Sara Elaine Katra v. State of Minnesota

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-0232
Sara Elaine Katra, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent.
Filed September 8, 2015
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge
Dakota County District Court
File No. 19-KX-06-002834
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Carol Comp, Special Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Chip Granger, Assistant County Attorney,
Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Hudson, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Toussaint, Judge.

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the summary denial of her petition for postconviction relief,
arguing that she should be permitted to withdraw her 2009 guilty plea based on newly
discovered evidence, a Brady violation, due-process violations, manifest injustice, and
ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
FACTS
On September 12, 2006, Officer Knutson of the Faribault Police Department
observed appellant Sara Elaine Katra enter a courtroom in the Dakota County Law
Enforcement Center. Officer Knutson knew that Katra had an active warrant, and
apprehended her. A search of Katra and her purse revealed two pipes and “a clear,
crystal-like substance.” An agent with the Dakota County Drug Task Force tested the
substance and determined it was methamphetamine.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Katra with fifth-degree controlled-
substance crime, two counts of obstructing legal process, and one count of fleeing a peace
officer. On July 7, 2009, Katra pleaded guilty to the controlled-substance offense in
exchange for the dismissal of the other charges. Katra received a stay of imposition and
was placed on probation for five years. In February 2014, the stay of imposition was
vacated and the district court stayed a 13-month prison sentence. On July 16, the district
court executed the prison sentence.
On July 19, Katra filed a petition for postconviction relief, seeking to withdraw
her guilty plea based on the “faulty testing policies, practices, and procedures” at the
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St. Paul Police Department Crime Laboratory (SPPDCL) that came to light in 2012. See
Roberts v. State, 856 N.W.2d 287, 289 (Minn. App. 2014), review denied (Minn. Jan. 28,
2015) (discussing the discovery of systemic problems and subsequent audits of the
SPPDCL). Katra argued that the two-year period for bringing her petition does not bar
her claim because the newly-discovered-evidence and interests-of-justice exceptions
apply. The district court denied Katra’s petition, without an evidentiary hearing, because
the petition was untimely. Katra appeals.
DECISION
We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of
discretion. Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. 2007). We will not reverse
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we review issues of law de novo.
Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012).
A person who asserts that her criminal conviction was obtained in violation of her
constitutional rights may petition the district court for relief. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.
1 (2014). Although petitioners are generally entitled to an evidentiary hearing, a district
court may summarily deny a petition when “the petition and the files and records of the
proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat.
§ 590.04, subd. 1 (2014). Petitions for postconviction relief must be filed within two
years of “the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.
4(a) (2014). A district court may hear a petition filed after the deadline only if the
petitioner establishes that one of five statutory exceptions applies. See id., subd. 4(b)
(2014) (listing five exceptions).
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Katra does not dispute the fact that she did not file her petition within two years of
sentencing, but she asserts that the errors at the SPPDCL constitute newly discovered
evidence. And she contends that the interests-of-justice exception to the two-year
limitation period applies based on a Brady violation, due-process violations, manifest
injustice, and ineffective assistance of counsel. We address each argument in turn.
A. Newly Discovered Evidence
A petitioner is entitled to postconviction relief based on newly discovered
evidence if she proves
that the evidence (1) is newly discovered; (2) could not have
been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence by the
petitioner or the petitioner’s attorney within the 2-year time-
bar for filing a petition; (3) is not cumulative to evidence
presented at trial; (4) is not for impeachment purposes; and
(5) establishes by the clear and convincing standard that
petitioner is innocent of the offenses for which he was
convicted.
Riley, 819 N.W.2d at 168. “All five criteria must be satisfied to obtain relief.” Id.
Katra argues that the testing deficiencies at the SPPDCL constitute newly
discovered evidence. We rejected this argument in Roberts, concluding that the newly-
discovered-evidence exception did not apply because Roberts did not show that the
testing deficiencies could not have been discovered by the exercise of due diligence and
did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was innocent. Roberts, 856
N.W.2d at 290-92.
As in Roberts, Katra did not dispute the test results, makes no specific allegations
concerning the testing done in her case, and expressly gave up her right to challenge the
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state’s evidence by pleading guilty. See id. at 293 (noting that by pleading guilty Roberts
waived his right to challenge the state’s evidence against him). And she has never
claimed the substance found in her possession was anything but methamphetamine.
Moreover, testing performed by the Dakota County Drug Task Force indicated that the
“clear, crystal-like” substance was methamphetamine. On this record, we conclude that
Katra has not demonstrated that she is innocent of the controlled-substance offense.
B. Interests of Justice
Katra first argues that the state’s failure to disclose the SPPDCL’s testing
deficiencies prior to trial was a violation of its obligation under Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). To warrant a new trial due to a Brady violation, a
petitioner must establish that (1) the evidence was favorable to her as exculpatory or
impeaching; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution, intentionally or
otherwise; and (3) the evidence was material, resulting in prejudice to the petitioner.
Walen v. State, 777 N.W.2d 213, 216 (Minn. 2010). The suppression of evidence is
prejudicial if “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
The district court rejected Katra’s argument based on the second factor,
determining that “nothing in the record suggests that the evidence was suppressed in any
manner by the prosecutor.” We agree. Katra does not allege any facts indicating that the
state knew of the problems at the SPPDCL at the time of her guilty plea. In fact, she
argues that no one outside the lab knew about the problems until July 2012. And she
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does not allege any facts that demonstrate that evidence regarding the testing procedures
at the SPPDCL would have altered the outcome of the proceeding.
Katra next asserts that the interests-of-justice exception applies because the
SPPDCL deficiencies violated her procedural due-process rights. Both the United States
and Minnesota Constitutions require that an individual receive “adequate notice and an
opportunity to be heard before being deprived of life, liberty, or property.” Christopher
v. Windom Area Sch. Bd., 781 N.W.2d 904, 911 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied
(Minn. June 29, 2010). When considering a procedural due-process claim, we “first
determine whether a protected liberty or property interest is implicated and then
determine what process is due by applying a balancing test.” State v. Ness, 819 N.W.2d
219, 225 (Minn. App. 2012), aff’d, 834 N.W.2d 177 (Minn. 2013).
Katra relies on State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 426 (Minn. 1989), to support
her argument that the state’s use of unreliable scientific testing methods affects a liberty
interest that is subject to due-process protections. In Schwartz, the supreme court held
that due-process rights are implicated when the state relies on DNA testing evidence and
that “defense counsel has the right to inspect and reproduce any results or reports of . . .
scientific tests, experiments or comparisons made in connection with the particular case.”
447 N.W.2d at 427 (quotation omitted). We are not persuaded that the state’s failure to
provide the court with data from the SPPDCL violates her due-process rights. She does
not allege any facts that suggest the testing data was unavailable to her. She did not seek
independent review of the testing results and does not allege that she was denied the
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opportunity to do so. Moreover, Katra waived her right to challenge the state’s evidence
against her when she pleaded guilty.
Katra’s next interests-of-justice argument is premised on her right to withdraw her
guilty plea at any time “to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1.
A manifest injustice occurs if a guilty plea is not accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.
Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn. 1997). Katra argues that her guilty plea
was not accurate, voluntary, or intelligent. We are not persuaded.
To be accurate, a plea must have a proper factual basis. State v. Ecker, 524
N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). Katra pleaded guilty to fifth-degree controlled-substance
crime. See Minn. Stat. §§ 152.02, subd. 3(b) (establishing methamphetamine as a
Schedule II controlled substance), .025, subd. 2(1) (stating a person is guilty of fifth-
degree controlled-substance crime if she unlawfully possesses one or more mixtures
containing a controlled substance) (2006). Katra’s signed plea petition states that she was
not making any claim that she was innocent, and she testified that the substance in her
possession was methamphetamine. On this record, we conclude that the facts Katra
acknowledged when entering her guilty plea meet the accuracy requirement.
The requirement that a plea be voluntary “ensures a defendant is not pleading
guilty due to improper pressure or coercion.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 96 (Minn.
2010) (stating that “[w]hether a plea is voluntary is determined by considering all
relevant circumstances”). The district court found that Katra’s guilty plea was voluntary
because “[n]othing in the record suggests that [Katra] was improperly coerced or
threatened.” The record supports this finding. Katra does not allege any facts suggesting
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that she was subjected to improper pressure or coercion. Rather, she argues that the
unreliable testing procedure itself was coercive. We are not persuaded. The SPPDCL’s
testing confirmed the Dakota County Drug Task Force’s preliminary determination that
the substance Katra possessed was methamphetamine. Katra has never disputed the test
results and we discern no improper pressure or coercion in connection with Katra’s guilty
plea.
The intelligence requirement ensures that a defendant understands the charges
against her, the rights she is waiving, and the consequences of her guilty plea. Id. Katra
argues that because she did not know about the testing problems at the SPPDCL, she did
not fully understand the scope of her right to challenge the evidence against her. This
argument is unavailing. Katra’s plea petition indicates that her attorney informed her of
the rights she was waiving, including the right to an evidentiary hearing to challenge the
evidence against her. Accordingly, we conclude that Katra understood the charges
against her, the rights she was waiving, and the consequences of her guilty plea. Because
the plea was accurate, voluntary, and intelligent, Katra is not entitled to postconviction
relief based on manifest injustice.
Finally, Katra argues that the interests of justice warrant postconviction relief
because her trial counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate the SPPDCL’s testing
procedures and protocols. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
Katra must demonstrate “(1) that [her] counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness’; and (2) ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’”
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Nissalke v. State, 861 N.W.2d 88, 94 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984)). An attorney provides
reasonable assistance when he exercises the customary skills and diligence that a
reasonably competent attorney would exercise under the circumstances. Dukes v. State,
621 N.W.2d 246, 252 (Minn. 2001).
The district court rejected Katra’s argument, concluding that Katra did not show
that her counsel’s performance was objectively deficient. We agree. As the district court
noted, the customary practice at the time of Katra’s plea (2009) did not include
requesting the underlying file from the SPPDCL. And Katra never claimed that the
substance was not methamphetamine. Under these circumstances, Katra cannot satisfy
either prong of the Strickland test.
In sum, we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in denying Katra’s
postconviction petition. She has not demonstrated that the newly-discovered-evidence or
interests-of-justice exceptions apply to permit her otherwise untimely petition. And
because the record conclusively shows that Katra is not entitled to relief, the district court
did not abuse its discretion by denying her request for an evidentiary hearing. Powers v.
State, 695 N.W.2d 371, 374 (Minn. 2005) (“An evidentiary hearing is not required unless
there are material facts in dispute that must be resolved to determine the postconviction
claim on its merits.”).
Affirmed.
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