State of Minnesota v. Daniel Paul Wateski

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-0811
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Daniel Paul Wateski,
Appellant.
Filed December 7, 2015
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge
Houston County District Court
File No. 28-CR-13-892
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Matthew Frank, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and
Samuel D. Jandt, Houston County Attorney, Caledonia, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Bradford Colbert, Assistant
Public Defender, Joseph Bergstrom (certified student attorney), St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Daniel Paul Wateski challenges his convictions of first-degree driving
while impaired, driving without a valid Minnesota driver’s license, and driving after
cancellation (inimical to public safety), arguing that alleged evidentiary errors warrant a
new trial and that the district court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury
concerning the corroboration requirement for accomplice testimony. We affirm.
FACTS
This appeal follows appellant’s conviction of multiple offenses arising from his
activities on the evening of November 1 and early into the morning of November 2, 2013.
Appellant and A.D., together with a third companion, D.S., spent time at a restaurant and
then at a strip bar. Appellant admits that he drank heavily over the course of the evening.
A.D. drove appellant’s mother’s car to the restaurant, from the restaurant to the strip bar,
and from the strip bar to D.S.’s home, where D.S. got out of the car and went inside.
The parties dispute what happened next in D.S.’s driveway. The state presented
evidence in the form of A.D.’s testimony that appellant became angry and ordered A.D.
to get out of the driver’s seat, that appellant got into the driver’s seat, that A.D. got back
into the car on the passenger’s side for fear of being left behind, and that appellant took
control of the vehicle, backing out of the driveway and into the ditch. Appellant
insinuates without actually alleging that A.D. remained in the driver’s seat after the pair
left D.S.’s home, and that it was she who drove the vehicle backwards out of the
driveway and into the ditch. The car was parked on the side of the road, partially
encroaching on the travelled portion of the lane, a short distance from where it went into
the ditch.
A.D. testified at trial that appellant became angry and agitated in D.S.’s driveway
and that he remained so during the few minutes of contested events. A.D. alleges that the
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altercation started because she did not want appellant to drive. A.D. claims that they
yelled at each other, that she threw an empty pop can at appellant’s head, and that they
both hit each other in the face. She claims that appellant started driving, and that he
drove very fast, starting and stopping abruptly, and that he was driving when the car went
into the ditch. She testified that the altercation started in D.S.’s driveway and lasted until
they were standing on the roadway at the place where the car, damaged because of having
apparently hit a mailbox, was ultimately left. Appellant left the scene on foot. A.D.
called 911 shortly after 2:00 a.m. while standing on the side of the county road near the
car, and she gave her version of the preceding events to the dispatcher. A.D. sent a text
message shortly after her 911 call indicating that appellant had “f---ed up” and that
“[A.D.] was not going to get another DUI out of it just because of [appellant].” A.D.’s
father picked her up and brought her to his house, where A.D. was temporarily staying.
Police arrived and eventually interviewed A.D. at her father’s home.
Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he drove the car
that night, and that A.D. has fabricated her testimony to protect herself. No one other
than appellant and A.D. witnessed the events after D.S. was dropped off.1
R.J. called appellant’s brother, E.W., for help to recover the vehicle from the side
of the county road. Appellant was eventually found at some time after 3:00 a.m.,
sleeping on the couch at the home of E.W., which is within reasonable walking-distance
of where the car had been left. A responding police officer met with appellant and
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The car that appellant and A.D. were using belonged to appellant’s mother, R.J., who
had given A.D. permission to drive it on this occasion and regularly in the past. R.J. is a
co-worker of A.D. and the next-door neighbor of A.D.’s father.
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observed indicia of intoxication, including a smell of an alcoholic beverage on his breath,
and red, watery eyes. Appellant also stated after brief questioning that he was “drunk as
a skunk.” Appellant was arrested and booked into jail, where he produced an intoxilyzer
result of 0.10 at 4:37 a.m.
The state argued at trial that appellant did not consume alcohol at any point after
leaving the strip bar at about 12:30 a.m. and before taking the intoxilyzer test about four
hours later. E.W., who stated that he had not been aware of appellant’s presence in his
house until he came downstairs, testified that appellant would not have found any alcohol
in the house. And no one claimed that alcohol was consumed in the car after leaving the
strip bar.
Appellant was charged with first-degree driving while impaired, first-degree
driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours, driving without a
valid Minnesota driver’s license, driving after cancellation (inimical to public safety), and
fifth-degree assault. The district court dismissed the charge of first-degree driving with
an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours. The remaining charges were
tried to a jury. Appellant stipulated before trial that he had prior qualified impaired-
driving convictions and that, if convicted of driving while impaired, he would be guilty of
a first-degree offense because of his prior convictions. The jury found appellant not
guilty of fifth-degree assault, but guilty of the remaining charges.
Appellant was initially sentenced to 66 months in prison with credit for time
served. Following appellant’s appeal, which was stayed and remanded for post-
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conviction relief, the district court recalculated appellant’s criminal history score and
reduced his sentence to 52 months in prison. Appellant then reinstated his appeal.
DECISION
I. Evidentiary rulings
Appellant argues that the district court made three erroneous evidentiary rulings.
A district court’s evidentiary rulings generally will not be disturbed on appeal unless the
ruling demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Nunn, 561 N.W.2d 902, 906-07
(Minn. 1997). On this record, and to the extent that there were evidentiary errors at all,
we conclude that they were harmless.
a. Flashing evidence
Appellant challenges the district court’s exclusion of testimony that A.D. flashed
her breasts at the strip bar, arguing that such testimony was relevant to his theory that
A.D. drove the car while intoxicated and then framed appellant to avoid legal trouble.
Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or
less probable. Minn. R. Evid. 401. The Minnesota Rules of Evidence also provide that
evidence, although relevant, “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Minn. R. Evid. 403.
It appears from the record (or the lack of a record on this specific subject) that the
district court’s pretrial decision to exclude this testimony was handled largely off the
record. The transcript contains the district judge’s brief statement that “the court is
satisfied that in today’s society, [the fact that a woman exposes her breasts] isn’t
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necessarily an indicator of alcohol consumption,” and the judge then instructed the
attorneys to tell their witnesses not to make any reference to the alleged flashing.
The lack of a more thorough record of the district court’s analysis of this issue
leaves us with questions concerning whether that analysis was properly tethered to rule
403. The district court considered the probative value of the proposed testimony, but it is
not clear that it specifically weighed probative value against the danger of unfair
prejudice. Rule 403 requires that the probative value of a given piece of evidence must
be “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice” in order for a court to
properly exclude it. The district court appears to have implicitly determined that the
flashing evidence might have some (if not dispositive) logical relevance under rule 401
concerning whether A.D. was drinking alcohol, but that the logical relevance was
outweighed by other rule-403 considerations.
Regardless of whether the district court fully and properly applied rule 403, we are
unable to conclude on this record that the district court reversibly erred. The district
court found the proffered evidence to have minimal probative value and implicitly
concluded that the allegation that a witness flashed her breasts would be substantially
more prejudicial than probative on the relevant issues. There was other, and seemingly
more persuasive, evidence of A.D.’s alcohol consumption from witnesses who saw her
drinking. And A.D. admitted to drinking two beers, but denied witnesses’ claims that she
drank more than that. In context, the flashing evidence would likely have added nothing
of significant value for the jury’s consideration. It would have been a waste of time,
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needlessly cumulative, and marginally relevant, in addition to being unfairly prejudicial.
See Minn. R. Evid. 403.
b. Prior DWI evidence
Appellant argues that the district court erred in sustaining the state’s objection to
evidence of A.D.’s prior DWI conviction. The district court ruled that the probative
value of the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. We review the district
court’s application of the rules of evidence for abuse of discretion. State v. Griller, 583
N.W.2d 736, 743 (Minn. 1998).
Rule 616 of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence allows the admission of evidence,
including extrinsic evidence, to show bias, prejudice, or interest “for the purpose of
attacking the credibility of a witness.” Minn. R. Evid. 616; see also Minn. R. Evid. 616
1989 comm. cmt. However, rule 609 bars impeachment by evidence of prior convictions,
except in certain prescribed classes of crimes, which the parties agree do not encompass
A.D.’s prior DWI. Minn. R. Evid. 609. In general, rule 608(b) bars the use of extrinsic
evidence to prove specific instances of conduct “for the purpose of attacking or
supporting the witness’ character for truthfulness.” Minn. R. Evid. 608(b); see also
Minn. R. Evid. 608(b) 2006 advisory comm. cmt.
The parties agree that evidence of A.D.’s past DWI conviction cannot be admitted
for impeachment purposes under rule 609. But appellant argues that the conviction and
related questioning would have shown A.D.’s bias or interest and was admissible under
rule 616. The district court excluded the proffered evidence because under rule 403 “the
probative value would be outweighed by the prejudicial value.” Minn. R. Evid. 403.
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Although the rule requires that the district court consider whether the probative value is
“substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice” (emphasis added), we see
no abuse of the district court’s discretion here. Appellant’s theory at trial was that he was
not driving, that A.D. was the driver at all relevant times, and that A.D.’s claim that he
was driving arose from her desire to avoid conviction for DWI. Evidence of A.D.’s
alcohol consumption was admitted at trial and the impact of that evidence on her
credibility was fully argued. Whether A.D. had or did not have an earlier DWI
conviction added very little respecting her bias.
Moreover, while the district court ruled that all evidence of A.D.’s past DWI
conviction was inadmissible, the fact inadvertently came out through the testimony of
R.J. (appellant’s mother) during direct examination by the state. R.J. stated that A.D.
sent her a text message stating “[A.D.] was not going to get another DUI out of it just
because of [appellant].” The prosecutor objected and sought to have the statement
stricken from the record, but the court overruled stating, “You asked the question, she
answered it.” The district court later prohibited further targeted questioning on the issue
of A.D.’s past DWI conviction, but confirmed that the testimony of R.J. was not stricken
and was part of the record.
Even if the district court erred in ruling that evidence of A.D.’s earlier DWI was
inadmissible (which we do not conclude that it did), any error was harmless because
evidence of the prior DWI was received in any event.
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c. Officer’s testimony
Appellant argues that the district court erred by allowing the jury to hear, and the
prosecutor to repeat, a police officer’s opinion that appellant would have been too
impaired by alcohol to legally drive at the time of the alleged offense.
We have held that a police officer’s testimony about the level of impairment from
alcohol consumption is not an expert opinion and is admissible with proper foundation.
State v. Ards, 816 N.W.2d 679, 684 (Minn. App. 2012) “[T]raditionally the foundation
required before an opinion regarding intoxication can be given has been testimony
concerning observation of manner of walking and standing, manner of speech,
appearances of eyes and face, and odor, if any, upon such person’s breath.” Id. (quoting
State v. Hicks, 301 Minn. 350, 353, 222 N.W.2d 345, 348 (1974)).
The officer in this case provided sufficient foundation for his opinion by testifying
that he “detected that odor of alcoholic beverage on [appellant’s] breath as we talked.”
He made other observations of appellant consistent with alcohol intoxication.
The parties dispute whether this argument was properly preserved below. The
state argues that the plain-error test applies because appellant did not advance at the
district court the precise arguments he makes on appeal. Appellant argues that his
objection to the district court was sufficient to preserve the argument for appeal, and that
the harmless-error test applies. We need not decide the preservation issue because
appellant’s arguments fail under either test. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.01 (“Any error that
does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”); Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02 (“Plain
error affecting substantial rights can be considered by the court on motion for new trial
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. . . or on appeal even if it was not brought to the trial court’s attention.”). The district
court’s decision to allow the police officer’s testimony that, in his opinion, appellant was
too impaired to legally drive was not erroneous. Moreover, that testimony was neither
prejudicial nor did it affect a substantial right, because appellant himself told a police
officer that he was “drunk as a skunk” when he was arrested, and acknowledged that he
had been drinking heavily throughout the night. The jury had ample evidence on which
to conclude that appellant was impaired, even without the contested statement by the
officer.
Appellant also argues that the officer’s testimony was highly prejudicial because it
insinuated that appellant actually drove the car, which was a critical fact question for the
jury. See State v. Moore, 699 N.W.2d 733, 740 (Minn. 2005) (holding that testimony
regarding the ultimate issue in a case is not always objectionable); but see State v.
Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d 189, 193 (Minn. App. 1997) (“Special care must be taken by the
trial judge to ensure that the defendant’s presumption of innocence does not get lost in
the flurry of expert testimony and, more importantly, that the responsibility for judging
credibility and the facts remains with the jury.”). While the prosecutor’s first iteration of
the question to the officer was arguably improper (“[W]as it unsafe for [appellant] to
operate a motor vehicle?”), the question was rephrased and did not call for the officer to
opine concerning whether appellant actually drove the car. The officer testified, “It was
my opinion that he was intoxicated and would have been over the legal limit to operate a
motor vehicle in the state of Minnesota.” (Emphasis added.) The officer, who of course
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did not know whether appellant had been driving, was not asked to nor did he opine
concerning whether appellant drove.
II. Accomplice testimony
Appellant argues that the district court plainly erred by failing to instruct the jury
that a conviction cannot rest upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. See
Minn. Stat. § 634.04 (2014). We review for plain error because this issue was not raised
before the district court. The plain-error test requires the appellant to show (1) error, (2)
that was plain, and (3) that affected substantial rights. Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 740. An
error is plain if it is “clear and obvious; usually this means an error that violates or
contradicts case law, a rule, or an applicable standard of conduct.” State v. Matthews,
779 N.W.2d 543, 549 (Minn. 2010) (citation omitted).
An accomplice is “[a] person [who] is criminally liable for a crime committed by
another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or
otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.” Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2014).
Appellant argues that the test for determining whether a witness is an accomplice should
be whether the witness could have been charged and convicted for the crime alleged
against the defendant. See, e.g., State v. Jensen, 289 Minn. 444, 446, 184 N.W.2d 813,
815 (1971). But appellant misconstrues Jensen and overlooks the important distinction
between an alternative perpetrator and an accomplice. The Minnesota Supreme Court
has recognized this distinction, and has held that an accomplice-liability instruction is not
required where the defendant presented an alternative-perpetrator theory at trial. State v.
Larson, 787 N.W.2d 592, 603 (Minn. 2010).
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At its core, any definition of “accomplice” must include some conjunctive act or
mutual intent involving two or more people. An accomplice is “[s]omeone who is in any
way involved with another in the commission of a crime,” or “[s]omeone who
knowingly, voluntarily, and intentionally unites with the principal offender in committing
a crime and thereby becomes punishable for it.” Black’s Law Dictionary 20 (10th ed.
2014) (emphases added). Appellant’s theory of the case was not that A.D. assisted him in
his commission of a crime. Appellant’s trial strategy was that he was not the drunk
driver—A.D. was. There is no evidence that A.D. assisted appellant in any way. And the
jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that it was appellant who was driving while
impaired.
The district court neither erred nor plainly erred in declining to instruct the jury
concerning the corroboration requirement for accomplice testimony.
III. Cumulative error
Appellant argues that the cumulative effect of erroneous evidentiary rulings
entitles him to a new trial. We construe his cumulative-effect argument broadly as to
include the effect of the claimed error in not instructing the jury on accomplice
testimony. It is true that an appellant “is entitled to a new trial if the errors, when taken
cumulatively, had the effect of denying appellant a fair trial.” State v. Keeton, 589
N.W.2d 85, 91 (Minn. 1998).
Appellant cites State v. Mayhorn in support of his argument that the cumulative
evidentiary errors warrant a new trial. 720 N.W.2d 776 (Minn. 2006). But Mayhorn is
easily distinguishable. In Mayhorn, the Minnesota Supreme Court ordered a new trial
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where at least ten instances of prosecutorial misconduct and two evidentiary errors
prevented the jury from focusing on the real issues in the trial. Id. at 792. Appellant also
cites State v. Glaze as authority for his claim that cumulative evidentiary errors warrants
a new trial, but Glaze affirmed a murder conviction despite trial errors, where the
supreme court concluded that the errors did not deprive appellant of a fair trial. 452
N.W.2d 655, 661-62 (Minn. 1990). Just so in this case: any error that may have been
committed by the district court did not have the effect of depriving appellant of a fair
trial.
Affirmed.
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