State of Minnesota v. Daniel Thomas Labarre

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-0550
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Daniel Thomas Labarre,
Appellant.
Filed February 2, 2015
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge
Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-13-6748
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Bridget Kearns Sabo, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Daniel Labarre challenges his conviction for fleeing a police officer by
motor vehicle, arguing that the district court erred in admitting hearsay and Spreigl
evidence and that the state committed prosecutorial misconduct. Appellant also argues
that the cumulative effect of these errors requires reversal. We affirm.
FACTS
In the early afternoon of September 3, 2013, four officers in the St. Paul Police
Department’s Focusing Our Resources on Community Enforcement (FORCE) unit were
patrolling in an unmarked sports-utility vehicle (SUV) on Edgerton Avenue in east
St. Paul. Two of the St. Paul police officers were the only witnesses at trial. Officer
Bilek testified that he was driving the SUV and that, as he drove southbound on Edgerton
Avenue, the officer in the front passenger seat, Officer Dunaski, “observed the defendant
. . . I believe he said he was on a motorcycle.” Officer Bilek also testified that he “saw a
white male on a motorcycle, on the sidewalk -- like the sidewalk going up to the house.”
Officer Bilek later testified that the man he saw was appellant. The officers were aware
that there was an outstanding warrant for appellant’s arrest.
Officer Bilek turned the SUV around to approach appellant. Officer Bilek
testified that, after he turned around and while traveling northbound on Edgerton, the
man on the motorcycle began to drive away, also northbound on Edgerton. Officer Bilek
then activated his emergency lights and siren. The motorcycle did not stop. It
accelerated. Officer Bilek testified that his vehicle was “within maybe 30 yards” of the
motorcycle but the motorcycle then “really, really accelerated past us [at an] estimated
speed to be about 50 to 60 miles an hour as we tried to close distance.” Officer Bilek
testified that he followed the motorcycle northbound on Edgerton until ending the chase
near Larpenteur Avenue because Officer Bilek was concerned about public safety, he was
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confident that the man was appellant, and the man had entered Maplewood, another
jurisdiction.
St. Paul police arrested appellant later that night. Appellant was charged with one
felony count of fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.487, subd. 3 (2012). At trial, the identity of the man on the motorcycle was the
principal issue in dispute.
Officer Dunaski’s trial testimony largely corroborated Officer Bilek’s testimony.
He testified that his job at the time involved regularly reviewing active arrest warrant lists
to “see who the current wanted people are before I go out on my shift.” Officer Dunaski
testified that he saw appellant’s name and photo on the active-warrant list on the morning
of September 3, that he knew who appellant was and what he looked like, and that he had
interacted with appellant “at least 10, 12 times.”
At trial, appellant objected on hearsay grounds when Officer Bilek testified that
Officer Dunaski “looked at the residence and observed the defendant . . . I believe he
said he was on a motorcycle.” After this objection, the prosecutor said, “So let me stop
you there” and asked Officer Bilek, “So he observed somebody in the yard?” and
continued with questioning. The district court never ruled on the objection. During
Officer Dunaski’s examination, appellant did not object to similar testimony when
Officer Dunaski stated, “One of the guys in the car said, ‘That’s Danny LaBarre [sic],
Danny Boy on his motorcycle.’”
Appellant also objected, without providing grounds for the objection, when
Officer Dunaski appeared to start providing the reason for the arrest warrant for
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appellant: “Q: . . . there was an active warrant for the arrest of Daniel LaBarre [sic]?
A: Yes, he was -- he was wanted previously for a previous –[.]” The district court
responded to the objection, stating, “Just answer the question, please,” and the witness
responded, “Yes.” The district court then stated, “It was a yes or no question.” Appellant
also objected when the prosecutor asked Officer Dunaski how many times he had
interacted with appellant. The district court overruled the objection.
Appellant also objected on relevance grounds to Officer Bilek’s testimony that he
and the other officers were “check[ing] on . . . one of our addresses we know to be a
problem property.” The district court overruled the objection.
During summation, the prosecutor made four statements that appellant claims
amount to prosecutorial misconduct. The first such statement is:
We have testimony from two officers that told you what
happened that day. The officers who knew the defendant,
who saw him that day and who saw him flee.
We have the word of the officers telling you what
happened that day. And if you believe them, then we have
enough evidence to convict the defendant.
The next three statements, made at the beginning of the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument,
are:
All these cops were shady characters, weren’t they? They
have a lot to think of up here and a lot to go after the
defendant with apparently. The conspiracy theory that
they’re out to get him.
Does it sound like they were out to get him or did they
sound like a couple of cops who were just out doing their job?
They were just telling you what they saw because there
weren’t embellishments. They didn’t have every single little
detail about it because we don’t have squad video telling us
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what exactly happened. What we have is officers telling you
what happened.
In contrary to the defense’s assertions, I would say that
their testimony was clear, it was consistent and it was
compelling about what happened that day.
(Emphasis added to identify the portions of which appellant complains).
The jury found appellant guilty, and he was sentenced to serve 22 months in
prison. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Appellant argues that evidence of the arrest warrant for appellant and of his prior
contacts with the officers was improperly admitted Spreigl evidence. Appellant argues
that we should review for an abuse of discretion because he objected to these statements
at trial. See State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003) (stating that “[e]videntiary
rulings rest within the sound discretion of the [district] court” and that we will not
overturn “absent a clear abuse of discretion”). But because appellant did not identify
Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) as the basis of his objection, we review for plain error. State v.
Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998) (stating that unobjected-to errors are
reviewed under the plain-error test). Under a plain-error review, appellant must show an
“(1) error; (2) that is plain; and (3) the error must affect substantial rights.” Id.Appellant argues on appeal that evidence of appellant’s arrest warrant and of his
prior contacts with police officers was inadmissible as bad-acts evidence under rule
404(b). This argument was not raised in the district court. Respondent maintains that the
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evidence was necessary to prove an element of the charged crime: that the police were
acting in the lawful discharge of their official duty.
To prove that appellant violated Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 3, the state was
required prove that (1) appellant fled from police officers by motor vehicle; (2) the police
officers were acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty; (3) appellant knew or
reasonably should have known that he was fleeing from police officers; and (4) the
incident took place on September 3, 2013 in Ramsey County. Evidence is relevant when
it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401. “Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). Evidence of prior crimes or bad acts, or Spreigl
evidence, may “be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Id.Appellant objected to Officer Dunaski’s response to the question of whether there
was an active warrant for appellant, but did not identify the basis for the objection. The
objection was made after Officer Dunaski had answered that there was a warrant and
appears to have begun to answer another question that had not been asked concerning
why the warrant had been issued. The district court directed the witness to answer the
question that had been asked, and the witness stated, “Yes.” Apparently satisfied that the
witness had followed its instruction, the district court stated, “It was a yes or no
question.” Appellant made no further record to clarify his objection to more broadly
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include the testimony that a warrant existed at all. Appellant argues on appeal that the
district court “failed to engage in any analysis” regarding admissibility under rule 404(b).
But appellant did not object under rule 404(b).
Evidence of the existence of a warrant for appellant’s arrest was relevant and
material to prove an element of the crime. See Minn. R. Evid. 401. Evidence that the
warrant existed tended to prove that the police were acting in lawful discharge of an
official duty in pursuing appellant on the motorcycle. The officers’ belief that appellant
had an active arrest warrant tended to prove that the officers were acting within their
lawful duty to enforce warrants.1 The district court properly confined Officer Dunaski’s
testimony to the subject of whether there was an arrest warrant for appellant. We
therefore conclude that it was not plain error for the district court to decline to sua sponte
exclude the evidence under rule 404(b).
We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
evidence of the existence of appellant’s active arrest warrant on hearsay grounds, as the
evidence was not offered to prove the matter asserted. Rather, it was offered to prove
that the officers were lawfully discharging their official duty to enforce warrants by
acting on information that appellant had an arrest warrant. Moreover, appellant made no
further record concerning the hearsay objection.2 See State v. Manthey, 711 N.W.2d 498,
1
Officer Dunaski testified that he spent “the last nine years doing high risk warrants,”
and Officer Bilek affirmatively responded to the prosecutor’s question, “Is it your job to
enforce warrants?”
2
During discussion after the state rested, outside the presence of the jury, the district
court asked if there was “anything else we need to put on the record at this point,” and
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504 (Minn. 2006) (stating that hearsay objections require particular attention to “the
creation of a record of the trial court’s decision-making process in either admitting or
excluding a given statement”). “It is well to bear in mind that on appeal error is never
presumed” and that “the burden of showing error rests upon the one who relies upon it.”
Loth v. Loth, 227 Minn. 387, 392, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (1949) (quotation omitted).
Appellant also argues that the evidence that Officer Dunaski had interacted with
him “10, 12 times” was duplicative and inadmissible. Appellant relies on State v.
Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681 (Minn. 2002), to support his contention. In Strommen, the
defendant was charged with attempted robbery of a gas station, and his defense theory
was that he did not intend to rob the gas station and that when asked to leave, he did so,
abandoning any effort to commit the robbery. 648 N.W.2d at 682, 684. The supreme
court stated: “From a review of the record, Strommen’s identification does not appear to
have been the intended purpose of the questions eliciting the officer’s testimony
regarding ‘prior contacts and incidents’” and that “the officer had been asked and had
answered questions identifying Strommen as matching the general description” as the
suspect. Id. at 687-88. The supreme court then stated: “[T]o the extent that the questions
were intended to establish that the person the officer arrested was indeed Strommen, the
questions were unnecessary.” Id. at 688. The supreme court also stated that
“Strommen’s identity does not appear to have been an issue in this case” and that the real
appellant’s counsel answered, “I know I had some objections and the Court sustained
some and overruled others, but I have no specific record to make in that regard.”
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purpose of the offending questions was to suggest that “Strommen was a person of bad
character who had frequent contacts with the police.” Id.
Here, however, the identity of the driver of the motorcycle was a disputed element
at trial. The number of prior contacts these officers had with appellant is material and
relevant to the question of whether the officers knew appellant sufficiently to identify
him as the man on the motorcycle. Evidence of the number of times the officers had
interacted with appellant tends to prove that the officers were able to recognize appellant
from their vehicle. Admission of the prior-contact testimony was not plainly erroneous.
Appellant also argues that “prior interactions” connotes “run-ins” with the officers
and that the jury would have presumed the contacts were evidence of prior bad acts. But
there was no evidence or argument concerning appellant’s role in these interactions.
Neither we nor the jury know from this record whether any or all of appellant’s contacts
with these specific officers were for crimes or bad acts. We conclude that the district
court did not err in admitting evidence that the officers had prior interactions with
appellant.
Appellant also argues that the district court erred in admitting hearsay evidence
concerning what various officers in the SUV said. And, while appellant objected to
Officer Bilek’s testimony that Officer Dunaski “observed [appellant] in the -- in the
yard,” he did not object to Officer Dunaski’s testimony that another officer stated:
“That’s Danny LaBarre [sic], Danny Boy on his motorcycle.” On appeal, appellant does
not challenge the admission of the first statement from Officer Bilek on hearsay grounds.
Because there was no objection to Officer Dunaski’s testimony regarding the
9
identification of appellant, we review the admission of that testimony for plain error.
Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 740.
Hearsay evidence is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.” Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). Hearsay is generally inadmissible unless an exception
exists in rule or statute. Minn. R. Evid. 802. Respondent argues that the officers’
testimony concerning the warrant was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted but
rather as evidence that the police officers believed that the person on the motorcycle was
appellant, who had a warrant for his arrest. Appellant argues that, because the district
court did not provide a limiting instruction, the statement was offered as a statement
supporting the truth of the matter asserted. We see no plain error where, as here, the
evidence in question was not objected to, and had an evident non-hearsay purpose.
Appellant also argues that the district court plainly erred in allowing Officer
Dunaski to testify that another officer in the car stated: “That’s Danny LaBarre [sic],
Danny Boy on his motorcycle.” As with the testimony concerning the warrant, this
evidence had a non-hearsay purpose: proving that police believed the person on the
motorcycle to be appellant, for whom an arrest warrant had been issued, and tending to
prove that the officers were therefore lawfully discharging their duties in pursuing him.
We conclude that the district court did not plainly err in declining to strike the testimony
sua sponte. See State v. Vick, 632 N.W.2d 676, 687 (Minn. 2001) (stating that “failure to
sua sponte strike or instruct is not [ordinarily] reversible error”). Even if we did conclude
that the statement was offered to prove that appellant was the man on the motorcycle, the
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state may have argued one or more exceptions to the rule against hearsay. It did not have
the chance to do so as appellant’s trial counsel never made the objection. We cannot
conclude that error, if any existed, was plain. See Strommen, 648 N.W.2d at 688 (stating
that an error must be clear or obvious to be plain).
Appellant next argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct during
summation. Appellant concedes that he did not object to these statements at trial. We
therefore review under a modified plain-error standard. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294,
302 (Minn. 2006). This two-tiered test requires appellant to first establish that the
prosecutor committed plain error, one that contravenes caselaw, a rule, or a standard of
conduct. Id. If appellant makes this showing, the burden shifts to the state to
demonstrate that its misconduct did not affect appellant’s substantial rights. Id. When
misconduct is demonstrated, we consider whether an appellant’s substantial rights have
been affected. See State v. Porter, 526 N.W.2d 359, 365 (Minn. 1995); see also State v.
Reed, 737 N.W.2d 572, 583 (Minn. 2007) (“The ‘affects substantial rights’ language of
the third plain error factor is the same language used to define harmless error.”).
It is prosecutorial misconduct for the prosecutor to “bolster the credibility of the
state’s witnesses with the prosecutor’s own opinion.” State v. Hobbs, 713 N.W.2d 884,
888 (Minn. App. 2006), vacated in part on other grounds (Minn. Dec. 12, 2006). But
“[m]erely arguing that the witness has no interest in the case . . . is not interjecting the
prosecutor’s opinion into the credibility analysis.” Id. at 889. When reviewing for
prosecutorial misconduct in the summation, we consider the argument as a whole. State
v. Powers, 654 N.W.2d 667, 678 (Minn. 2003).
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Appellant argues that the prosecutor improperly endorsed the witnesses’
credibility. Respondent maintains that the statements are not prosecutorial misconduct
when examined in the context of the full closing argument. The statements include the
prosecutor’s statements that the officers “told you what happened that day” and that they
“were just telling you what they saw” and “telling you what happened that day.” The
prosecutor also stated that, “I would say that their testimony was clear, it was consistent
and it was compelling about what happened that day.”
Appellant cites Hobbs to support his argument that statements from the prosecutor
that the officers “were just telling you what they saw” and “telling you what happened
that day” constitutes prosecutorial misconduct. In Hobbs, the prosecutor stated that one
of the officers “told you what she saw, what happened” and we concluded that this was
improper. 713 N.W.2d at 889; see also State v. Ture, 353 N.W.2d 502, 516 (Minn. 1984)
(concluding that “portions of the final argument of the prosecutor endorsing the
credibility of the state's witnesses and injecting personal opinion as to defendant’s
credibility were clearly improper”).
While the prosecutors’ statements in Hobbs and Ture were deemed to be
misconduct, context is important and unique in each case. See Powers, 654 N.W.2d at
679. Upon review, in context of the closing argument and rebuttal, the prosecutor’s
comments here appear to be explanatory and arguing inferences from the testimony at
trial. Specifically, the statements that the officers “told you what happened that day” and
that they “were just telling you what they saw” fairly characterize the officers’ testimony
as arising from routine, professional observations. The officers’ testimony was the only
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evidence available, as there was no squad video or physical evidence. The prosecutor
began her closing argument by stating, “The evidence in this case is not complicated, it’s
not extensive. We have testimony from two officers that told you what happened that
day. The officers who knew the defendant, who saw him that day and who saw him flee.
That’s the evidence . . . .” In this context, the statements were not an endorsement of
credibility.
At the beginning of the prosecutor’s rebuttal, she responded to appellant’s attacks
on the officers’ credibility by saying:
Does it sound like they were out to get him or did they sound
like a couple of cops who were just out doing their job? They
were just telling you what they saw because there weren’t
embellishments. They didn’t have every single little detail
about it because we don’t have squad video telling us what
exactly happened. What we have is officers telling you what
happened.
(Emphasis added.) Appellant argues that these comments were improper and “made up a
significant portion of her closing argument,” citing State v. Davis, 735 N.W.2d 674, 682
(Minn. 2007) (stating that misconduct was not pervasive when it covered less than one
page of a 64-page argument). But as discussed above, the statements appear to be a
legitimate effort to focus the jury’s attention on the evidence in the record, and arguing
that the evidence so understood was sufficient to find appellant guilty. The statements at
issue, when combined, amount to approximately one page of the 11-page summation.
Even if we were to conclude that the statements were plain error, we conclude that
appellant’s substantial rights were not affected in any event. The evidence in this case
was very strong. Officer Dunaski testified that he had been “face to face” with appellant
13
previously and that he was “one hundred percent” certain that the man on the motorcycle
was appellant. This was strong evidence establishing appellant’s identity. Officer
Dunaski’s testimony corroborated much of Officer Bilek’s testimony about the
subsequent chase. We cannot conclude on this record that appellant’s substantial rights
were affected by the prosecutor’s statements in summation. The result would have been
the same with or without the challenged statements.
Appellant also argues that the alleged errors, when taken together, demonstrate
that he did not receive a fair trial. When “the number of errors and the seriousness of
some of them” render this court “unable to determine whether the jury based its verdict
on the admissible evidence and the reasonable inferences derived therefrom,” we may
determine that the defendant was deprived of a procedurally fair trial. State v. Mayhorn,
720 N.W.2d 776, 792 (Minn. 2006). To find cumulative error, we must find multiple
errors that, when combined, are more prejudicial than each of the errors separately. State
v. Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d 185, 200 (Minn. 2006).
As discussed above, we do not conclude that the district court erred. However,
even if there were errors, appellant has failed to demonstrate that his substantial rights
were affected or that he was deprived of a procedurally fair trial. The district court
properly instructed the jury, and we presume that the jury followed these instructions.
We therefore conclude that any cumulative error did not prejudice appellant.
Affirmed.
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