Tiffany Lachell King v. Travelers Property Casualty Insurance Co

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TIFFANY LACHELL KING and EMANUEL FOR PUBLICATION
KING, III, January 19, 2023
9:10 a.m.
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and
SELECT SPECIALISTS, LLC, AFFILIATED
DIAGNOSTICS OF OAKLAND, LLC, and
GROESBECK RX, LLC,
Intervening Plaintiffs,
v No. 359064
Oakland Circuit Court
MICHIGAN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE LC No. 20-183782-NI
PLACEMENT FACILITY and MARY ANN PAGE,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: YATES, P.J., and JANSEN and SERVITTO, JJ.
YATES, P.J.
The complexity of our no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., is evident in this case. Plaintiffs,
Tiffany Lachell King and Emanuel King, III, were involved in a motor-vehicle collision when their
Nissan Pathfinder was struck from the side by a Ford Focus driven by defendant, Mary Ann Page.
Plaintiffs filed this suit alleging negligence and seeking first-party and third-party benefits under
the no-fault act. The trial court awarded summary disposition to defendant, Michigan Automobile
Insurance Placement Facility (MAIPF), on plaintiffs’ first-party claims and to Page on plaintiffs’
third-party claim after finding out that plaintiffs were residents of Michigan who lacked no-fault
insurance on their Nissan Pathfinder at the time of the collision. We conclude that the trial court
correctly resolved plaintiffs’ first-party claims against MAIPF and Emanuel King’s third-party
claim against Page, but the trial court erred in awarding summary disposition to Page on Tiffany
King’s negligence claim seeking third-party benefits.
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On March 7, 2020, Emanuel King was driving a Nissan Pathfinder owned by Tiffany King
on Woodward Avenue in Ferndale. Tiffany King was riding along as a passenger in the Pathfinder.
Defendant Page, driving her own car, turned left and hit the side of plaintiffs’ vehicle. As a result
of the collision, both Kings sustained injuries requiring medical treatment, so they both applied to
MAIPF for first-party benefits.1 But MAIPF denied their claims because the applications that they
submitted indicated that they were Michigan residents on the date of the collision and their vehicle
did not have proper no-fault insurance.
After their applications were denied, the Kings filed this lawsuit against their own insurer,
i.e., Travelers Property Casualty Company (Travelers), MAIPF, and Page. Plaintiffs set forth one
claim for no-fault benefits against Travelers, one claim for declaratory judgment against Travelers,
one claim for no-fault benefits against MAIPF, one claim for declaratory judgment against MAIPF,
and one claim for negligence against Page for third-party benefits.2 In addition, Select Specialists,
LLC, Affiliated Diagnostics of Oakland, LLC, and Groesbeck RX, LLC, all intervened as plaintiffs
in this case in their capacities as providers of medical services.
Page responded to the action by moving for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8),
asserting that because the Kings were dual residents of Michigan and Georgia, they were required
to maintain Michigan no-fault insurance on the vehicle involved in the collision. Page argued that
both plaintiffs were barred from bringing suit against her for tort liability under MCL 500.3135(1).
Page also asserted that the claim brought by Select Specialists, LLC, was barred because plaintiffs
were residents of Michigan at the time of the collision. MAIPF filed a response to Page’s motion,
agreeing with Page’s claim that plaintiffs lived in Michigan at the time of the accident, yet their
vehicle was registered and insured in Georgia. As MAIPF put it, plaintiffs were required to register
and insure their vehicle in Michigan either because they were Michigan residents or because their
vehicle was in Michigan for an aggregate of more than 30 days in the calendar year. Thus, MAIPF
requested summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) on plaintiffs’ first-party claims.
Plaintiffs Tiffany and Emanuel King also responded to Page’s motion. In their response,
plaintiffs acknowledged that their vehicle was registered and insured in Georgia at the time of the
collision, but they insisted that their vehicle need not be registered in Michigan because they were
residents of Michigan and Georgia. Plaintiffs also noted that Emanuel King did not own the Nissan
Pathfinder. The trial court conducted a hearing on September 1, 2021, to consider the summary
disposition motions. From the outset of that hearing, the trial court stated that it believed plaintiffs
were domiciled in Michigan. The trial court based this determination upon the facts that plaintiffs
1
The term “first-party benefits” is common parlance for “personal protection insurance benefits”
under MCL 500.3105(1). McKelvie v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 459 Mich 42, 44 n 1; 586 NW2d 395(1998). Oddly, “personal protection insurance benefits” are also informally called “PIP benefits”
even though that acronym does not fit quite right. Id.2
“A third-party tort claim is distinct from a claim for first-party benefits because a third-party tort
claim involves an adversarial process in which the plaintiff must prove fault in order to recover.”
Atkins v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp, 492 Mich 707, 718; 822 NW2d 522 (2012).
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noted in the police report and on the application for first-party benefits that they lived in Michigan.
The trial court also found that both Tiffany and Emanuel King were owners of the vehicle.
On September 8, 2021, the trial court issued a written order memorializing its oral rulings.
The order explained that plaintiffs were residents of Michigan and “domiciled in Michigan” at the
time of the accident, and both plaintiffs were owners of the Nissan Pathfinder, which did not have
the required insurance. Therefore, the trial court granted summary disposition to MAIPF and Page
because plaintiffs were not entitled to first-party benefits by operation of MCL 500.3113(b) and
plaintiffs were not entitled to a tort claim under MCL 500.3135(1). The trial court also awarded
Page summary disposition on the claim brought by intervening plaintiff Select Specialists, LLC.
The trial court concluded its order by stating that all claims brought by plaintiffs and intervening
plaintiffs against MAIPF and Page were “dismissed with prejudice[.]” Plaintiffs unsuccessfully
moved for reconsideration, and this appeal followed.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred when it awarded summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (I)(2) to defendants Page and MAIPF, thereby denying plaintiffs both
first-party and third-party benefits.3 “We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for
summary disposition.” El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665(2019). Although defendant Page moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), which
permits a trial court to decide “the motion on the pleadings alone[,]” id. at 160, Page attached ten
exhibits to her motion. Plaintiffs followed suit by attaching a police report to their response, and
MAIPF moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) in addition to asking for relief
under MCR 2.116(I)(2). The trial court acted properly in considering the materials submitted by
the competing parties, and its decision to review the materials converted Page’s initial motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) into a request for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10), just as MAIPF had formally demanded. See Jawad A Shah, MD, PC v State Farm
Mut Auto Ins Co, 324 Mich App 182, 207; 920 NW2d 148 (2018).
A summary disposition motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) “tests the factual sufficiency of a
claim.” El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 160. A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may only be granted if
“there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. “ ‘A genuine issue of material fact exists when
the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.’ ” Id. In the process
of granting summary disposition, the trial court necessarily interpreted the no-fault act. We review
questions of statutory interpretation, construction, and application de novo. Home-Owners Ins Co
v Perkins, 328 Mich App 570, 578; 939 NW2d 705 (2019). Questions of law are also reviewed de
novo. White v Taylor Distrib Co, Inc, 289 Mich App 731, 734; 798 NW2d 354 (2010). We must
decide, on de novo review, whether the trial court correctly denied first-party and third-party
benefits to plaintiffs prior to trial based upon a proper reading of the no-fault act.
3
The trial court also dismissed the claims brought by the intervening plaintiffs, but no intervening
plaintiff has appealed that ruling, so this Court need not address that ruling on appeal.
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A. FIRST-PARTY BENEFITS
Plaintiffs opened their complaint by demanding first-party benefits from their own insurer,
Travelers, which had issued a Georgia automobile-insurance policy to plaintiff Tiffany King. But
because the Georgia policy did not contemplate first-party benefits under the no-fault act, plaintiffs
also made claims against defendant MAIPF for first-party benefits. After plaintiffs’ claims against
Travelers were dismissed by stipulation on February 10, 2021, MAIPF became the sole remaining
focus of the plaintiffs’ efforts to obtain first-party benefits. First-party benefits, which an injured
person is entitled to receive from his or her own insurer, are defined in the no-fault act to include
“reasonable charges incurred for . . . care, recovery, or rehabilitation” as well as “[w]ork loss” and
other expenses. See MCL 500.3107(1). But the no-fault act disqualifies from first-party benefits
any “person [who] was the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle or motorcycle involved in the
accident with respect to which the security required by section 3101 or 3103 was not in effect.”
MCL 500.3113(b). Thus, an “owner or registrant of a motor vehicle” who lacked insurance under
the no-fault act at the time of the collision cannot recover first-party benefits. Moreover, although
our Legislature “created the MAIPF to provide no-fault insurance to any person who was unable
to obtain insurance through ordinary means[,]”4 Spectrum Health Hosps v Mich Assigned Claims
Plan, 330 Mich App 21, 33; 944 NW2d 412 (2019), the record contains no evidence that plaintiffs
obtained no-fault insurance through MAIPF. Thus, the trial court awarded summary disposition
to MAIPF on both plaintiffs’ claims for first-party benefits.
Neither plaintiff had no-fault insurance under the Georgia automobile-insurance policy that
Travelers issued or under any other policy. Therefore, the disqualification from recovery of first-
party benefits prescribed by MCL 500.3113(b) appears obvious. In a baffling argument, however,
plaintiffs insist that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether they were “domiciled” in
Michigan or Georgia at the time of the collision. They cite MCL 500.3163, which prescribes rules
for out-of-state insurers such as Travelers to pay first-party benefits, but this appeal only involves
MAIPF, not Travelers, as a potential source of first-party benefits. More significantly, the no-fault
act, MCL 500.3113(c), prescribes a separate disqualification from first-party benefits for a “person
[who] was not a resident of this state, unless the person owned a motor vehicle that was registered
and insured in this state.” Accordingly, if plaintiffs were residents of Georgia as they now claim,
their effort to obtain first-party benefits from MAIPF would still fail because their vehicle was not
“registered and insured in this state[,]” as required to avoid disqualification under the no-fault act,
MCL 500.3113(c). But if plaintiffs were residents of Michigan, as the trial court concluded, then
they were required to register their Pathfinder in Michigan and also obligated to maintain no-fault
insurance on the vehicle pursuant to MCL 500.3101(1). Witt v American Family Mut Ins Co, 219
Mich App 602, 607; 557 NW2d 163 (1996). Their failure to do so disqualified them from getting
first-party benefits by dint of MCL 500.3113(b).
Plaintiffs’ only potential path to first-party benefits runs through the disqualification clause
in MCL 500.3113(b), which limits disqualification from first-party benefits to Michigan residents
4
As we have noted, “[t]he MAIPF is not a state agency; it is a ‘nonprofit organization of insurer
members[.]’ ” Spectrum Health Hosps v Mich Assigned Claims Plan, 330 Mich App 21, 33; 944
NW2d 412 (2019).
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who can be described as “the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle involved in the accident” that
lacks no-fault insurance. The record demonstrates that Tiffany King was both the title owner and
the registrant of the Pathfinder, so she is necessarily disqualified from first-party benefits pursuant
to MCL 500.3113(b). But Emanuel King was not the title owner or the registrant of the Pathfinder,
so he might have a theory that the disqualification prescribed by MCL 500.3113(b) does not apply
to him. Unfortunately for him, though, the no-fault act broadly defines an “owner” of a vehicle as
a person “having the use of a motor vehicle, under a lease or otherwise, for a period that is greater
than 30 days.” See MCL 500.3101(3)(l)(i). That capacious definition includes Emanuel King,
who had use of the Pathfinder for more than 30 days. See Twichel v MIC Gen Ins Corp, 469 Mich
524, 530; 676 NW2d 616 (2004) (“[I]t is not necessary that a person actually have used the vehicle
for a thirty-day period before a finding may be made that the person is the owner. Rather, the
focus must be on the nature of the person’s right to use the vehicle.”).
The trial court’s decision to award MAIPF summary disposition on plaintiffs’ claims for
first-party benefits not only squares with the terms of the no-fault act, but also makes good sense.
After all, plaintiffs never paid for no-fault insurance through their own insurer, i.e., Travelers, or
through MAIPF. Moreover, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against their insurer, i.e.,
Travelers, which should have been their principal source for first-party benefits under one of the
most fundamental tenets of the no-fault act. Miclea v Cherokee Ins Co, 333 Mich App 661, 668;
963 NW2d 665 (2020), quoting Parks v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 426 Mich 191, 202-203; 393
NW2d 833 (1986). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s summary disposition award to MAIPF
on plaintiffs’ claims for first-party benefits.
B. THIRD-PARTY BENEFITS
Plaintiffs’ complaint concludes with a negligence claim against defendant Page that seeks
third-party benefits. Pursuant to the no-fault act, MCL 500.3135(1), a “person remains subject to
tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his or her ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor
vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or
permanent disfigurement.” But the no-fault act, MCL 500.3135(2)(c), states that “[d]amages must
not be assessed in favor of a party who was operating his or her own vehicle at the time the injury
occurred and did not have in effect for that motor vehicle the security required by section 3101(1)”
of the no-fault act “at the time the injury occurred.”
As the disqualifying language in MCL 500.3135(2)(c) makes clear, the absence of no-fault
insurance “at the time the injury occurred” is not, in and of itself, sufficient to preclude a claim for
third-party benefits. Disqualification also requires that the party seeking third-party benefits “was
operating his or her own vehicle at the time the injury occurred[.]” See MCL 500.3135(2)(c). We
have stated the disqualification rule in MCL 500.3135(2)(c) as follows: “individuals injured while
operating a motor vehicle that is both owned by them and uninsured in violation of MCL 500.3101
are not entitled to recover damages.” Brickley v McCarver, 323 Mich App 639, 648; 919 NW2d
412 (2018). In other words, each plaintiff is disqualified from seeking third-party benefits against
Page only if each plaintiff was injured while “operating” a motor vehicle that was owned by them
and uninsured under the no-fault act. Accepting the trial court’s well-supported conclusions that
the Pathfinder was owned by both plaintiffs and uninsured under the no-fault act, each plaintiff is
still eligible to seek third-party damages from Page if that plaintiff was not operating the Pathfinder
“at the time the injury occurred[.]” See MCL 500.3135(2)(c).
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The record establishes that Emanuel King was driving the Pathfinder when Page struck the
vehicle with her Ford Focus. Thus, Emanuel King is disqualified under MCL 500.3135(2)(c) from
seeking damages from Page because he was “operating” the Pathfinder when the injury occurred.
In contrast, Tiffany King was merely riding in the Pathfinder at the time of the collision. It would
defy common sense to say that she was “operating” the Pathfinder simply by riding in the vehicle.
Indeed, our Supreme Court and this Court have consistently treated the concept of “operating” as
synonymous with driving a vehicle. E.g., Cole v Barber, 353 Mich 427, 431; 91 NW2d 848 (1958)
(“a driver shall not operate his vehicle so fast that he cannot bring it to a complete stop”); Farm
Bureau Gen Ins Co of Mich v Riddering, 172 Mich App 696, 703; 432 NW2d 404 (1988) (“While
[defendant] did exercise some control over the vehicle by grabbing the steering wheel, steering is
only part of operating a vehicle. Operation [of a motor vehicle] necessarily includes the additional
functions of controlling the gas and brake pedals and all other components necessary to make a
vehicle run.”). The most expansive interpretation of “operating” a vehicle came from our Supreme
Court in a criminal case where the Court ruled that a defendant “operated” a vehicle by “grabbing
the steering wheel and thereby causing the car to veer off the road[.]” People v Yamat, 475 Mich
49, 57; 714 NW2d 335 (2006). But as far as we can tell, no Michigan decision has ever held that
merely riding along as a passenger in a car amounts to “operating” a motor vehicle. Therefore, we
conclude that Tiffany King was not “operating” a vehicle when she was riding in the Pathfinder at
the time her injury occurred, so the disqualification prescribed by MCL 500.3135(2)(c) does not
apply to her. Thus, the trial court erred in awarding summary disposition to Page on Tiffany King’s
negligence claim set forth in Count Five of the complaint. Accordingly, we must reverse the award
of summary disposition to Page and remand Tiffany King’s negligence claim for consideration on
the merits.
Summary disposition for MAIPF on plaintiffs’ first-party claims and for Page on Emanuel
King’s negligence claim is affirmed, summary disposition for Page on Tiffany King’s negligence
claim is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Christopher P. Yates
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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