DocketNumber: Calendar No. 24,650
Citation Numbers: 178 Mich. 250
Judges: Bird, Brooke, Kuhn, McAlvay, Moore, Ostrander, Steere, Stone
Filed Date: 12/20/1913
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 9/8/2022
The Michigan railroad commission made and entered certain orders respectively on October 19,1909, October 22, 1909, and November 3, 1909. Pursuant to the statute, Act No. 300, Public Acts of 1909, § 26a, the railway company began an action in the circuit court in chancery for the county of Wayne against the Michigan railroad commission to vacate
“The sum of the whole matter was that the bill was dismissed because the complainant did not, with sufficient certainty and clearness, prove the existence of that confiscation, the presence of which was necessary to enable courts to give relief. We are satisfied that the opinion, upon the whole, confirms our view that the Michigan courts could consider only this question, and had no legislative or administrative discretion in determining what was reasonable, and that, therefore, when complainant resorted to the Michigan courts, it invoked the protection of the judicial power.
“It follows that the right of the railway company to such a review as any court could give became fixed when the order of the commission was promulgated; that, to prevent an invasion of its legal right, the railway company could resort to any court of com*253 petent jurisdiction; and that, having selected the Wayne circuit court in chancery, and having submitted its controversy to that court, and judgment having been rendered against complainant by that court and by the Supreme Court of Michigan, the railway company cannot now try the same controversy over again in this court.” 203 Fed. 864.
See, also, Puget Sound Electric Railway v. Lee (D. C.), 207 Fed. 860.
From the order denying the motion for a preliminary injunction an appeal has been taken to the Supreme Court of the United States, and is pending.
The Michigan railroad commission, by the attorney general, moves this court to amend its decree in the cause by inserting therein these words:
“And it is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the said Detroit & Mackinac Railway Company forthwith put in full force and effect the several orders of the Michigan railroad commission heretofore made, in the premises, namely, the order made on October 22, 1909, in a proceeding in which Frank W. Gilchrist, Churchill Lumber Company and Island Mill Lumber Company are complainants, and the Detroit & Mackinac Railway Company is defendant, and the order made October 19, 1909, in a proceeding in which the Fletcher Paper Company is complainant, and the Detroit & Mackinac Railway Company is defendant, and the supplemental order made by said commission in a proceeding between said parties, dated November 3, 1909,”—
Or that, in lieu thereof, the Wayne circuit court in chancery be directed to put the said orders into effect. In opposing the granting of the motion it is urged by the railway company (1) that neither in the answer of the Michigan railroad commission nor in those of intervening defendants in the original action was there a prayer for affirmative relief; (2) that in said action the Wayne circuit court and this court acted in the place of the commission to review and correct, revise or affirm, the orders of the commission; that
These contentions, except the first and the last one, rest upon the proposition asserted in argument that the power exercised by the court in the proceeding to review the action of the Michigan railroad commission is not judicial in character, and is exercised merely for the purpose of reviewing and of correcting the results of a similar exercise of power by the Michigan railroad commission. In short, that the action in court was a mere continuation of the proceedings before the commission, the court exercising no other or different powers from those exercised by the commission, and addressing itself to the decision of no questions other than those decided by the commission. We are told that in filing its bill of complaint in the circuit court in chancery, and in appealing to this court, the railway company was but pursuing a practice approved by the Supreme Court of the United States in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210 (29 Sup. Ct. 67), preparatory to thereafter invoking the judicial authority, to determine the lawfulness of the orders made by the railroad commission.
If, as is contended, the court acted as an appellate
But if the proposition asserted upon the part of the railway company is unsound, if the court has determined — judicially determined — that the orders of the commission are not unreasonable or unlawful, that their enforcement will not result in confiscation or in unlawfully depriving the company of property, it would seem to follow that the orders of the commission should be immediately enforced, unless there is some arbitrary rule which prevents an amendment of the decree. To insist that the commission shall in all such cases institute mandamus proceedings in this court, in which proceedings the questions of the lawfulness and reasonableness of the orders would necessarily be regarded as having been settled by the decree, would seem to be to prefer form to substance.
This court has not had occasion to examine, generally, and to construe the various provisions of the act of 1909. Many of its provisions were taken from Act No. 312 of the Public Acts of 1907. In Michigan Central R. Co. v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 156 Mich. 459 (120 N. W. 1073), and in Michigan Central R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 160 Mich. 355 (125 N. W. 549), certain orders of the commission were considered; in the first case the question being whether, the circuit court should have granted a preliminary injunction restraining the enforcement of the orders of the commission, and in the other (the same case on appeal) whether the act of 1907 was void because it conferred upon the commission executive and legislative powers.
“The legislature may, from time to time, pass laws establishing reasonable maximum rates of charges for the transportation of passengers and freight on different railroads in this State, and may pass laws establishing reasonable maximum rates of charges for the transportation of property by express companies in this State, and may delegate such power to fix reasonable maximum rates of charges for the transportation of freight by railroad companies and for the transportation of property by express companies to a commission created by law; and shall prohibit running contracts between such railroád companies whereby discrimination is made in favor of either of such companies as against other companies owning connecting or intersecting lines of railroad.” Art. 12, §7.
In neither of the cases referred to nor in Detroit, etc., R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 171 Mich. 335 (137 N. W. 329), did the court undertake to review, other than judicially, the orders of the commission. In the first case it was said:
“We do not construe the provisions of this act to lodge in the courts the power to establish rates. The power conferred upon the courts is solely to determine whether the rates are confiscatory or unreasonable. If the courts should so find, they are not authorized to determine what are reasonable, but the matter must again be referred to the commission to establish other rates. If they are found to be reasonable, the courts will sustain the action of the commission. If, however, it should be determined that such power was conferred upon the courts and is unconstitutional, the act would still be held valid, because it could stand with that clause eliminated from the statute. Courts*257 declare legislative enactments invalid only when they are able .to determine from the act itself that the legislature would not in all probability have enacted the law with the objectionable features eliminated. This act expressly declares that, so long as the main purpose and object of the act can be sustained, any provision held void shall not affect its validity. We are not now prepared to hold that, if all the provisions which counsel for relators now attack should be held void, it would invalidate the entire law. Similar acts have been sustained by the courts of many of the States, and we prefer to reserve this important question until the final hearing.”
This was said in view of contentions, one of which was that section 26 of the act conferred upon the courts the power to establish rates if those established by the commission were found to be unlawful or unreasonable. When the cause after hearing came to this court upon appeal, the foregoing and some other portions of the earlier opinion were quoted, and it was said:
“We have thus quoted, perhaps at unnecessary length, from the opinion of Justice Grant, because it appeared there, as it did upon this hearing, that the rates fixed by the commission are not confiscatory, but afford some remuneration over and above expenses, and because the law expressly makes the rates fixed by the commission prima facie lawful and reasonable, and casts the burden of showing the contrary upon the railroad companies contesting, who are the complainants here. While the holding of this court in the mandamus proceeding may not be res judicata, yet it shows clearly the view held at that time as to the law of the case.”
Sections 26a. and 26d of the act of 1909 are similar to sections found in the act of 1907, the language of which was the ground for the contention that powers other than judicial had been conferred upon the courts. The sections referred to read:
“Sec. 26. (a) Any common carrier or other party*258 in interest, being dissatisfied with any order of the commission fixing any rate or rates, fares, charges, classifications, joint rate or rates, or any order fixing any regulations, practices or services, 'may within thirty days from the issuance of such order and notice thereof commence an action in the circuit court in chancery against the commission as defendant to vacate and set aside any such order on the ground that the rate or ratesj fares, charges, classifications, joint rate or rates fixed are unlawful or unreasonable, or that any such regulation, practice or service fixed in such order is unreasonable; in which suit the commission shall be served with a subpoena and a copy of the complaint. The commission shall file its answer, and on leave of court any interested party may file an answer to said complaint. Upon the filing of the answer of the commission said action shall be at issue and stand ready for hearing upon ten days’ notice by either party. All suits brought under this section shall have precedence over any civil cause of a different nature pending in such court, and the circuit court shall always be deemed open for the hearing thereof, and the same shall proceed, be tried and determined as other chancery suits. Any party to such suit may introduce original evidence in addition to the transcript of evidence offered to said commission, and the circuit courts in chancery are hereby given jurisdiction of such suits and empowered to affirm, vacate or set aside the order of the commission in whole or in part, and to make such other order or decree as the courts shall decide to be in accordance with the facts and the law. * * *
“(d) Either party to said action, within sixty days after service of a copy of the order or judgment of the court, may appeal to the Supreme Court, which appeal shall be governed by the statutes governing chancery appeals. When the appeal is taken the case shall, on the return of the papers to the Supreme Court, be immediately placed on the calendar of the then pending term, and shall be brought to a hearing in the same manner as other cases on the calendar, or if no term is then pending, shall take precedence of cases of a different nature except criminal cases at the next term of the Supreme Court.”
We affirm the power of the court, in proper cases, to order by its decree the performance by the railway company of orders which it has found to be not unlawful or unreasonable.
There is, however, a rule of chancery practice long adhered to which denies relief not prayed for, and denies to a nonappealing party relief beyond that granted in the decree by the court below. The rule is not one of form merely, but one of substance, and we are not inclined to make cases like the present exceptional.
Nor is the Michigan railroad commission, nor are the interveners, without remedy. It is provided by section 47 of the act that:
“In addition to all the other remedies provided by this act for the prevention and punishment of any and all violations of the provisions hereof and of all orders of the commissions, the commission, and likewise any person, firm or corporation interested, may compel compliance with the provisions of this act and with the orders of the commission by proceedings in mandamus, injunction or by other appropriate civil remedies.”
Whether the pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court of the United States should prevent the issue of
The motion to amend the decree is denied, but without costs.