State of Minnesota v. Edwin Gochingco Reyes

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0040
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Edwin Gochingco Reyes,
Appellant.
Filed January 9, 2017
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge
Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-13-2657
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Elizabeth M. Swank, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)
Jeffrey C. Dean, Dean Law Office, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Kirk, Judge.
SYLLABUS
A stepgrandfather-stepgranddaughter relationship constitutes a “significant
relationship” as defined by Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 15 (2010).
OPINION
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant challenges his second-degree criminal-sexual-conduct convictions,
arguing the district court erred when it interpreted the term “significant relationship” in
Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 15, to include a stepgrandfather-stepgranddaughter
relationship and abused its discretion when it permitted experts to testify generally about
sexual abuse of adolescents. Because we hold that the district court correctly found
stepgrandfathers to be included in the statutory definition of “significant relationship” and
that the district court did not err when it allowed into evidence general expert testimony
regarding characteristics of minors who have been sexually abused, we affirm.
FACTS
In February 2007, M.C.’s mother, C.R., married R.R., the son of appellant Edwin
Gochingco Reyes. According to M.C., one summer day in 2009, when she was 11 years
old, Reyes—M.C.’s stepgrandfather by marriage—told M.C. that she had to kiss him in
order to receive a gift. When M.C. attempted to kiss Reyes on the lips, Reyes inserted his
tongue into M.C.’s mouth. Reyes told M.C. that she did not have to tell anyone about the
kiss; so M.C. did not tell anyone at that time.
That same summer, M.C. stayed at Reyes’s house while her mother and stepfather
attended a baseball game. M.C., her sister, and Reyes were watching TV while on Reyes’s
bed. Reyes told M.C. to sit next to him. M.C. complied and eventually fell asleep. She
woke up from a nap to find Reyes moving her hand inside his pants, rubbing his penis in a
circular motion. M.C. did not know what to do until 20-30 seconds later when she pulled
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her hand away and said that she had to go to the bathroom. M.C. typed a text message to
send to R.R. describing what happened, but erased it before sending it because she was
afraid, nervous, and embarrassed, and did not know if R.R. would believe her. Later that
day, Reyes and Z.R., Reyes’s wife, took M.C. to a mall where Reyes asked M.C. if she was
upset about what happened. M.C. did not respond and did not tell anyone about it because
she felt weak and embarrassed.
In late summer 2010, M.C. stayed with Reyes for a weekend while her mother and
stepfather were out of town. Reyes and M.C. were in the basement alone. Reyes asked
M.C. to sit on his lap. When she did, Reyes started touching and grabbing M.C.’s chest
over her clothes, and put his hand inside M.C.’s pants but on top of her underwear. This
continued for 5-10 seconds. When M.C. left, Reyes again told her she did not have to tell
anyone what had happened.
In mid-October 2010, M.C., C.R., and R.R. moved to Nebraska. While working on
a school health lesson with M.C. about sexual touching, C.R. asked her if anyone had ever
touched her inappropriately. In response, M.C. told C.R. about the incidents with Reyes.
C.R. and R.R. decided to set up therapy for M.C. and themselves. As time went on, M.C.
disclosed more details about the events.
In January 2012, R.R. reported the incidents to the police. Detective Stephanie
Bolks, a specialist in crimes-against-persons cases, investigated the report but was
unsuccessful in her attempts to contact Reyes. M.C. was later interviewed by Mindee
Rolles, a forensic interviewer. Reyes was charged with criminal sexual conduct in the
second degree (victim under 16) (significant relationship), pursuant to Minn. Stat.
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§ 609.343, subd. 1(g) (2010), occurring on or about May 1, 2010 through October 1, 2010,
and criminal sexual conduct in the second degree (victim under 16) (significant
relationship), pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(g) (2008), occurring on or about
May 1, 2009 through October 1, 2009.1
At a pretrial hearing, the state requested permission, through the testimony of
Rolles, to address why a child may delay reporting, what circumstances may lead to a child
disclosing, and to whom a child may disclose. Reyes objected, arguing that this evidence
would improperly bolster M.C.’s credibility. The district court reserved ruling on the issue,
pending the presentation on foundation presented by the state.
At trial, the state called Rolles and Detective Bolks as witnesses, and both testified
to behaviors and characteristics common in sexual-abuse-of-adolescent cases. The defense
did not renew its objection to Rolles’s testimony or object to Detective Bolks’s testimony
as improperly bolstering M.C.’s credibility. The jury found Reyes guilty of the two charges
of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. This appeal follows.
ISSUES
I. Does a stepgrandfather-stepgrandchild relationship constitute a “significant
relationship” as defined in Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 15?
II. Did the district court’s decision to allow expert testimony regarding characteristics
of minors who have been sexually abused constitute plain error?
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The relevant portions of the statutes did not change from 2008 to 2010, so although the
actions for which Reyes was convicted may implicate both the 2008 and 2010 versions of
the statutes, we cite only the 2010 statutes.
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ANALYSIS
I.
Reyes argues that his second-degree criminal-sexual-conduct convictions must be
reversed because a stepgrandfather-stepgrandchild relationship does not satisfy the
significant-relationship element. Minn. Stat. §§ 609.341, subd. 15, .343, subd. 1(g).
Interpretation of a criminal statute is a question of law that this court reviews de novo.
State v. Rucker, 752 N.W.2d 538, 545 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Sept. 23,
2008). The objective of our statutory-interpretation analysis is to ascertain and give effect
to the legislature’s intent. State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2003). “The first
step in statutory interpretation is to determine whether the statute is ambiguous on its face.”
State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 535 (Minn. 2014). A statute is ambiguous if its language
is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. State v. Mauer, 741 N.W.2d 107,
111 (Minn. 2007). Statutory construction is not permitted when legislative intent is
“discernible from [the statute’s] plain and unambiguous language.” Jones, 848 N.W.2d at
535. Canons of interpretation and construction guide our analysis if the statutory language
is ambiguous. State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn. 2015); State v. Hayes, 826
N.W.2d 799, 804 (Minn. 2013).
We are guided by several factors to ascertain legislative intent, including:
(1) the occasion and necessity for the law;
(2) the circumstances under which it was enacted;
(3) the mischief to be remedied;
(4) the object to be attained;
(5) the former law, if any, including other laws upon the
same or similar subjects;
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(6) the consequences of a particular interpretation; [and]
(7) the contemporaneous legislative history[.]
Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2016). Non-technical “words and phrases are construed according
to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.” Minn. Stat.
§ 645.08(1) (2016). We also presume that “the legislature does not intend a result that is
absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable,” and that “the legislature intends the
entire statute to be effective and certain.” Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1)-(2) (2016).
Addressing the statutory language in question, a person is guilty of second-degree
criminal sexual conduct if he or she “engages in sexual contact with another person” and
“the actor has a significant relationship to the complainant and the complainant was under
16 years of age at the time of the sexual contact.” Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(g). A
“significant relationship” is defined as a circumstance in which the actor is “any of the
following persons related to the complainant by blood, marriage, or adoption: brother,
sister, stepbrother, stepsister, first cousin, aunt, uncle, nephew, niece, grandparent, great-
grandparent, great-uncle, [or] great-aunt.” Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 15(2). A
stepgrandfather is not explicitly listed in the statute. Id.Both parties maintain that a plain-meaning interpretation of “significant
relationship” is appropriate because the definition in Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 15, is
unambiguous. But their plain-meaning interpretations are vastly different. Reyes asserts
that “significant relationship” excludes stepgrandfathers because the statutory definition
identifies a limited list of relationships using the phrase, “any of the following persons,”
and stepgrandfather is not one of the relationships that appears on the list. The state
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contends that its reading of the statutory language distributes the phrase “related to the
complainant by blood, marriage, or adoption” to all of the listed relationships. This
interpretation includes stepgrandfathers because they are grandfathers related by marriage.
We conclude that both of these interpretations are reasonable, and because the statute is
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous. As a result, we
turn to an examination of the legislative intent surrounding this statute.
The phrase “significant relationship” was added to the criminal-sexual-conduct
statutes in 1985, when the legislature merged the crimes of criminal sexual conduct with
the crimes of intrafamilial sexual abuse. State v. Cook, 617 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. App.
2000), review denied (Minn. Nov. 21, 2000); see also 1985 Minn. Laws ch. 286, pmbl.
The overall objective or purpose of the statute is to “prohibit[] intra-family sexual
contacts.” State v. Williams, 762 N.W.2d 583, 587 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied
(Minn. May 27, 2009).
In Williams, we considered whether the definition of “significant relationship”
included a half-brother. Id. at 585-87. Because the definition was “arguably ambiguous”
in the context of a half-brother, we similarly considered legislative intent. Id. at 587. We
concluded that it would be illogical “and contrary to the overall statutory purpose of
prohibiting intra-family sexual contacts” to exclude half-brothers because “the law would
then include step-brothers (with no blood relation) and cousins (genetically more distant
than half-brothers) but exclude a brother related by half blood.” Id.Reyes’s interpretation of “significant relationship” would similarly lead to an absurd
result because it is contrary to the overall statutory purpose. A stepgrandfather is not
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genetically related to a child, similar to a stepparent or stepsibling who are both listed in
the definition of “significant relationship.” Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 15. But the
legislature clearly intended to prohibit intra-familial sexual conduct, even among persons
with whom the child has no blood relation. See id.; Williams, 762 N.W.2d at 587 (finding
that stepbrothers are included in the definition even though they have no blood relation).
Although the statute explicitly lists “great-grandparent, great-uncle, [and] great-aunt” in its
definition of “significant relationship,” these relationships may not be as intimate as the
familial closeness between a stepgrandfather and a child. Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd.
15(2). Here, M.C. testified that she saw Reyes one to three times per week and visited
Reyes without her parents up to four times per month, which demonstrates that Reyes had
a close familial relationship with M.C. Stepgrandfathers may also share a close familial
relationship with a child, as is the case here. We conclude that stepgrandfathers are
included in the definition of “significant relationship” because excluding stepgrandfathers
would be absurd and contrary to the statute’s purpose of prohibiting intra-family sexual
contacts.
Reyes also contends that interpreting the statute to include stepgrandfathers creates
superfluous terms. “A statute should be interpreted, whenever possible, to give effect to
all of its provisions; no word, phrase, or sentence should be deemed superfluous, void, or
insignificant.” State v. Perry, 725 N.W.2d 761, 764-65 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotation
omitted), review denied (Minn. Mar. 20, 2007). But the statute contains superfluous terms
under both reasonable interpretations. If “significant relationship” only includes the
relationships listed in the definition, then the language, “related to the complainant by
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blood, marriage, or adoption” is superfluous. And if we interpret the statute to apply the
phrase “related to the complainant by blood, marriage, or adoption” to the list of
relationships, then “stepbrother” and “stepsister” are superfluous because the statute would
already include brothers and sisters related to the complainant by marriage. Because the
definition contains superfluous terms under both reasonable interpretations, the
presumption that the legislature intended the entire statute to be given effect provides no
guidance.
Reyes argues that if the statutory language is ambiguous, then the rule of lenity
requires us to interpret the statute in his favor. But we only look to the rule of lenity if “a
grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute remains after we have considered other
canons of statutory construction.” State v. Nelson, 842 N.W.2d 433, 443 (Minn. 2014)
(quotation omitted). Based on our analysis, the rule of lenity is inapplicable in this case.
For these reasons, we conclude that the statutory definition of “significant
relationship” includes a stepgrandfather.
II.
Reyes contends that Rolles’s and Detective Bolks’s expert testimony addressing
general characteristics of minor victims of sexual abuse should have been excluded because
it improperly bolstered M.C.’s credibility.
At a pretrial hearing, the district court heard arguments on the admissibility of the
testimony of Rolles, who conducted a forensic interview of M.C. Rolles received her
bachelor’s degree in psychology and master’s degree in social work, and she is a certified
master social worker and a licensed mental-health practitioner in Nebraska. As a forensic
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interviewer, Rolles is trained to speak with children about abuse in a neutral manner and
has conducted approximately 750 interviews. At the hearing, the state requested that Rolles
be permitted to testify to why a minor victim may delay reporting sexual abuse, what
circumstances may lead to a minor disclosing, and who a minor may disclose to. Reyes
objected to the proposed testimony, arguing that it “essentially works to explain or
overcome any issues the State may have regarding credibility of the alleged victim” or “any
issues or reasonable doubt . . . that may be present in the case.” The district court reserved
ruling on the objection, stating: “I have some concern about it as well, so what I want to
do is reserve it. Let’s see where you get foundationally with this witness, what the
foundation is for that kind of testimony, and then I will decide there.”
At trial, Rolles testified about her interactions with M.C., why a minor may disclose
abuse at a certain time, and that the following characteristics were not unusual: the manner
in which M.C. disclosed her sexual abuse, delayed reporting, family members as abusers,
abuse occurring in the family home, and another person being present in the home during
the abuse. Detective Bolks, a licensed officer who has been a police detective since 1994
and has investigated hundreds of sexual-abuse cases involving children, also testified for
the state. Detective Bolks testified concerning her investigation, that people of all ages and
occupations can be abusers, and that the following characteristics are common: delayed
reporting, sexual abuse in the family home, and another adult’s presence in the home during
the abuse. At trial, Reyes did not renew his objection to Rolles’s testimony and never
objected to Detective Bolks’s testimony.
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When a party fails to object to the admission of evidence, we review an allegation
of error under the plain-error standard. Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02; State v. Griller, 583
N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998). “The plain-error standard requires that the defendant
show: (1) error, (2) that was plain, and (3) that affected substantial rights.” State v.
Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 686 (Minn. 2002).
“The admissibility of expert testimony lies within the sound discretion of the trial
court.” State v. Hall, 406 N.W.2d 503, 505 (Minn. 1987). Expert testimony must be
helpful to the jury to be admitted. Id. Even helpful evidence can be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion,
or misleading the jury. Id.; see also Minn. R. Evid. 403. Generally, we “reject expert
opinion testimony regarding the truth or falsity of a witness’ allegations about a crime.”
State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 611 (Minn. 1984). But expert testimony that adds
precision or depth to the jury’s ability to reach conclusions is admissible. See State v.
Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn. 1980). The supreme court has held that some
evidence of the reporting conduct of adolescent sexual-assault victims and their continued
contact with the assailant may be admissible, subject to the district court’s discretion. Hall,
406 N.W.2d at 505.
In Hall, the district court permitted a clinical psychologist to testify to characteristics
commonly exhibited by sexually abused adolescents, including why they commonly delay
reporting the abuse and why they commonly have continued contact with the abuser. Id.
at 504. The clinical psychologist had not interacted with the victim, so she did not testify
to whether she observed any of these characteristics or conditions in the victim. Id. at 505.
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The supreme court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the
testimony, stating:
While we hold that in cases where a sexual assault victim is an
adolescent, expert testimony as to the reporting conduct of
such victims and as to continued contact by the adolescent with
the assailant is admissible in the proper exercise of discretion
by the trial court, we caution that we do not intend to establish
a categorical rule that expert testimony concerning all
characteristics typically displayed by adolescent sexual assault
victims is admissible.
Id. The supreme court clarified that it would be reversible error for an expert witness to
testify to the characteristics typically displayed by sexual-assault victims and to then opine
that the victim had been raped or that the victim’s behavior was consistent with rape trauma
syndrome. Id. at 504-05 (citing State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 1982); State v.
Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982)).
Here, the expert testimony is comparable to the testimony in Hall. The testimony
of Rolles and Detective Bolks addressed the frequency of delayed reporting, abuse in the
family home, and the involvement or presence of family members. While this testimony
may have had an indirect effect on the jury’s evaluation of M.C.’s credibility, that does not
render the testimony inadmissible. Myers, 359 N.W.2d at 609. The question is not whether
the testimony embraces the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury, but whether it “will
help the jury to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Id. Because a
jury may not have the foundation necessary to assess the credibility of a child who
complains of sexual abuse, background information providing “relevant insight into the
puzzling aspects of [a] child’s conduct and demeanor . . . is helpful and appropriate in cases
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of sexual abuse of children.” Id. at 610. The opinion testimony of Rolles and Detective
Bolks provided insight that helped the jury understand the delayed reporting and the
circumstances of the abuse.
In contrast to Hall, Rolles and Detective Bolks did testify to their interactions with
M.C. and her family members. But neither expert opined that M.C. had been abused or
was truthful in her accusations. Because the opinion testimony was limited to whether
certain characteristics were common in cases dealing with the sexual abuse of adolescents,
we conclude that the testimony was within Hall’s parameters and that the district court did
not err in admitting it.
DECISION
Based on the canons of statutory construction, we conclude that a stepgrandfather
is included in the definition of “significant relationship” under Minn. Stat. § 609.341,
subd. 15. Because Reyes had a significant relationship with M.C. and because the district
court did not err in admitting the expert testimony, we affirm the convictions.
Affirmed.
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