State v. Pride

KEITH, Chief Justice

(concurring specially).

Although I concur in the result reached by the majority, I wish to express my concern regarding the scope of today’s decision. In particular, I caution that the majority opinion should not be interpreted as expanding the opportunity for defendants to cross-examine their alleged victims regarding speculative theories of bias or motive. In reviewing this case, we should be mindful of our past holdings that limit the introduction of evidence of a victim’s sexual conduct that is remote and of extremely limited relevance. See, e.g. State v. Dornack, 329 N.W.2d 839 (Minn. 1983). Indeed, our own “rape shield” law embodies an intent to protect victims of sexual assault from the unnecessary admission of evidence regarding the victim’s prior sexual conduct. Minn.Stat. § 609.347, subd. 3 (1994). To now open the door to broad cross-examination regarding a victim’s romantic affections runs contrary to this intent.

In this case, however, we are presented with a very unique situation that compels our holding. Specifically, no physical evidence was presented in this case, and the jury’s determination rests purely on the credibility of the defendant and the alleged victim. Further, the testimony of the only other witness does not shed light on the pivotal fact question in this case: whether the defendant engaged in nonconsensual sexual contact by grabbing Rogers’ crotch. Regardless of whether we find defendant’s theory of bias particularly compelling, the testimony regarding Rogers’ romantic interests was critical to the defendant’s ability to attack Rogers’ credibility. Under these extremely narrow circumstances, the trial court violated the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause when it prohibited defendant from cross-examining Rogers and Officer Se-guilia regarding their romantic involvement.