DocketNumber: Docket Nos. 307152 and 307154
Citation Numbers: 297 Mich. App. 242
Judges: Murray, Rlordan, Whitbeck
Filed Date: 7/3/2012
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 9/9/2022
In these consolidated appeals, respondents contest the trial court order terminating their parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions leading to adjudication continue to exist), (c)(ii) (other conditions supporting jurisdiction have not been rectified), (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to parental home). We affirm.
Respondents contend that the trial court’s findings were clearly erroneous and that the Department of Human Services (DHS) failed to sustain its burden of proving the statutory grounds for termination. Termination of parental rights is appropriate when the DHS proves one or more grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 355; 612 NW2d 407 (2000); In re B & J, 279 Mich App 12, 17; 756 NW2d 234 (2008). It is only necessary for the DHS to establish by clear and convincing evidence the existence of one statutory ground to support the order for termination of parental rights. In re Powers Minors, 244 Mich App 111, 118; 624 NW2d 472 (2000). We review the lower court’s findings for clear error. MCR 3.977(K); In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010); In re Sours Minors, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999).
The primary condition leading to the adjudication in this matter was respondents’ failure to resolve issues pertaining to respondent father’s alcohol abuse and respondent mother’s substance abuse. Further, during the pendency of the proceedings, issues came to light
The minor child was removed in December 2009, after respondents and the child were involved in an automobile accident. At the time of the accident, respondent father was determined to have a blood alcohol level of 0.24 grams per 100 milliliters of blood. While the exact cause of the accident is unknown, evidence indicated that respondent father was driving at a rate of 100 miles an hour and that respondent mother and the minor child were in the vehicle at the time of the accident. This accident resulted in respondent father’s fifth drunk driving conviction since 2007. Respondent mother admitted having taken a narcotic immediately before the accident and being aware that respondent father was inebriated when she voluntarily entered the vehicle with the child.
Respondents made admissions and pleaded no contest to parts of the petition, leading to the child being made a temporary court ward in January 2010 with placement in the care of her maternal grandmother. A dispositional hearing was held in February 2010. At that time, respondents were ordered to participate in a parent-agency agreement (PAA) that required their involvement in individual therapy, parenting classes, visitation with the minor child, substance abuse assessments, and drug screens. Participation in substance abuse treatment also was mandated if the respondents’ drug screens were positive. Respondents were also required to maintain contact with the caseworker, obtain suitable housing and income, and undergo psychological evaluations.
At that time, the concern expressed by the trial court and the DHS with regard to respondents’ failure to comply with the mandated drug screens was premised on verifiable incidents in respondents’ history and proved to be prescient. In May 2011, respondent mother tested positive for cocaine. In July 2011, respondents were arrested for their involvement in a home invasion. Respondent mother admitted that she had participated in the home invasion in order to steal prescription drugs. She was placed on probation and required to complete a 90- to 120-day inpatient substance abuse program. Respondent father was reincarcerated in May 2011. At the time of the final hearing, neither parent was physically available to care for the child. During the pendency of these proceedings, respondent mother was
Respondents further allege that the DHS failed to provide them adequate services in light of their problems securing transportation in order to participate in drug testing. Respondents contend that they lacked access to transportation, resulting in their inability to comply with court-ordered drug screens. Respondents do not dispute that the caseworker offered them bus tickets, but allege that they lived several miles from a bus stop. While it is true that, with limited exceptions, “reasonable efforts to reunify the child and family must be made in all cases,” MCL 712A.19a(2), respondents failed to object or indicate that the services provided to them were somehow inadequate, thereby failing to preserve this issue. “The time for asserting the need for accommodation in services is when the court adopts a service plan . ...” In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 27; 610 NW2d 563 (2000).
Although respondents now contend that the DHS failed to accommodate their need for transportation services to ensure their compliance with mandated drug screenings, those allegations appear specious. Respondents alternatively asserted that they could not attend drug screenings because they lacked funds to fuel and insure their vehicle, they lived too far from a bus stop to obtain a ride to a drug screening facility, the license plate for their vehicle had expired, and they lacked bus tickets; respondent mother also merely asserted that
We also conclude the trial court did not clearly err by determining that termination of respondents’ parental rights was in the best interests of the child. MCL 712A.19b(5); MCR 3.977(H)(3) and (K); Trejo, 462 Mich at 356-357; In re Foster, 285 Mich App 630, 633; 776 NW2d 415 (2009). The child was in foster care or placed with relatives for 22 months. While respondents did make some progress in addressing their issues, the
Affirmed.