State of Minnesota v. Charles Steven Owens

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1824
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Charles Steven Owens,
Appellant.
Filed September 12, 2016
Affirmed
Randall, Judge *
Pine County District Court
File No. 58-CR-14-901
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Reese Frederickson, Pine County Attorney, Michelle R. Skubitz, Assistant County
Attorney, Pine City, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Melissa V. Sheridan, Assistant Public Defender, Eagan, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Randall,
Judge.
*
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RANDALL, Judge
Appellant Charles Steven Owens challenges his conviction of fifth-degree
controlled-substance crime, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he
knowingly possessed methamphetamine and that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel. We affirm.
FACTS
On November 11, 2014, Pine County Sheriff’s Deputy Bradley Carlson was
dispatched to the Grand Hinckley Inn to investigate an alleged incident of domestic assault.
Deputy Carlson went to appellant’s hotel room to speak with the victim. While in the hotel
room, Deputy Carlson observed a Q-tip in an ashtray. From his training and experience,
Deputy Carlson knew that methamphetamine users often use Q-tips to pack
methamphetamine into pipes and to clean syringes.
Deputy Carlson subsequently made contact with appellant in the hotel lobby and
placed him under arrest for the alleged domestic assault. 1 Deputy Carlson conducted a
standard search incident to the arrest and discovered a plastic baggie in appellant’s jacket
pocket. It was a small baggie that Deputy Carlson knew from his training and experience
is the type of baggie often used to package illegal drugs. Deputy Carlson observed a white
powdery residue in the baggie that resembled methamphetamine residue. He commented
1
Prior to trial, counsel for both parties agreed that the domestic assault charge would be
dropped and that no testimony regarding the domestic assault would be presented to the
jury. No argument disputing the validity of the arrest was raised.
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to a trooper that he believed the baggie contained methamphetamine residue, and appellant
interjected that it was “candy apple candy” in the baggie and that it was a “sugar residue,”
not illegal drugs.
Deputy Carlson conducted a preliminary field test of the residue. It tested positive
for methamphetamine. A forensic scientist from the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension later analyzed the baggie and concluded that it contained a trace amount of
methamphetamine.
The state charged appellant with fifth-degree controlled-substance crime in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(b)(1) (2014), for possessing methamphetamine.
The state also charged him with fifth-degree assault but later dismissed that charge.
Appellant had a jury trial and was found guilty of fifth-degree controlled-substance
possession. The district court sentenced him to a stayed prison term of 13 months, 10
years’ probation, and 180 days in jail. This appeal followed.
DECISION
I.
Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the crime. In
reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we conduct “a painstaking
analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which
they did.” State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). We
assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any contrary evidence.
Id.3
Appellant argues that evidence of a trace amount of methamphetamine in the baggie
was insufficient to prove that he possessed methamphetamine in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 152.025, subd. 2(b)(1). But the statute does not require the state to prove a specific
weight as an element of the offense. State v. Traxler, 583 N.W.2d 556, 562 (Minn. 1998)
(holding that a trace amount of methamphetamine was sufficient to support a conviction of
fifth-degree controlled-substance crime). Evidence that the baggie on appellant at the time
of his arrest contained trace amounts of methamphetamine was sufficient under the statute
to prove that he possessed methamphetamine.
Appellant also argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he knew the
substance he possessed was methamphetamine. “Possession crimes require proof that the
defendant had actual knowledge of the nature of the substance in his possession.” State v.
Ali, 775 N.W.2d 914, 918 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn.
Feb. 16, 2010). Knowledge is typically proved by circumstantial evidence. Id. at 919.
We apply a two-part test when reviewing a conviction supported by circumstantial
evidence. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). First, we identify the
circumstances proved. Id. We construe conflicting evidence in favor of the verdict and
assume the jury believed the state’s witnesses and rejected evidence to the contrary. Id. at
599. Second, we determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with any other rational hypothesis. Id. “Circumstantial evidence must form a
complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the
defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than
guilt.” State v. Pratt, 813 N.W.2d 868, 874 (Minn. 2012) (quotations omitted).
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The circumstances proved here are as follows. Deputy Carlson observed a Q-tip in
an ashtray in appellant’s hotel room and testified that Q-tips are often used by
methamphetamine users. Appellant had a baggie in his pocket, and Deputy Carlson
testified that baggies of the sort found on appellant are commonly used to package drugs.
The baggie contained a white residue that resembled methamphetamine and in fact tested
positive for methamphetamine. Although appellant stated that the substance was sugar
residue from candy, the jury evidently did not believe that, and appellate courts give
deference to a jury on the facts.
These circumstances form a complete chain that leads to one reasonable inference:
appellant knew the substance in his possession was methamphetamine. The evidence was
sufficient to prove appellant’s knowledge of the contraband in his pocket.
II.
Appellant argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial
counsel’s closing argument. “Generally, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim should
be raised in a postconviction petition for relief, rather than on direct appeal.” State v.
Gustafson, 610 N.W.2d 314, 321 (Minn. 2000). “A postconviction hearing provides the
court with additional facts to explain the attorney’s decisions, so as to properly consider
whether a defense counsel’s performance was deficient.” Id. (quotation omitted). But
appellate courts will consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal
when the appellant requests that we do so and when the record is sufficient to analyze the
claim without any additional fact-finding. Voorhees v. State, 627 N.W.2d 642, 649 (Minn.
2001). Because appellant is basing his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel solely on
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his trial counsel’s closing argument, we conclude that the record is sufficient to address the
claim.
The following excerpt from the trial transcript represents the closing argument of
appellant’s counsel in its entirety:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, [y]our [h]onor, [c]ounsel, as
we begin final argument the presumption of innocence still
resides with this man. Only you can take it away and only after
you’re convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence, not
speculation, not reading his mind, but evidence, you have to
have evidence. Every day all across the United States of
America school children stand up, put their hand over their
heart, and they repeat in unison, “I pledge allegiance to the flag
of the United States of America and to the Republic for which
it stands, one nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and
justice for all.” I am asking for justice today. Thank you.
Appellant argues that this closing argument fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that he was prejudiced as a result.
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel present mixed questions of law and fact,
and we review them de novo. State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn. 2003).
Minnesota appellate courts apply the two-prong test set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), to analyze a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. To prevail on the claim, “an appellant must
demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
and that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different but for
counsel’s errors.” Id. (quotation omitted). An appellate court need not address both prongs
of the test if one is determinative. Id.6
“There is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range
of reasonable assistance.” State v. Miller, 666 N.W.2d 703, 716 (Minn. 2003) (quotation
omitted). We give particular deference to strategic decisions by trial counsel. Id.“Counsel’s choice of strategy in closing argument should not be second-guessed.” State v.
Brown, 376 N.W.2d 451, 455 (Minn. App. 1985) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn.
Dec. 19, 1985); see also Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8, 124 S. Ct. 1, 5 (2003)
(“[J]udicious selection of arguments for summation is a core exercise of defense counsel’s
discretion.”).
Appellant argues that his trial counsel’s closing argument was objectively
unreasonable because his counsel abandoned the theme of his opening statement that the
state could not prove that appellant knew the substance in the baggie was
methamphetamine. But defense counsel’s statements to the jurors that they could not find
appellant guilty based on “speculation” or “reading his mind” represent an argument
attacking the state’s proof on the element of appellant’s knowledge of the substance in the
baggie. The fact that it was a brief closing in which he reminded the jury of the
presumption of innocence and the state’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt could
have been a strategic decision since the trial itself was short and it was a simple case of
drug possession.
The jury heard the evidence during trial, and all the proved circumstances led to the
rational inference that appellant knowingly possessed methamphetamine in violation of the
law. The district court instructed the jury that “the arguments or other remarks of an
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attorney are not evidence.” Appellant has not demonstrated that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Affirmed.
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