Joshua Lloyd Gangestad v. Commissioner of Public Safety

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0729
Joshua Lloyd Gangestad, petitioner,
Respondent,
vs.
Commissioner of Public Safety,
Appellant.
Filed December 27, 2016
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge
Mille Lacs County District Court
File No. 48-CV-15-1907
Sharon R. Osborn, Kelli S. Jasper, Osborn Law Office, LLC, Princeton, Minnesota; and
Jay S. Adkins, Ramsay Law Firm, Roseville, Minnesota (for respondent)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Cory Beth Monnens, Assistant Attorney General, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and
Toussaint, Judge.*
*
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant, the commissioner of public safety, revoked respondent Joshua Lloyd
Gangestad’s driver’s license for driving while impaired. Gangestad sought judicial review,
and the district court issued an order rescinding the revocation of his driver’s license. The
commissioner appealed, arguing that (1) Gangestad’s Fourth Amendment rights were not
violated by the warrantless urine test, (2) application of the exclusionary rule is
inappropriate, and (3) the district court erred by analyzing Gangestad’s claim as a
constitutional due-process violation. Because the misleading and inaccurate implied-
consent advisory violated Gangestad’s right to due process, we affirm.
DECISION
The state may not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.” U.S. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Minn. Const. art. 1, § 7. A due-process
violation is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. State v. Beecroft, 813 N.W.2d
814, 836 (Minn. 2012).
On July 18, 2015, at approximately 12:53 a.m., a Princeton police officer stopped a
vehicle driven by Joshua Lloyd Gangestad and arrested Gangestad for driving while
impaired (DWI).1 At the Mille Lacs County Jail, the officer read Gangestad the implied-
consent advisory. The advisory informed Gangestad that “Minnesota law requires you to
take a test to determine . . . if you are under the influence of alcohol” and that “[r]efusal to
1
It is undisputed that the officer had probable cause to suspect that Gangestad was
operating a motor vehicle while impaired.
2
take a test is a crime.” The officer offered Gangestad the opportunity to contact an attorney,
which he declined. The officer then asked Gangestad to submit to a urine test, Gangestad
consented. The officer did not obtain a warrant prior to requesting the urine sample. The
urine test results revealed that Gangestad’s alcohol concentration was 0.132.
The commissioner of public safety subsequently revoked Gangestad’s driver’s
license, as mandated by Minnesota law. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.52, subd. 4(a), (c) (2014).
Gangestad timely filed an implied-consent petition, seeking rescission of the revocation of
his driver’s license. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 2 (2014). The district court held an
implied-consent hearing, at which the officer testified about the stop, arrest, advisory, and
urine test. At the hearing, the court granted leave to the parties to submit additional briefing
on the issues presented.
In his post-hearing memorandum, Gangestad argued that, because the officer
obtained a sample of his urine in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, the district
court must rescind the revocation of his driver’s license. Alternatively, Gangestad argued
that the misleading and inaccurate implied-consent advisory violated his right to due
process by threatening criminal charges the state was unauthorized to impose.
The commissioner also submitted a memorandum, arguing that Gangestad
consented to the warrantless urine test, a valid exception to the warrant requirement, and
therefore the warrantless urine test did not violate Gangestad’s Fourth Amendment rights.
The commissioner also argued that the implied-consent advisory was not misleading
because the advisory was accurate at the time it was read to Gangestad. Finally, the
3
commissioner argued that application of the exclusionary rule is inappropriate in
Gangestad’s case.
In March 2016, the district court issued an order granting Gangestad’s petition and
rescinding the revocation of his driver’s license. The district court found that, under the
totality of the circumstances, Gangestad consented to the urine test. Because consent is a
valid exception to the warrant requirement, the district court concluded that the implied-
consent advisory did not violate Gangestad’s Fourth Amendment rights. However, the
district court determined the police officer violated Gangestad’s due-process rights by
reading the implied-consent advisory, which misstates Minnesota law and threatens
unauthorized charges.
In McDonnell v. Commissioner of Public Safety, a police officer arrested the
appellant on suspicion of driving while intoxicated and transported her to police
headquarters. 473 N.W.2d 848, 851 (Minn. 1991). There an officer read the appellant the
implied-consent advisory, which informed the appellant that the state may prosecute her
for refusing to submit to chemical testing—even though the commissioner had not
previously revoked appellant’s driver’s license. Id. at 851, 853. At the time the officer
read the appellant the implied-consent advisory, prior revocation of her driver’s license
was a prerequisite for the refusal charge. Id. at 850 n.1, 853 (citing Minn. Stat. § 169.121,
subd. 1a (Supp. 1989)). Because the Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that police
“threaten[ed] criminal charges the state was not authorized to impose, thereby violating
[the appellant’s] constitutional guarantee of due process,” the supreme court rescinded the
revocation of her driver’s license. Id. at 855.
4
Following McDonnell, this court noted that the “misleading and inaccurate
information [that the implied-consent advisory conveyed] to every first-time offender” was
“[t]he focus of the supreme court’s concern.” Steinolfson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 478
N.W.2d 808, 809 (Minn. App. 1991). We therefore declined to hold that “the
commissioner may benefit from an advisory which our supreme court has determined
misinformed the driver, and threatened criminal charges that were not actually authorized.”
Id. During the pendency of Gangestad’s appeal, this court extended the supreme court’s
holding in McDonnell. See Johnson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, ___ N.W.2d ___, 2016 WL
6570284 (Minn. App. Nov. 7, 2016). Applying McDonnell, we held that an implied-
consent advisory that threatened a criminal charge for a driver who refused to submit to an
unconstitutional urine test violated a driver’s due-process rights. Id. at *12-13.
In State v. Thompson, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the state may not
criminally punish a driver for refusing to submit to a warrantless urine test under the search-
incident-to-arrest exception. 886 N.W.2d 224, 233-34 (Minn. 2016). In this case, the
advisory read to Gangestad was misleading and inaccurate. The fact that Gangestad
consented to the urine test does not change the due-process analysis. Because the implied-
consent advisory was misleading and inaccurate, Gangestad’s due-process rights were
violated. The district court therefore did not err by rescinding the revocation of
Gangestad’s license. See McDonnell, 473 N.W.2d at 853-55; Johnson, 2016 WL 6570284,
at *10-13.
5
Because Gangestad’s due-process rights were violated, we need not address the
parties’ Fourth Amendment claims.
Affirmed.
6