John Patrick Murphy v. State of Minnesota

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A13-2332, A13-2413
John Patrick Murphy, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent.
Filed August 25, 2014
Affirmed
Smith, Judge
Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-K2-93-001209
Beau D. McGraw, McGraw Law Firm, P.A., Lake Elmo, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jean E. Burdorf, J. Michael
Richardson, Assistant County Attorneys, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Smith, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Hudson, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SMITH, Judge
We affirm the district court’s denial of appellant’s postconviction petition and
motion for recusal because the district court did not abuse its discretion.
FACTS
In May 2006, the district court revoked appellant John Patrick Murphy’s
remaining probation and executed all of his remaining sentences, committing him to
prison for a total of 330 months. Murphy appealed, and we affirmed. State v. Murphy,
No. A06-1471, 2007 WL 4390348, at *6 (Minn. App. Dec. 18, 2007), review denied
(Minn. Feb. 27, 2008). Murphy then petitioned the district court for postconviction relief.
He also moved for recusal of the district court judge. In October 2013, the district court
summarily denied Murphy’s postconviction-relief petition and his motion for recusal.
The chief judge of the judicial district where the district court judge sits also considered
and denied the recusal motion. Murphy appealed the denial of postconviction relief
through counsel. Acting pro se, he appealed the district court’s denial of his recusal
motion in a separate appeal. We ordered the two appeals consolidated and construed
Murphy’s pro se brief in the recusal matter as a supplement to the appeal filed by counsel
in the postconviction-relief matter. Murphy v. State, No. A13-2332, A13-2413 (Minn.
App. Apr. 25, 2014) (order).
DECISION
I.
“When reviewing a postconviction court’s decision, we examine only whether the
postconviction court’s findings are supported by sufficient evidence. We will reverse a
decision of the postconviction court only if that court abused its discretion.” Lussier v.
State, 821 N.W.2d 581, 588 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). A summary denial of a
postconviction petition is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Nicks, 831
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N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn. 2013). A postconviction court is required to hold an evidentiary
hearing unless “the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show
that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2012). “An
evidentiary hearing upon a petition for postconviction relief is not required unless the
petitioner alleges such facts which, if proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence,
would entitle him or her to the requested relief.” Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 356
(Minn. 1996). The allegations “must be more than argumentative assertions without
factual support.” Hodgson v. State, 540 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Minn. 1995) (quotation
omitted).
In his postconviction-relief petition, Murphy argued that his executed sentences
should be stayed and probation reinstated because “the allegations against him in the
North Dakota Courts, which [is] the underlying basis for his probation revocation in this
matter, have been dismissed with prejudice.” As exhibits, Murphy attached copies of two
motions filed in a North Dakota district court. One is a motion to dismiss a charge of
false report to law enforcement. The other is a motion to dismiss a charge of theft by
deception. Both motions were granted. Murphy asserted that he is “entitled to a new
probation revocation hearing and/or resentencing in light of [this] newly discovered
evidence that all charges against him in North Dakota . . . were dismissed with
prejudice.”
The district court rejected Murphy’s argument, reasoning that the probation
violation was not because Murphy had been convicted of an offense. Rather, it was
because Murphy had failed to inform his probation officer that he had been arrested and
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that he had convicted of fleeing a police officer in addition to failing to maintain contact
with his probation officer after his inadvertent release. The district court concluded that
Murphy “has been unable to establish, even by the bare allegations in his petition, any
facts that would be legally sufficient, if proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence,
to entitle [him to] relief” and denied Murphy’s petition without further hearing.
For Murphy to be entitled to a hearing on his postconviction petition, he would
need to allege facts sufficient to show that he would be entitled to the relief requested and
then prove those facts. See id. Murphy has failed to do so for three reasons. First, the
prompt reporting of an arrest—regardless of whether it leads to a conviction or even
being charged—was a condition of his probation. Murphy does not dispute that he failed
to report his North Dakota arrests. Second, Murphy was also required to report any
convictions, and does not dispute that he failed to report the North Dakota conviction for
fleeing a police officer. Third, Murphy does not dispute the district court’s finding that
he failed to keep in contact with his probation officer after he was inadvertently released.
Any one of these violations is sufficient to support a revocation decision. See State v.
Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980) (requiring only a single willful violation of
the terms of probation).
Even if Murphy’s probation could be revoked only if he was convicted of one of
the North Dakota offenses, the record still supports the probation revocation because it
shows that Murphy was in fact convicted of fleeing a police officer. The two motions
granted by the North Dakota court dismissed only two of the charges. Nothing in the
record shows that his conviction for fleeing a police officer has been reversed, vacated, or
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otherwise modified. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
summarily denying Murphy’s postconviction petition.
II.
Murphy’s pro se brief, which states a single legal issue, includes two questions:
(1) should the district court judge have recused himself based on bias and partiality and
(2) should the judge have referred the recusal motion to the chief judge. “A request to
disqualify a judge for cause must be heard and determined by the chief judge of the
district . . . .” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 14 (3). Although the answer to the second
question is yes, this question is moot because the chief judge considered and denied
Murphy’s recusal motion. The district court notified Murphy of the chief judge’s
decision and filed a copy of the chief judge’s order with this court. To forestall further
litigation over the chief judge’s denial of the recusal motion, we include the chief judge’s
order in the scope of our review. We have the authority to do so under Minn. R. Crim. P.
28.01, subd. 2 (providing that “the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure govern
[criminal] appellate procedure unless these rules direct otherwise”), and Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 103.04 (permitting us to “review any other matter as the interest of justice may
require”).
Denial of a recusal motion is within the district court’s discretion and should not
be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Carlson v. Carlson, 390 N.W.2d 780, 785
(Minn. App. 1986), review denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 1986). A litigant may disqualify a
judge as a matter of right by making a motion before the judge presides at a trial or
hearing in the matter, but otherwise, removal motions must be supported by an
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affirmative showing of prejudice. Minn. Stat. § 542.16 (2012). “A judge must not
preside at a trial or other proceeding if disqualified under the Code of Judicial Conduct.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 14 (3). Under rule 2.11 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a
judge “shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including [when] [t]he judge has a personal
bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts
that are in dispute in the proceeding.”
Murphy argues that his recusal motion should have been granted because the
district court judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Murphy asserts,
among other things, that the district court judge “imposed a strict screening process” to
prevent him from filing papers with the court administrator. This allegation is an
apparent reference to the process imposed by a 2003 order designating Murphy as a
frivolous litigant. That order is not in the record, but the district court judge referenced it
in the cover letter accompanying the order denying the recusal motion. Murphy also
asserts that the district court judge ignored evidence of ex-parte communications
involving a different judge formerly assigned to the case and justices of the Minnesota
Supreme Court, but he points to no evidence of the alleged communications. He refers to
unidentified “people in the ‘criminal justice system’ who . . . were appalled by the rulings
and sentences handed down . . . in this case” and asserts that these people “volunteered
information” to him, which he included in the affidavit he filed with his recusal motion.
That affidavit consists of a string of assertions of improper conduct and statements of
legal authority unsupported by objective facts. Murphy’s appellate counsel also
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addressed the recusal motions in a reply brief, asserting that the district court judge could
only be considered unbiased “if one ignores any common sense or reasonable
understanding of human nature.” But the only evidence of bias the reply brief points to is
that the district court judge “has denied motion after motion.”
In his order denying the recusal motion, the district court judge detailed steps he
had taken to avoid the possibility of bias: he intentionally avoided reading the underlying
complaint so that he could make decisions without knowing who Murphy’s victims were,
and had based his decisions on facts raised by Murphy. The chief judge’s order simply
states that Murphy “has failed to sufficiently demonstrate that [the district court judge’s]
impartiality might be reasonably questioned in this matter.”
We conclude that Murphy’s motion for recusal, and his appellate claims regarding
recusal, are based not on specific instances of questionable judicial conduct, but on
unfavorable judicial rulings. Adverse rulings do not support a recusal motion. Greer v.
State, 673 N.W.2d 151, 157 (Minn. 2004). Neither the district court nor the chief judge
of the district court erred by denying the recusal motion.
Affirmed.
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