Patrick H. Horan, Relator v. Centerline Charter Corp., Department of Employment and Economic Development

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-0703
Patrick H. Horan,
Relator,
vs.
Centerline Charter Corp.,
Respondent,
Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.
Filed November 9, 2015
Reversed
Chutich, Judge
Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 33152080-3
Patrick H. Horan, Maplewood, Minnesota (pro se relator)
Centerline Charter Corp., St. Paul, Minnesota (respondent)
Lee B. Nelson, Department of Employment and Economic Development, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent department)
Considered and decided by Chutich, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CHUTICH, Judge
Relator Patrick H. Horan challenges a decision by an unemployment-law judge,
affirmed on reconsideration, determining him ineligible for unemployment benefits.
Respondent Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development (the
department) has filed a letter requesting reversal of the unemployment-law judge’s
decision. Horan’s employer, respondent Centerline Charter Corp., has not filed an
appellate brief or a response to the department’s letter. Because we agree with the
department that the unemployment-law judge did not provide a fair hearing to Horan and
that the unemployment-law judge’s decision is not supported by the evidence in the
record, we reverse.
FACTS
Horan worked as a bus driver for Centerline beginning in September 2013. On
December 12, 2014, Centerline suspended Horan for a period of 30 days. Horan applied
for unemployment benefits, and the department issued an initial determination that he
was ineligible for benefits because he was suspended for misconduct. Horan filed an
administrative appeal, and a hearing was held before an unemployment-law judge on
February 3, 2015. In the interim, on January 9, 2015, Centerline terminated Horan’s
employment.
Centerline has asserted three reasons for terminating Horan’s employment:
(1) dishonest reporting of time/“stalling for time”; (2) an altercation with a parent of
student bus riders; and (3) littering from the bus. Both the written suspension notice
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issued by Centerline on December 12, 2014, and Centerline’s response to the
department’s request for information cite only the first reason. Centerline’s letter
terminating Horan’s employment, however, cites all three reasons.
Centerline’s assertion that Horan was dishonest in reporting his time and was
“stalling for time” stems from two days on which Horan stopped at his home after
completing the first of two assigned morning routes. On December 9, 2014, Horan drove
route 509, dropping students off at their school at 8:05 a.m., and he then stopped at his
home to use the bathroom before driving route 38, his second and final route of the day.
Route 38 had only one student, who was not to be picked up until 8:50 a.m. According to
Centerline GPS records, Horan’s bus was parked near his home on December 9 from
8:14 a.m. until 8:36 a.m. During that time, Centerline unsuccessfully attempted to reach
Horan to request his assistance with a student who had missed a bus. When Horan
reconnected with dispatch, he was told that route 38 was cancelled that day, and he
returned to the terminal. On December 11, 2014, Horan again drove route 509, and was
notified after he completed that route that route 38 was cancelled. But he urgently
needed to use the bathroom and so stopped at his home before returning to the terminal.
GPS records indicate that his bus was parked near his home from 8:17 a.m. until 8:35
a.m.
Horan testified that he was not assigned a course of travel to get to the student on
route 38 after completing route 509, and that the course he elected to travel took him
within a couple of blocks of his home. Horan also testified that the time he spent at his
home did not impact the amount of time that he reported on his time cards because
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Centerline pays drivers for a minimum of two hours per route. Horan testified that
neither of his stops at home caused him to exceed the two-hour minimum.
Centerline dispatcher Jim Weiss acknowledged the existence of the two-hour-
minimum policy during his testimony, and did not dispute Horan’s assertion that his total
time on his routes (including the restroom stops) on December 9 and 11 did not exceed
the two-hour minimum. Centerline officer Craig Rossow testified that drivers were
expected to use the most efficient course of travel, to return to the terminal after
completing routes, and to use the bathrooms at the schools or at the terminal. Rossow
asserted that the most efficient route between Horan’s two assigned routes would not take
him near his home. But Rossow did not contradict Horan’s testimony that the time he
reported on December 9 and 11 was unaffected by his stops at home to use the bathroom.
The second reason cited by Centerline for Horan’s discharge was a September
2014 altercation between Horan and the parent of students who rode bus route 18, which
Horan was driving at that time. The parent was concerned that Horan was not stopping in
the correct place to pick up the students and that Horan departed from the bus stop before
the students were seated. The parent confronted Horan at the bus stop, and a
disagreement ensued, during which Horan closed the doors of the school bus on the
parent. Horan testified that it was an accident. Centerline removed Horan from route 18,
but did not otherwise investigate the incident or address it with Horan.
The third reason cited by Centerline for Horan’s discharge was a June 11, 2014,
incident in which Horan was identified as having thrown seat cushions out of his bus and
onto a residential lawn. Rossow testified that Centerline received a complaint from the
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president of a neighborhood-watch group who had witnessed the littering and who
identified Horan by bus number and gave a description that matched him. At the hearing,
Horan denied the littering allegations. Centerline did not address the incident with Horan
at the time because it was the end of the school year and it was uncertain if he would be
returning the following year.
Horan not only disputes Centerline’s characterization of the events cited as
reasons for discharge, but also asserts that those events were not the true reason he was
discharged.
DECISION
The Minnesota Unemployment Insurance Law
is remedial in nature and must be applied in favor of awarding
unemployment benefits. Any legal conclusion that results in
an applicant being ineligible for unemployment benefits must
be fully supported by the facts. In determining eligibility or
ineligibility for benefits, any statutory provision that would
preclude an applicant from receiving benefits must be
narrowly construed.
Minn. Stat. § 268.031, subd. 2 (2014). This court may remand a case for further
proceedings or may “reverse or modify a[n unemployment-law judge]’s decision if the
relator’s substantial rights may have been prejudiced because the findings or decision are
unsupported by substantial evidence or made upon unlawful procedure.” Icenhower v.
Total Auto., Inc., 845 N.W.2d 849, 855 (Minn. App. 2014), review denied (Minn. July 15,
2014); see also Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(a) (Supp. 2015).
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I. Fair hearing
“The hearing must be conducted by an unemployment law judge as an evidence-
gathering inquiry, without regard to a burden of proof.” Minn. R. 3310.2921 (supp.
2014).
Each party may present and examine witnesses and offer their
own documents or other exhibits. Parties have the right to
examine witnesses, object to exhibits and testimony, and
cross-examine the other party’s witnesses. The
unemployment law judge must assist all parties in the
presentation of evidence. The unemployment law judge must
rule upon evidentiary objections on the record. The
unemployment law judge must permit rebuttal testimony.
Parties have the right to make closing statements. Closing
statements may include comments based upon the evidence
and arguments of law.
Id. “The unemployment law judge may limit repetitious testimony and arguments.” Id.
But “[t]he unemployment law judge must ensure that all relevant facts are clearly and
fully developed.” Id. “When the reason for the discharge is disputed, the hearing process
must allow evidence on the competing reasons and provide factual findings on the cause
of discharge.” Scheunemann v. Radisson S. Hotel, 562 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Minn. App.
1997).
The department concedes that the unemployment-law judge violated his duty to
conduct a fair hearing, and we agree. The unemployment-law judge not only failed in his
statutory duty to assist Horan in developing the record to support his arguments, but
almost completely precluded Horan from doing so on his own. The unemployment-law
judge repeatedly obstructed Horan’s attempts to cross-examine Centerline witnesses, both
by explicitly cutting off the questioning and by discouraging Horan from asking further
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questions. A number of times, the unemployment-law judge interrupted and cut off
Horan as he attempted to cross-examine Centerline’s witnesses on topics related to the
contested issues and made comments suggesting that he was prejudging the evidence.
The unemployment-law judge also abruptly terminated Horan’s questioning of
Centerline’s two key witnesses and precluded Horan from asking any questions about the
only topic on which a third witness had any personal knowledge. And the
unemployment-law judge cut short Horan’s closing argument, despite repeated
assurances that Horan would be given an opportunity to present his side of the story and
arguments regarding the true reason for his discharge.
Because the unemployment-law judge failed to conduct a fair hearing, we may
reverse the ineligibility determination or remand for a new hearing. See Minn. Stat.
§ 268.105, subd. 7(d) (Supp. 2015); see also Scheunemann, 562 N.W.2d at 34 (reversing
and remanding ineligibility determination because relator had not been allowed to present
evidence disputing the reason for her discharge). The department asserts that the
unemployment-law judge’s decision also should be reversed because the evidence does
not support the unemployment-law judge’s finding that Horan was discharged for
employment misconduct. We address that argument next.
II. Misconduct determination
An employee is ineligible for unemployment benefits if he was discharged from
employment because of misconduct. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4(1) (2014).
Employment misconduct means any intentional, negligent, or
indifferent conduct, on the job or off the job that displays
clearly:
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(1) a serious violation of the standards of behavior the
employer has the right to reasonably expect of the
employee; or
(2) a substantial lack of concern for the employment.
Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(a) (2014). “Whether an employee committed employment
misconduct is a mixed question of fact and law.” Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., 721 N.W.2d
340, 344 (Minn. App. 2006). “Whether the employee committed a particular act is a
question of fact” that we review to determine whether it is supported by substantial
evidence. Id. “But whether the act committed by the employee constitutes employment
misconduct is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Id.
The department argues that the record does not support the unemployment-law
judge’s finding that Horan was “stalling for time” when he stopped at home to use the
bathroom on December 9 and 11, 2014. We agree. In making the finding, the
unemployment-law judge disregarded Horan’s testimony, undisputed by the employer,
that he was not required to travel any particular course to pick up the student on route 38,
he was not scheduled to pick up that student until 8:50 a.m., and his stops at home did not
impact his claimed hours because of Centerline’s two-hour-minimum policy. Centerline
witnesses testified that Horan violated its policies by failing to use the most efficient
course of travel between routes, failing to return to the terminal after completing route
509, and using a different bathroom than one at the school or terminal. But none of these
alleged failures are the asserted reason for discharge. Rather, Centerline asserted that
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Horan was discharged for dishonest reporting of time, or “stalling for time.” This
asserted basis for discharge is not supported by the evidence in the record.
Respecting the other two incidents that Centerline asserted as reasons for Horan’s
discharge, the department argues, and we agree, that the evidence does not support the
existence of a causal connection between those two incidents and Horan’s discharge. The
littering incident took place at the end of the 2013-14 school year, and Centerline not
only failed to address the incident with Horan but rehired him as a driver for the 2014-15
school year. Similarly, no evidence suggests that Centerline ever addressed the
September 2014 incident with Horan, and he was thereafter assigned additional routes to
drive. Notably, neither the June 2014 incident nor the September 2014 incident was
mentioned in the December 12, 2014 suspension notice or in Centerline’s response to the
department’s request for information. Under these circumstances, we conclude the
unemployment-law judge erred by finding these two incidents among the reasons for
Horan’s discharge. See Redalen v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 504 N.W.2d 237, 239
(Minn. App. 1993) (“Lapse of time between the alleged misconduct and discharge, absent
circumstances that would explain the delay, may tend to negate a causal relation between
the misconduct and the discharge.”).
Because the record evidence does not support the unemployment-law judge’s
findings that Horan was discharged for misconduct, we reverse the unemployment-law
judge’s ineligibility determination.
Reversed.
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