguous statutory language. See Exxon Mobil Corp v
Allapattah Servs, Inc, 545 US 546, 568-570; 125 S Ct 2611; 162 L Ed 2d 502 (2005),
using the criticism to explain that legislative history should not be used to determine
whether Congress intended an otherwise unambiguous statute to overrule a court’s
interpretation of an earlier version of the statute because “[e]xtrinsic materials have a role
in statutory interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting
Legislature’s understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.” See also Conroy v Aniskoff,
507 US 511, 518-519; 113 S Ct 1562; 123 L Ed 2d 229 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(using the criticism to explain why the majority should have stopped its analysis after
concluding that a statute was unambiguous).
40
of the statute is consistent with the House legislative analysis’s statement that the
amendments were intended to return the law to a threshold “resembling” Cassidy. House
Legislative Analysis, HB 4341, December 18, 1995. The dissent’s statements to the
contrary are, again, largely based on its mistaken characterization of the majority opinion
as resuscitating DiFranco and ignoring Cassidy.
The dissent also repeatedly states that the majority opinion holds that temporal
considerations are “wholly or largely irrelevant” to the serious impairment threshold, and,
accordingly, it spends a significant amount of energy explaining why temporal
considerations are relevant and accusing the majority of holding that the threshold is met
if “the plaintiff’s general ability to lead his normal life has been affected for even a single
moment in time.” Contrary to the dissent’s cries, there is simply no basis in our analysis
for concluding that we hold that temporal considerations are irrelevant or that a
momentary impairment is sufficient. The opinion merely notes that there is no specific
express temporal requirement in the text of the statute and rejects Kreiner’s strained
attempts to insert what was essentially a permanency requirement into the statute.39 The
dissent’s mistaken characterizations of this opinion amount to nothing more than, like
Kreiner itself, yet another attempt to distract courts and parties from the actual text of
MCL 500.3135.
39
Indeed, the dissent is so blindly intent on concluding that the majority must be
rejecting temporal considerations that it fails to consider that its triumphant discovery of
the majority’s “hypocrisy” in referencing time periods in our application of MCL
500.3135(2) is nothing more than a reflection of the fact that we are not holding that
temporal considerations are irrelevant.
41
IV. CONCLUSION
We hold that Kreiner should be overruled because the Kreiner majority’s
interpretation of MCL 500.3135 departed from the statute’s clear and unambiguous text.
Applying the unambiguous statutory language, we hold that as a question of law, in this
case, plaintiff established that he suffered a serious impairment of body function. Thus,
we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
KELLY, C.J., and WEAVER (except for the part entitled “Stare Decisis”),
and HATHAWAY, JJ., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.
42
STATE OF MICHIGAN
SUPREME COURT
RODNEY MCCORMICK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 136738
LARRY CARRIER,
Defendant,
and
ALLIED AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, INC.,
indemnitor of GENERAL MOTORS
CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
WEAVER, J. (concurring).
I concur in and sign all of the majority opinion except part III(B)(3), regarding
stare decisis. I fully support the decision to overrule Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich 109;
683 NW2d 611 (2004). As I wrote in Jones v Olson, 480 Mich 1169, 1173 (2008):
By importing the concept of permanency of injury into MCL
500.3135—a concept that is nowhere referenced in the text of the statute—
the majority of four (Chief Justice TAYLOR and Justices CORRIGAN,
YOUNG, and MARKMAN), in Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich 109 (2004),
actively and judicially legislated a permanency and temporal requirement to
recover noneconomic damages in automobile accident cases. The Kreiner
interpretation of MCL 500.3135 is an unrestrained misuse and abuse of the
power of interpretation masquerading as an exercise in following the
Legislature’s intent.
With regard to the policy of stare decisis, my view is that past precedent should
generally be followed but that to serve the rule of law, in deciding whether wrongly
decided precedent should be overruled, each case should be looked at individually on its
facts and merits through the lens of judicial restraint, common sense, and fairness. I
agree with the sentiment recently expressed by Chief Justice Roberts of the United States
Supreme Court in his concurrence to the decision in Citizens United v Fed Election
Comm, 558 US ___, ___; 130 S Ct 876, 920; 175 L Ed 2d 753, 806 (2010), when he said
that
stare decisis is neither an “inexorable command,” Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 577, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 156 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2003), nor “a
mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision,” Helvering v.
Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119, 60 S. Ct. 444, 84 L. Ed. 604 (1940) . . . . If it
were, segregation would be legal, minimum wage laws would be
unconstitutional, and the Government could wiretap ordinary criminal
suspects without first obtaining warrants. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954); Adkins v.
Children's Hospital of D. C., 261 U.S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. 785(1923), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.
Ct. 578, 81 L. Ed. 703 (1937); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48
S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967).
Chief Justice Roberts further called stare decisis a “principle of policy” and said that it “is
not an end in itself.” Id. at ___; 130 S Ct at 920; 175 L Ed 2d at 807. He explained that
“[i]ts greatest purpose is to serve a constitutional ideal—the rule of law. It follows that in
the unusual circumstance when fidelity to any particular precedent does more to damage
2
this constitutional ideal than to advance it, we must be more willing to depart from that
precedent.” Id at ___; 130 S Ct at 921; 175 L Ed 2d at 807.1
I agree with Chief Justice Roberts that stare decisis is a policy and not an
immutable doctrine. I chose not to sign Chief Justice KELLY’s lead opinion in Petersen v
Magna Corp, 484 Mich 300, 316-320; 773 NW2d 564 (2009), because it proposed to
create a standardized test for stare decisis. Likewise, I do not sign the majority opinion’s
stare decisis section in this case because it applies Petersen. There is no need for this
Court to adopt any standardized test regarding stare decisis. In fact, it is an impossible
1
It appears that the dissent in this case does not agree with Chief Justice Roberts.
The dissent lists 12 cases that have been overruled by this Court in the past 18 months.
While the dissenting justices may feel aggrieved by this Court overruling those 12 cases,
amongst those cases were some of the most egregious examples of judicial activism that
did great harm to the people of Michigan. Those decisions were made by the “majority
of four,” including the dissenting justices, under the guise of ideologies such as
“textualism” and “judicial traditionalism.” One of the dissenting justices, Justice YOUNG,
expressed his apparent contempt for the common law and common sense in his 2004
article in the Texas Review of Law and Politics, where Justice YOUNG stated:
Consequently, I want to focus my remarks here on the
embarrassment that the common law presents—or ought to present—to a
conscientious judicial traditionalist. . . .
To give a graphic illustration of my feelings on the subject, I tend to
think of the common law as a drunken, toothless ancient relative, sprawled
prominently and in a state of nature on a settee in the middle of one’s
genteel garden party. Grandpa’s presence is undoubtedly a cause of
mortification to the host. But since only the most ill-bred of guests would
be coarse enough to comment on Grandpa’s presence and condition, all
concerned simply try ignore him. [Young, A judicial traditionalist
confronts the common law, 8 Texas Rev L & Pol 299, 301-302 (2004).]
3
task. There are many factors to consider when deciding whether or not to overrule
precedent, and the importance of such factors often changes on a case-by-case basis.2
In the end, the consideration of stare decisis and whether to overrule wrongly
decided precedent always includes service to the rule of law through an application and
exercise of judicial restraint, common sense, and a sense of fairness—justice for all.
In serving the rule of law and applying judicial restraint, common sense, and a
sense of fairness to the case at hand, I agree with and join the majority opinion’s holding
that Kreiner is overruled.
Elizabeth A. Weaver
2
Over the past decade, the principal tool used by this Court to decide when a
precedent should be overruled is the set of guidelines that was laid out in Robinson v
Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 463; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), an opinion written by former Justice
TAYLOR, signed by Justices CORRIGAN, YOUNG, MARKMAN and myself, and that I have
used numerous times. By no means do I consider the Robinson guidelines a “be-all, end-
all test” that constitutes precedent of this Court to be used whenever this Court considers
overruling precedent. I view Robinson as merely providing guidelines to assist this Court
in its legal analysis when pertinent.
4
1/Jan 10—DMH
STATE OF MICHIGAN
SUPREME COURT
RODNEY MCCORMICK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 136738
LARRY CARRIER,
Defendant,
and
ALLIED AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, INC,
indemnitor of GENERAL MOTORS
CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
HATHAWAY, J. (concurring).
I fully concur with Justice CAVANAGH’s analysis and conclusion in this matter and
I support overruling Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich 109; 683 NW2d 611 (2004). I write
separately to express my thoughts on the doctrine of stare decisis. Any analysis of the
impact of stare decisis must focus on the individual case and the reason for overruling
precedent.1 The reasons for overruling Kreiner are paramount to any articulated test, and
the special and compelling justifications to do so are overwhelming in this case. I agree
1
For further discussion of my views regarding stare decisis, please see my
concurring statement in U of M v Titan Ins Co, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2010).
1/Jan 10—DMH
with the well-articulated reasons expressed by Justice CAVANAGH, and I fully support
overruling Kreiner.
Diane M. Hathaway
2
STATE OF MICHIGAN
SUPREME COURT
RODNEY MCCORMICK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 136738
LARRY CARRIER,
Defendant,
and
ALLIED AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, INC,
indemnitor of GENERAL MOTORS
CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
MARKMAN, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to overrule Kreiner v Fischer,
471 Mich 109; 683 NW2d 611 (2004). The no-fault automobile insurance act, MCL
500.3135(1), provides that “[a] person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic
loss caused by his or her ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle only if the
injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent
serious disfigurement.” The issue here is whether plaintiff has suffered a serious
impairment of body function. “‘[S]erious impairment of body function’ means an
objectively manifested impairment of an important body function that affects the person’s
general ability to lead his or her normal life.” MCL 500.3135(7).
In Kreiner, 471 Mich at 132-133, this Court held that in determining whether an
impairment affects the plaintiff’s general ability to lead his normal life, “a court should
engage in a multifaceted inquiry, comparing the plaintiff’s life before and after the
accident as well as the significance of any affected aspects on the course of the plaintiff’s
overall life.” In addition, Kreiner indicated that certain factors, such as the duration of
the impairment, may be of assistance in evaluating whether the plaintiff’s general ability
to lead his normal life has been affected. Id. at 133.
The majority overrules Kreiner, rejecting these factors and holding that temporal
considerations are wholly or largely irrelevant in determining whether an impairment
affects the plaintiff’s general ability to lead his normal life. The majority instead holds
that, as long as the plaintiff’s general ability to lead his normal life has been affected,
apparently for even a single moment in time, the plaintiff has suffered a “serious
impairment of body function.” This conclusion is at odds with the actual language of the
no-fault automobile act and nullifies the legislative compromise embodied in that act. I
continue to believe that Kreiner was correctly decided, and that temporal considerations
are highly relevant-- indeed necessary-- in determining whether an impairment affects the
plaintiff’s general ability to lead his normal life. By nullifying the legislative
compromise, which was grounded in concerns over excessive litigation, the over-
compensation of minor injuries, and the availability of affordable insurance, the Court’s
decision today will resurrect a legal environment in which each of these hazards reappear
and threaten the continued fiscal integrity of our no-fault system.
2
Because I do not believe that the lower courts erred in concluding that plaintiff in
this case has not suffered a serious impairment of body function, I would affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I. FACTS AND HISTORY
Because the majority opinion provides only a cursory presentation of the facts, in a
case requiring a fact-intensive analysis, I find it necessary to set forth a more thorough
discussion of these facts. Beginning in August of 2002, plaintiff was employed by Allied
Systems, and over the years, he has held various positions with the company.1 On
January 17, 2005, approximately six months after beginning his position as a medium
truck loader, plaintiff was struck by a truck driven by plaintiff’s co-worker and co-
defendant, Larry Carrier, while shuttling vehicles at a General Motors plant. Plaintiff
was knocked down, and the wheels of the truck ran over his left ankle, fracturing his
medial malleolus. Plaintiff was immediately taken to the hospital and was released that
same day. Two days later, he underwent surgery for the implantation of a device to
stabilize his ankle fracture. Immediately following surgery, plaintiff was on crutches and
in a boot for approximately four weeks and, during this time, he was restricted from
bearing weight on his left leg. Additionally, plaintiff underwent physical therapy.2
1
Before plaintiff began working for Allied, he installed windows. When he first
began working for Allied, he loaded trains, and after approximately six months, he took a
“utility job,” providing support to other departments as needed. In June of 2004, he
began working as a medium truck loader.
2
It is not altogether clear how long plaintiff’s physical therapy actually lasted. In
plaintiff’s deposition, he indicated that he underwent “many months” of therapy.
3
On October 21, 2005, plaintiff again underwent surgery on his ankle, this time to
remove the implanted device. The surgeon reported that plaintiff’s ankle had “healed
nicely.” On November 5, 2005, at the request of Allied, plaintiff was examined by Dr.
Paul Drouillard, who stated that plaintiff could return to work with restrictions of no
prolonged standing or walking for three weeks, after which time, plaintiff could return to
work with no restrictions. On November 17, 2005, plaintiff was examined by his
surgeon, who observed that plaintiff’s “wound is healed very nicely” and that plaintiff
“needs to be in seated work for approximately six weeks.”
On January 12, 2006, plaintiff’s surgeon examined him and cleared him to return
to work with no restrictions. At this examination, plaintiff reported to his surgeon that
“[h]is medial malleolus is not giving him any pain.” The surgeon observed that plaintiff
had an “excellent range of motion with no specific tenderness.” Upon returning to work
for several days, however, plaintiff indicated that performing the physical tasks that his
job required, such as walking, climbing, and crouching, caused his ankle to hurt. After
plaintiff’s request for a different assignment was denied, plaintiff went back on workers’
compensation.
However, in his response to defendant’s motion for summary disposition, plaintiff
indicated that he had six weeks of therapy. And, during plaintiff’s oral argument
opposing defendant’s motion for summary disposition, plaintiff’s counsel claimed that
plaintiff underwent 18 weeks of therapy.
4
On March 16, 2006, Allied required plaintiff to undergo a functional capacity
evaluation (FCE),3 which showed that plaintiff could not fully perform all of his previous
job duties.4 During this evaluation, when asked what his goal was in returning to work,
plaintiff responded, “I don’t want to go back to work; there is talk about a buyout and I
think I want to do that.” Plaintiff also reported that his ankle pain was a three on a scale
of zero to ten, with ten being the highest.
On May 31, 2006, Dr. Drouillard again examined plaintiff, at the request of Allied.
Dr. Drouillard found no objective abnormality to correspond to plaintiff’s complaints and
opined that plaintiff was magnifying his symptoms. Dr. Drouillard also observed that,
although plaintiff claimed that he had been wearing an ankle brace for the last two weeks,
the tan lines on plaintiff’s left and right feet were symmetrical, consistent with wearing
flip-flops, with no break in his tan lines to indicate that he had been wearing the brace at
all. Dr. Drouillard believed that plaintiff could return to work unrestricted and that
plaintiff’s ankle required no further treatment.
On June 12, 2006, plaintiff underwent an MRI test; the physiatrist who reviewed
the MRI and performed a follow-up examination found that there was some evidence of
ligamentous injury, but he did not establish a plan to decrease plaintiff’s pain because
3
An FCE is “an all-encompassing term to describe the physical assessment of an
individual’s ability to perform work-related activity.” American Occupational Therapy
Association, (accessed
July 1, 2010).
4
This was due in part to shoulder pain resulting from a preexisting and unrelated
shoulder injury.
5
there was little the physiatrist could do.5 At this examination, plaintiff reported that his
pain was a six on a scale of zero to ten, that the pain was worse with “any movement,”
and that nothing alleviates that pain. On June 20, 2006, Dr. Drouillard reviewed the MRI
results and found that plaintiff’s ankle had healed well and that his opinion from May 31,
2006 had not changed.
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff’s workers’ compensation benefits were terminated.6
At this point, plaintiff sought another FCE so that he could return to work. On August 1,
2006, the FCE indicated that plaintiff was able to perform essential job demands without
restriction. At this FCE, plaintiff reported that he experienced “occasional aching” in his
ankle, and that there were no “activities that aggravated his symptoms in the left ankle
(including prolonged standing, prolonged walking).” Plaintiff reported that his pain level
was a two on a scale of zero to ten and, during the two weeks immediately preceding the
FCE, his highest pain level had been a three and his lowest pain level had been a one. By
the completion of the FCE, plaintiff reported his pain level at zero. On August 16, 2006,
approximately 17 months after the accident, plaintiff returned to work and Allied
5
A physiatrist is a medical doctor who practices physiatry, “a medical specialty
for the treatment of disease and injury by physical agents, as exercise or heat therapy.”
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1991).
6
Plaintiff began receiving workers’ compensation in January 2005. Plaintiff
claims that he lost $66,000 in wages, the difference between his salary and his workers’
compensation benefits for the time he was not working. However, the instant case only
involves noneconomic damages. Lost wages are economic damages and are
compensable as personal protection insurance benefits, MCL 500.3107(1)(b), and/or
through a tort claim against the party at fault to recover excess economic losses, MCL
500.3135(3)(c).
6
assigned him to a new job with different physical requirements, and with no reduction in
pay. Plaintiff volunteered to be assigned to this other job, and has been able to perform
his new job duties since that time.
During his recuperation, plaintiff did not require any assistance with normal
household tasks. Additionally, he was able to drive and his injuries have not affected his
relationship with his wife in any way.7 Outside of work, plaintiff was able to engage in
most of the activities in which he was engaged before his injury, such as fishing.8
Importantly, by plaintiff’s own admission at his deposition in October of 2006, his life
was “normal” despite some “occasional aching.”
On March 24, 2006, plaintiff filed a third-party action against Carrier (the driver
of the truck) and General Motors Corporation (GM).9 Carrier was later released by
7
Plaintiff’s wife has not brought a loss-of-consortium claim.
8
Although the majority suggests that plaintiff returned to fishing at pre-injury
levels by the spring and summer of 2006, the record indicates that plaintiff’s fishing
activities had never been interrupted. Plaintiff was asked if he “[s]till fish[ed] the same
amount of time as [he] fished before the accident when [he] get[s] a chance,” to which
plaintiff replied, “When I get a chance.” Furthermore, defendant argued in its motion for
summary disposition that plaintiff’s fishing activities were uninterrupted by the injury,
and plaintiff did not dispute this. Plaintiff essentially conceded this fact and instead
argued that the disruption in his life as a result of his injuries was centered on his inability
to work. Plaintiff also was a weekend golfer. The record reflects that since plaintiff
returned to work in August 2006, he had only golfed once, using a golf cart. We do not
know whether plaintiff was able to golf during the time between his accident in January
2005 and August 2006. Defendant argued in its motion for summary disposition that
plaintiff continued to engage in his pre-accident level of golfing activity, and again
plaintiff did not argue to the contrary.
9
With GM’s bankruptcy, the parties stipulated to a change in case caption and
party, adding Allied Automotive Group, Inc., indemnitor of GM; plaintiff’s employer,
7
stipulation of the parties, and the trial court granted GM’s motion for summary
disposition, finding that plaintiff had undergone a relatively good recovery and could not
meet the “serious impairment of body function” threshold.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, with one judge dissenting, concluding that the
impairment did not affect plaintiff’s general ability to lead his normal life. McCormick v
Carrier, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 25, 2008
(Docket No. 275888). The majority cited various facts to support its conclusion, such as
plaintiff’s golfing, fishing, driving, caring for himself, and returning to work without
restriction. The dissent would have reversed for two reasons: first, on the basis that
plaintiff’s entire life, including the possibility of future problems, must be considered;
and, second, on the basis that there was evidence to indicate that plaintiff’s life was not
currently normal. The evidence that the dissent relied on to reach this conclusion was
that plaintiff was assigned to a job with reduced physical requirements and the doctors
had identified “some indication of degenerative joint disease in [plaintiff’s] ankle.” Id.,unpub op at 2 (DAVIS, J., dissenting).
On October 22, 2008, this Court denied plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal,
although Chief Justice KELLY and Justices CAVANAGH and WEAVER would have granted
leave to appeal. 482 Mich 1018 (2008). However, after the composition of this Court
changed when Justice HATHAWAY replaced former Chief Justice TAYLOR on January 1,
Allied Systems, is a subsidiary of Allied Automotive Group, Inc. This Court entered an
order in accordance with this stipulation. 485 Mich 851 (2009).
8
2009, this Court granted plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, even though such motion
had not raised any new legal arguments. 485 Mich 851 (2009).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case presents issues of statutory interpretation, which this Court reviews de
novo. Dep’t of Transp v Tompkins, 481 Mich 184, 190; 749 NW2d 716 (2008). We also
review rulings on motions for summary disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep’t of Transp,
456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
III. ANALYSIS
A. HISTORY OF NO-FAULT INSURANCE ACT
In Michigan, before the enactment of the no-fault insurance act, the only available
recourse to victims of motor vehicle accidents seeking to recover damages was to file a
common-law tort action. “[U]nder [this] tort liability system[,] the doctrine of
contributory negligence denied benefits to a high percentage of motor vehicle accident
victims, minor injuries were overcompensated, serious injuries were undercompensated,
long payment delays were commonplace, the court system was overburdened, and those
with low income and little education suffered discrimination.” Shavers v Attorney
General, 402 Mich 554, 579; 267 NW2d 72 (1978). In response to these deficiencies, the
Legislature enacted the no-fault automobile insurance act, MCL 500.3101 et seq.,
effective March 30, 1973. The primary goal of the no-fault act is “to provide victims of
motor vehicle accidents assured, adequate, and prompt reparation for certain economic
losses.” Shavers, 402 Mich at 579. In order to meet this objective, the Legislature
decided to make no-fault insurance compulsory, i.e., “whereby every Michigan motorist
9
would be required to purchase no-fault insurance or be unable to operate a motor vehicle
legally in this state.” Id. In addition, “[i]n exchange for the payment of . . . no-fault
economic loss benefits from one’s own insurance company, the Legislature limited an
injured person’s ability to sue a negligent operator or owner of a motor vehicle for bodily
injuries.” Kreiner, 471 Mich at 115. That is, with the enactment of the no-fault act, “the
Legislature abolished tort liability generally in motor vehicle accident cases and replaced
it with a regime that established that a person injured in such an accident is entitled to
certain economic compensation from his own insurance company regardless of fault.” Id.
at 114.10 In exchange for economic loss benefits regardless of fault, “the Legislature
significantly limited the injured person’s ability to sue a third party for noneconomic
damages, e.g., pain and suffering.” Id. at 115. More specifically, no tort suit against a
third party for noneconomic damages is permitted unless the injured person “has suffered
death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.” MCL
500.3135(1).11
10
The injured person’s insurance company is responsible for all expenses incurred
for medical care, recovery, and rehabilitation as long as the service, product, or
accommodation is reasonably necessary and the charge is reasonable. MCL
500.3107(1)(a). There is no monetary limit on such expenses, and this entitlement can
last for the person’s lifetime. An injured person is also entitled to recover from his own
insurance company up to three years of earnings loss, i.e., loss of income from work that
the person would have performed if he had not been injured. MCL 500.3107(1)(b). An
injured person can also recover “replacement” expenses, i.e., expenses reasonably
incurred in obtaining ordinary and necessary services that the injured person would
otherwise have performed. MCL 500.3107(1)(c). Further, an at-fault driver is still liable
in tort for an injured person’s excess economic damages. MCL 500.3135(3)(c).
11
In its entirety, MCL 500.3135(1) provides:
10
The Legislature did not initially define the language that is in dispute in this case--
“serious impairment of body function”-- and this Court itself struggled in the process of
giving reasonable meaning to this language. In Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of
1972 PA 294, 389 Mich 441, 481; 208 NW2d 469 (1973), we held that whether the
plaintiff has suffered a “serious impairment of body function” is “within the province of
the trier of fact . . . .” However, in Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich 483; 330 NW2d 22
(1982), noting that an advisory opinion “‘is not precedentially binding in the same sense
as a decision of the Court after a hearing on the merits,’” id. at 495 (citation omitted), this
Court held:
[W]hen there is no factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of
a plaintiff’s injuries, the question of serious impairment of body function
shall be decided as a matter of law by the court. Likewise, if there is a
factual dispute as to the nature and extent of a plaintiff’s injuries, but the
dispute is not material to the determination whether plaintiff has suffered a
serious impairment of body function, the court shall rule as a matter of law
whether the threshold requirement . . . has been met. [Id. at 502.]
In addition, Cassidy held that the phrase “serious impairment of body function” refers to
“objectively manifested injuries” that impair “important body functions.” Id. at 504-505.
Cassidy also held that “the Legislature intended an objective standard that looks to the
effect of an injury on the person’s general ability to live a normal life.” Id. at 505.
Finally, Cassidy held that although “an injury need not be permanent to be serious,”
A person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss
caused by his or her ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle
only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body
function, or permanent serious disfigurement.
11
“[p]ermanency is, nevertheless, relevant” because “[t]wo injuries identical except that
one is permanent do differ in seriousness.” Id. at 505-506.
However, only four years later, in DiFranco v Pickard, 427 Mich 32; 398 NW2d
896 (1986), this Court overruled Cassidy. DiFranco held that “[i]f reasonable minds can
differ as to whether the plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of body function, the issue
must be submitted to the jury, even if the evidentiary facts are undisputed. Id. at 58. In
addition, DiFranco held that the “impairment need not be of . . . an important body
function,” and it is unnecessary to look to the effect of the injury on the person’s
“‘general ability to live a normal life.’” Id. at 39. DiFranco also held that, although the
plaintiff must prove a “medically identifiable injury,” this can be done on the basis of
“the plaintiff’s subjective complaints or the symptoms of an injury.” Id. at 75. Finally,
DiFranco held that the following factors should be considered when determining whether
the impairment was serious:
The extent of the impairment, the particular body function impaired, the
length of time the impairment lasted, the treatment required to correct the
impairment, and any other relevant factors. [Id. at 69-70.]
In 1995, the Legislature amended the no-fault act. In particular, it amended MCL
500.3135(2)(a), which provides:
The issues of whether an injured person has suffered serious
impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement are
questions of law for the court if the court finds either of the following:
(i) There is no factual dispute concerning the nature and extent of
the person’s injuries.
(ii) There is a factual dispute concerning the nature and extent of the
person’s injuries, but the dispute is not material to the determination as to
12
whether the person has suffered a serious impairment of body function or
permanent serious disfigurement.
In addition, the Legislature defined “serious impairment of body function” to mean “an
objectively manifested impairment of an important body function that affects the person’s
general ability to lead his or her normal life.” MCL 500.3135(7). In other words, the
Legislature essentially rejected DiFranco and, with one exception, codified Cassidy.12
B. KREINER V FISCHER
In Kreiner, this Court for the first time interpreted the Legislature’s definition of
“serious impairment of body function.” Because “generally” means “‘for the most part,’”
Kreiner held that “determining whether a plaintiff is ‘generally able’ to lead his normal
life requires considering whether the plaintiff is, ‘for the most part’ able to lead his
normal life.” Kreiner, 471 Mich at 130, quoting Random House Webster’s College
Dictionary (1991). In addition, because “lead” means “‘to conduct or bring in a
particular course,’” Kreiner held that “the effect of the impairment on the course of a
plaintiff’s entire normal life must be considered.” Id. at 130-131, quoting Random House
Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary (2001). Therefore, Kreiner concluded, “[a]lthough
some aspects of a plaintiff’s entire normal life may be interrupted by the impairment, if,
despite those impingements, the course or trajectory of the plaintiff’s normal life has not
12
That one exception is that while Cassidy, 415 Mich at 505, required an
evaluation of “the effect of an injury on the person’s general ability to live a normal life,”
MCL 500.3135(7) requires an evaluation of the effect of an injury on “the person’s
general ability to lead his or her normal life.” (Emphasis added.) That is, while the
Cassidy test was exclusively objective, the MCL 500.3135(7) test is at least partially
subjective.
13
been affected, then the plaintiff's ‘general ability’ to lead his normal life has not been
affected and he does not meet the ‘serious impairment of body function’ threshold.” Id.
at 131.
Kreiner established a “multi-step process . . . for separating out those plaintiffs
who meet the statutory threshold from those who do not.” Id. First, the court must
determine whether there is a factual dispute that is material to the determination whether
the person has suffered a serious impairment of body function.13 Second, the court must
determine whether an important body function has been impaired. Third, the court must
determine whether the impairment is objectively manifested.14 Finally, the court must
determine whether the impairment affects the plaintiff’s general ability to lead his or her
normal life. “In determining whether the course of the plaintiff’s normal life has been
affected, a court should engage in a multifaceted inquiry, comparing the plaintiff’s life
before and after the accident as well as the significance of any affected aspects on the
course of the plaintiff’s overall life.” Id. at 132-133. Kreiner indicated that the following
factors may be of assistance in evaluating whether the plaintiff’s general ability to
conduct the course of his normal life has been affected:
13
If there is such a dispute, the court cannot decide the issue as a matter of law;
however, if there is no such dispute, the court can so decide.
14
“Subjective complaints that are not medically documented are insufficient.” Id.
at 132.
14
(a) the nature and extent of the impairment, (b) the type and length
of treatment required, (c) the duration of the impairment,[15] (d) the extent
of any residual impairment,[16] and (e) the prognosis for eventual recovery.
[Id. at 133.]
Although the dissent in Kreiner essentially agreed with the majority’s analysis of the
language “an objectively manifested impairment of an important body function,” it
disagreed with the majority’s analysis of the language “that affects the person’s general
ability to lead his or her normal life.” Most significantly in this regard, the dissent
rejected the factors set forth by the majority on the basis that “time or temporal
considerations” are inappropriate considerations. Id. at 147 (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting).
C. MAJORITY’S NEW TEST
It is appropriate that Justice CAVANAGH, the authoring justice of the majority
opinion in DiFranco, which was rejected by the Legislature, and also the authoring
justice of the dissent in Kreiner, which was rejected by this Court, is now the authoring
justice of the majority opinion, in which Kreiner is overruled. While to some, there may
be a sense of justice, or at least a sense of irony, in this sequence of events, to others,
including those of us in dissent in this case, such sequence embodies all that is wrong
when a judiciary confuses its own preferences with those of the people’s representatives
in the Legislature. While it is intriguing that Justice CAVANAGH now is able to transform
his dissent in Kreiner into a majority opinion, and thereby resuscitate his earlier opinion
15
“While an injury need not be permanent, it must be of sufficient duration to
affect the course of a plaintiff’s life.” Id. at 135.
16
“Self-imposed restrictions, as opposed to physician-imposed restrictions, based
on real or perceived pain do not establish this point.” Id. at 133 n 17.
15
in DiFranco, this has been achieved only after the people of this state, through their
Legislature, have made clear that DiFranco did not reflect what ought to be the policy of
this state. Therefore, just as he did in his dissent in Kreiner, Justice CAVANAGH, now
with majority support, rejects Kreiner’s analysis of the language “that affects the person’s
general ability to lead his or her normal life.” The worm has turned, and never mind
what the people and their Legislature have sought to accomplish in establishing as the
law.
Before proceeding too far into where our substantive disagreements lie, I would be
remiss not to point out where we are in agreement. First, the majority, just as did the
Kreiner dissent, largely agrees with Kreiner’s analysis of MCL 500.3135(2)(a), i.e., if
there is no material factual dispute, whether a person has suffered a serious impairment of
body function should be determined by the court as a matter of law.17 The majority also
17
However, the majority indicates that this statute “could unconstitutionally
conflict with MCR 2.116(C)(10) . . . .” Because I see no conflict between the statute and
the court rule, i.e., each allows the court to determine as a matter of law whether a person
has suffered a serious impairment of body function only if there are no material factual
disputes, I do not believe the statute is in any way unconstitutional. Moreover, the case
cited by the majority in support of its suggestion that jury trials “promote judicial
efficiency” actually stands for the exact opposite proposition. See Moll v Abbott
Laboratories, 444 Mich 1, 26; 506 NW2d 816 (1993) (“Both our court rules and case law
recognize the desirability of allowing summary disposition, regardless of a jury request,
when uncontroverted facts are presented to the court. This promotes efficiency and
preservation of judicial resources.”). It is interesting that, although the majority
acknowledges that the constitutionality of MCL 500.3135(2)(a) is not at issue here, it
repeatedly implies that MCL 500.3135(2)(a) “could” be unconstitutional, thus, making it
obvious that MCL 500.3135(2)(a) will also likely fall within the majority’s effort to
expunge the jurisprudence of the past decade.
16
largely agrees with Kreiner’s analysis of the language, “an objectively manifested
impairment of an important body function.”18 In addition, the majority agrees with
Kreiner’s conclusion that the serious impairment of body function threshold entails a
subjective analysis, i.e., “[w]hether an impairment that precludes a person from throwing
a ninety-five miles-an-hour fastball is a ‘serious impairment of body function’ may
depend on whether the person is a professional baseball player or an accountant who likes
to play catch with his son every once in a while.” Kreiner, 471 Mich at 134 n 19. The
I also disagree with the majority that “the disputed fact does not need to be
outcome determinative in order to be material . . . .” MCL 500.3135(2)(a)(ii) states,
“whether an injured person has suffered serious impairment of body function . . . [is a]
question [] of law for the court if the court finds . . . [that the] factual dispute . . . is not
material to the determination as to whether the person has suffered a serious impairment
of body function . . . .” That is, “[a]bsent an outcome-determinative genuine factual
dispute, the issue of threshold injury is now a question of law for the court.” Kern v
Blethen-Coluni, 240 Mich App 333, 341; 612 NW2d 838 (2000) (emphasis added).
Although the majority cites Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed) in support of its proposition
that “the disputed fact does not need to be outcome determinative in order to be
material,” Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed) states the very opposite-- “[m]aterial fact is
one upon which outcome of litigation depends.” See also Black’s Law Dictionary (8th
ed), which defines “material” as “[h]aving some logical connection with the
consequential facts,” and Random House Webster’s College Dictionary, which defines
“material” as “likely to influence the determination of a case.”
18
The majority does take issue with Kreiner’s conclusion that “[s]ubjective
complaints that are not medically documented are insufficient” to establish that an
impairment is “objectively manifested.” Kreiner, 471 Mich at 132. However, given that
the majority agrees that “plaintiffs must ‘introduce evidence establishing that there is a
physical basis for their subjective complaints of pain and suffering,’” quoting DiFranco,
427 Mich at 74, and I am uncertain what evidence other than medical documentation
would establish such a “physical basis,” it is not clear why the majority objects to
Kreiner’s statement that medical documentation is required. See also DiFranco, 427
Mich at 75 (“The ‘serious impairment of body function’ threshold requires the plaintiff to
prove that his noneconomic losses arose out of a medically identifiable injury which
seriously impaired a body function.”) (emphasis added).
17
majority also agrees with Kreiner’s conclusion that determining whether a plaintiff’s
general ability to lead his or her normal life has been affected “necessarily requires a
comparison of the plaintiff’s life before and after the incident.”19 Finally, the majority
agrees with Kreiner’s conclusion that permanency is not required.20
1. DIFRANCO VS. CASSIDY
However, this is where our agreements end. First, the majority takes issue with
Kreiner’s statement that “the Legislature largely rejected DiFranco in favor of Cassidy.”
Kreiner, 471 Mich at 121 n 8. As explained earlier, the Legislature adopted Cassidy with
a single exception. That single exception pertains to the fact that Cassidy, 415 Mich at
505, required an evaluation of “the effect of an injury on the person’s general ability to
live a normal life,” while MCL 500.3135(7) requires an evaluation of the effect of an
injury on “the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life.” (Emphasis added.)
That is, while the Cassidy test was entirely objective, the MCL 500.3135(7) test is at least
partially subjective. As this Court explained in Kreiner, 471 Mich at 121 n 7:
[T]he Legislature modified the entirely objective Cassidy standard to
a partially objective and partially subjective inquiry. Thus, what is
“normal” is to be determined subjectively on the basis of the plaintiff’s own
life and not the life of some objective third party. However, once that is
19
The majority also indicates that “many other considerations could typically be
relevant to determining how an impairment affects a person’s ability to live in his or her
pre-incident normal manner of living.” The majority does not offer any further
explanation as to what these “many other considerations” might conceivably be.
20
Although Kreiner, 471 Mich at 135, specifically held that “an injury need not be
permanent,” the majority nonetheless criticizes it for “effectively creat[ing] a permanency
requirement.”
18
fixed as the base, it is to be objectively determined whether the impairment
in fact affects the plaintiff’s “general ability to lead” that life.
Nevertheless, given that: (a) Cassidy, 415 Mich at 505, held that courts should “look[] to
the effect of an injury on the person’s general ability to live a normal life”; (b) DiFranco,
427 Mich at 39, held that courts should not look to the effect of the injury on the person’s
“‘general ability to live a normal life’”; and (c) the Legislature subsequently and
affirmatively directed the courts to look to the effect of an injury on “the person’s general
ability to lead his or her normal life,” MCL 500.3135(7), the Legislature obviously
preferred the policy of Cassidy to that of DiFranco. In addition, in contrast to DiFranco,
and consistent with Cassidy, the Legislature expressly adopted an “important body
function” requirement, MCL 500.3135(7), and amended MCL 500.3135 to make clear
that whether a serious impairment of body function has occurred is a question of law
unless there is a material factual dispute. MCL 500.3135(2)(a). Thus, contrary to the
majority’s understandably defensive posture, it is hardly an “oversimplification” to
conclude that the Legislature essentially rejected DiFranco in favor of Cassidy.21
Moreover, the Legislature’s action of amending MCL 500.3135 following
DiFranco is an example of legislative history that has genuine utility in the interpretative
process. This Court has emphasized that “not all legislative history is of equal value,”
and has specifically noted that “[c]learly of the highest quality is legislative history that
relates to an action of the Legislature from which a court may draw reasonable inferences
21
Contrary to the majority’s contention, this dissent very clearly provides in the
above language “specific, substantive arguments” in support of this conclusion.
19
about the Legislature’s intent . . . .” In re Certified Question, 468 Mich 109, 115 n 5; 659
NW2d 597 (2003). The instant case presents an ideal “[e]xample[] of legitimate
legislative history,” i.e., the recitation of “actions of the Legislature intended to repudiate
the judicial construction of a statute . . . .” Id. And yet, not altogether inexplicably, the
majority entirely disregards these legislative actions.
Defendant and amicus curiae the Attorney General have presented the Court with
legislative analyses, committee reports, and other materials to support their argument
that, in enacting the amendments, the Legislature intended to repudiate DiFranco and
restore Cassidy, just as Kreiner held. Even the most cursory review of these documents
demonstrates that defendant and its amicus’ reading has merit. For example, the original
draft of House Bill 4341 was accompanied by a memorandum from its sponsor that stated
that the bill’s first goal was to “[r]eestablish the two-part Cassidy standard of: (1)
definition of ‘serious impairment of body function,’ and (2) make the determination of
whether an injury is a serious impairment of body function a question of law (judge)
rather than of fact (jury).” Memorandum of Representative Harold Voorhees enclosing
the original draft of HB 4341, February 8, 1995. Similarly, the House Legislative
Analysis expressly set forth the chronology of Cassidy and DiFranco, noting that
DiFranco had “rejected” Cassidy and that the bill “would return to a tort threshold
resembling that provided by the Cassidy ruling . . . .” House Legislative Analysis, HB
4341, December 18, 1995. The analysis provided to the Senate Financial Services
Committee likewise explained in the first sentence of the bill’s description that it “would
put into law the Cassidy standards for meeting the serious impairment of body function
20
threshold.” Department of Commerce Bill Analysis of HB 4341, February 14, 1995.
And finally, it is apparent from the statements of protest of the bill’s opponents that they
also clearly understood House Bill 4341 to be a “return to the Cassidy standard.”
Statements of Senator Henry Stallings and Senator John Cherry, October 12, 1995.
While on several occasions I have explained why I do not find all forms of
legislative history to be useful tools in the interpretative process, see, e.g., Petersen v
Magna Corp, 484 Mich 300, 381-382; 773 NW2d 564 (2009) (MARKMAN, J.,
dissenting), the author of the majority opinion has never questioned their utility.22 Thus,
22
The authoring justice states, “I have repeatedly stated that legislative history
should only be used when statutory language is ambiguous.” Although, in some cases, he
has asserted this, see, for example, People v Gardner, 482 Mich 41; 753 NW2d 78 (2008)
(CAVANAGH, J., dissenting); Bukowski v Detroit, 478 Mich 268; 732 NW2d 75 (2007)
(CAVANAGH, J., concurring); People v Derror, 475 Mich 316; 715 NW2d 822 (2006)
(CAVANAGH, J., dissenting); Lansing Mayor v Pub Serv Comm, 470 Mich 154; 680
NW2d 840 (2004) (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting), in other cases, he has suggested that
legislative history can be considered even though the statute is not ambiguous, see, for
example, Jackson v Green Estate, 484 Mich 209, 230; 771 NW2d 675 (2009)
(CAVANAGH, J., dissenting) (“Not only is this interpretation consistent with the plain
language of the statute, it is also consistent with the legislative history of the statute.”)
(emphasis added); Koester v City of Novi, 458 Mich 1; 580 NW2d 835 (1998); Elias Bros
Restaurants v Treasury Dep’t, 452 Mich 144; 549 NW2d 837 (1996) (CAVANAGH, J.,
concurring); People v Barrera, 451 Mich 261; 547 NW2d 280 (1996); People v Sloan,
450 Mich 160; 538 NW2d 380 (1995); Orzel v Scott Drug Co, 449 Mich 550; 537 NW2d
208 (1995); Gardner v Van Buren Pub Schools, 445 Mich 23; 517 NW2d 1 (1994);
Grand Trunk Western R Co v Fenton, 439 Mich 240; 482 NW2d 706 (1992); Romein v
General Motors Corp, 436 Mich 515; 462 NW2d 555 (1990). Further, given the
definition of “ambiguous” supported by the authoring justice, see Petersen, 484 Mich at
329 (KELLY, C.J., lead opinion) (quoting Yellow Freight Sys, Inc v Michigan, 464 Mich
21, 38; 627 NW2d 236 [2001], for the proposition that “‘[w]hen a statute is capable of
being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses,
[a] statute is ambiguous’”), and the different understandings given to the statute here by
the majority and dissenting justices, I fail to see how, by his own standards, he can
21
there is no apparent reason why the majority “turn[s] a blind eye to the wealth of extrinsic
information available” on the history of the 1995 amendments. Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc
v Governor, 481 Mich 56, 95 n 34; 748 NW2d 524 (2008) (KELLY, J., dissenting).
Rather, the only, quite obvious explanation for the majority’s selective silence is that it
can find nothing in this “wealth of extrinsic information available” to support its
interpretation. One of the most common and compelling critiques of the use of
legislative history is that a judge can almost always find something in the legislative
history to support the interpretation he personally wishes to give to a law. To borrow an
analogy invoked by United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, using
legislative history is like entering a room, looking over the assembled multitudes in the
crowd, and picking out your friends. See Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), at 36. In its near silence, the majority places a
new twist on this analogy, and illustrates another fundamental problem with the use of
legislative history. Here, the majority enters a room, and, finding no friends in sight,
makes a quick exit. Considering the quality and quantity of the legislative history
available here, the majority’s “quick exit” and its selective silence on the subject speaks
volumes. It should not go unremarked that it is this dissent that cites legislative history--
albeit a uniquely persuasive and bona fide form of legislative history-- as a relevant factor
in interpreting MCL 500.3135, while the justices of the majority, the supposed advocates
conclude that the statute is unambiguous, unless, of course, he does not believe that the
dissenting justices are “reasonably well-informed persons.”
22
of this mode of interpretation, exclude this from their consideration. Apparently,
legislative history is to be considered when it supports a justice’s preferred interpretation,
and ignored when it does not.
Indeed, the problem with this approach of sometimes relying on legislative history
and sometimes not is, as I explained in my dissent in Petersen, 484 Mich at 381-382, that
it is a process in which judges in the very guise of selecting the tools and
factors to be employed in “interpreting” the law are effectively its
formulators-- in short, judges who are wielding the legislative, not the
judicial, power.
A critical strength of a judicial philosophy committed to exercising
only the constitution’s “judicial power” is that reasonably clear rules of
decision-making are established before the fact. That is, a judge essentially
promises the parties that he or she will decide their case, as with all others,
by attempting to discern the reasonable meaning of relevant statutes or
contracts and that this will be done by relying upon recognized rules, and
tools, of interpretation. By contrast, under the [majority’s] approach . . . ,
in which there is essentially a limitless array of rules, and tools, that may be
employed for “defining” the law apart from its language, there is no
consistently applied interpretative process with which the judge promises
beforehand to comply. He or she may promise to be “fair,” and he or she
may seek to be fair, but there are no rules for how this fairness is to be
achieved. There is only the promise that the judge will address each
dispute on a case-by-case basis, using whatever rules, and whichever tools,
he or she believes are required in that instance. And the suspicion simply
cannot be avoided that these varying and indeterminate rules, and tools,
may be largely a function of the outcome preferred by the judge and by his
or her personal attitudes toward the parties and their causes. Any
interpretative rules will be identified only after the fact, and these “rules”
may or may not have been invoked in resolving yesterday’s dispute, and
may or may not be employed in resolving tomorrow’s dispute. Any judge
can concoct an after-the-fact rationale for a decision; the judicial process,
however, is predicated upon before-the-fact rationales. An ad hoc process
is not a judicial process at all. In the place of predetermined rules--
otherwise understood as the rule of law-- the [majority] would substitute
rules to be determined later. [Emphasis in the original.]
23
2. “TRAJECTORY” AND “ENTIRE”
Next, the majority peremptorily rejects Kreiner’s use of the words “trajectory” and
“entire.” Again, the pertinent statutory language being defined here is, “that affects the
person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life.” MCL 500.3135(7). “Lead” is
defined as “to conduct or bring . . . in a particular course,” and, as the majority
acknowledges, “‘trajectory’ is a synonym for ‘course.’” Random House Webster’s
College Dictionary (1991). In addition, contrary to the majority’s contention, Kreiner’s
use of the word “entire” was not “created out of thin air.” Instead, the use of the word
“entire” derived from the Legislature’s use of the word “general” because “in general”
means “with respect to the entirety.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary
(1991) (emphasis added). More accurately, it is the meaning that the majority gives to
“general” that is “created out of thin air.” The majority concludes that the word
“general” means “some,” even though the definition that the majority itself relies upon
does not even include “some,” but instead indicates that “general” means “whole,”
“every,” “majority,” “prevalent,” “usually,” “in most instances,” “not limited,” and “main
features.” Nowhere among these possible meanings can a reader sight the word
“some.”23
23
I find it interesting that the authoring justice of the majority opinion once
chastised me for “leav[ing] no dictionary unturned,” with regards to an opinion in which I
cited two different dictionaries, People v Raby, 456 Mich 487, 501; 572 NW2d 644
(1998) (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting), and, here, he cites seven different dictionaries and
still cannot quite find a definition that serves his purpose. While considering relevant
dictionary definitions can be a valuable tool of interpretation, the majority’s generous use
of dictionaries here is noteworthy because the majority has questioned the propriety and
24
3. TEMPORAL CONSIDERATIONS
Finally, the majority rejects the non-exhaustive list of factors that Kreiner set forth
for consideration in evaluating whether the plaintiff’s general ability to lead his normal
life has been affected. The majority asserts that Kreiner “departed . . . from the statutory
text, by providing an extra-textual ‘nonexhaustive list of objective factors’ to be used to
compare the plaintiff’s pre- and post-incident lifestyle.” This critique is quite surprising
given that it is not uncommon for courts in general, and for this Court in particular, to
provide “extra-textual” factors to be considered in interpreting a statute that demands a
fact-specific analysis.24 To the best of my knowledge, members of this majority have
never before complained about this practice, but consistency in the application and non-
application of interpretative factors is hardly a preoccupation of this majority.25
usefulness of this tool in the past. Jones v Olson, 480 Mich 1169, 1176 (2008) (“In the
legal context, using a dictionary to unwaveringly determine the legislative intent behind a
statute is nothing more than barely hidden judicial activism.”) (WEAVER, J., dissenting)
(Then-Justice KELLY and Justice CAVANAGH joined Justice WEAVER’s dissenting
statement).
24
I use the phrase “extra-textual” factors only because this is the phrase the
majority uses. However, in truth, I do not believe that the factors articulated in Kreiner
are at all “extra-textual,” because these have been derived directly from the text of the
statute itself.
25
Indeed, as I explained in my dissent in Petersen, 484 Mich at 380, the majority’s
“interpretative” process seems to consist of “picking and choosing at [its] discretion from
among some uncertain array of tools lying ‘beyond the plain language of the statute [or
contract].’” (Citation omitted.) The problem with this approach is that “[t]he litigants
will, of course, have no notice beforehand of which tools are to be employed, for the
justices themselves will not know this beforehand.” Id. The rule gleaned from the
instant case is apparently that it is appropriate to employ “extra-textual” factors, but only
25
Indeed, in DiFranco itself, Justice CAVANAGH provided numerous “extra-textual”
factors to be considered in determining whether a plaintiff has established a serious
impairment of body function. DiFranco, 427 Mich at 69-70, states:
In determining whether the impairment of body function was
serious, the jury should consider such factors as the extent of the
impairment, the particular body function impaired, the length of time the
impairment lasted, the treatment required to correct the impairment, and
any other relevant factors.
Indeed, these “extra-textual” factors are remarkably similar to the Kreiner factors: “(a)
the nature and extent of the impairment, (b) the type and length of treatment required, (c)
the duration of the impairment, (d) the extent of any residual impairment, and (e) the
prognosis for eventual recovery.” Kreiner, 471 Mich at 133. It not clear why the
authoring justice thought it acceptable to list “extra-textual” factors in DiFranco, but
unacceptable to cite virtually the same factors in Kreiner. In addition, in Wexford Med
Group v City of Cadillac, 474 Mich 192; 713 NW2d 734 (2006), he listed “extra-textual”
factors a court should consider in determining whether an entity is a “charitable
institution” and thus exempt from ad valorem property taxes. Also, in Chmielewski v
Xermac, Inc, 457 Mich 593, 633; 580 NW2d 817 (1998), the Court considered the
Handicapper’s Civil Rights Act requirement that to be handicapped one must be
“substantially limited in a major life activity.” MCL 37.1103(e)(i)(A). Then-Justice
KELLY, joined by Justice CAVANAGH, stated in dissent:
where the majority wishes to do so. The parties will be made aware of the majority’s
inclinations, but only after a decision has been issued.
26
I would hold that the following factors should be considered to
determine whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life
activity: (1) the nature of the impairment, (2) its severity, (3) its duration or
expected duration, and (4) its long-term effect. [Chmielewski, 457 Mich at
63.]
See, also, Wood v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 413 Mich 573; 321 NW2d 653 (1982),
listing several “extra-textual” factors a court should consider in awarding “reasonable”
attorney fees under MCL 500.3148(1);26 Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 404
Mich 477, 496-497; 274 NW2d 373 (1979), adopting a four-factor test to determine
whether for purposes of the no-fault act a person is “domiciled in the same household” as
a relative pursuant to MCL 500.3114; Stewart v Michigan, 471 Mich 692, 698-699; 692
NW2d 376 (2004), stating “extra-textual” “factors such as the manner, location, and
fashion in which a vehicle is parked” are material to determining whether the parked
vehicle poses an unreasonable risk under MCL 500.3106(1); and Reed v Yackell, 473
Mich 520; 703 NW2d 1 (2005), utilizing an “extra-textual” multi-factor economic-reality
test to determine who is an employer for purposes of the Worker’s Disability
Compensation Act.
As should be readily apparent, the majority’s claim that Kreiner erred by including
“extra-textual” factors to consider in interpreting a statute is a wholly manufactured
concern. The statute requires a fact-specific analysis. As Justice CAVANAGH’s
DiFranco opinion and numerous other decisions of this Court have recognized, such
26
In his dissent in Smith v Khouri, 481 Mich 519, 544; 751 NW2d 472 (2008),
Justice CAVANAGH affirmed his satisfaction with the Wood “factors,” even though these
factors are obviously “extra-textual.”
27
factors assist courts in applying the statutory language on a case-by-case basis. To date,
none of the members of the majority have objected to the inclusion of such factors in any
other of this Court’s decisions.
Nevertheless, the majority rejects Kreiner’s “extra-textual” factors on the basis
that they all “include a temporal component,” reiterating the argument made by the
Kreiner dissent that “the statute does not create an express temporal requirement as to
how long an impairment must last.” Ante at __, see also Kreiner, 471 Mich at 147(CAVANAGH, J., dissenting) (“[T]he serious impairment of body function threshold does
not suggest any sort of temporal limitation. . . . Therefore, the duration of the impairment
is not an appropriate inquiry.”). Indeed, the majority now holds that it is unnecessary to
consider whether the impairment even “continues to affect [plaintiff’s] general ability to
lead his pre-incident ‘normal life’ . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
The majority, not surprisingly, claims that this dissent mischaracterizes its holding
when we conclude that temporal considerations are wholly or largely irrelevant in the
majority’s holding. Not only, as explained above, is my characterization of their holding
supported by the actual language of the majority opinion, but it is also dictated by simple
logic. That is, given that the majority rejects Kreiner’s factors because they all “include a
temporal component,” given that it feels passionately enough about this to write a lengthy
opinion overruling Kreiner, and given that we can discern no other significant departure
28
from Kreiner in the majority’s new test than that of the temporal component,27 it is
difficult to escape the conclusion we reach here, that the majority believes that temporal
considerations are wholly or largely irrelevant.
I am reminded of a famous Sherlock Holmes line:
“How often have I said to you that when you have eliminated the
impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth?”
[A. Conan Doyle, The Sign of the Four, from The Complete Sherlock
Holmes (New York: Doubleday, 1890), ch 6, p 111.]
That is, given that the majority essentially agrees with everything in Kreiner but its
temporal considerations,28 Kreiner’s temporal considerations are all that remain as to our
27
As explained above, there are other discrepancies between Kreiner and the
majority’s opinion, i.e., the DiFranco/Cassidy and the “trajectory/entire” discrepancies.
However, these two discrepancies are intertwined with our disagreement about whether
temporal considerations should be considered. By returning our law to DiFranco, at
which time the plaintiff’s “general ability to lead his or her normal life” was not at issue,
it is much easier for the majority to claim that temporal considerations are wholly or
largely irrelevant. In addition, because the majority believes that it is inappropriate to
consider either the “trajectory” or the “entire” person’s life, it believes that temporal
considerations, such as the duration of the impairment, are wholly or largely irrelevant.
However, because we conclude that the statute clearly precludes a return to DiFranco,
since the Legislature has very clearly indicated that the plaintiff’s “general ability to lead
his or her normal life” is at issue, we believe that temporal considerations are relevant.
Similarly, because we believe that the “trajectory” or the “entire” person’s life should be
considered, we believe that temporal considerations, such as the duration of the
impairment, are, in fact, highly relevant.
28
The majority essentially agrees with: (1) Kreiner’s analysis of MCL
500.3135(2)(a), i.e., if there is no material factual dispute, whether a person has suffered
a serious impairment of body function should be determined by the court as a matter of
law; (2) Kreiner’s analysis of the language, “an objectively manifested impairment of an
important body function”; (3) Kreiner’s conclusion that the serious impairment of body
function threshold entails a subjective analysis; (4) Kreiner’s conclusion that determining
whether a plaintiff’s general ability to lead his or her normal life has been affected
29
disagreement. Therefore, that the majority disagrees with Kreiner’s temporal
considerations, such as the duration of the impairment, “must be the truth.” In other
words, when comparing the Kreiner test and the majority’s new test-- whatever that is
intended to be-- the only apparent substantive difference is that, while Kreiner expressly
includes temporal considerations, the majority’s test does not. Given that the majority
essentially agrees with everything in Kreiner but its temporal considerations, and given
that the only reason it gives for rejecting these considerations is that they all “include a
temporal component,” how can we deduce anything other than that the majority holds
that temporal considerations, such as the duration of the impairment, are irrelevant?
Furthermore, if temporal considerations are not irrelevant, why does the majority
not explain in what way these are relevant, or how, in fact, the majority views the
relevancy of temporal considerations, and how these views differ from those expressed in
Kreiner? This glaring void in explanation of its own test in the majority opinion can only
be explained by the fact that the majority is holding that temporal considerations are
wholly or largely irrelevant.
In sum, if temporal considerations are relevant: (1) why is the majority overruling
Kreiner; (2) why does the majority reject Kreiner’s factors, such as the duration of the
impairment; (3) why does the majority not include temporal considerations within its new
test; (4) why does the majority fail to explain the relevancy of temporal considerations;
“necessarily requires a comparison of the plaintiff’s life before and after the incident”;
and (5) Kreiner’s conclusion that permanency is not required.
30
(5) why does the majority conclude that it is unnecessary to consider whether the
impairment “continues to affect [plaintiff’s] general ability to lead his pre-incident
‘normal life’”; and (6) perhaps most tellingly, why does not the majority clarify its
position, whatever it may be, in light of this dissent? Simply saying that our conclusion
is “erroneous” does not make it so, and, even more to the point, will hardly assist the
bench and bar of this state in determining whether, and how, temporal considerations
somehow remain relevant after today’s decision.
For these reasons, we are unable to avoid the conclusion that the majority is,
indeed, holding that temporal considerations are wholly or largely irrelevant, even though
this “improbable” result constitutes a departure from Cassidy, DiFranco, and Kreiner,
and makes utterly no sense. How can it possibly be determined whether an impairment
“affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life” without taking into
account temporal considerations? As Kreiner, 471 Mich at 133 n 18, inquired:
Does the dissent [now the majority] really believe that an
impairment lasting only a few moments has the same effect on a person’s
“general ability to lead his or her normal life” as an impairment lasting
several years or that an impairment requiring annual treatment has the same
effect on a person’s “general ability to lead his or her normal life” as an
impairment requiring daily treatment?
Does the majority really believe that the Legislature intended for the serious impairment
threshold to be met in every instance where an objectively manifested impairment of an
important body function affected a person’s ability to lead his normal life for a mere
moment in time? What if a person gets hit in the head and passes out for five minutes,
but after those five minutes is completely unaffected by the impairment? If all temporal
31
considerations are irrelevant, would not this person satisfy the majority’s threshold,
because his general ability to lead his normal life was certainly affected for those five
minutes of unconsciousness? Under the majority’s rule, it is apparently irrelevant that the
person arose after those five minutes and led a completely normal life thereafter. The
majority asserts that all that matters is that for that moment in time, the person’s general
ability to lead his normal life had been affected. I am not sure that the majority’s new
threshold can even be called a “threshold” when it can be satisfied in virtually every
automobile accident case that results in injury.29 As long as the plaintiff has suffered an
objectively manifested impairment of an important body function, that plaintiff will have
satisfied the majority’s threshold, because the majority has essentially read the third
criterion, i.e., “that affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life,” out
of the statute.
The clearest illustration of the difficulty in determining whether an impairment
“affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life” without taking into
account temporal considerations is the majority’s own inability to do so.30 In determining
29
It certainly is a “threshold” bearing no resemblance to the other two thresholds--
“permanent serious disfigurement” and “death.” See MCL 500.3135(1).
30
The majority criticizes Kreiner as “def[ying] practical workability” on the basis
that “Kreiner has led to inconsistent interpretation of the statutory language, with
similarly situated plaintiffs being treated differently by different courts.” However, in his
opinion in DiFranco, 427 Mich at 56-57, Justice CAVANAGH has already provided an
explanation for why this might be the case:
Conflicting results have also arisen among cases involving similarly
injured plaintiffs. This is undoubtedly because no two plaintiffs are injured
32
whether the plaintiff in the instant case suffered an impairment that affects his general
ability to lead his normal life, the majority itself repeatedly cites temporal considerations.
For example, the majority indicates that “for a month after the incident, plaintiff could
not bear weight on his left ankle”; “[h]e underwent two surgeries over a period of 10
months and multiple months of physical therapy”; “after the incident he was unable to
perform functions necessary for his job for at least 14 months”; “he did not return to work
for 19 months”; and “he missed fishing for a year after the incident.” (Emphasis added.)
Are such temporal considerations irrelevant or relevant? Do we interpret the words or the
actions of the majority? And, if temporal considerations are irrelevant, how are we to
determine whether an impairment affects a plaintiff’s “general ability to lead his normal
life”? The majority does not appear to know the answers, and it appears not to care that it
does not know.
Indeed, under the majority’s new threshold, it would seem that the moment the
plaintiff in this case went to the emergency room and it was determined that he had
broken his ankle, the threshold was met. For at that moment, plaintiff could not work.
While at the emergency room, and for some measurable time afterwards, plaintiff’s
or recover in precisely the same manner. These conflicting results indicate
that threshold issues are often questions upon which reasonable minds can
differ.
Moreover, if the Court of Appeals is inconsistently or incorrectly applying Kreiner, this
Court has a mechanism to rectify such errors-- reversing such decisions, not overruling
precedent and substituting an incomprehensible new standard bearing no relationship to
the law being interpreted.
33
broken ankle affected not just some, but all, of his capacity to live his normal life. Under
the majority’s non-temporal test, there is apparently no need to consider anything beyond
the emergency room visit. If this reading of its decision is wrong, once again, the
majority might wish to explain why this is so for the benefit of the bench, the bar, and the
public.
In crafting its new threshold, the majority would also have been wise to consider
the larger no-fault statute. Recall that the Legislature has decided that an injured plaintiff
should only be allowed to sue to recover noneconomic damages resulting from an
automobile accident where he or she has suffered: (a) death; (b) permanent serious
disfigurement; or (c) serious impairment of body function. MCL 500.3135. It is well
established that “‘[w]hen construing a series of terms . . . we are guided by the principle
that words grouped in a list should be given related meaning.’” In re Complaint of Rovas
Against SBC Mich, 482 Mich 90, 114; 754 NW2d 259 (2008) (citation omitted). “In other
words, this Court applies the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, which ‘stands for the principle
that a word or phrase is given meaning by its context of setting.’” Id. (citation omitted).
Therefore, as this Court explained in Cassidy, 415 Mich at 503:
In determining the seriousness of the injury required for a “serious
impairment of body function”, this threshold should be considered in
conjunction with the other threshold requirements for a tort action for
noneconomic loss, namely, death and permanent serious disfigurement.
MCL 500.3135 . . . . The Legislature clearly did not intend to erect two
significant obstacles to a tort action for noneconomic loss and one quite
insignificant obstacle.[31]
31
See also DiFranco, 427 Mich at 95 (WILLIAMS, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“In the statutory language, ‘serious impairment of body function’
34
In addition, the Legislature defined “serious impairment of body function” to mean “an
objectively manifested impairment of an important body function that affects the person’s
general ability to lead his or her normal life.” MCL 500.3135(7). Obviously, in enacting
this threshold language, and in joining it with “death” and “serious permanent
disfigurement,” the Legislature was unlikely to have had in mind an impairment that only
affected a plaintiff’s ability to lead his normal life for a moment in time, with no
consideration being given to the plaintiff’s general ability to lead his normal life beyond
that moment. Indeed, it is quite certain that this is not what the Legislature had in mind,
given that the very premise of the no-fault act, and the core of the accompanying
legislative compromise, was that some injured persons would not be able to recover
noneconomic damages, so that all injured persons would be able to recover economic loss
benefits regardless of fault.
D. APPLICATION
As explained earlier, both Kreiner and the majority agree that the court must first
determine whether there is a factual dispute that is material to the determination whether
plaintiff has suffered a serious impairment of body function. Here, there are no material
factual disputes. Before the accident, plaintiff worked approximately 60 hours a week
and for the six months immediately before the accident, plaintiff’s position was that of a
medium truck loader. Additionally, plaintiff fished and golfed. Twelve months after the
appears with the other threshold requirements of ‘permanent serious disfigurement’ and
‘death,’ leaving the strong implication, under the rule of ejusdem generis, that while the
impairment need not be permanent or fatal, it was not to be transient or trivial either.”).
35
accident, plaintiff’s surgeon cleared him to return to work with no restrictions. Seventeen
months after the accident, plaintiff returned to work and has been able to perform all of
his job duties since then. During the entire time he was recuperating, plaintiff could tend
to his needs and there was no effect on his relationship with his then-fiancée.
Additionally, plaintiff continued to fish and golf. Thus, I agree with the majority that
there are no factual disputes that are material to the determination of whether plaintiff
suffered a serious impairment of a body function. The facts are clear.
I also agree with the majority that the “body function” that was “impaired,” the
ability to walk, was “important,” and that the impairment was “objectively manifested.”
Although plaintiff was able to walk to some extent, his ability to do so was impaired, and
his impairment, a broken ankle, was recognized by his doctors. The final, and critical,
inquiry in this case concerns whether the impairment affects plaintiff’s “general ability to
lead his normal life.” This is where the majority and I depart. The Kreiner analysis
requires a comparison of plaintiff’s life before the accident and after the accident,
including “the significance of any affected aspects on the course of the plaintiff’s overall
life.” Kreiner, 471 Mich at 132-133. To aid in this analysis, the following factors may
be considered:
(a) the nature and extent of the impairment, (b) the type and length
of treatment required, (c) the duration of the impairment, (d) the extent of
any residual impairment, and (e) the prognosis for eventual recovery. [Id.
at 133.]
Plaintiff’s ability to walk, as just noted, was impaired by a broken ankle.
However, once plaintiff’s ankle was placed in a cast at the emergency room, he was able
36
to walk with the aid of crutches. And, immediately following his initial surgery in which
a device was implanted to stabilize his ankle, plaintiff was still able to walk with
crutches, although he was instructed not to place any weight on his ankle for one month.
Plaintiff underwent physical therapy and nine months later, in October of 2005, plaintiff
again underwent surgery to remove the device. By January 2006 (one year after the
accident), plaintiff’s surgeon had cleared plaintiff to return to work with no restrictions.
However, plaintiff claimed that he could not keep up with the demands of his job and
thus was placed back on workers’ compensation. Although plaintiff’s subjective reports
of his pain from January 2006 forward varied greatly,32 the March 2006 FCE supported
plaintiff’s claim that he could not fully perform all of his previous job duties; however,
this was due in part to a preexisting and unrelated shoulder injury. After plaintiff’s
workers’ compensation benefits were terminated, however, plaintiff requested another
FCE, and, on August 1, 2006, the FCE showed that plaintiff was able to perform essential
job demands with no restrictions. Plaintiff returned to work on August 16, 2006, and has
been able to perform his job duties since that time.
32
As already discussed, in January 2006, plaintiff reported to his surgeon that his
ankle was not giving him any pain; in March of 2006, plaintiff reported during his FCE
that his pain was a three out of ten; in June of 2006, plaintiff reported to his physiatrist
that his pain was a six out of ten; in August 2006, plaintiff reported during his FCE that
his pain was as low as zero out of ten (at which point, he returned to work); and in
October of 2006, plaintiff reported during his deposition that his life was “normal” with
some pain. These drastically inconsistent reports of pain demonstrate why, with regard to
the “extent of any residual impairment,” “[s]elf-imposed restrictions, as opposed to
physician-imposed restrictions, based on real or perceived pain do not establish this
point.” Kreiner, 471 Mich at 133 n 17.
37
Although plaintiff was assigned to a position that was less physically demanding
than the position he had been performing before he was injured, plaintiff did this
voluntarily and he suffered no loss in pay. Moreover, at the time plaintiff was injured, he
had only been in that position for six months and, since he began to work for Allied in
2002, he had worked in three different positions. Thus, the fact that defendant was
assigned to a different position upon his return is not particularly significant in this
Court’s analysis.
Plaintiff’s only argument regarding his inability to lead his normal life is that he
was unable to work at certain times. During the time he was recuperating, plaintiff could
care for himself and tend to his household chores without assistance. His relationship
with his fiancée/wife was unaffected. And he was able to enjoy his recreational activities
without interruption. By plaintiff’s own admission, his life was “normal” with some
“occasional aching” that was not aggravated by any activities, including standing or
prolonged walking. It is fair to say that by August of 2006 plaintiff had fully recovered
from his broken ankle. Because only plaintiff’s ability to work was affected and because
this only lasted, at the very lengthiest, 17 months, the lower courts did not err in
concluding that the impairment did not affect plaintiff’s “general ability to lead his
normal life” and, therefore, that plaintiff did not meet the “serious impairment of body
function” threshold.
38
E. STARE DECISIS
The majority overrules Kreiner while paying its usual lip service to stare decisis.33
My fundamental disagreement with the majority’s application of the stare decisis doctrine
is quite easily summarized. In Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 464; 613 NW2d 307
(2000), this Court drew on past caselaw and identified several relevant considerations in
determining whether a case should be overruled under stare decisis.34 As explained
33
It is of interest that this is the second time the authoring justice has authored an
opinion overruling an earlier case making it easier for a plaintiff to establish a serious
impairment of body function. In DiFranco, he authored an opinion overruling Cassidy.
Justice WILLIAMS complained: “Four years after this Court issued its opinion in Cassidy
v McGovern, 415 Mich 483; 330 NW2d 22 (1982), the majority sees fit to overrule the
decision of five members of a six-member court and adopt the position of the dissent in
that case.” DiFranco, 427 Mich at 92 (WILLIAMS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). In this case, the authoring justice again sees fit to overrule a case that was decided
only six years ago and to adopt his own dissenting opinion from that case. While it is by
now clear what the authoring justice believes the no-fault policies of this state ought to
be, it is considerably less clear what connection these views bear to those of the people
and their Legislature.
34
The fact that the lead opinion relies far more on Chief Justice KELLY’s opinion
in Petersen, which only Justice CAVANAGH joined, than on the majority opinion in
Robinson should not go unnoticed. For a discussion of Chief Justice KELLY’s Petersen
standard for overruling precedent, see my dissent in Petersen, 484 Mich at 350.
Concerning the statements of Justices HATHAWAY and WEAVER about stare
decisis:
Justice HATHAWAY contends that stare decisis constitutes a “policy
consideration” and that the “particular analytical approach will differ from
case to case.” Similarly, Justice WEAVER contends that stare decisis
constitutes a “principle of policy” and that there is no need for a
“standardized test for stare decisis,” as long as justices exercise “judicial
restraint, common sense, and a sense of fairness.” The problem with these
“approaches” is that “litigants will, of course, have no notice beforehand of
which [“analytical approach”] will be employed, for the justices themselves
39
herein, Kreiner was the first occasion on which this Court was called upon to interpret the
1995 amendments to MCL 500.3135. Kreiner gave effect to the legislative intent as
expressed in the language of the amended statute and was not, in my judgment, wrongly
decided. Nonetheless, my disagreement with the majority on this point is not the thrust
of this section. Rather, it is to remind the majority “that there are larger issues at stake in
this case: the rule of law, respect for precedent, the integrity of this Court, and judicial
restraint. Accordingly, larger institutional issues are implicated in this case.” Paige v
City of Sterling Hts, 476 Mich 495, 543; 720 NW2d 219 (2006) (CAVANAGH, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Indeed, the author of the majority opinion, as one who subscribes to the doctrine
of legislative acquiescence, has often argued that principles of stare decisis are especially
will not know this beforehand.” Petersen, 484 Mich at 380 (MARKMAN, J.,
dissenting).
* * *
Although Justice WEAVER is correct that “there are many factors to
consider in deciding whether or not to overrule precedent,” and Justice
HATHAWAY is equally correct that the application of stare decisis must take
place on a “case-by-case basis,” this does not obviate the need to at least
reasonably attempt to apprise the parties, and the citizens of this state,
before the fact what some of these factors might be, as this Court did in
Robinson and as the Chief Justice and Justice CAVANAGH did in Petersen.
And, whatever else can be understood of Justice HATHAWAY’s and Justice
WEAVER’s “approaches” to stare decisis, the application of these
“approaches” has resulted in 13 precedents of this Court being overruled
during this term alone, and 6 other precedents being teed up for possible
overruling during the next term, doubtless a record pace for dismantling the
caselaw of this state. [Univ of Mich v Titan, Ins Co, __ Mich __; __ NW2d
__ (2010) (MARKMAN, J., dissenting).]
40
strong in matters of statutory interpretation.35 Accordingly, his own words are relevant
here: “[T]he majority does not adequately explain why it disregards the doctrine of stare
decisis in a matter of statutory interpretation when the Legislature itself has not seen fit in
[six] years to correct [Kreiner’s] allegedly incorrect interpretation.” Id. at 536. To be
35
“[P]rinciples of stare decisis in matters of statutory interpretation, particularly
where the Legislature has not responded to a prior interpretation, weigh against
overruling precedent absent sound and specific justification.” Paige, 476 Mich at 540-
541 (CAVANAGH, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added); see also
Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562, 613-614; 702 NW2d 539 (2005)
(CAVANAGH, J., dissenting); Neal v Wilkes, 470 Mich 661, 676-677; 685 NW2d 648
(2004) (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting); People v Moore, 470 Mich 56, 78-79; 679 NW2d 41
(2004) (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting); Jones v Dep’t of Corrections, 468 Mich 646, 665;
664 NW2d 717 (2003) (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting); Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 221-
222; 649 NW2d 47 (2002) (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting); Robertson v DaimlerChrysler
Corp, 465 Mich 732, 767-768; 641 NW2d 567 (2002) (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting).
Significantly, the authoring justice has gone so far as to suggest that “when this Court
first interprets a statute, then the statute becomes what this Court has said it is,” and that,
absent further legislative action, “‘[h]aving given our view on the meaning of a statute,
our task is concluded, absent extraordinary circumstances.’” Paige, 476 Mich at 537
(CAVANAGH, concurring in part and dissenting in part), quoting Boys Markets, Inc v
Retail Clerks Union, 398 US 235, 257-258; 90 S Ct 1583; 26 L Ed 2d 199 (1970) (Black,
J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). One cannot reconcile this view of legislative
acquiescence and stare decisis with the majority’s decision to overrule Kreiner. Kreiner
was this Court’s first interpretation of the amended MCL 500.3135, and, although bills
were subsequently introduced that would have abolished Kreiner, such bills were
repeatedly rejected by the Legislature. See, e.g., SB 1429 (2004); SB 618, HB 4846, and
HB 4940 (2005); SB 445, HB 4301, and HB 4999 (2007); and SB 83 and HB 4680
(2009). Therefore, what is the majority’s “sound and specific justification” for departing
from Kreiner? Paige, 476 Mich at 541 (CAVANAGH, concurring in part and dissenting in
part). What are the “extraordinary circumstances” that make it appropriate to do so? Id.
at 538 (citation, quotation marks, and emphasis omitted). While, in my view, this Court
has correctly repudiated the doctrine of legislative acquiescence, see Donajkowski v
Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 258-261; 596 NW2d 574 (1999), there is no principled
reason why the majority, whose members are convinced advocates of this doctrine,
chooses to ignore the Legislature’s repeated rejection of attempts to abolish Kreiner, just
as there is no principled reason why the majority chooses to ignore the Legislature’s
actions in amending MCL 500.3135 and the other forms of available legislative history.
41
fair, it is not only the author of the majority opinion, but all the justices who comprise the
majority who should more clearly recognize the consequences of what they are doing.
Even a cursory analysis of the majority’s treatment of precedent since it ascended to
power in January 2009 reveals a lack of sufficient regard for recent precedents that is
directly contrary to their own previous assertions of the need not to needlessly overrule
cases on account of stare decisis. Past complaints on their part that cases should not be
overruled when the only thing that has changed is the membership of the Court have gone
by the wayside.36
1. MAJORITY AND PRECEDENT IN 2009
The new majority assumed power in January 2009, and wasted little time in
beginning its efforts to “undo” decisions of the previous majority.37 On December 29,
2008, the former majority issued its opinion in United States Fidelity Ins & Guaranty Co
v Mich Catastrophic Claims Ass’n, 482 Mich 414, 417; 759 NW2d 154 (2008). Soon
36
Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197, 256; 731 NW2d 41 (2007)
(KELLY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The law has not changed. Only
the individuals wearing the robes have changed.”); Paige, 476 Mich at 532-533(CAVANAGH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The only change has been the
composition of this Court. And unfortunately, this is the only reasonable answer to the
question why a decision from this Court decided just eight years earlier and involving the
same issue is now being overruled. But make no mistake, this answer is alarming, and it
has become increasingly common.”). As observed, after the composition of this Court
changed when Justice HATHAWAY replaced former Chief Justice TAYLOR on January 1,
2009, this Court granted plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration even though such motion
had not raised any new legal arguments. 485 Mich 851 (2009).
37
See Detroit Free Press, December 10, 2008, at A2, where Chief Justice KELLY
promised to “undo . . . the damage that the Republican-dominated court has done.”
42
after Justice HATHAWAY replaced former Chief Justice TAYLOR on January 1, 2009, the
plaintiffs filed motions for rehearing. The new majority granted the plaintiffs’ motions
for rehearing, and the cases were resubmitted for decision “without further briefing or
oral argument.” 483 Mich 918 (2009). Then, in United States Fidelity Ins & Guaranty
Co v Michigan Catastrophic Claims Ass’n (On Rehearing), 484 Mich 1, 46; __ NW2d __
(2009), the new majority reversed the former majority’s decision.
In Bush v Shabahang, 484 Mich 156, 175 n 34; 772 NW2d 272 (2009), the
majority stated that it “question[ed] whether Roberts I [Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp,
466 Mich 57; 642 NW2d 663 (2002)] and Boodt [v Borgess Med Ctr, 481 Mich 558; 751
NW2d 44 (2008)] were correctly decided . . . .” And, in Potter v McLeary, 484 Mich
397, 424 n 32; 774 NW2d 1 (2009), the majority said: “We question whether Roberts II
[Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 470 Mich 679; 684 NW2d 711 (2004)] was correctly
decided . . . .”
The majority’s treatment of precedent in the seven-month period from when it
took power until the end of the Court’s term in July 2009 was well explained in earlier
statements of mine and of Justices CORRIGAN and YOUNG. For example, in Henry v Dow
Chem Co, 484 Mich 483, 528 n 28; 772 NW2d 301 (2009), Justice YOUNG observed in
his partial dissent:
The majority’s determination to ignore facts and precedent
inconvenient to its desired outcome has become its modus operandi. See,
e.g., Vanslembrouck v Halperin, 483 Mich 965; 763 NW2d 919 (2009),
where the new majority ignored Vega v Lakeland Hospitals at Niles & St
Joseph, Inc, 479 Mich 243, 244; 736 NW2d 561 (2007); Hardacre v
Saginaw Vascular Services, 483 Mich 918 (2009), where it failed to follow
Boodt v Borgess Med Ctr, 481 Mich 558; 751 NW2d 44 (2008); Sazima v
43
Shepherd Bar & Restaurant, 483 Mich 924; 762 NW2d 924 (2009), where
it failed to follow Chrysler v Blue Arrow Transport Lines, 295 Mich 606;
295 NW 331 (1940), and Camburn v Northwest School Dist, 459 Mich 471;
592 NW2d 46 (1999); Juarez v Holbrook, 483 Mich 970 (2009), where it
failed to follow Smith v Khouri, 481 Mich 519; 751 NW2d 472 (2008)[38];
Chambers v Wayne Co Airport Auth, 483 Mich 1081 (2009), where it failed
to follow Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197; 731 NW2d
41 (2007);[39] and Scott v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 483 Mich 1032(2009), where it failed to enforce Thornton v Allstate Ins Co, 425 Mich
643; 391 NW2d 320 (1986), and Putkamer v Transamerica Ins Corp of
America, 454 Mich 626; 563 NW2d 683 (1997).
And, as Justice CORRIGAN stated in her dissenting statement in Beasley v
Michigan, 483 Mich 1025 (2009):
[T]he new majority’s failure to abide by Rowland continues a
growing and troubling trend. Rather than forthrightly overruling that
decision, it is increasingly becoming the practice of this Court to simply
ignore precedents with which it disagrees. . . .
* * *
On this Court, the new majority offers no articulable reasons
whatsoever for its apparent detours from stare decisis. Instead, the majority
declines to explain whether--and, if so, why--it is overruling precedent
despite the obvious appearance that it is doing so. If it intends to alter legal
principles embedded in this Court’s decisions, then the new majority should
explain its reasons clearly and intelligibly. Instead, the new majority
38
I dissented in Juarez v Holbrook, 483 Mich 970 (2009), stating:
[T]he majority’s disdain for Smith [v Khouri, 481 Mich 519; 751
NW2d 472 (2008)] is apparently viewed as adequate justification for
ignoring Smith. Rather than forthrightly overruling this decision,
something the new majority is apparently loathe to do (perhaps because
several majority justices repeatedly and loudly proclaimed fealty to stare
decisis, and dissented, whenever the former majority overruled a
precedent), it is increasingly becoming the modus operandi of this Court
that relevant precedents simply be ignored.
39
The majority also failed to follow Rowland in Ward v Michigan State Univ, 485
Mich 917 (2009).
44
overrules by indirection, or at least leaves the impression that it is doing so,
thereby sowing the seeds of confusion and making it difficult for the
citizens of this state to comprehend precisely what our caselaw requires.
This appears to be an unfortunate return to our predecessors’ past practice
of “frequently pa[ying] little attention to the inconsistencies among its cases
and declin[ing] to reduce confusion in [the Court’s] jurisprudence by
overruling conflicting decisions.” Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473
Mich 562, 571 n 19 [702 NW2d 539] (2005).[40]
Additionally, in Petersen, 484 Mich 300, Chief Justice KELLY authored an
opinion, joined only by Justice CAVANAGH, in which she indicated that she wanted to
overrule Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), and Lansing Mayor v
Pub Serv Comm, 470 Mich 154; 680 NW2d 840 (2004). In my dissent, I stated:
Given that in this case the Chief Justice would expressly overrule,
not one, but two of this Court’s prior decisions,
“one is naturally tempted to re-inquire, see Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd
Comm, 477 Mich 197, 223-228; 731 NW2d 41 (2007) (MARKMAN, J.,
concurring), whether the ongoing dispute between the [former] majority
and Justice KELLY over overrulings of precedent truly concerns attitudes
toward stare decisis or merely attitudes toward particular previous decisions
of this Court.” [People v Smith, 478 Mich 292, 322-323 n 17; 733 NW2d
351 (2007).]
“A justice’s perspective on stare decisis is not evidenced by her
willingness to maintain precedents with which she agrees, but by her
willingness to maintain precedents with which she disagrees.” Rowland,
477 Mich at 224-225 n 3 (MARKMAN, J., concurring). Now that the Chief
Justice is positioned to overrule decisions with which she disagrees, her
40
On the other hand, as I stated in Rowland, 477 Mich at 226-227:
[T]he [former] majority has been disciplined in stating expressly
when a precedent has been overruled. The [former] majority has never
attempted to obscure when a precedent was overruled or to minimize the
number of such precedents by dubious “distinguishing” of prior caselaw.
Rather, it has been forthright in identifying and critiquing precedents that
were viewed as wrongly decided and warranting overruling.
45
actions increasingly demonstrate that her former claims of fealty toward
stare decisis were considerably overstated. Despite all her rhetoric
concerning the importance of stare decisis for the exercise of the judicial
power, see, e.g., her hollow claim that she possessed a “differing [and
elevated] esteem for stare decisis” than another justice, People v Gardner,
482 Mich 41, 88 n 31; 753 NW2d 78 (2008), such rhetoric was in reality
little more than a means of communicating her opposition to overruling
particular past decisions with which she agreed. [Petersen, 484 Mich at
389-390 (MARKMAN, J., dissenting) (emphasis in the original).]
One other practice to which the new majority began to adhere in 2009 was
requesting that the parties brief whether a decision of the former majority should be
overruled. See, e.g., Justice YOUNG’s partial dissent in Potter, 484 Mich at 450 n 43, in
which he stated:
It is quickly becoming a new favored practice of the majority to flag
decisions of the past decade and invite challenges to those decisions. It is
difficult to reconcile this practice with the majority’s previous claims of
fidelity to stare decisis. See, e.g., . . . Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465
Mich 675, 712; [641] NW2d 219 (2002) (KELLY, J., dissenting) (“[I]f each
successive Court, believing its reading is correct and past readings wrong,
rejects precedent, then the law will fluctuate from year to year, rendering
our jurisprudence dangerously unstable.”); Devillers, supra at 620(WEAVER, J., dissenting) (“Under the doctrine of stare decisis, it is
necessary to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise
again in litigation.”); Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197,
278; 731 NW2d 41 (2007) (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting) (“Under the
doctrine of stare decisis, principles of law deliberately examined and
decided by a court of competent jurisdiction become precedent and should
not be lightly departed. Absent the rarest circumstances, we should remain
faithful to established precedent.”) . . . . See also Todd C. Berg, Esq.,
Hathaway Attacks, Michigan Lawyers Weekly, October 27, 2008, in which
Justice HATHAWAY was quoted: “I believe in stare decisis. Something must
be drastically wrong for the court to overrule”; Lawyers’ Election Guide:
Judge Diane Marie Hathaway, Michigan Lawyers Weekly, October 30,
2006, in which Justice HATHAWAY, then running for a position on the
Court of Appeals, was quoted: “Too many appellate decisions are being
decided by judicial activists who are overturning precedent.” [Citations
omitted.]
46
Thus, from January 2009 through July 31, 2009, the new majority reversed an
opinion on rehearing, sowed seeds of confusion by questioning three cases decided by the
former majority, i.e., Roberts I, Roberts II, and Boodt, failed to follow numerous other
precedents as cited above, and began to issue orders requesting that the parties brief
whether decisions made by the former majority should be overruled.41 And Chief Justice
KELLY and Justice CAVANAGH went on record urging the express overruling of two
cases: Robinson and Mayor of Lansing.
2. MAJORITY AND PRECEDENT IN 2010
In 2010, the majority has accelerated efforts to “undo” numerous cases decided by
the former majority through express overrulings and additional orders asking parties to
brief whether a case should be overruled.
In People v Feezel, 486 Mich 184; 783 NW2d 67 (2010), the majority expressly
overruled People v Derror, 475 Mich 316; 715 NW2d 822 (2006). In Lansing Sch Educ
41
The Detroit Free Press took note of the majority’s actions and stated as follows
in an October 11, 2009 editorial, Restoring judicial restraint:
Even before the new term began, the new Democratic majority
(buttressed by the renegade WEAVER) had signaled its own impatience to
begin dismantling the Engler Court’s legacy when it agreed to reconsider
an appeal the court rejected just a month before TAYLOR’S departure. The
revived appeal appears to hinge on the court’s willingness to reverse two of
the Engler court’s more recent decisions.
* * *
Democrats can hardly reinvigorate stare decisis – the reasonable
conviction that the rules of the game shouldn’t change every time a new
referee takes the field – by reversing every questionable call its
predecessors made.
47
Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Edu, __ Mich __; __ NW2d __ (2010), the majority overruled Lee
v Macomb Co Bd of Comm’rs, 464 Mich 726; 629 NW2d 900 (2001), Crawford v Dep’t
of Civil Serv, 466 Mich 250; 645 NW2d 6 (2002), Nat’l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland
Cliffs Iron Co, 471 Mich 608; 684 NW2d 800 (2004), Associated Builders & Contractors
v Dep’t of Consumer & Indus Servs Dir, 472 Mich 117, 124-127; 693 NW2d 374 (2005),
Mich Chiropractic Council v Comm’r of the Office of Fin & Ins Servs, 475 Mich 363;
716 NW2d 561 (2006), Rohde v Ann Arbor Pub Sch, 479 Mich 336; 737 NW2d 158
(2007), and Mich Citizens for Water Conservation v Nestlé Waters North America Inc,
479 Mich 280, 302-303; 737 NW2d 447 (2007), and Manuel v Gill, 481 Mich 637; 753
NW2d 48 (2008). In Bezeau v Palace Sports, __ Mich __; __ NW2d __ (2010), the
majority expressly overruled the limited retroactive effect of Karaczewski v Farbman
Stein & Co, 478 Mich 28; 732 NW2d 56 (2007). In Univ of Mich v Titan Ins Co, __
Mich __; __ NW2d __ (2010), the majority expressly overruled Cameron v Auto Club Ins
Ass’n, 476 Mich 55; 718 NW2d 784 (2006). In O’Neal v St. John Hosp, __ Mich __, __
n __; __ NW2d __ (2010), the lead opinion authored by Justice HATHAWAY indicated its
agreement with Justice CAVANAGH’s partial dissent in Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare
Sys, 465 Mich 53; 631 NW2d 686 (2001), which already had the support of three Justices
(Chief Justice KELLY and Justices CAVANAGH and WEAVER). And, of course, in the case
at bar, the majority has expressly overruled Kreiner. Finally, by amending MCR 2.112
and MCR 2.118 to allow amendments of affidavits of merit to relate back to the of the
original filing of the affidavit, the majority effectively overruled Kirkaldy v Rim, 478
Mich 581; 734 NW2d 201 (2007). 485 Mich ___ (2010).
48
3. REVERSALS OF PRECEDENT TO COME
The majority’s work, however, has apparently only just begun. It has already teed
up six more cases in its grant orders for possible overruling. These include: Mich
Citizens v Nestlé Waters, 479 Mich 280; 737 NW2d 447 (2007);42 Preserve the Dunes,
Inc v Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 471 Mich 508; 684 NW2d 847 (2004);43 Trentadue
v Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Co, 479 Mich 378; 738 NW2d 664 (2007);44 Griffith
v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 472 Mich 521; 697 NW2d 895 (2005);45 Rory v
42
This Court’s grant order in Anglers of the AuSable, Inc v Dep’t of
Environmental Quality, 485 Mich 1067 (2010), inquired whether Mich Citizens v Nestlé
Waters, 479 Mich 280; 737 NW2d 447 (2007), was correctly decided, and the majority
denied a motion to dismiss in that case even though that case is now clearly moot. See
Anglers, __ Mich __ (2010) (YOUNG, J., dissenting), order entered June 18, 2010 (Docket
Nos. 138863 to 138866). Apparently, the majority just could not wait until next term to
overrule Nestlé Waters, because it appears already to have done so in Lansing Sch Educ
Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Educ, __ Mich __; __ NW2d __ (2010).
43
This Court’s grant order in Anglers also inquired whether Preserve the Dunes
was correctly decided, and, as noted, the majority denied the motion to dismiss in that
case even though it is now clearly moot. See Anglers, __ Mich at __ (2010) (YOUNG, J.,
dissenting), ordered entered June 18, 2010 (Docket Nos. 138863 to 138866).
44
Colaianni v Stuart Frankel Dev Corp, 485 Mich 1070 (2010), inquired “whether
Trentadue v Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Co, 479 Mich 378, was correctly
decided.”
45
This Court’s grant order in Wilcox v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 486 Mich 870(2010), inquired “whether Griffith v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 472 Mich 521 (2005),
was correctly decided.” This order is the majority’s second tee-up of Griffith. The
majority first requested that the parties brief whether Griffith was correctly decided in
Hoover v Mich Mut Ins Co, 485 Mich 881 (2009), but that case was subsequently
dismissed after a settlement, Hoover v Mich Mut Ins Co, 485 Mich 1036 (2010).
However, the majority wasted little time in finding another case to use as a vehicle for
reconsidering Griffith.
49
Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457; 703 NW2d 23 (2005);46 and Rowland v Washtenaw
Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197; 731 NW2d 41 (2007).47
The new majority once purported to be concerned about the stability of the law,48
but that concern appears to have passed with the passing of the former majority. Indeed,
it is difficult to consider anything more destabilizing to the law than to have the majority
issue multiple orders continually requesting that the parties brief whether recently
decided cases have been properly decided. Justices who once postured as champions of
stare decisis now cannot act quickly enough to reverse disfavored precedents. The
majority’s past claims of fealty to stare decisis were greatly exaggerated, and obviously
nothing more than a function of their opposition to particular decisions being decided by
the Court at the time.
4. HYPOCRISY AND STARE DECISIS
The majority accuses the dissenting justices of hypocrisy with regard to our stare
decisis criticisms of the majority.
46
This Court’s grant order in Idalski v Schwedt, 486 Mich 916 (2010), inquired
“whether Rory v Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457 (2005), should be reconsidered.”
47
This Court’s grant order in Pollard v Suburban Mobility Auth, 486 Mich 963(2010), inquired “whether this Court should reconsider Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd
Comm, 477 Mich 197 (2007).”
48
See, e.g., People v Davis, 472 Mich 156, 190; 695 NW2d 45 (2005), where
then-Justice KELLY opined in dissent that overruling cases “destabilizes our state’s
jurisprudence. It suggests to the public that the law is at the whim of whoever is sitting
on the Supreme Court bench. Surely, it erodes the public’s confidence in our judicial
system.”
50
The dissenters’ stare decisis protestations should taste like ashes in
their mouths. To the principles of stare decisis, to which they paid
absolutely no heed as they denigrated the wisdom of innumerable
predecessors, the dissenters now would wrap themselves in its benefits to
save their recent precedent. [Ante at __.]
However, the position of the dissenting justices on stare decisis has not changed a whit
since we were in the majority; by contrast, the position of the majority justices is
unrecognizable.
It has always been our position that stare decisis is not an “inexorable command,”
and that a judge’s primary obligation is to the law and the constitution, not to the
judgments of his or her predecessors. To that end, we have always asserted that there are
multiple judicial values that must be assessed in any case in which previous decisions of
the Court are implicated. In every such case, a judge must respectfully consider the
interests served by stare decisis-- predictability and certainty in the law, and the
uniformity of its application. However, in every such case, a judge must also consider
the interests served by interpreting the law correctly-- regard for the lawmaker, adherence
to constitutional dictates concerning the “judicial power” and the separation of powers,
and competing predictability and certainty interests that are served where the law means
what it plainly says. Robinson, 462 Mich at 464-468. As we explained in Robinson:
[I]t is well to recall in discussing reliance, when dealing with an area
of the law that is statutory . . . , that it is to the words of the statute itself
that a citizen first looks for guidance in directing his actions. This is the
essence of the rule of law: to know in advance what the rules of society are.
Thus, if the words of the statute are clear, the actor should be able to
expect, that is, rely, that they will be carried out by all in society, including
the courts. In fact, should a court confound those legitimate citizen
expectations by misreading or misconstruing a statute, it is that court itself
that has disrupted the reliance interest. When that happens, a subsequent
51
court, rather than holding to the distorted reading because of the doctrine of
stare decisis, should overrule the earlier court’s misconstruction. The
reason for this is that the court in distorting the statute was engaged in a
form of judicial usurpation that runs counter to the bedrock principle of
American constitutionalism, i.e., that the lawmaking power is reposed in
the people as reflected in the work of the Legislature, and, absent a
constitutional violation, the courts have no legitimacy in overruling or
nullifying the people’s representatives. Moreover, not only does such a
compromising by a court of the citizen’s ability to rely on a statute have no
constitutional warrant, it can gain no higher pedigree as later courts repeat
the error. [Id. at 467-468.]
That has been the consistent approach of the dissenting justices, and this continues to be
our approach. Respect for stare decisis is a critical judicial value, but so is a regard for
the constitutional processes of government by which a judge strives to interpret the law in
accordance with its actual language. Balancing these values is sometimes difficult, and
reasonable people can often disagree as to how this balance should be struck. Robinson
supplies one attempt at identifying the factors that courts have traditionally looked to in
striking this balance in a consistent and reasonable manner. Despite suggestions to the
contrary, Robinson does not establish a “mechanical” process, but simply attempts to
afford reasonable guidance in achieving a fair equilibrium between stare decisis and
getting the law right.49
However, as explained above, the justices now in the majority who were on the
Court at the time took a quite different approach to stare decisis when they were in the
minority. As Justice YOUNG has explained:
49
Given that it has always been our position that Robinson does not establish a
“mechanical” process, it is not surprising that the majority has been able to identify a
single case in which we overruled precedent without specifically citing Robinson.
52
[Our] position on stare decisis has not changed, and the [the
majority] attempts to shift focus to [us] in order to avoid confronting [their]
own inconsistency. The public should understand when Justices’ positions
on important matters shift. And that is the focus of this dissent: when the
[majority] justice[s] [were] in the minority, [they] liked stare decisis a lot;
now that [they are] in the majority, it is not an issue. That is the “irony” the
public should understand. [Anglers, __ Mich at __ (2010) (YOUNG, J.,
dissenting), order entered June 18, 2010 (Docket Nos. 138863 to 138866).]
The majority entirely misapprehends our criticism of its record on stare decisis if it thinks
that we are simply counting the number of occasions on which they have reversed
precedent over the past term and a half. That is not our intention at all. We freely
acknowledge that we too reversed precedents when we were in the majority-- although
hardly at their remarkable pace. That is not the nub of our critique. Rather, the nub is:
(a) that the majority justices have demonstrated a remarkably inconsistent and “flexible”
attitude toward stare decisis, in which their views on the subject appear to be nothing
more than a function of whether they are in the majority or the minority; and (b) that the
majority justices equate their own reversals of precedent, in which they have widened the
distance between the law of the lawmaker and the law of the court, with the previous
majority’s reversals in which we did the opposite.
“[N]o meaningful discussion of a court’s attitude toward precedent can be based
solely on an arithmetical analysis in which raw numbers of overrulings are simply
counted. Such an analysis obscures that not all precedents are built alike, that some are
better reasoned than others, that some are grounded in the exercise of discretionary
judgments and others in the interpretation of plain language, that some are thorough in
their analyses and others superficial.” Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich
53197, 226; 731 NW2d 41 (2007) (MARKMAN, J., concurring). The chart set forth in
Rowland demonstrates, we believe, that the overrulings of precedent that occurred
between January 1, 2000 until Rowland was decided on May 2, 2007 “overwhelmingly
came in cases involving what the justices in the majority [at that time] view[ed] as the
misinterpretation of straightforward words and phrases in statutes and contracts, in which
words that were not there were read into the law or words that were there were read out
of the law.” Id. That is, these reversals of precedent sought more closely to equate our
state’s caselaw with our statutes, while the reversals of precedent of the present majority
have achieved exactly the opposite.
Thus, the present majority has regard neither for precedent nor for the most
significant competing value that would sometimes warrant overturning a precedent, to
wit, that it is not in accord with the words of the lawmaker. In the end, the majority’s
approach to stare decisis is empty and incoherent. The majority has unsettled the
precedents of this Court at a Guinness world’s record pace, and it has done so while
disserving both the values of stare decisis and that of a court acting in accordance with
the constitutional separation of powers to respect the decisions of the lawmaker. The
majority has run amuck in service of values that have no grounding in either stare decisis,
or in any other conception of the “judicial power,” other than that they comprise an
arithmetical majority of this Court. In this regard, the majority confuses power and
authority. The majority unsettles and confuses the law both in its disregard for this
Court’s previous decisions and in its equal disregard for the language of the law. It
compounds the confusion it fosters in one realm with the confusion that it fosters in the
54
other.50 There is no saving grace in its reversals of precedent, no balancing of difficult
judicial principles, no apparent recognition of the values served by either of the
competing considerations involved where precedents are at issue, and no thoughtful effort
to articulate even the roughest principles for its actions. In its destructive march through
the caselaw of this state to identify surviving and straggling decisions that need to be
“taken out,” the majority furthers no discernible legal value of any kind, other than
litigation and still more litigation. In the end, there is no legal core to the majority’s
approach to stare decisis, and it is left with nothing other than a feeble effort to equate its
own actions with those of the dissenting justices when they were in the majority. “We
are no worse than you,” is the majority’s banner, when in truth the majority has not the
slightest conception of our approach to stare decisis, and not the slightest conception of
the damage that their own approach to stare decisis is doing to the citizens of this state
who wish to act in accordance with the law and who wish to understand their rights and
obligations under that law.
F. UNDOING THE LEGISLATIVE COMPROMISE
As discussed earlier, although virtually all legislation involves some sort of
compromise, the no-fault act, in particular, entailed a substantial and well-understood
50
See, for example, The Detroit News, Ruling Clouds Pot Smoking, Driving Law,
July 29, 2010 (indicating that the majority’s recent overruling of Derror in Feezel “has
police officers scratching their heads in confusion”; “The ruling mostly leaves law
enforcement officers in a legal limbo, said Sgt. Christopher Hawkins, legislative liaison
for the state police.”). (accessed July 29, 2010).
55
compromise. In exchange for the payment of economic loss benefits from one’s own
insurance company (first-party benefits), the Legislature limited an injured person’s
ability to sue a negligent operator or owner of a motor vehicle for noneconomic losses
(third-party benefits). Kreiner, 471 Mich at 114-115. As stated in Stephens v Dixon, 449
Mich 531, 541; 536 NW2d 755 (1995): “It was a specific purpose of the Legislature in
enacting the Michigan no-fault act to partially abolish tort remedies for injuries sustained
in motor vehicle accidents and to substitute for those remedies an entitlement to first-
party insurance benefits.”
At least two reasons are evident concerning why the Legislature
limited recovery for noneconomic loss, both of which relate to the
economic viability of the system. First, there was the problem of the
overcompensation of minor injuries. Second, there were the problems
incident to the excessive litigation of motor vehicle accident cases.
Regarding the second problem, if noneconomic losses were always to be a
matter subject to adjudication under the act, the goal of reducing motor
vehicle accident litigation would likely be illusory. The combination of the
costs of continuing litigation and continuing overcompensation for minor
injuries could easily threaten the economic viability, or at least desirability,
of providing so many benefits without regard to fault. If every case is
subject to the potential of litigation on the question of noneconomic loss,
for which recovery is still predicated on negligence, perhaps little has been
gained by granting benefits for economic loss without regard to fault.
Regarding the trade-off involved in no-fault acts, 7 Am Jur 2d,
Automobile Insurance, § 340, p 1068, contains the following:
“It has been said of one such plan that the practical effect of the
adoption of personal injury protection insurance is to afford the citizen the
security of prompt and certain recovery to a fixed amount of the most
salient elements of his out-of-pocket expenses * * *. In return for this
he surrenders the possibly minimal damages for pain and suffering
recoverable in cases not marked by serious economic loss or objective
indicia of grave injury, and also surrenders the outside chance that through
a generous settlement or a liberal award by a judge or jury in such a case he
56
may be able to reap a monetary windfall out of his misfortune.” (Footnotes
omitted.)
Thus, it is apparent that the threshold requirements for a traditional tort
action for noneconomic loss play an important role in the functioning of the
no-fault act. [Cassidy, 415 Mich at 500-501.]
Accordingly, there is no question that the legislative compromise that produced the no-
fault act recognized that some injuries would not be considered sufficient to meet the no-
fault threshold. While every injury resulting from a motor vehicle accident certainly has
adverse consequences, and may involve medical costs, treatment, and bodily pain, not all
injuries rise to the level of the no-fault threshold of a “serious impairment of a body
function.” Some injured persons are able to recover noneconomic damages, so that all
injured persons are able to recover economic loss benefits regardless of fault. Otherwise,
“little has been gained by granting benefits for economic loss without regard to fault.”
Id. at 500. Indeed, “the excessive litigation of motor vehicle accident cases” would
continue, and, yet, economic loss benefits would have to be paid regardless of fault. Id.In other words, plaintiffs would be able to recover economic loss benefits regardless of
fault and without having to go to a jury, while these same plaintiffs would also be able to
go to a jury and seek noneconomic benefits as well. That is not the compromise reached
by the Legislature. In particular, it is a lose-lose proposition for those funding the no-
fault system, i.e., all insured Michigan drivers.51
51
The majority argues that the legislative compromise of 1973 which led to the
adoption of the no-fault act itself cannot be cited to trump the 1995 enactment of MCL
500.3135(7). We agree, but it is our position that the 1995 enactment of MCL
500.3135(7), which in large measure rejected DiFranco, and made it more difficult for
57
In addition, it has been repeatedly recognized that, due to the mandatory nature of
no-fault insurance, the Legislature intended that its cost be affordable. Shavers, 402
Mich at 599 (“The Legislature has . . . fostered the expectation that no-fault insurance
will be available at fair and equitable rates.”).52 Indeed, because it is mandatory, it must
be affordable. Id. at 600 (“We therefore conclude that Michigan motorists are
constitutionally entitled to have no-fault insurance made available on a fair and equitable
basis.”). It is a matter of economic logic that in order to maintain a system in which
motor vehicle accident victims are able to receive economic loss benefits regardless of
fault, drivers must be required to purchase insurance, and in order to ensure that drivers
purchase this insurance, it must be kept affordable. The majority’s decision, however,
very considerably “lowers the bar” that an injured plaintiff must satisfy in order to meet
the serious impairment of body function threshold, making it significantly easier for a
plaintiffs to prevail in noneconomic loss benefit cases, is entirely consistent with the
compromise. The majority’s opinion is not in accord with either the compromise or
MCL 500.3135(7).
52
See, e.g., Tebo v Havlik, 418 Mich 350, 366; 343 NW2d 181 (1984) (opinion by
BRICKLEY, J.) (recognizing that a primary goal of the no-fault act is to “provid[e] an
equitable and prompt method of redressing injuries in a way which made the mandatory
insurance coverage affordable to all motorists”); Celina Mut Ins Co v Lake States Ins Co,
452 Mich 84, 89; 549 NW2d 834 (1996) (holding that “the no-fault insurance system . . .
is designed to provide victims with assured, adequate, and prompt reparations at the
lowest cost to both the individuals and the no-fault system”); O’Donnell v State Farm
Mut Auto Ins Co, 404 Mich 524, 547; 273 NW2d 829 (1979) (recognizing that the
Legislature has provided for setoffs in the no-fault act: “Because the first-party insurance
proposed by the act was to be compulsory, it was important that the premiums to be
charged by the insurance companies be maintained as low as possible[;] [o]therwise, the
poor and the disadvantaged people of the state might not be able to obtain the necessary
insurance”).
58
plaintiff to recover for noneconomic losses. This means insurance companies that issue
no-fault policies will be financially obligated in more cases, and, as a result, will be
required to pass along their increased costs to policyholders by way of increased
premiums charged to Michigan drivers.53 Today’s decision, just as last term’s decision
by the new majority in United States Fidelity Ins & Guaranty Co v Mich Catastrophic
Claims Ass’n (On Rehearing), 484 Mich 1; __ NW2d __ (2008),54 will eventually result
in a substantial increase in premiums paid for their mandatory no-fault policies.55
53
In Univ of Mich v Titan Ins Co, __ Mich __; __ NW2d __ (2010), the majority
has overruled Cameron v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 476 Mich 55; 718 NW2d 784 (2006).
This overruling will also lead to significant cost increases to no-fault policies. Indeed,
defendant Titan Insurance Company argued that overruling Cameron would have
“devastating affects” on the orderly adjustment of no-fault claims and “threaten the
viability” of the Michigan Assigned Claims Facility and the Michigan Catastrophic
Claims Association because the gutting of the one-year back rule will lead to a flood of
decades old no-fault claims seeking expensive family attendant care benefits. In addition,
in Hoover v Mich Mut Ins Co, 485 Mich 881 (2009), the majority has asked the parties to
brief whether Griffith v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 472 Mich 521; 697 NW2d 895
(2005), “was correctly decided.” No-fault insurance costs can be expected to rise even
further if the majority overrules Griffith, which considered the parameters of an
“allowable expense” under MCL 500.3107(1)(a).
54
As a consequence of the majority’s decision in United States Fidelity Ins &
Guaranty Co (On Rehearing), the Michigan Catastrophic Claims Association
substantially increased the mandatory annual assessment no-fault policy holders must pay
to the Association. According to the MCCA’s own website, the annual assessment has
increased forty percent in the last two years (from $104.58 per insured vehicle effective
July 1, 2008 to June 30, 2009 to $143.09 per insured vehicle effective July 1, 2010 to
June 30, 2011.). (accessed June 28, 2010).
55
As stated in Justice YOUNG’s dissent in United States Fidelity Ins & Guaranty
Co, 484 Mich at 26, this increase in premiums is not pertinent to our analysis of the
substantive issue beyond making the point that the majority is undoing the compromise
embodied by the no-fault act. But having lost the battle with the majority over the legal
59
Every owner of a car that is driven on a public highway must buy certain basic
coverages in order to register the vehicle and obtain license plates. MCL 500.3101(1).
The Legislature has provided two incentives to ensure that owners purchase the required
insurance. First, it is a misdemeanor to drive a motor vehicle without basic no-fault
coverage. Under MCL 500.3102(2), if someone is convicted of driving without basic no-
fault insurance coverage, he or she can be fined up to $500, incarcerated in jail for up to
one year, or both. Second, the no-fault act precludes receipt of no-fault personal
protection benefits if at the time of the accident the person was the owner or registrant of
an uninsured motor vehicle involved in the accident. MCL 500.3113(b).
Notwithstanding this criminal sanction, and this potential preclusion of no-fault benefits,
it is estimated that 17 percent56 of Michigan’s approximately eight million motor
vehicles57 are still operated without a no-fault policy in effect. With such mandatory
analysis of the no-fault statute, the financial consequences of the majority’s decision
should not go unremarked.
56
According to the Insurance Institute of Michigan’s 2009 Fact Book, the
Insurance Research Council (IRC) released a study in 2008 estimating Michigan’s
uninsured motorists rate at 17 percent. (accessed June 28, 2010). Indeed, according to
a July 11, 2010 editorial in the Detroit News, “Statistics suggest more than half the
drivers in Detroit ignore state law by driving without coverage because they can’t afford
the premiums. That’s a problem for their fellow motorists and for the state.”
(accessed July 14, 2010).
57
According to the Insurance Institute of Michigan, as of 2008, Michigan had 8.2
million registered motor vehicles. (accessed June 28, 2010).
60
policies now becoming even more expensive, one can also reasonably anticipate a
corresponding increase in the already large number of uninsured vehicles being driven on
our roads and highways.
The majority’s decision will not only result in increased automobile insurance
premiums, and more uninsured vehicles on our roads and highways, but it will also mean
that substantially more lawsuits will be filed, even though an express goal of the no-fault
act was to reduce “excessive litigation of motor vehicle accident cases.” Cassidy, 415
Mich at 500. Yet, under the majority’s opinion, more lawsuits will make their way to
juries for the consideration of noneconomic loss benefits, straining our already
overburdened courts.58 As it is, no-fault automobile negligence cases remain a dominant
58
If one reviews the new majority’s decisions, it is difficult not to conclude that
the only coherent theme of their jurisprudence is the fostering of litigation. They have
virtually guaranteed as much by introducing uncertainty, doubt and confusion into the
law, and by gratuitously interjecting irrelevant considerations into their opinions. See,
e.g., O’Neal, __ Mich at __ (gratuitously calling into question the viability of Wickens v
Oakwood Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53; 631 NW2d 686 (2001), a case having no
relevance to that dispute); Zahn v Kroger Co, 483 Mich 34; 764 NW2d 207 (2009)
(gratuitously observing that the parties to the contract were business entities “with equal
bargaining power,” as if the latter circumstance, not at all relevant in that case, might be
relevant in a different case); Anglers, __ Mich at __, order entered June 18, 2010 (Docket
Nos. 138863 to 138866 (refusing to dismiss a moot case); Scott v State Farm Mut Auto
Ins Co, 483 Mich 1032; 766 NW2d 273 (2009) (relaxing the causal connection that must
exist between an injury sustained and the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor
vehicle in no-fault cases); Decosta v Gossage, 486 Mich 116; __ NW2d __ (2010)
(refusing to enforce notice-of-intent requirements under MCL 600.2912b(2); Chambers v
Wayne Co Airport Auth, 483 Mich 1081; 765 NW2d 890 (2009), Beasley v Michigan,
483 Mich 1025, 1025-1027; 765 NW2d 608 (2009), and Ward v Michigan State Univ,
485 Mich 917; 773 NW2d 666 (2009) (refusing to enforce pre-litigation notice
requirements); Adair v Mich, __ Mich __; __ NW2d __ (2010) (reducing a Headlee
Amendment plaintiff’s burden of proof); Lansing Sch Educ Ass'n v Lansing Bd of Educ,
__ Mich __ ; __ NW2d __ (2010) (nullifying historic standards for determining whether a
61
factor in Michigan civil filings every year. Indeed, of the 47,300 new civil case filings in
Michigan circuit courts in 2009, 9,067-- approximately 20 percent of all civil cases--
were automobile related.59 Given that many no-fault claims are settled without the filing
of a lawsuit, the number of claims potentially affected by the majority’s ruling is even
higher.
The majority’s decision will also increase costs incurred by the state of Michigan
itself (and, of course, the taxpayers who fund those costs). In the course of arguing that
Kreiner should not be overruled because it “clarifies rather than expands the statutory
language,” the Attorney General’s amicus brief warns that if Kreiner is overruled, as a
plaintiff has “standing” to bring a lawsuit); Univ of Mich v Titan Ins Co, __ Mich __; __
NW2d __ (2010) (eroding the no-fault act’s one-year-back rule); O’Neal, supra(concluding that whichever lost-opportunity formula benefits the plaintiff the most in any
particular case is the correct formula to be utilized); Vanslembrouck v Halperin, 483
Mich 965; 763 NW2d 919 (2009) (incorrectly characterizing MCL 600.5851(7) as a
statute of limitations that can be tolled rather than a savings provision that cannot be
tolled); Sazima v Shepherd Bar & Restaurant, 483 Mich 924; 762 NW2d 924 (2009)
(expanding what injuries can be considered to have occurred “in the course of
employment” for purposes of worker’s compensation); and the 2010 amendments of
MCR 2.112 and MCR 2.118 (undermining affidavit of merit requirements). In the instant
case, of course, the majority, by undermining the no-fault compromise struck by the
Legislature, makes it easier for plaintiffs to sue for noneconomic loss benefits.
59
See 2009 Annual Report of the Michigan Supreme Court, pps 35-36.
(accessed June 28, 2010).
62
self-insured entity, the state will realize “a direct, significant increase in the cost of its
litigation and coverage obligations.”60
Finally, and as a consequence of all of the above, the majority’s decision will
almost certainly call into question the long-term economic integrity of the present no-
fault system in Michigan. By nullifying the legislative compromise that was struck when
the no-fault act was adopted-- a compromise grounded in concerns over excessive
litigation, the over-compensation of minor injuries, and the availability of affordable
insurance-- the Court’s decision today will restore a legal environment in which each of
these hazards reappear and threaten the continued fiscal soundness of our no-fault
system.61
IV. CONCLUSION
The no-fault automobile insurance act, MCL 500.3135(1), provides that “[a]
person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his or her
ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered
death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.” The
issue here is whether plaintiff has suffered a serious impairment of body function.
60
It was reported that, as of 2007, the state vehicle fleet totaled 11,856.
(accessed
June 28, 2010).
61
I reiterate that expected increases in no-fault premiums are not pertinent to our
analysis of the legal issues in this case, beyond making the point that the majority is
undoing the legislative compromise embodied by the no-fault act and that there will be
significant practical consequences to doing this.
63
“‘[S]erious impairment of body function’ means an objectively manifested impairment of
an important body function that affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her
normal life.” MCL 500.3135(7).
In Kreiner, 471 Mich at 132-133, this Court held that in determining whether the
impairment affects the plaintiff’s general ability to lead his normal life, “a court should
engage in a multifaceted inquiry, comparing the plaintiff’s life before and after the
accident as well as the significance of any affected aspects on the course of the plaintiff’s
overall life.” In addition, Kreiner indicated that certain factors, such as the duration of
the impairment, may be of assistance in evaluating whether the plaintiff’s general ability
to lead his normal life has been affected. Id. at 133.
The majority overrules Kreiner, rejecting these factors and holding that temporal
considerations are wholly or largely irrelevant in determining whether an impairment
affects the plaintiff’s general ability to lead his or her normal life. The majority
apparently holds instead that as long as a plaintiff’s general ability to lead his normal life
has been affected for even a single moment in time, the plaintiff has suffered a serious
impairment of body function. This conclusion is at odds with the actual language of the
statute and nullifies the legislative compromise embodied in the no-fault act. Because I
believe that Kreiner was correctly decided and that temporal considerations are, in fact,
highly relevant, and indeed necessary, in determining whether an impairment affects the
plaintiff’s general ability to lead his normal life, I would sustain Kreiner. By nullifying
the legislative compromise over the no-fault act-- a compromise grounded in concerns
over excessive litigation, the over-compensation of minor injuries, and the availability of
64
affordable insurance-- the Court’s decision today will revive a legal environment in
which each of these hazards reappear and threaten the continued fiscal integrity of our
no-fault system.
Because I do not believe that the lower courts erred in concluding that plaintiff has
not suffered a serious impairment of body function, I would affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
CORRIGAN and YOUNG, JJ., concurred with MARKMAN, J.
65