People ex rel. Plugger v. Township Board of Overyssel

Manning J.:

Four of the relators, who took the contract to build the piers, were members of the board of freeholders organized under the act for the purposes therein mentioned, and that let the contract on behalf of the public. So careful is the law in guarding against the abuse of fiduciary relations, that it will not permit an agent to act for himself and his principal in the same transaction, as to buy of himself, as agent, the property of his principal, or the like. All such transactions are void, as it respects his principal, unless ratified by him with a full knowledge of all the circumstances. To repudiate them he need not show himself damnified. Whether he has been or not is immaterial. Actual injury is not the principle the law proceeds on in holding such transactions void. Fidelity in the agent is what is aimed at, and as a means of securing it, the law will not permit the agent to place himself in a situation in which he may be tempted by his own private interest to disregard that of his principal. Hence, the law will not permit an administrator to purchase at a public sale by himself, property of the estate on which he has administered; or a guardian the property of his ward, when sold by himself. All public officers are agents, and their official powers are fiduciary. They are trusted with public functions for the good of the public; to protect, advance and promote its interests, and not their own. And, a greater necessity exists than in private life for removing from them every inducement to “abuse the trust reposed in them, as the temptations to which they are sometimes exposed are stronger, and the risk of detection and exposure is less. A judge cannot hear and decide his own case, or one in which he is personally interested. He may decide it conscientiously and in accordance with law. But that is not enough. The law will not permit him to reap a personal advantage from an official act performed in favor of himself. For these reasons, we hold the contract we are asked to enforce by mandamus, void as against public policy. — See Clute v. Barron, 2 Mich. 192; Dwight v. Blackmar, 2 Mich. 330; Ingerson v. Starkweather, Walk. Ch. 346; Beaubien v. Poupard, Har. Ch. 206; Walton v. Torrey, Har. Ch. 259; Perkins v. Thompson, 3 N. H. 144; Obert v. Hammel, 3 Harrison (N. J.) 74 ; Lazarus v. Bryson, 3 Bin. 54.

We think it no exception to the rule we have stated, that all the contractors were not members of the board of freeholders, or that those who were members were a minority of the board. The rule would not amount to much if it could be evaded in any such way. It might almost as well not exist, as to exist with such an exception. The public would reap little or no benefit from it.

Being against the relators on this part of the case, I think it unnecessary to notice the other points made on the argument.

The mandamus, I think, should be denied, with costs.