State of Minnesota v. Robert Lee Crisler

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A13-1827
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Robert Lee Crisler,
Appellant.
Filed August 11, 2014
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-12-15242
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Sandra H. Johnson, Bloomington City Attorney, Torrie J. Schneider, Assistant City
Attorney, Bloomington, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathyrn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant
Public Defender, John Donovan, Certified Student Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant)
Considered and decided by Cleary, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Stoneburner, Judge.*
*
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Robert Lee Crisler appeals from his conviction of gross misdemeanor
driving while impaired (DWI) after the district court denied his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea before sentencing. We affirm.
FACTS
At approximately 1:56 a.m. on March 13, 2012, Bloomington Police Officer Tou
Vue was on patrol when he observed a stopped vehicle facing south in the designated
northbound lanes of Normandale Boulevard. Officer Vue used his public address system
to tell the driver to move the vehicle. But the vehicle did not move. Officer Vue then got
out of his squad car, walked up to the vehicle and noticed that the driver smelled strongly
of alcohol, was drooling, and that his eyes were watery and bloodshot. The driver
appeared confused, slurred his speech, and was slow to respond. After Officer Vue
identified appellant as the driver, he asked appellant to step out of the vehicle. Appellant
stumbled and was not able to maintain his balance without assistance. Officer Vue
obtained a preliminary breath test from appellant indicating an alcohol concentration of
.19. Appellant stated that he was “drunk” and that he had “drunk too much and too
often.” Appellant held his chest and appeared to have trouble breathing. Officer Vue
called for paramedics, who arrived and transported appellant to a local hospital.
According to the complaint, Officer Vue read appellant the Minnesota Implied
Consent Advisory at the hospital, and appellant consented to having his blood drawn. At
3:30 a.m., hospital staff drew a sample of blood that was later tested and showed an
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alcohol concentration of .30. Appellant had two qualified prior DWI incidents from
December 2, 2002 and September 18, 2006 and he was therefore charged with two counts
of second-degree DWI, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1), (5) (2010), one
count of second-degree DWI with an alcohol concentration of .20 or more, in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 3(2) (2010), and one count of driving after revocation, in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 171.24, subd. 2 (2010).
On May 9, 2013, appellant, represented by counsel, pleaded guilty to one count of
second-degree DWI with an alcohol concentration greater than .08 within two hours of
driving. The state agreed to dismiss the other charges. Appellant’s counsel summarized
the agreement at the plea hearing as follows: “[Appellant] would be pleading to the gross
misdemeanor DWI. There would be no sentence. He would be referred to misdemeanor
mental health court. Upon acceptance, they would handle it, and if, for whatever reason,
he would be rejected, he would come back to this court for sentencing . . . .” Paragraph
17 of appellant’s plea petition reads: “I understand that whether or not I have had a
pretrial hearing, I will not be able to object tomorrow or any other time to the evidence
the prosecutor has.” And at paragraph 28, the plea petition states that appellant is
“knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently” waiving his “[constitutional] right to a pretrial
hearing to contest the admissibility at trial of evidence obtained from search or seizure,
confessions and/or admissions.”
Appellant was referred to misdemeanor mental health court (MMHC) but was not
accepted. Consistent with the plea agreement, appellant returned to district court for
sentencing.
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Appellant moved to withdraw his guilty plea before sentence was imposed. The
motion was not based on MMHC having not accepted appellant. Instead, appellant’s
attorney stated that “[appellant] believes he would like to file a McNeely. He feels that
the evidence was tainted, and thinks the case should be dismissed.”
The district court denied the motion, stating:
And the motion to withdraw based on McNeely is denied.
I’ve been issuing orders in the McNeely case, and I know this
is some—a test rather than refusal, but I’ve issued orders in
various blood, breath, and urine tests denying the McNeely
motion. McNeely dealt with a driver who, when asked to test,
refused to test. And then the police, after the person said, ‘no,
I’m not going to test,’ then the police had the hospital
technicians stick a needle in the person’s arm and draw blood
after they said no.
Unless that’s the facts here, my understanding of the facts
here are the implied-consent advisory was read, the[re] are
arguments about whether it was coercive or not, but the
implied-consent advisory was read and [appellant] agreed to
submit to chemical testing, which is the law in Minnesota.
So it’s my conclusion that McNeely does not apply, and the
motion to withdraw based on McNeely is denied.
The district court then sentenced appellant, and this appeal followed.
DECISION
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by not allowing him to
withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing. A defendant may be permitted to withdraw a
plea before sentencing when “it is fair and just to do so.” Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263,
266 (Minn. 1989); see Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. “The [fair-and-just] standard
requires district courts to give due consideration to two factors: (1) the reasons a
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defendant advances to support withdrawal and (2) prejudice granting the motion would
cause the [s]tate given reliance on the plea.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn.
2010) (quotation marks omitted). A defendant bears the burden of advancing reasons to
support withdrawal. Id. at 94. But “defendants may not withdraw their guilty pleas for
simply any reason before a sentence is imposed.” State v. Farnsworth, 738 N.W.2d 364,
372 (Minn. 2007). “[T]he ‘ultimate decision’ of whether to allow withdrawal under the
‘fair and just’ standard is ‘left to the sound discretion of the [district] court, and it will be
reversed only in the rare case in which the appellate court can fairly conclude that the
[district] court abused its discretion.’” State v. Kaiser, 469 N.W.2d 316, 320 (Minn.
1991) (quoting Kim, 434 N.W.2d at 266).
Appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea before the district court was based only
on his attorney’s statement that appellant wished to “file a McNeely. He feels that the
evidence was tainted, and thinks the case should be dismissed.” And on appeal it is clear
that appellant did not seek to withdraw his plea because he was not admitted to MMHC.1
Appellant seems to have intended to withdraw his earlier plea with the intention to then
separately move to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless blood draw.
The United States Supreme Court decided Missouri v. McNeely on April 17, 2013,
holding that the dissipation of alcohol in the blood does not create a single-factor
1
Appellant’s plea petition reads: “I understand that if the court does not approve the
agreement [to be referred to MMHC], I have the right to withdraw my plea of guilty and
have a trial.” But this is not how the plea agreement was characterized on the record at
the plea hearing, as appellant’s attorney stated that if “[appellant] would be rejected [from
MMHC] he would come back to [the district] court for sentencing.” In any event,
appellant did not contend at the district court, nor does he argue now on appeal, that he
has an absolute right to withdraw his plea based on his not being admitted to MMHC.
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exigency allowing law enforcement to bypass the warrant requirement before obtaining a
blood, breath, or urine sample. 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1556 (2013). Appellant pleaded guilty
on May 9, 2013, three weeks after the McNeely decision was released. Although
appellant was not specifically questioned on the record about whether he understood that
he was waiving his right to challenge the admissibility of the state’s evidence by pleading
guilty, appellant’s plea petition contains a waiver of the right to make a suppression
motion. See State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Minn. 1980) (noting that a
defendant generally waives nonjurisdictional defects by entering a guilty plea, including
the right to “raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights
that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” (quotation omitted)). Appellant,
represented by counsel, had not moved to suppress evidence before pleading guilty, and
the record is devoid of any indication that the plea agreement contemplated that appellant
was reserving the right to challenge the state’s evidence if MMHC did not accept him.
Appellant cites Farnsworth in support of the argument that,
when a defendant moves before sentencing to withdraw a
guilty plea based upon the defendant’s desire to move to
suppress evidence, and the district court bases its ruling on
the plea-withdrawal motion upon its ruling on the suppression
issue, the issue becomes whether the district court erred in
granting or denying the suppression motion.
A close reading of Farnsworth does not support this proposed standard of review.
In Farnsworth, the defendant pleaded guilty without any challenge to the
admissibility of his statements to law enforcement. 738 N.W.2d at 368-69. His attorney
had advised him that “there was no Miranda violation.” Id. at 368. The defendant later
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moved to withdraw his plea before sentencing, arguing that “he was not informed that
grounds may exist to suppress his [prior] statement to [law enforcement]” and that “he
was not informed that his statement . . . could be used against him at sentencing.” Id. at
369. The district court exercised its discretion and held an evidentiary hearing on the
plea-withdrawal issue. Id. The district court “weighed potential prejudice to the state
against [the defendant’s] arguments for withdrawal” and “concluded that if the
confession was indeed suppressible, it would be fair and just to allow [the defendant] to
withdraw his guilty plea.” Id.
The district court then held a separate hearing regarding the admissibility of the
defendant’s confession. Id. It analyzed the suppression issue and concluded that parts of
the defendant’s prior admissions to law enforcement were inadmissible. Id. at 369-70.
We reversed and remanded for sentencing, concluding that the district court had
abused its discretion in permitting the plea withdrawal. Id. at 371. The Minnesota
Supreme Court affirmed, but based on a different analysis. It concluded that the district
court erred in its application of the law to the defendant’s suppression motion. Id. at 372
(“[W]e must decide whether the court correctly concluded that [the defendant’s]
confession was inadmissible. If that conclusion was incorrect, then the [district] court
abused its discretion in permitting the withdrawal of [the defendant’s] plea.” (emphasis
added)). But in so doing, the supreme court held that it is proper, in context, for a district
court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the plea-withdrawal issue. Id. (citing Kaiser, 469
N.W.2d at 319).
7
Farnsworth in turn relied on Kaiser, 469 N.W.2d at 319, in concluding that it was
proper for the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the plea-withdrawal motion.
Id. In Kaiser, the defendant moved to withdraw his plea before sentencing, arguing that
his attorney had coerced him into pleading guilty, and the district court denied the motion
without a hearing. 469 N.W.2d at 318. The supreme court held that it was error for the
district court not to hear the defendant’s testimony on the issue: “Deciding whether or not
defendant was coerced by his attorney into pleading guilty required the [district] court to
make findings of fact and the [district] court could not fairly do that without allowing
defendant to testify.” Id. at 319. The supreme court also noted that the issue in that case
was whether the plea agreement was voluntary; if a plea agreement is involuntary, a
defendant has the right to withdraw it at any time. Id.; see Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd.
1 (“At any time the court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea upon a timely
motion and proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a
manifest injustice.”); see also Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94 (noting that it is a manifest
injustice if a plea is not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made). We read
Farnsworth and Kaiser to indicate that, in some circumstances, a district court abuses its
discretion when it does not hold an evidentiary hearing on a defendant’s presentence
plea-withdrawal motion. But the circumstances here are unlike those in Farnsworth and
Kaiser.
Appellant argues neither that he was coerced into pleading guilty, nor that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel. See Farnsworth, 738 N.W.2d at 369 (noting
that the district court found that there was some question as to whether the defendant
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understood he was waiving his right to challenge the admissibility of evidence by
pleading guilty); Kaiser, 469 N.W.2d at 319 (noting that the issue was whether the
defendant had been coerced into pleading guilty by his own attorney). Rather,
appellant’s sole basis for requesting to withdraw his guilty plea is to enable him to “file a
McNeely.” He had made no suppression motion before his counseled guilty plea and
expressly waived in writing his right to contest the admissibility of the state’s evidence.
See Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d at 857. And there is nothing in the record to indicate that,
at the time of his plea, appellant did not understand that he was waiving his right to later
challenge the admissibility of evidence.
The scope of a district court’s discretion includes whether to hold an evidentiary
hearing on a plea-withdrawal motion. Farnsworth, 738 N.W.2d at 371. We see no error
in the district court’s denial of appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea in these
circumstances. Having waived his right to seek suppression of the state’s evidence as
part of a plea agreement that called for referral to MMHC, and having not been admitted
into that program, the terms of the plea agreement called for appellant to return to the
district court for sentencing. The district court acted within its discretion in holding
appellant to his plea agreement, which included a waiver of appellant’s right to challenge
the admissibility of the state’s evidence. See State v. Brunes, 373 N.W.2d 381, 386
(Minn. App. 1985) (holding that defendant waived his constitutional objection to
admissibility of evidence by failing to raise the issue at the omnibus hearing), review
denied (Minn. Oct. 11, 1985).
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We note that the district court did not expressly consider whether the state would
be prejudiced by plea withdrawal in this case. See State v. Cubas, 838 N.W.2d 220, 224
(Minn. App. 2013) (“Although a decision to allow plea withdrawal is discretionary under
[Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2], a district court must apply the standard mandated by
the rule when exercising its discretion.”), review denied (Minn. Dec. 31, 2013). The
district court was not required to consider potential prejudice to the state where appellant
did not establish a fair-and-just reason for plea withdrawal. We conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s plea-withdrawal motion.
Affirmed.
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