In re the Matter of: Cherelle Lee Schroeder v. Bladen Frederick Schroeder

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A13-2053
In re the Matter of: Cherelle Lee Schroeder, petitioner,
Respondent,
vs.
Bladen Frederick Schroeder,
Appellant.
Filed July 21, 2014
Affirmed in part and reversed in part
Connolly, Judge
St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-FA-13-1003
Cherelle Schroeder, Hermantown, Minnesota (pro se respondent)
Bill L. Thompson, Law Office of Bill L. Thompson, Duluth, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Smith, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the order for protection (OFP) granted to his estranged wife
against him and the order requiring that his parenting time with the parties’ son be
supervised. Because we see no abuse of discretion in the grant of the OFP, we affirm it;
because there are no findings to support the requirement of supervised parenting time, we
reverse that order.
FACTS
Appellant Bladen Schroeder and respondent Cherelle Schroeder were married in
2010; their son, B.C., was born in 2011 and is now three years old.1 The family lived
together, with respondent’s child from a former relationship, until 2013, when appellant
left. Thereafter, respondent let appellant see their son only when she was present.
On August 28, 2013, the parties had an altercation as a result of respondent’s
refusal to let appellant take B.C. to visit appellant’s family. The next day, respondent
filed a petition for an OFP for herself and on behalf of the children, and an emergency
OFP was granted.
On September 3, 2013, at the hearing on respondent’s petition, she had an
advocate with her, and appellant was represented by counsel. Respondent testified that,
on August 28, appellant “kind of made open-ended threats as in if I don’t allow him to
take [B.C.] or see [B.C.], it’s not going to go well for me, I’ll regret it . . . although he
isn’t specific as to how I’ll regret it or when, it does make me fearful that he’s going to
1
Respondent takes no part in this appeal.
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act out violently.” Appellant testified that, when respondent told him he could not take
B.C.,
I said, you know, if you keep this up, things . . . are not going
to go pleasant . . . it’s not going to work in your favor. You
can’t really hold the kid [B.C.] from me . . . [or] the cops will
be involved. And that was my open-ended threat, saying that
the cops would be involved in the matter . . . because we can’t
agree upon things civilly.
Respondent also testified that, when appellant was at her house after moving out,
he “did prevent me at one point from shutting my front door. When I . . . finally [got] my
front door shut and locked, he ended up punching it to the point where when I opened it
again . . . I was unable to put the dead bolt in the hole.” Appellant testified that his dog
was still in respondent’s house and that, when he “had pounded on the door and I had
asked for [the] dog back,” respondent didn’t answer but “as [he] was leaving, she came
out and tossed [his] dog through the window of the car.”
When asked why she sought an OFP on behalf of B.C. and her own child,
respondent answered that it was because they cowered when “anybody” yelled at or
pointed at them and described an incident in which she saw a hand print on B.C.’s back
after he had been in a room with appellant. Appellant testified that he had never left a
mark on B.C.
The district court made no finding that there had been any abuse of B.C. and
issued an OFP for respondent but not on behalf of the children; however, the district court
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also ordered that appellant’s parenting time be supervised.2 Appellant argues that both
the OFP and the parenting-time decision were abuses of the district court’s discretion.
DECISION
1. OFP
“Whether to grant relief under the Domestic Abuse Act (Minn. Stat. [§§ 518B.01-
.02 (2012)]) is discretionary with the district court.” McIntosh v. McIntosh, 740 N.W.2d
1, 9 (Minn. App. 2007). But, absent sufficient evidence, this court will reverse an OFP
issued under Minn. Stat. § 518B.01. See Bjergum v. Bjergum, 392 N.W.2d 604, 606-07
(Minn. App. 1986).
After closing arguments, the district court said it was “concerned about the verbal
statements . . . by [appellant] to [respondent] that ‘you will regret it,’ . . . [and] ‘things
will not go well’” and “also concerned with the fact that apparently there was a door
slamming incident or a door pounding incident . . . which could and the Court finds by
preponderance of the evidence did put [respondent] in fear of bodily harm or injury [and]
. . . does constitute domestic abuse as defined by the statute [i.e., Minn. Stat. § 518B.01,
subd. 2(a)].” Based on the findings that respondent had been threatened and had feared
bodily harm, the district court granted the OFP. The parties’ testimony supports these
findings.
Both testified that appellant made an “open-ended” threat, and respondent said she
was “fearful that [appellant is] going to act out violently.” Respondent also described “a
debate, well, a fight” the parties had in April 2013 in which appellant grabbed her by the
2
Both orders expired on March 3, 2014.
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neck and threw her against a wall, but did not cause bruising; she also testified that no
police report was filed after this incident. This was sufficient evidence for the grant of
the OFP and the district court did not abuse its discretion.
2. Supervised parenting time
The district court has broad discretion in deciding parenting-time questions based
on the best interests of the child and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.
Olson v. Olson, 534 N.W.2d 547, 550 (Minn. 1995). “A district court abuses [its]
discretion [regarding parenting time] by making findings unsupported by the evidence or
improperly applying the law.” Hagen v. Schirmers, 783 N.W.2d 212, 215 (Minn. App.
2010). A district court may restrict parenting time if it finds that parenting time “is likely
to endanger the child’s physical or emotional health or impair the child’s emotional
development.” Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1 (a) (2012).
At the hearing, appellant’s attorney objected to the supervised visitation, noting
that “there’s been no substantial . . . evidence provided here today that shows my client
has abused the children” and “there’s nothing in the record that would indicate that my
client is in need of supervised visits with the child.” Respondent’s advocate was asked
for her reaction and said supervised parenting time was requested “because of the fear of
abuse that had occurred towards the children before . . . .” The district court then
observed, “I didn’t make a finding that that occurred though.”
Because the district court explicitly found that appellant did not abuse B.C. and
did not make any finding indicating why B.C.’s physical or emotional health would be
endangered or his emotional development impaired by being in appellant’s care without
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supervision, we conclude that the order for supervised parenting time was an abuse of
discretion and reverse it.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
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