State of Minnesota v. Andrew William Serres

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A13-1864
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Andrew William Serres,
Appellant.
Filed August 11, 2014
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge
Houston County District Court
File No. 28-CR-12-584
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Jamie Hammell, Houston County Attorney, Caledonia, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant)
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Smith,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence
seized during the execution of a search warrant at his residence. He argues that the
search-warrant application contained information from an unlawful, warrantless garbage
search and that probable cause was lacking without that information. He contends that
the garbage search was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment because the warrant
application did not establish that the trash was located outside of the curtilage of his
residence. He further contends that even if the trash was outside of the curtilage, the
search was unlawful under the Minnesota Constitution because the people of this state
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of trash set out for collection by
licensed garbage collectors. We conclude that the garbage search was not unlawful under
either the United States or Minnesota constitutions and therefore affirm.
FACTS
Police officers found 125 grams of marijuana and 6.7 grams of psilocybin
mushrooms while executing a search warrant at appellant Andrew William Serres’s
residence at 108 South Fourth Street, #4, in Brownsville. Respondent State of Minnesota
charged Serres with two counts of fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance.
Serres moved the district court to suppress the drug evidence, in relevant part because
“the search warrant application did not support probable cause because it contained
information obtained from an unlawful, warrantless search of his trash.”
In deciding the issue, the district court considered the application for search
warrant and supporting affidavit. In the supporting affidavit, law enforcement officer
Dan Coogan stated that:
On 6/18/2012 I observed a bag of trash near the corner of S.
4th and Clay streets in the city of Brownsville. This is also
where Mr. Serres lives. 6/18/2012 is a normal trash
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collection day for the city of Brownsville and it was apparent
to me that this bag of trash had been left for collection. I
collected the bag and went to my processing area.
Coogan also stated that within the bag, he found a certificate of rent paid made out
to “Andrew Serres of 108 4th St. #4 in Brownsville”; a plastic bag containing a small
amount of “green leafy residue,” which field tested positive for THC; and two unlabeled
prescription-pill bottles containing white powdery residue. Coogan described 108 South
Fourth Street as a “single story multi-unit dwelling,” with apartments running south to
north.
The district court denied Serres’s motion to suppress, concluding that “the trash
bag was abandoned for trash collection in an area outside the curtilage of [Serres’s]
apartment” and “he no longer had an expectation of privacy in the trash.” Serres
stipulated to the state’s case pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.01,
subdivision 4, to obtain appellate review of the district court’s ruling. The district court
found Serres guilty of both charges, stayed imposition of sentence, and placed Serres on
probation. Serres appeals.
DECISION
Serres argues that the district court’s ruling “must be reversed because the only
information supporting the court’s probable cause determination for the search warrant
was evidence obtained during a warrantless search of [his] trash bag.” He contends that
the garbage search was unlawful for two reasons. First, “the search violated the Fourth
Amendment because the warrant application did not establish the bag was located outside
[of] the curtilage of [his] residence.” Second, “even if the bag was outside [of] the
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curtilage and therefore not protected by the Fourth Amendment, the search violated the
Minnesota Constitution because . . . the people of this state have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the contents of trash bags [that] they leave for collection by licensed
garbage collectors.” He contends that “[w]ithout the evidence recovered from the
unlawful, warrantless search of [his] trash bag, the warrant application did not provide
probable cause to believe contraband would be found on [him] or in his apartment.”
We address each of Serres’s arguments regarding the legality of the garbage
search in turn. We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal
determinations de novo. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008).
I.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This
guarantee establishes the right to privacy “as one of the unique values of our civilization
and, with few exceptions, stays the hands of the police unless they have a search
warrant.” McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453, 69 S. Ct. 191, 192 (1948).
Although the Fourth Amendment protects several places and things, “when it
comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals.” Florida v. Jardines,
133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013). And the area “immediately surrounding and associated
with the home,” which is referred to as curtilage, is regarded as “part of home itself for
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Fourth Amendment purposes.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S. Ct.
1735, 1742 (1984).
At common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the
intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s home
and the privacies of life, and therefore has been considered
part of home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. Thus,
courts have extended Fourth Amendment protection to the
curtilage; and they have defined the curtilage, as did the
common law, by reference to the factors that determine
whether an individual reasonably may expect that an area
immediately adjacent to the home will remain private.
Id. (emphasis added) (quotation omitted).
However, “a resident of a multifamily residence has a diminished expectation of
privacy in the common areas surrounding the residence . . . due to the fact that the
common areas are not subject to the exclusive control of one tenant and are utilized by
tenants generally and the numerous visitors attracted to a multiple-occupancy building.”
State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 799 (Minn. 2012) (quotations omitted). Because there
is a diminished expectation of privacy in common areas of multi-occupancy buildings,
such areas are not curtilage. Id. at 799-800 (concluding that a shared stairway and
platform at a duplex was a common area and therefore not curtilage).
Moreover, the Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that
it is a fair generalization that the lands adjoining a multiple-
occupancy residence are less likely to receive Fourth
Amendment protection than the yard of a single-family
residence because the privacy expectation as to such an area
is often diminished because it is not subject to the exclusive
control of one tenant and is utilized by tenants generally and
the numerous visitors attracted to a multiple-occupancy
building.
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State v. Krech, 403 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Minn. 1987) (quotation omitted).
As to curtilage and garbage searches, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the
warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for collection outside of the curtilage of a
home. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1627 (1988). “It is, as
the United States Supreme Court points out, ‘common knowledge’ that plastic garbage
bags left on or beside a public street are vulnerable to any number of invasions, whether
from animals or members of the public.” State v. Goebel, 654 N.W.2d 700, 703-04
(Minn. App. 2002) (quoting Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40, 108 S. Ct. at 1628-29).
“Therefore, the expectation of privacy in garbage adjacent to a public street is eroded.”
Id. at 704.
Under the authorities cited above, we fail to discern how the district court possibly
could have concluded that the garbage bag, which was located outside of a multi-unit
apartment building and near the corner of two city streets, was within protected curtilage.
See Gauster, 752 N.W.2d at 502 (“We may independently review facts that are not in
dispute, and determine, as a matter of law, whether the evidence need be suppressed.”
(quotation omitted)). We therefore reject Serres’s argument that the information in the
warrant application “make[s] it impossible to determine whether the trash bag was or was
not actually located within the curtilage of [his] residence.”
Serres’s argument that several of the district court’s findings are clearly erroneous
is also unpersuasive. For example, he contends that “the finding that the bag was ‘at the
corner’ is inconsistent with Coogan’s averment that the bag was ‘near’ the corner.” We
disagree with Serres’s assertion that “[t]his is a material difference.” Whether the trash
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bag was “at” or “near” the corner is far less significant than the undisputed fact that the
bag was located outside of a multi-unit apartment building and therefore not within
protected curtilage. See Milton, 821 N.W.2d at 799; Krech, 403 N.W.2d at 637. The
other challenged findings are adequately supported by the application for search warrant
and supporting affidavit. See State v. Evans, 756 N.W.2d 854, 870 (Minn. 2008) (stating
that the “clearly erroneous standard requires that we be left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made,” and “[i]f we find reasonable evidence to
support the district court’s findings of fact, we will not disturb those findings” (quotations
omitted)).
In sum, the district court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous and the record
supports the district court’s determination that the trash bag was not located within
protected curtilage. Thus, the garbage search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See
Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 37, 108 S. Ct. at 1627.
II.
Serres contends that regardless of the curtilage determination, “[i]n Minnesota,
under our state constitution, citizens of this state have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the contents of trash bags placed outside [of] their residences for collection.” Serres
concedes that there is no reasonable expectation to privacy in garbage bags left in public
areas under the Fourth Amendment. See id. But he asserts that “[n]o Minnesota
appellate court has thoroughly considered whether an individual has, under the Minnesota
Constitution, a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his or her trash bags.”
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He asks this court to hold that under the Minnesota Constitution, there is a reasonable
expectation to privacy in trash that is set out for collection.
Serres relies on appellate cases from other jurisdictions that have held, “under
their respective state constitutions, that individuals have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the contents of trash and that their trash may not be seized or searched by
police without a warrant issued upon probable cause.” See, e.g., State v. Crane, 254 P.3d
117, 123 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011) (“By placing his garbage in sealed, opaque bags and
depositing it directly in the dumpster provided for motel guests, Defendant’s actions
demonstrated a reasonable expectation that those bags would remain free from
warrantless law enforcement inspection at the place where the garbage is placed for
customary garbage collection.”), aff’d on other grounds, ___ P.3d ___ (N.M. June 30,
2014); State v. Boland, 800 P.2d 1112, 1116 (Wash. 1990) (stating that “average persons
would find it reasonable to believe the garbage they place in their trash cans will be
protected from warrantless governmental intrusion”). Serres argues that the “logic of
these decisions is compelling,” and he urges this court to “adopt it.”
The state objects to our consideration of this issue, arguing that it is not properly
before this court because it was not raised below.1 See Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354,
357 (Minn. 1996) (“This court generally will not decide issues which were not raised
before the district court, including constitutional questions of criminal procedure.”).
Serres concedes that the issue was not raised below, but he asks this court to consider and
determine it in the “interests of justice.” See Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 11 (stating
1
The state nonetheless briefed the issue on appeal.
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that “[o]n appeal from a judgment, the court may review any order or ruling of the district
court or any other matter, as the interests of justice may require”). He argues that “this
court should address the Minnesota constitutional argument because this precise issue is
pending in the Minnesota Supreme Court” and “[t]he interests of justice would not be
served by not reviewing the issue in this case if the Minnesota Supreme Court were to
ultimately conclude the citizens of this [s]tate have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their garbage.” See State v. McMurray, A12-2266, 2013 WL 5021206, at *3 (Minn. App.
Sept. 16, 2013) (holding that “[u]nder well-established caselaw from this court, appellant
had no expectation of privacy with respect to this garbage under the Minnesota
Constitution”), review granted (Minn. Nov. 26, 2013). Under these unique
circumstances, we will review the issue in the interests of justice. But for the reasons that
follow, we decline to grant relief.
Because the language of Minn. Const. art. I, § 10, is identical to that of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, appellate courts turn to the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court interpreting and applying the Fourth Amendment when
determining whether police conduct constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure. In re
Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 781 (Minn. 1993). However,
[i]t is axiomatic that a state supreme court may
interpret its own state constitution to offer greater protection
of individual rights than does the federal constitution. Indeed,
as the highest court of this state, [the Minnesota Supreme
Court is] independently responsible for safeguarding the
rights of our citizens. State courts are, and should be, the first
line of defense for individual liberties within the federalist
system. This, of course, does not mean that [the Minnesota
Supreme Court] will or should cavalierly construe [the
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Minnesota] constitution more expansively than the United
States Supreme Court has construed the federal constitution.
Indeed, a decision of the United States Supreme Court
interpreting a comparable provision of the federal constitution
that, as here, is textually identical to a provision of [the
Minnesota] constitution, is of inherently persuasive, although
not necessarily compelling, force.
State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726-27 (Minn. 1985) (quotations, citations, and footnote
omitted).
In Goebel, this court held that trash set out for routine pickup does not come under
the protection of the Fourth Amendment or Minnesota’s constitutional equivalent. 654
N.W.2d at 701. In so holding, we relied on the “common knowledge that plastic garbage
bags left on or beside a public street are vulnerable to any number of invasions, whether
from animals or members of the public. Therefore, the expectation of privacy in garbage
adjacent to a public street is eroded.” Id. at 703-04 (quotation omitted). “[A]
householder may ordinarily have some expectation of privacy in the items he places in
his garbage can,” but “when a police officer searches trash, set on the curb for routine
pickup, without trespassing on the premises, no illegal search has occurred.” Id. at 703(quotation omitted).
This court relied on Goebel in McMurray, where we rejected the argument that
“because the Minnesota Constitution provides ‘broader protections’ than the federal
constitution, this court should hold that [an individual] has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the contents of his garbage.” McMurray, 2013 WL 5021206, at *2. We also
relied on McGrath, in which this court declined to hold that “garbage searches are per se
unreasonable under Minnesota law.” State v. McGrath, 706 N.W.2d 532, 545 (Minn.
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App. 2005), review denied (Minn. Feb. 22, 2005). Although McMurray is an
unpublished decision2 and is currently pending review by the Minnesota Supreme Court,
it is based on precedential authority holding that the Minnesota Constitution does not
protect against the search of garbage that has been set out for collection. See McGrath,
706 N.W.2d at 545 (stating that “each of the three garbage searches was conducted on
garbage set out at curbside for normal pickup”); Goebel, 654 N.W.2d at 703 (stating that
“the garbage searched was ‘out on the curb at the end of the driveway’”). Here, the
record establishes that the trash was found near the intersection of two city streets on “a
normal trash collection day” and “it was apparent to [the seizing officer] that this bag of
trash had been left for collection.” On this record, the trash is not protected by the
Minnesota Constitution, as it is currently construed by this court.
A decision to depart from precedent and construe the Minnesota Constitution more
expansively than the federal constitution is not made “cavalierly.” See Fuller, 374
N.W.2d at 726-27. “Further, it is not the role of this court to make a dramatic change in
the interpretation of the Minnesota Constitution when the supreme court has not done
so.” State v. Rodriguez, 738 N.W.2d 422, 431 (Minn. App. 2007), aff’d, 754 N.W.2d 672(Minn. 2008). The task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or the
legislature, and not to this court. Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn. App.
1987), review denied (Minn. Dec. 18, 1987). We therefore decline the invitation to
extend Minnesota’s constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure to
2
“Unpublished opinions of the Court of Appeals are not precedential.” Minn. Stat.
§ 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
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garbage that has been set out for normal curbside pickup. Our decision is consistent with
this court’s role as an error-correcting court and the current state of Minnesota law. See
Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988) (“The function of the court of
appeals is limited to identifying errors and then correcting them.”).
In conclusion, Serres could not have reasonably expected that the contents of a
trash bag set out for collection near the intersection of two city streets would remain
private. Thus, the warrantless search of the trash bag was not unconstitutional, and the
district court properly relied on information obtained from that search to determine that
there was probable cause to search Serres’s residence. We therefore affirm.
Affirmed.
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