People of Michigan v. Kyvon Deandre Wells

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED
April 27, 2023
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 361701
Ingham Circuit Court
KYVON DEANDRE WELLS, LC No. 19-000653-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and MURRAY and LETICA, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant pleaded nolo contendere to second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and was
sentenced to 348 to 770 months imprisonment. Defendant now appeals by leave granted,1 arguing
that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated and that he should be allowed to withdraw
his plea. We affirm but remand for the ministerial task of amending the November 18, 2021,
amended judgment of sentence.
I. SPEEDY TRIAL
Defendant was arrested on March 22, 2019, and pleaded nolo contendere on September
15, 2021. Because of this time-lapse, defendant argues that he was denied his constitutional right
to a speedy trial. See People v Williams, 475 Mich 245, 261; 716 NW2d 208 (2006).
We conclude that defendant’s unconditional nolo contendere plea to second-degree murder
waived this issue. A defendant “waives a claim of violation of federal and Michigan constitutional
rights to a speedy trial” when he enters an unconditional guilty plea. People v Depifanio, 192
Mich App 257, 257; 480 NW2d 616 (1991). Because “a plea of nolo contendere has the same
effect upon a defendant’s ability to raise an issue on appeal as does a plea of guilty,” People v
New, 427 Mich 482, 493; 398 NW2d 358 (1986), a defendant who enters an unconditional plea of
nolo contendere waives any argument that his constitutional rights to a speedy trial were violated.
1
People v Wells, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered August 2, 2022 (Docket No.
361701).
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People v Scott, 275 Mich App 521, 524; 739 NW2d 702 (2007). Accordingly, defendant has
waived appellate review of his speedy trial issue.
Although defendant asserts that it remains an open question whether the plea-waiver
doctrine applies to constitutional speedy trial violations, this question was resolved by our
Supreme Court. See People v Lannom, 441 Mich 490, 494; 490 NW2d 396 (1992) (“[A] plea of
guilty waives a claim that a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated.”).
This Court “is bound by Michigan Supreme Court precedent.” See People v Beasley, 239 Mich
App 548, 556; 609 NW2d 581 (2000). It was also resolved by this Court in Scott. Therefore,
defendant waived his right to appeal a violation of his speedy trial rights when he pleaded nolo
contendere to second-degree murder.
II. DEFENDANT’S STANDARD 4 BRIEF
In a pro se supplemental brief filed pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Order No.
2004-6, 471 Mich c, cii (2004), defendant argues that he was denied his right to a speedy trial and
that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw his plea. For the
reasons discussed above, we do not address defendant’s speedy trial argument.
Defendant argues that he should have been allowed to withdraw his nolo contendere plea
because he was under duress. However, defendant does not elaborate on his argument or provide
support for his assertion that he should have been allowed to withdraw his plea. Because defendant
has failed to adequately brief this argument, it is abandoned. See People v Harris, 261 Mich App
44, 50; 680 NW2d 17 (2004). “It is not enough for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a
position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis
for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either
to sustain or reject his position.” People v Kevorkian, 248 Mich App 373, 389; 639 NW2d 291(2001) (quotation marks and citation omitted). But even if we consider the merits of defendant’s
argument, we disagree.
This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw a plea for an abuse of
discretion. People v Al-Shara, 311 Mich App 560, 566; 876 NW2d 826 (2015). A trial court
abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes. Id. at 566.
Under MCR 6.302(A), a trial court may not accept a defendant’s no-contest plea unless the
court is convinced the plea is “understanding, voluntary, and accurate.” “For a plea to be voluntary
and understanding, a defendant must be aware of the rights he or she waives by entering the plea
as well as the direct consequences of the plea.” Al-Shara, 311 Mich App at 568.
“[A] motion to withdraw a plea before sentencing should only be granted if the defendant
is able to show that withdrawal of the plea is in the interest of justice, meaning that the defendant
has to articulate a fair and just reason for withdrawing the plea.” People v Fonville, 291 Mich App
363, 377-378; 804 NW2d 878 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Fair and just
reasons include reasons like a claim of actual innocence or a valid defense to the charge.” Id. at
378.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion to withdraw
his plea because there is nothing to contradict the court’s finding that defendant’s plea was
“understanding and voluntarily made without undo [sic] influence, threats, or promises of
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leniency.” Additionally, defendant fails to explain how he was under duress when he entered the
plea or how it was in the interest of justice to allow him to withdraw his plea when the prosecution
extended the plea offer upon defendant’s request. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his no-contest plea.
Affirmed, but remanded to amend the November 18, 2021, amended judgment of sentence
to reflect that defendant plead no contest to the charges of second-degree murder. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Anica Letica
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