Randy Lee Oulman v. Wade Setter, Superintendent, Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, in his official capacity

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A13-2389
Randy Lee Oulman,
Appellant,
vs.
Wade Setter, Superintendent,
Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension,
in his official capacity,
Respondent.
Filed August 4, 2014
Affirmed
Ross, Judge
Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-12-8895
Bradford Colbert, Legal Assistance to Minnesota Prisoners, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Angela Helseth Kiese, Assistant Attorney General, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Willis,
Judge.

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ROSS, Judge
A Colorado court convicted Randy Oulman of sex offenses. Those offenses
required Oulman to register as a predatory offender for his entire life in Colorado under
Colorado registration statutes but would have required him to register for only ten years
in Minnesota under Minnesota registration laws if he had committed the offenses in
Minnesota and been convicted here. Because Minnesota law honors the registration laws
of other states by requiring offenders who relocate to Minnesota to register here under the
terms imposed by the vacated state, Oulman asked the district court to relieve him of the
Minnesota obligation to register for life based on his equal protection rights. The district
court granted summary judgment against Oulman, a decision we affirm because Colorado
sex offenders who immigrate to Minnesota are not similarly situated to sex offenders who
committed their offenses in Minnesota, and Minnesota’s registration statute affords
similar treatment to all out-of-state offenders who relocate here.
FACTS
Randy Oulman pleaded guilty in 1997 to Colorado charges of sexual exploitation
of a child, attempted sexual exploitation of a child, and attempted sexual assault of a
child. He was convicted of the Colorado offenses in Colorado and sentenced to six years
in prison. Oulman ended his Colorado prison term in 2002 and was, under Colorado law,
required to register for life as a predatory offender. Oulman left Colorado without
registering but moved to Iowa and began registering in June 2002.
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Oulman relocated to Minnesota in 2005 and filed the statutorily required
registration forms in this state. Officials with the BCA’s Predatory Offender Unit
assessed Oulman’s case, contacted Colorado officials, and learned that Oulman was
required to register in Colorado for the rest of his life. Oulman commenced his
registration in Minnesota beginning in September 2005 but later inquired about avoiding
the requirement. Minnesota officials informed him that his duty to register in Minnesota
remains so long as Colorado imposes a lifetime registration duty.
Oulman filed a civil complaint against the BCA’s superintendent urging the
district court to declare an end to his duty to register in Minnesota. He maintained that
Minnesota Statutes section 243.166, subdivision 1b(b) (2012), which results in his
Minnesota lifetime registration requirement based on his Colorado convictions and
Colorado registration requirement, violates his state and federal constitutional rights to
due process and equal protection and his constitutional right not to be subject to ex post
facto laws. The superintendent moved for summary judgment, which the district court
granted.
Oulman appeals the district court’s summary judgment decision only under his
equal protection theory.
DECISION
Oulman challenges the district court’s summary judgment decision. We review the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to decide whether any genuine issues of
material fact are present and whether the district court correctly applied the law.
Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn.
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2010). When the facts are undisputed, we review de novo the district court’s application
of the law. Id.Oulman specifically challenges as unconstitutional his lifetime Minnesota
registration requirement. A challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is a legal
question, which we review independently. Schatz v. Interfaith Care Ctr., 811 N.W.2d
643, 653 (Minn. 2012). We presume statutes are constitutional and invalidate them only
when absolutely necessary. Id. at 653–54. The party challenging the statute’s
constitutionality must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is
unconstitutional. Id. at 654.
Oulman rests his constitutional challenge on his right to equal protection. The
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution provides that no state may
“deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1. The Minnesota Constitution similarly declares that “[n]o member of
this state shall be disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to
any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers.” Minn.
Const. art. I, § 2. We apply this section of the Minnesota Constitution under the same
principles used to analyze the federal Equal Protection Clause. Greene v. Comm’r of
Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs., 755 N.W.2d 713, 725 (Minn. 2008). These principles hold
that similarly situated people should be treated similarly but that only invidious
discrimination is unconstitutional. Kolton v. Cnty. of Anoka, 645 N.W.2d 403, 411 (Minn.
2002).
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To prevail on his equal protection claim, Oulman must make the threshold
showing that the predatory offender registration statute treats similarly situated
individuals differently. State v. Cox, 798 N.W.2d 517, 521 (Minn. 2011). We may rely on
federal law when deciding whether groups are similarly situated, and we decide the issue
by asking whether the groups “are alike in all relevant respects.” Id. at 521–22.
Oulman premises his equal protection claim on his argument that he is similarly
situated to people convicted in Minnesota of offenses similar to his Colorado offenses,
and he maintains that the registration statute treats him differently because he was
convicted in Colorado. He is correct that Minnesota law requires him to register for life
based on his convictions and registration requirement in Colorado. The predatory
offender registration statute outlines the registration requirements for individuals
convicted of offenses in Minnesota:
A person shall register under this section if . . . the person was
charged with . . . any of the following, and convicted of or
adjudicated delinquent for that offense . . . [fourth-degree]
criminal sexual conduct under section . . . 609.345 . . . or . . .
using a minor in a sexual performance in violation of section
617.246.
Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(1)–(2) (2012). The statute specifies that offenders
must continue to register for at least ten years after they first register. Id., subd. 6(a)
(2012). But the statute imposes a different registration requirement on those who are
convicted in other states and move to Minnesota:
A person also shall register under this section if:
(1) the person was convicted of or adjudicated delinquent in
another state for an offense that would be a violation of
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a law described in paragraph (a) if committed in this
state;
(2) the person enters this state to reside, work, or attend
school, or enters this state and remains for 14 days or
longer; and
(3) ten years have not elapsed since the person was released
from confinement . . . unless the person is subject to a
longer registration period under the laws of another state
in which the person has been convicted or adjudicated,
or is subject to lifetime registration.
If a person described in this paragraph is subject to a
longer registration period in another state or is subject to
lifetime registration, the person shall register for that
time period regardless of when the person was released
from confinement, convicted, or adjudicated delinquent.
Id., subd. 1b(b). It reinforces this language when describing the registration period,
stating that:
A person described in subdivision 1b, paragraph (b), who is
required to register under the laws of a state in which the
person has been previously convicted . . . shall register under
this section for the time period required by the state of
conviction or adjudication unless a longer time period is
required elsewhere in this section.
Id., subd. 6(e) (2012). The superintendent concedes that Oulman was convicted under
Colorado statutes that are similar to Minnesota’s statutes defining fourth-degree criminal
sexual conduct and attempt to use a minor in a sexual performance. He also concedes
that, although Colorado law imposes a lifetime registration requirement for Oulman’s
offenses, Oulman’s Minnesota registration obligation would last only ten years if he had
committed his crimes in Minnesota and been convicted under the corollary Minnesota
statutes.
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We believe that Oulman defines too broadly the relevant class as all individuals
who commit crimes analogous to Minnesota’s crimes of fourth-degree criminal sexual
conduct and attempt to use a minor in a sexual performance, regardless of where those
crimes were committed and where the convictions occurred. He would have us define the
nature of the crime and the duty to register by ignoring where the crime and the
conviction occurred. But individuals may be classified as dissimilarly situated based on
location. Schatz, 811 N.W.2d at 656–57. The Schatz court rejected an equal protection
challenge to a statute that controlled coverage of medical expenses for workers injured in
Minnesota and subject to Minnesota’s Worker’s Compensation Act. The court held that
workers injured on the job in Minnesota who then leave the state and receive medical
treatment elsewhere are not similarly situated to workers injured in Minnesota who
remain and receive medical care in Minnesota. Id. The court emphasized that, because
Minnesota had jurisdiction over in-state providers but not necessarily out-of-state
providers, employers wishing to challenge the cost of medical care had recourse against
in-state providers but not necessarily against out-of-state providers. Id. at 657. We hold
similarly that Oulman belongs to that class of persons who commit crimes in violation of
another state’s laws, who are subject to registration requirements of that state, and who
relocate to Minnesota.
Given this class definition, Oulman has not taken his equal protection argument
past the threshold. Minnesota’s predatory offender registration statute treats all offenders
in Oulman’s class similarly. Oulman’s registration duty is the same as anyone else’s who
has relocated to Minnesota with out-of-state convictions. Under the Minnesota statutory
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scheme that Oulman challenges, everyone convicted after engaging in a Minnesota
predatory crime is subject to a defined registration obligation, and everyone convicted
after engaging in a Colorado offense is subject to whatever registration obligation
Colorado law imposes.
Oulman would have us reach a different conclusion, broadly defining the class,
based on the supreme court’s discussion in State v. Cox that “a defendant [can] prevail on
an equal-protection claim based on the disparity in sentencing for two different offenses
[if] the defendant . . . first show[s] that a person who is convicted of committing one
offense is similarly situated to people who are convicted of committing the other offense”
and that “the two statutes prohibit the same conduct.” 798 N.W.2d at 523. The argument
includes flaws. We discuss only one of them, the most obvious: Cox was not discussing a
regulatory statute by which Minnesota imposes different penalties (or different
registration requirements) on two defendants who have engaged in the same conduct. The
“conduct” that triggers registration is not merely the act of the offense but also the act of
receiving an out-of-state conviction and becoming subject to the obligations of that
state’s registration requirements.
Oulman also cites several foreign cases to support his argument that the distinction
between offenders with in-state convictions and those with out-of-state convictions is
unconstitutional. Because each of these cases—none of which is binding on us—was
decided on clearly distinguishable grounds, we reject the argument without further
discussion. See Doe v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 513 F.3d 95, 102, 112 (3rd Cir. 2008)
(striking down provisions of Pennsylvania registration law that provided an “extensive
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adjudicatory process” to in-state offenders before subjecting them to community
notification requirements but affording no similar process to out-of-state offenders);
ACLU of N.M. v. City of Albuquerque, 137 P.3d 1215, 1226–27 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006)
(spotting an equal protection violation in a local law that required offenders residing in
other states to register if they spent three consecutive days in Albuquerque while not
requiring sex offenders who lived in neighboring cities and worked in Albuquerque to
register); Hendricks v. Jones ex rel. State, 2013 WL 5201235 (Okla. 2013) (holding that a
sex offender registration statute violated equal protection rights because it required out-
of-state offenders but not in-state offenders to register when convicted before the statute’s
enactment date).
Oulman, who is subject to Colorado’s registration requirements because of his
Colorado convictions, is not similarly situated to offenders convicted of similar (not
necessarily identical) crimes in Minnesota. We therefore go no further with the equal
protection analysis and need not consider whether the statute withstands rational basis
review.
Affirmed.
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