DocketNumber: Docket No. 11
Citation Numbers: 177 Mich. 620
Judges: Bird, Brooke, Kuhn, McAlvay, Moore, Ostrander, Steere, Stone
Filed Date: 11/3/1913
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 9/8/2022
Defendant Mary T. Fonger is the niece of complainant Sarah C. Nye. To the Fongers the Nyes made a deed of certain premises in May, 1910, reserving to themselves a life estate. The deed was taken by Mrs. Fonger, and was recorded in April, 1911. Complainants, seeking to set aside and cancel the deed, charge that no consideration was received by them for the conveyance; that it was obtained by fraud; that undue influence was exerted by defendants in procuring it; that neither of the grantors un
“That said complainants should be furnished by said defendants a comfortable support so long as said complainants and each of them should live, and at their death that said defendants should afford them and each of them a decent burial; that such support should be in accordance with their circumstances and station in life, and such as the complainants have heretofore been accustomed to, and that such support should be furnished at the farm hereinbefore described and in the home of defendants thereon.”
Pursuant to this finding the decree provides that defendants shall so maintain complainants, etc., and give to complainants a lien upon the premises as security for performance of the decree. At the hearing the court stated that performance of the parol contract of the parties could be decreed only because de
There are various minor propositions and issues of fact raised by the pleadings, but a recital of them and an analysis of the testimony would profit no one. Upon the main issue we are satisfied with the conclusion of the court below. That is to say, we think it is not made out that the deed was unfairly procured, or that it was not intelligently executed and delivered. But the deed reserves a life estate to complainants, and in their bill they do not assert the parol contract and agreement with defendants found by the court, and to which the decree gives effect. Enforcement of this provision of the decree involves the possession by defendants of the premises in question, which it is needless to say is apparently inconsistent with a life use thereof by complainants. Complainants, without expressly waiving any benefit which performance of the decree may afford them, complain that it creates contractual relations, and forces complainants to accept them. We are satisfied that the parol agreement was made, and that it was contemplated that in performing it on their part defendants should possess the premises. It is an agreement involving in a large degree the personal comfort of complainants, and the death of either of defendants would, or might, make complete performance impossible, while a change in their mental attitude towards complainants would, or might, take away the very consideration for making such an agreement. Assuming that the provision for a life estate was merely a safety device intended to secure complainants in any event a home and the fruits of the farm, it is evident, we think, that complainants should not be refused the right, at their election, to possess the land, and that, if they so de