State of Minnesota v. John Achuil Deng

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-0847
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
John Achuil Deng,
Appellant.
Filed March 23, 2015
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge
Mower County District Court
File No. 50-CR-13-2676
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Kristen Nelsen, Mower County Attorney, Jeremy Clinefelter, Assistant County Attorney,
Austin, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Stauber, Judge; and
Hooten, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Following his convictions of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon,
terroristic threats, and gross-misdemeanor domestic assault, appellant argues that his
conviction of second-degree assault is not supported by sufficient evidence and that all
his convictions should be reversed because the district court failed to make findings to
support its general verdicts. Alternatively, appellant argues that his case should be
remanded for written findings. We affirm.
FACTS
Austin police officers were dispatched to a domestic assault in progress on the
evening of November 23, 2013. Lt. Rene Phan arrived first at the scene, where he
observed a female, N.Y., breathing hard, crying, yelling, and pointing toward appellant
John Deng, who was running away. Lt. Phan pursued and apprehended Deng. Lt. Phan
then spoke with N.Y., who said that she and Deng resided together as a couple and had
argued because Deng wanted to drive despite not having a driver’s license or insurance.
N.Y. said that Deng punched her in the face; pulled her hair; and grabbed a steel knife
sharpener, pointed it at her, and tried to hit her with it. N.Y. said that she ran out of the
residence and that Deng chased her and verbally threatened to kill her. Police located the
knife sharpener in a bush outside the residence and photographed the knife sharpener,
multiple hair extensions scattered throughout a room in the residence, and injuries to
N.Y.’s lips.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Deng with second-degree assault with a
dangerous weapon, terroristic threats, and gross-misdemeanor domestic assault. Deng
waived his right to a jury trial, and the district court found him guilty of all three charges
and issued a written order that contains general findings of guilt and incorporates a
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memorandum. The court sentenced Deng to 21 months’ imprisonment for his conviction
of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Sufficiency of the evidence for second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon
The elements of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon are (1) assault of
another person (2) with a dangerous weapon. Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2012). A
device or instrumentality is a dangerous weapon if, “in the manner it is used or intended
to be used, is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.02, subd. 6 (2012). Deng argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he
used or intended to use the knife sharpener in a manner that qualified it as a dangerous
weapon.
To evaluate the sufficiency of evidence, appellate courts use the same standard of
review for bench trials and jury trials. State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn.
2011). “[Appellate courts] review the evidence to determine whether, given the facts in
the record and the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those facts, a [fact-finder]
could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged.” State v.
Fairbanks, 842 N.W.2d 297, 306–07 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts
undertake “a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the [fact-
finder] to reach the verdict which [it] did.” State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn.
2012) (quotation omitted).
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“[I]ntent is not usually susceptible to direct proof and must, therefore, be proved
by circumstantial evidence.” State v. Schneider, 402 N.W.2d 779, 782 (Minn. 1987). “If a
conviction, or a single element of a criminal offense, is based solely on circumstantial
evidence,” Fairbanks, 842 N.W.2d at 307, “[appellate courts] apply a two-step analysis
in determining whether [that] circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a guilty
verdict,” State v. Moore, 846 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Minn. 2014). The first step is to “identify
the circumstances proved.” Palmer, 803 N.W.2d at 733 (quotation omitted). The second
step is to “examine the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the
circumstances proved, including inferences consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt.”
Id. (quotations omitted).
Under the first step, “[appellate courts] assume that the [fact-finder] resolved any
factual disputes in a manner that is consistent with the [fact-finder]’s verdict. Put
differently, [appellate courts] construe conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict . . . .” Moore, 846 N.W.2d at 88 (quotation and citation omitted). Under the
second step, “[appellate courts] examine independently the reasonableness of the
inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved.” Id. (quotations omitted).
“To affirm the conviction, [appellate courts] must conclude that the circumstances proved
are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt,
not simply that the inferences that point to guilt are reasonable.” Id. (quotations omitted).
“[Appellate courts] give no deference to the fact finder’s choice between reasonable
inferences.” State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329–30 (Minn. 2010) (quotation
omitted).
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Deng argues that the state offered no evidence that he used, and only
circumstantial evidence that he intended to use, the knife sharpener in a manner that
qualified it as a dangerous weapon. He further argues that the evidence is insufficient to
support his conviction because the evidence also supports “a reasonable inference that
Deng intended to use the knife sharpener only to cause [N.Y.] fear of bodily harm.”
Deng’s arguments are unavailing. N.Y. testified that Deng hit her, repeatedly said that he
was going to kill her, and grabbed the knife sharpener—a long, cylindrical piece of steel.
Once outside the residence, Deng continued saying that he was going to kill N.Y., but she
was unsure whether Deng continued to hold the knife sharpener because he was behind
her and it was dark. N.Y. called the police when she had “a little bit” of distance from
Deng. Deng stopped chasing her when she told him that she was calling the police.
N.Y.’s testimony was consistent with her audio-recorded statements to Lt. Phan that
Deng tried to hit her with the knife sharpener, repeatedly said that he was going to kill
her, and chased her.
N.Y.’s statement that Deng tried to hit her with the knife sharpener is direct
evidence of Deng’s actual use of the knife sharpener. See Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d
465, 477 n.11 (Minn. 2004) (defining “direct evidence” as “evidence that is based on
personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or
presumption” (quotations omitted)). And N.Y.’s testimony that Deng repeatedly stated he
was going to kill her is direct evidence of his intended use of the knife sharpener. See
State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 605 n.2 (Minn. 2013) (Stras, J., concurring in part)
(observing “the critical distinction between a reasonable inference drawn from the
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circumstances proved and the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses” and concluding
that “when [witness] recounted [defendant]’s confession at trial, the only inference the
jury needed to make was that [witness] and [defendant] were credible—an assessment
that we have long vested with the jury”). This evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict, was sufficient to support a finding that Deng used or intended to
use the knife sharpener in a manner calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily
harm to N.Y.
Even if this court applies the heightened sufficiency standard for circumstantial
evidence, Deng’s argument fails. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict, see Moore, 846 N.W.2d at 88, proves the following circumstances. Deng and
N.Y. argued over his intention to drive without a license or insurance. Deng slapped N.Y.
in the stomach multiple times, punched her in the face, and pulled out a number of her
hair extensions. Deng tried to hit N.Y. with a knife sharpener and chased her, repeatedly
saying that he was going to kill her. The circumstances proved are consistent with Deng’s
guilt, see id., because they support a rational inference that Deng intended to use the knife
sharpener in a manner “calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm,” see
Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6. The circumstances proved are inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis except that of guilt. A hypothesis that Deng intended to use the knife
sharpener only to inflict fear of bodily harm on N.Y. is irrational in light of his
immediately preceding assaultive acts, his attempt to hit N.Y. with the knife sharpener,
his repeated statements that he was going to kill N.Y., his extended chase of N.Y., and his
decision to discard the knife sharpener in the bush. Because the circumstances proved are
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consistent with Deng’s guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis besides his
guilt, the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. See id.
District court’s findings on essential facts
Deng argues that the district court failed to make findings to support its general
verdicts and that this court therefore should reverse his convictions or, alternatively,
remand for written findings. “In a case tried without a jury, the court, within 7 days after
the completion of the trial, must make a general finding of guilty” or “not guilty.” Minn.
R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 2(a). “The court, within 7 days after making its general finding
in felony and gross misdemeanor cases, must in addition make findings in writing of the
essential facts.” Id., subd. 2(b). “An opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the
court satisfies the requirement to find the essential facts if they appear in the opinion or
memorandum.” Id., subd. 2(d). “The purpose of written findings is to aid the appellate
court in its review of conviction resulting from a nonjury trial.” State v. Scarver, 458
N.W.2d 167, 168 (Minn. App. 1990).
Here, although the district court’s order does not contain written findings on the
essential facts for the charges against Deng, the order indicates that the state proved each
element of each charge beyond a reasonable doubt. The order further reflects that the
court based its general findings of guilt on the credible testimony of N.Y. and the two
testifying police officers, as well as the consistency of the testimony and its corroboration
by physical evidence and recorded witness statements. Furthermore, “[i]f the court omits
a finding on any issue of fact essential to sustain the general finding, it must be deemed to
have made a finding consistent with the general finding.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd.
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2(e); see State v. Holliday, 745 N.W.2d 556, 562–63 (Minn. 2008) (deeming district court
to have found premeditation in light of, inter alia, its general finding of guilt of first-
degree premeditated murder); State v. Slaughter, 691 N.W.2d 70, 77 (Minn. 2005)
(quoting rule 26.01, subdivision 2, and concluding that evidence in trial without jury was
sufficient to prove that defendant intended to permanently deprive victim of her
necklaces although district court did not specifically make that finding). The district
court’s order sufficiently aided us in our review of Deng’s convictions, and we therefore
affirm Deng’s convictions.
Affirmed.
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