DocketNumber: Docket No. 28
Citation Numbers: 206 Mich. 488
Judges: Bird, Brooke, Kuhn, Moore, Ostrander, Steere, Stone
Filed Date: 7/17/1919
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 9/8/2022
Plaintiff is a brick mason. When injured he was in the employ of the River Raisin Paper Company. On June 29, 1917, while engaged in his work on a scaffold he slipped and bruised his shin. When his working hours were over he applied an antiseptic to his bruise. The injury gave evidence of healing in the ordinary manner and he continued to work. On July 7th his leg began to swell, but he worked on until July 13th. He then laid off and remained quiet until July 19th when he consulted a physician and on the following day, July 20th, it was determined that he was suffering from erysipelas in his injured leg. He was at once taken to Herman Kiefer hospital, where he remained in quarantine until November 16th, when he was transferred to Harper hospital, and he remained there until January 5, 1918. A week later he had so far recovered his strength that he was able to walk about and he visited his attorneys. They made a claim for him to the industrial accident board on January 14, 1918. An award of $10 a week was made by the committee of
The principal defense urged by the defendants is that plaintiff did not file his claim within the six months provided by the statute. Plaintiff concedes that his claim was not filed within the six months period but excuses the delay on the ground that during his stay at the Herman Kiefer hospital he was incapacitated, both physically and mentally.,
Upon that issue the board made the following finding:
“(e) That from July 20, 1917, to November 16, 1917, the applicant was physically and mentally incapable of making a claim for compensation within the meaning of the exception contained in section 15, of part 2, of the workmen’s compensation law, and that said three months and twenty-six days should be excluded in computing the limitations applicable to the facts in this case.”
It is argued by defendants in this court:
(1) That the foregoing finding of fact is not justified by the record.
(2) That if it is, the statute commenced to run at the date of the injury, and that, having commenced to run, the statute would not be flagged by the subsequent mental and physical incapacity of plaintiff.
1. The testimony discloses that during plaintiff’s stay at the Herman Kiefer hospital he was in quarantine and confined to the bed until the last day or two when he was placed in a wheel chair. That during a considerable portion of the time he was in great pain, and much of the time he was delirious. It further shows that he was cut off completely from the outside world and saw only the nurses and doctors. No letters could go out without special permission. On one occasion his brother was permitted to enter the room where he was, and remain five minutes, but before doing so he was required to don an oil cloth
2. The statute involved provides that:
“No proceedings for compensation for an injury under this act shall be maintained, unless a notice of the injury shall have.been given to the employer three months after the happening thereof, and unless the claim for compensation with respect to such injury shall have been made within six months after the occurrence of the same; or, in case of the death of the employee, or in the event of his physical or mental incapacity, within six months after death or the removal of such physical or mental incapacity” 2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 5445.
In construing this section of the statute counsel apply some general rules which have been held applicable to statutes of limitations, namely, that the disability must exist at the time when the action accrues, and that when the statute once attaches the period will continue to run and will not be suspended by any subsequent disability unless the statute so provides. It is then argued that because plaintiff was nót incapacitated for several days after the accident the statute has run and the claim is barred.
The rules stated by counsel are undoubtedly the rules which are usually invoked in construing general statutes of limitations, and they are precisely the rules
If defendants’ suggested construction should prevail the practical operation of the statute would result in this:
(a) In case of immediate death the saving clause would apply.
(b) If death did not ensue until the following day the saving clause would not apply because the statute of limitations would then have begun to run.
(c) In case of injury, if the claimant became incapacitated on the date of the accident, the saving clause would apply.
(d) In case of injury, if the incapacity did not develop until the following day, the exception in the statute would not apply because the statute of limitations would then be on its way.
It is easy to see that this is not the construction which the legislature obviously intended the exception should have, nor is it a reasonable construction, if we keep in mind the purpose of the legislation. The legislature, of course, understood that in many cases of injury periods of incapacity would follow, and it is fair to presume that it annexed the saving clause to exclude such periods from the operation of the statute.
Most of the cases bearing on this question of construction, including those cited by counsel, are cases construing statutes of limitation general in their application and wholly disconnected with the causes which produced the incapacity. The statute involved here is a short statute of limitation special in its ap