Crystal Fox v. Christopher David Sims

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CRYSTAL FOX, UNPUBLISHED
March 30, 2023
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 360165
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
CHRISTOPHER DAVID SIMS, LC No. 2021-007857-DM
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: PATEL, P.J., and SWARTZLE and HOOD, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this divorce action, plaintiff, Crystal Fox, appeals as of right the trial court’s judgment
of divorce. The trial court abused its discretion by failing to enter a signed consent judgment of
divorce as it was written, and instead altering its terms without a sufficient basis. But it did not err
when it declined to award child support retroactively from the time the divorce action was filed.
We, therefore, affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a divorce proceeding that Fox filed in March 2021. Fox and
defendant, Christopher David Sims, married in 2017. They have one child together who was born
in 2011. They separated in December 2020, and Fox filed a complaint for divorce in March 2021.
The trial was scheduled for November 18, 2021.
At a settlement conference in September 2021, the parties and their attorneys negotiated a
settlement agreement that appeared to resolve all issues in the case. They memorialized the
settlement terms in a consent judgement of divorce that both parties and their attorneys signed on
November 17, 2021. At the same time, the parties stipulated to adjourn the trial date from
November 18, 2021, to November 30, 2021.
On November 30, 2021, the parties appeared to place proofs on the record and enter the
consent judgment of divorce that they previously negotiated. During the hearing, Sims’s counsel
indicated that Sims did not agree with certain financial terms in the consent judgment. He admitted
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that he and Sims signed the consent judgment of divorce, but claimed he, Sims’s counsel, signed
it under duress. Specifically, Sims’s counsel claimed that he mistakenly believed that the trial,
which was originally scheduled for November 18, 2021, was to be held by Zoom. He had
scheduled to take his daughter to college out of the state on November 18, 2021, and therefore,
could not attend trial in person that day. Sims’s counsel claimed that Fox’s counsel would not
agree to reschedule the trial until he signed the consent judgment of divorce. He claimed that this
amounted to duress. Sims never indicated that he signed the document under duress. And there
is no record of Sims or his counsel filing a motion to adjourn the trial date, separate from the
requested stipulation.
Sims’s only objections to the terms of the consent judgment were that he did not receive
compensation for his claimed interest in a 2017 Chevrolet Suburban (worth approximately
$37,000), and that he did not receive half of the marital share of Fox’s pension and 401(k). In
addition to the 2017 Chevrolet Suburban, the parties owned a Chrysler 300, which was not
operational.
Following discussion of the marital vehicles, the trial court began to take proofs necessary
for a pro confesso hearing. After taking some basic proofs, the trial court informed Fox’s counsel
that they were “in trial now,” but did not clearly state that it was setting aside the consent judgment
of divorce, the basis for that decision, or what issues the parties were litigating. Both sides
presented evidence, but the trial court did not make findings regarding duress or the validity of the
consent judgment. Aside from stating at the beginning of the hearing that the consent judgment
“was at gunpoint,” the trial court did not comment on the validity of the consent judgment or
clearly state why it did not accept it.
At the end of the trial, the trial court concluded that Fox had no retirement accounts. The
trial court then awarded Sims the Chrysler 300 and Fox the 2017 Chevrolet Suburban. It also
awarded Sims “[$]750 in the settlement as a value toward the [Chevrolet Suburban].”
In response to the $750 award for the Suburban, Fox’s counsel requested that the trial court
instead award child support retroactively. By starting Sims “two months behind on the child
support,” Fox would not have to pay out of pocket for Sims’s interest in the Suburban. She argued
that she could have claimed child support payments retroactively from the time she filed the case.1
The trial court declined Fox’s request to award child support retroactively from the date of filing
and did not change the $750 award for the Suburban.
The trial court entered the judgment of divorce and uniform child support order in January
2022. The judgment of divorce was almost identical to the consent judgment of divorce. The only
1
In 2011, before the parties were married, Sims was ordered to pay child support in a paternity
suit in another county. See Wayne Circuit Court Case No. 11-166530-DP. The parties presented
conflicting evidence on whether Sims was still required to pay child support at the time of the
divorce, whether he paid while the parties were married, and whether there were arrears. Sims
insisted that he was current on child support payments, and that the support payments came directly
from his paycheck. Fox testified that she had not received support in years.
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meaningful difference was that Sims was specifically awarded the Chrysler 300 and $750 for his
share of the Chevrolet Suburban. This appeal followed.
II. FAILURE TO ENTER CONSENT JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE
Fox argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not entering the consent judgment
of divorce as written and clearly erred when it found that Sims and his counsel entered the consent
judgment under duress. We agree.
We review a trial court’s findings related to the validity of a consent agreement at divorce
for abuse of discretion, but we review a trial court’s factual findings for clear error. Vittiglio v
Vittiglio, 297 Mich App 391, 400; 824 NW2d 591 (2012). An abuse of discretion occurs when the
“trial court’s decision is outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Saffian v
Simmons, 477 Mich 8, 12; 727 NW2d 132 (2007). Clear error occurs when we are left with a
“definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, giving due regard to the trial court’s
special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” Smith v Smith, 278 Mich App 198, 204; 748 NW2d
258 (2008) (citation omitted). Contract interpretation is also a question of law; questions of law
are reviewed de novo. Sweebe v Sweebe, 474 Mich 151, 154; 712 NW2d 708 (2006). “While
what constitutes duress is a question of law, whether duress exists in a particular case is a question
of fact.” Clement v Buckley Mercantile Co, 172 Mich 243, 253; 137 NW 657 (1912).
The Michigan Court Rules unambiguously provide that agreements “made in open court”
or “in writing” are binding on the parties. See MCR 2.507(G). See also MCR 3.216(H)(8)
(providing that mediated settlement agreements in domestic relations cases are binding if “reduced
to a signed writing by the parties” and requiring the parties to “take steps necessary to enter the
judgment as in the case of other settlements.”). A court is likewise “bound by property settlements
reached through negotiations and agreement by parties to a divorce action, in the absence of fraud,
duress, mutual mistake, or severe stress which prevented a party from understanding in a
reasonable manner the nature and effect of the act in which she was engaged.” Vittiglio, 297 Mich
App at 400 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, “[c]ourts must uphold divorce
property settlements reached through negotiation and agreement of the parties because
modifications of property settlements in divorce judgments are disfavored.” Id. at 399 (citation
omitted).
“Consent judgments of divorce are contracts and treated as such.” Andrusz v Andrusz, 320
Mich App 445, 452; 904 NW2d 636 (2017) (citation omitted). Like all contracts, consent
judgments that are unambiguous are not open to interpretation, and they must be enforced as
written. Lentz v Lentz, 271 Mich App 465, 472; 721 NW2d 861 (2006) (citation omitted). This
rule is designed to protect the individual freedom to enter into contracts and arrange one’s own
affairs. Id. (citation omitted). “[A] consent judgment can only be modified with the consent of
the parties, at least in the absence of fraud, mistake, illegality, or unconscionability.” Andrusz,
320 Mich App at 453 (citations omitted). The trial court, however, may “fill voids in an incomplete
consent judgment, and in so doing must balance the equities insofar as is possible under the
circumstances.” Id. A contract is ambiguous, and may be interpreted by a court, when the
provisions in a contract “can be reasonably understood as meaning different things . . . .” Id.
(citation omitted).
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A consent judgment may be voided if a party signed it while under duress. But for a party
to prove that he was under duress when he entered into an agreement, he must establish that he
was afraid of serious injury to his person, reputation, or fortune, and that he was illegally coerced
or compelled to act by virtue of that fear. See Farm Credit Servs of Michigan’s Heartland, PCA
v Weldon, 232 Mich App 662, 681-682; 591 NW2d 438 (1998). “Th[e] pressure to settle is not,
by itself, coercion.” Vittiglio, 297 Mich App at 402.
Here, the trial court never made a finding that Sims or his counsel signed the settlement
under duress, and there was no evidence to support such a finding. Sims’s counsel claimed that
the consent judgment was signed under duress because he made a scheduling error that would have
prevented him from attending trial, and opposing counsel would not consent to postponing trial
until he signed the consent judgment. The trial court seemed to accept this argument, stating that
the consent judgment was signed “at gunpoint.” But there was never an explanation for why Sims
(as opposed to his counsel) signed the consent judgment, or any evidence that Sims’s counsel
pressured or coerced him to sign it. Again, to establish that someone was under duress when
signing a consent judgment, it must be established that he or she was in fear of serious injury to
his or her person, reputation, or fortune, and that the fear was induced by unlawful action. Weldon,
232 Mich App at 681-682. There is no indication that Fox, or Fox’s counsel, acted unlawfully by
refusing to postpone the trial. Their refusal to consent to postponing the trial merely added
pressure to settle. But, standing alone, pressure to settle is not coercion. Vittiglio, 297 Mich App
at 402.
Further, Sims’s counsel had many other options available to him besides signing the
consent judgment. He could have canceled his competing plans and made other arrangements for
his daughter to get to school, arranged for another attorney to stand in for him, or requested that
the court change the trial date without Fox’s consent. There is no indication that Sims’s counsel
(or Sims) was in serious fear for the safety of his person, reputation, or fortune. There is no
evidence that the consent judgment was signed under duress.
Because there is no evidence that Sims or his counsel signed the consent judgment under
duress, and there was no other basis to set aside the consent judgment (such as fraud, mutual
mistake, or severe stress) the trial court was required to enter the consent judgment as written.
Vittiglio, 297 Mich App at 400. The terms of the consent judgment could have been interpreted
by the trial court, however, if they were ambiguous, and terms could have been added by the trial
court if the consent judgment was incomplete. Lentz, 271 Mich App at 472-473.
Here, the consent judgment stated that Sims “is awarded the [Vehicle make, model, year,
and VIN], for [his/her] exclusive use, ownership, and possession free and clear from any claim of
Plaintiff, and Defendant shall indemnify and hold Plaintiff harmless from any further liability.”
This provision was inherently ambiguous because it states that Sims was awarded a vehicle, but
does not state which vehicle he was awarded. Therefore, the trial court had the ability to interpret
that language. The trial court arguably did so when it awarded Sims the Chrysler 300. The trial
court went further than simply interpreting the provision, however, when it awarded Sims an
additional $750 for his share of the Chevrolet Suburban. Therefore, the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to enter the signed consent judgment of divorce as it was written. We reverse
and remand for the trial court to enter the consent judgment as written or make adequate findings
that would support its decision to set aside an otherwise valid consent judgment.
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III. RETROACTIVE CHILD SUPPORT
Fox argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it held that Sims did not have to
pay child support retroactively from the date the divorce proceeding was filed, and instead child
support payments would start on the day the trial was held. We disagree.
We review child support orders for an abuse of discretion. Butler v Simmons-Butler, 308
Mich App 195, 224-225; 863 NW2d 677 (2014). An abuse of discretion occurs when “the
outcome is not within the range of principled outcomes.” Id. at 225.
Fox claims that she could have requested child support through the Family Support Act,
MCL 552.459 et seq., when she was no longer living with Sims, but that a support action under
that act cannot run simultaneously with a divorce action. She further claims that it is unfair to
deny her child support retroactively from the time the complaint was filed because it would be
punishing her for filing for divorce and not filing under the Family Support Act instead. MCL
552.452(1) states that a child support obligation under the Family Support Act is “retroactive to
the date that the complaint for support was filed.”
Fox is correct that an individual may not request child support under the Family Support
Act during a divorce action. See MCL 552.451. But, separate from the Family Support Act, an
individual who is in a pending divorce proceeding can still request child support under other
statutory authority. See MCL 552.15(1). MCL 552.15(1) provides:
After the filing of a complaint in an action to annul a marriage or for a
divorce or separate maintenance, on the motion of either party or the friend of the
court, or on the court’s own motion, the court may enter orders concerning the care,
custody, and support of the minor children of the parties during the pendency of the
action as prescribed in section 5 of the support and parenting time enforcement act,
1982 PA 295, MCL 552.605, and as the court considers proper and necessary.
Subject to section 5b of the support and parenting time enforcement act, 1982 PA
295, MCL 552.605b, the court may also order support as provided in this subsection
for the parties’ children who are not minor children.
Fox, therefore, could have requested child support during the pendency of the action, but
she failed to do so. While it is true she requested that the trial court order Sims to pay child support
in her complaint for divorce, her request was not a request for an interim or temporary support
order during the pendency of the action. Instead, it was a request that child support be awarded in
the judgment of divorce. Rather, Fox waited until trial to request that she receive child support
payments retroactively from the time she filed her complaint for divorce and only in response to,
or to offset, the trial court’s order related to Sims’s interest in one of the vehicles.
MCL 552.603(2) states:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, a support order that is part of
a judgment or is an order in a domestic relations matter is a judgment on and after
the date the support amount is due as prescribed in [MCL 522.605c], with the full
force, effect, and attributes of a judgment of this state, and is not, on and after the
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date it is due, subject to retroactive modification. No additional action is necessary
to reduce support to a final judgment. Retroactive modification of a support
payment due under a support order is permissible with respect to a period during
which there is pending a petition for modification, but only from the date that notice
of the petition was given to the payer or recipient of support. [Emphasis added.]
Because the child support order in this case was part of the judgment of divorce, MCL
552.603(2) controls. The child support order became effective on the date the judgment of divorce
was entered, and it could not be applied retroactively to the date Fox filed her complaint for
divorce. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to award child support retroactively
from the time the case was filed; it was not permitted to do so under MCL 552.603(2).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. We reverse the judgment of divorce based on the trial
court’s failure to enter the consent judgment as written or make adequate findings that would
support its decision to set aside an otherwise valid consent judgment. We affirm the trial court’s
child support order, including its denial of Fox’s request for retroactive support. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Sima G. Patel
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Noah P. Hood
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