John Excel Arradondo v. Tom Roy, Commissioner of Corrections

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0145
John Excel Arradondo, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
Tom Roy, Commissioner of Corrections,
Respondent.
Filed September 6, 2016
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge
Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-15-3540
John Excel Arradondo, Lino Lakes, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Rachel E. Bell, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant John Excel Arradondo challenges the district court’s denial of his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Because Arradondo cannot challenge his original

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
sentence through a habeas corpus petition and the record contains no evidence that the
Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC) failed to properly administer Arradondo’s
sentence or violated Arradondo’s due-process rights, we affirm.
FACTS
Following charges that he entered a home without permission and sexually
assaulted a woman and her teenage daughter, Arradondo pleaded guilty to one count of
third-degree criminal sexual conduct and was sentenced to 36 months in prison and 10
years of conditional release. He was also required to register as a predatory offender.
After completing his term of imprisonment and his supervised-release term,
Arradondo began serving his ten-year conditional-release term.1 Some two years later,
the DOC revoked Arradondo’s release for 60 days because he had lost his housing as a
result of a tornado. Following that revocation, Arradondo was released again, subject to
new conditions.
In September 2014, Arradondo was apprehended for alleged violation of release
conditions, and the DOC provided Arradondo with notice of a revocation hearing. The
DOC alleged that Arradondo had violated the conditions of his release by (1) being
terminated from outpatient sex-offender treatment; (2) possessing a smart phone;
(3) possessing pornographic images on the smart phone; (4) using social media;
(5) drinking alcohol; and (6) failing to inform his agent of a sexual relationship. At the
revocation hearing, Arradondo was represented by a public defender and admitted that he
violated several conditions of his release. The DOC determined that Arradondo’s sex-
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Arradondo’s conditional-release term is set to expire on September 5, 2018.
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offender treatment should be completed in custody and revoked Arradondo’s release for
270 days.
In June 2015, the DOC held a hearing to assess Arradondo’s progress and
extended Arradondo’s revocation by 365 days to allow him to complete sex-offender
treatment in custody. Arradondo then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
district court. The district court denied Arradondo’s habeas corpus petition without a
hearing, determining that (1) Arradondo’s due-process rights were not violated;
(2) supervised and conditional release do not violate ex post facto principles;
(3) Arradondo’s conditions of release do not violate the prohibition against double
jeopardy; and (4) Arradondo cannot challenge his original sentence through a petition for
habeas corpus.
Arradondo appeals.
DECISION
A writ of habeas corpus is a statutory remedy that allows an inmate “to obtain
relief from imprisonment or restraint.” Minn. Stat. § 589.01 (2014). The petitioner bears
the burden to show the illegality of his detention. State ex rel. Pollard v. Roy, 878
N.W.2d 341, 343 (Minn. App. 2016), review granted (Minn. June 29, 2016). “The
district court’s findings in ruling on a petition for habeas corpus are entitled to great
weight and will be upheld if reasonably supported by the evidence.” Rud v. Fabian, 743
N.W.2d 295, 297 (Minn. App. 2007). But we review questions of law, including the
interpretation and application of a statute, de novo. Pollard, 878 N.W.2d at 343-44; Rud,
743 N.W.2d at 298.
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A. Challenge to Original Sentence
Throughout his brief, Arradondo challenges the legality of his original sentence,
specifically the ten-year conditional-release term and the predatory-offender-registration
requirement. But habeas corpus “may not be used as a substitute for . . . [an] appeal; as a
motion to correct, amend, or vacate; or as a cover for a collateral attack upon a
judgment.” Breeding v. Swenson, 240 Minn. 93, 96, 60 N.W.2d 4, 7 (1953). Arradondo
cannot challenge his original sentence through a petition for habeas corpus. See id.
Moreover, Arradondo is incorrect that his original sentence was unlawful. At the
time of Arradondo’s offense, Minnesota required a sex offender to serve a ten-year
conditional-release term following completion of the offender’s executed sentence, see
Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 6 (Supp. 2005); Pollard, 878 N.W.2d at 343, and required
the offender to register as a predatory offender, see Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b
(Supp. 2005). Imposing these requirements therefore did not unlawfully increase
Arradondo’s penalty, as he suggests. Arradondo’s original sentence was proper.
B. Challenge to Implementation of Sentence
Arradondo also challenges the DOC’s implementation of his sentence. Judicial
review of the DOC’s implementation of a sentence may be obtained through a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus. State v. Schnagl, 859 N.W.2d 297, 303 (Minn. 2015). Although
it is not clear from his brief, Arradondo appears to assert that the DOC lacked authority to
revoke his release because his two-thirds term of imprisonment represents his
“mandatory maximum sentence.” We disagree.
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Arradondo’s sentence consists of (1) a term of imprisonment; (2) a supervised-
release term; and (3) a conditional-release term. See Minn. Stat. § 244.101, subd. 1
(2004) (explaining that an executed sentence consists of a term of imprisonment and a
supervised-release term); Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 6 (requiring sex offenders to
serve a ten-year conditional-release term). The term of imprisonment therefore
represents only one part of Arradondo’s sentence and not his “mandatory maximum
sentence.” In addition, the DOC “may not dismiss an offender on conditional release
from supervision until the offender’s conditional release term expires.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.3455, subd. 8(a) (Supp. 2005). The DOC retains authority to implement
Arradondo’s sentence and cannot dismiss Arradondo’s conditional release, as Arradondo
requests, until his conditional-release term expires. See id.
Although Arradondo generally challenges the revocation of his conditional
release, he does not challenge any specific condition of his release or the DOC’s
determination that he violated those conditions. The DOC has “broad discretion” when
imposing release conditions and making release decisions. State v. Schwartz, 628
N.W.2d 134, 142 n.4 (2001); see Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 8(b) (Supp. 2005) (stating
that the DOC may impose any conditions it “considers appropriate”). When an offender
fails to meet a condition of release, the DOC may revoke conditional release “and order
that the offender serve all or a part of the remaining portion of the conditional release
term in prison.” Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 8(b). Given Arradondo’s admission that
he failed to observe several conditions of his release, the DOC had the authority to revoke
Arradondo’s conditional release and order him to “serve all or a part of the remaining
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portion of the conditional release term in prison.” See id. The record contains no
evidence that the DOC improperly administered Arradondo’s sentence.
C. Due Process
Finally, Arradondo argues that the DOC’s decision to revoke his conditional
release and his continuing confinement violate his due-process rights. A writ of habeas
corpus “may . . . be used to raise claims involving fundamental constitutional rights.”
State ex rel. Guth v. Fabian, 716 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Minn. App. 2006), review denied
(Minn. Aug. 15, 2006).
The revocation of parole or conditional release implicates a protected liberty
interest. State v. Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Minn. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
92 (2015); see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2601 (1972). The
DOC must therefore provide an offender with due process of law when revoking release.
Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 2 (2014). “The fundamental requirement of due process is
the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Beaulieu,
859 N.W.2d at 280 (quotations omitted). To satisfy the due-process requirement, the
DOC must provide (1) written notice of the claimed violations; (2) disclosure of the
evidence against the offender; (3) the “opportunity to be heard in person and to present
witnesses and documentary evidence”; (4) the opportunity to cross-examine adverse
witnesses; (5) “a neutral and detached hearing body”; and (6) a written statement
detailing the evidence relied upon and the reasons for revoking release. Id. (quoting
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S. Ct. at 2604) (quotation marks omitted).
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Arradondo generally asserts that his due-process rights were violated, but alleges
no violations of any of the above due-process requirements. Based on the record, we
conclude that the DOC satisfied the due-process requirements because Arradondo
received (1) written notice of the claimed violations; (2) disclosure of the DOC’s
evidence against him; (3) an opportunity to participate in the hearing and present
evidence; (4) an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses; (5) a neutral hearing officer;
and (6) a written summary of the DOC’s decision. See id. And contrary to Arradondo’s
assertion, the revocation of conditional release was supported by facts in the record, as
well as Arradondo’s admission that he violated several conditions of his release. Finally,
there is no evidence that the DOC failed to follow its own regulations, as Arradondo
asserts. We can discern no violation of Arradondo’s due-process rights.
Affirmed.
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