DocketNumber: No. 29,951.
Citation Numbers: 257 N.W. 84, 192 Minn. 459
Judges: <italic>LORING, Justice</italic>.
Filed Date: 11/9/1934
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/12/2023
Melissa Morgan, the grantor in the deed here involved, was, at the time she made this and three other deeds, a widow who had lost her only child some years before the date of the deeds. She was apparently a determined woman with strong likes and dislikes. She had conceived a hatred for her own relatives on account of injustices to which she thought they had subjected her in early life. *Page 460 Her contacts with her husband's relatives were pleasant, and apparently she had a strong affection for them and had announced a determination to leave her property to the named grantees in the four deeds. February 25, 1932, she was in a hospital suffering from the effects of a severe fall. She also had an irregular heart action from which her doctors expected sudden death at any time. In that situation she sent for her banker, C.R. Peterson, who, at her request, made the four deeds before mentioned. She properly executed the deeds and handed them to Peterson, saying:
"Take those papers and keep them at the bank, and then in a few days when I get better I'll be up and get them."
The following day her condition had evidently changed for the worse because Mrs. Ditmore, an intimate friend, testified that Mrs. Morgan said that she knew she was dying and that "I have made some deeds and they are all right and I'm only sorry that I haven't time to make arrangements for my personal property." She later sent for her minister, who prayed with her, and she expired in the early morning of Saturday, February 27.
Mrs. Morgan had a strong prejudice against the disposition of property by will. She had a firm belief that wills were likely to be broken. Her mother's will had been broken, and she was determined to dispose of her property by deeds, which she evidently thought were not vulnerable to the attacks that might be made upon a will.
The trial court in its memorandum attached to its findings stated:
"There can be no doubt that at the time Melissa Morgan executed the deeds, it was her then intention that title to the property described therein should ultimately vest in the grantees named therein."
The trial court, relying upon Dickson v. Miller,
"The main thing which the law looks at, is whether the grantor indicates his will that the instrument should pass into the possession of the grantee, and if that will is manifest, then the conveyance enures as a valid grant, although, * * * the deed never comes into the hands of the grantee."
And again in the same case the court said [
"The doctrine seems to be settled beyond reasonable doubt, that where a party executes and acknowledges a deed, and afterwards *Page 462 either by acts or words, expresses his will, that the same is for the use of the grantee, especially where the assent of the grantee appears to the transaction, it shall be sufficient to convey the estate, although the deed remains in the hands of the grantor."
This opinion cited with approval the case of Souverbye v. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. 240, 256, where the New York court held:
"A voluntary settlement, fairly made, is always binding in equity upon the grantor, unless there be clear and decisive proof, that he never parted, nor intended to part, with the possession of the deed; and even if he retains it, the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of its validity, unless there be other circumstances, beside the mere fact of his retaining it, to show it was not intended to be absolute."
Mr. Justice Mitchell, speaking for this court in Nazro v. Ware,
"No particular ceremony is necessary to the delivery of a deed. It may consist in an act without words, or in words without any act; and, if in words, it is immaterial whether they are spoken or written. Manual possession of a deed by the grantee is not essential. Whether there has been a delivery is rather a question of fact than of law, depending upon the intent of the grantor to vest an estate in the grantee. If a deed be so disposed of as to evince clearly the intention of the parties that it should take effect as such, it is sufficient."
See also Chastek v. Souba,
In Kessler v. Von Bank,
"The intention of the grantor to pass title by the execution and disposition of the deed is of controlling importance."
In Schooler v. Schooler,
"It is also the law that the presumption of the delivery of a deed, or its acceptance in case of voluntary settlement, is stronger than in a case of bargain and sale. * * * Cannon v. Cannon,
In Hoyt v. Northup,
"In the case of a voluntary conveyance the retention of the deed in possession of the grantor will not destroy its effect as a deed, unless there are other circumstances to show that it was not intended to be absolute and to operate as a present conveyance. Baker v. Hall,
We are convinced that all the circumstances shown by the record, together with the conversation with Mrs. Ditmore, compel a conclusion that on February 26, after she had become convinced that she was about to die, Mrs. Morgan entertained an intention that the deeds be presently effective. That being her intent, neither her failure to announce it to Peterson nor her retention of the documents in his hands, kept the delivery from being effective.
The trial court made no finding in regard to the conversation with Mrs. Ditmore. She was evidently a disinterested as well as an unimpeached witness, whose testimony may not be disregarded under O'Leary v. Wangensteen,
The judgment is reversed with directions to amend the findings and conclusions and to enter judgment to conform to the views herein expressed.
STONE, Justice, took no part. *Page 464