DocketNumber: Docket 78-2301
Citation Numbers: 283 N.W.2d 722, 91 Mich. App. 273
Judges: D.C. Riley, P.J., and M.J. Kelly and Beasley
Filed Date: 7/10/1979
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 8/26/2023
On October 6, 1977, plaintiff, the union representative of correctional officers employed at the Detroit House of Correction (hereinafter, DeHoCo), petitioned the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (hereinafter, the Commission) for a formal determination as to whether the officers were eligible for arbitration under the compulsory arbitration statute, MCL 423.231 et seq.; MSA 17.455(31) et seq.
In an order dated May 17, 1978, the Commission held that it possessed the requisite jurisdiction necessary to effect a settlement of the controversy, and in addition ruled that the prison guards were within the act’s coverage and therefore entitled to mandatory arbitration. The City of Detroit and DeHoCo appeal that determination by leave, raising three issues, only one of which merits distended consideration.
Defendants’ initial argument, that the Commission lacks the jurisdiction and authority to hear and decide the question of plaintiff’s eligibility for compulsory arbitration, has been recently rebuffed by this Court in In The Matter of Metropolitan Council 23, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 89 Mich App 564; 280 NW2d 600 (1979), wherein it was held that the legislative intent to afford public employees within the scope of the act an expeditious and effective procedure for the resolution of disputes
Defendants also maintain that the Commission erred in determining that DeHoCo is a state rather than a city facility.
MCL 423.232; MSA 17.455(32) defines "public police and fire department”, to which the compulsory arbitration act applies, as follows:
"any department of a city, county, village or township having employees engaged as policemen, or in fire fighting or subject to the hazards thereof.”
Assuming, arguendo, the validity of defendants’ contention, Green v Dep’t of Corrections, 30 Mich App 648, 652; 186 NW2d 792 (1971), aff'd 386 Mich 459; 192 NW2d 491 (1971), we are no closer to a resolution of the ultimate dispute on appeal, which is, whether the Commission erroneously ruled that the correctional officers were within the purview of the act. As is readily apparent from the provision above, the focal point of conflict is not whether DeHoCo is a city or state institution, but rather the identity of the prison guards’ employer. Since the guards are employed and paid by the City of Detroit, they clearly come, in this respect, within the ambit of the statute.
Hence, we turn to the dispositive issue, whether the Commission’s holding that the officers in question were subject to the same or similar hazards as faced by Detroit policemen was in accordance with the law and supported by competent, material and substantial evidence. Const 1963, art 6, § 28, MCL 423.23(e); MSA 17.454(25)(e), Michigan Employment Relations Commission v Detroit Symphony Orchestra, Inc, 393 Mich 116, 121-124; 223 NW2d 283 (1974).
The functions of the correctional guards, and their attendant risks, were explained by various witnesses, including the director of DeHoCo. Their testimony may be summarized as follows: the officers are responsible for maintaining order throughout the detention facility, and also patrol its perimeters on foot and in vehicles. They are accountable for the custody of prisoners to and from police agencies, courts and hospitals. In the event of a prisoner escape, they pursue and initially attempt an apprehension, always with the
Upon a careful review of the evidence and testimony proffered, we are unable to reach the conclusion that the Commission’s finding was devoid of the necessary record support. We view the instant case as a decidedly close one, and accordingly afford due deference to administrative expertise and decline to "invade the province of exclusive administrative fact-finding by displacing an agency’s choice between two reasonably differing views”. Michigan Employment Relations Commission v Detroit Symphony Orchestra, Inc, supra, at 124.
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff.
MCL 423.231; MSA 17.455(31).