People v. Manifee

R. M. Maher, P.J.

(dissenting in part). I concur in the majority’s decision to grant defendant credit for the 63 days he was incarcerated in Indiana while awaiting trial. However, I must respectfully dissent to the majority’s conclusion that defendant is not entitled to an additional 237 days of credit.

In Brinson v Genesee Circuit Judge, 403 Mich 676, 686; 272 NW2d 513 (1978), the Supreme Court indicated that the credit statute "mandates the grant of credit in appropriate circumstances and is to be read to benefit defendants * * * unless the intent of a consecutive sentencing statute would be frustrated by such a reading * *

The record shows that defendant did not receive concurrent sentences largely as a result of the failure or inability of the State of Michigan to secure his return for resentencing. In addition, a grant of credit under these circumstances would not frustrate the policy of a consecutive sentencing statute since defendant could not have received a consecutive sentence for the first offense. MCL 768.7b; MSA 28.1030(2), and Brinson, supra. Finally, since the Indiana court’s intent to impose concurrent sentences will be frustrated if this Court fails to grant credit for defendant’s entire period of incarceration, principles of comity require such a sentence reduction. Otherwise, this Court cannot expect other states to accord appropriate deference to the sentencing decisions of our courts.

I believe that the so-called "liberal” view — as expressed in People v Potts, 46 Mich App 538; 208 NW2d 583 (1973), and People v Coyle, 104 Mich App 636; 305 NW2d 275 (1981) — reflects the fairest interpretation of the Legislature’s intent in enacting the credit statute and, therefore, would grant defendant credit for all 300 days spent in an Indiana prison.