State of Minnesota v. Peter Louis John

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-0303
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Peter Louis John,
Appellant.
Filed April 4, 2016
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge
Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-14-1708
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PETERSON, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of aiding and abetting second-degree murder,
arguing that the district court erroneously (1) admitted statements that he made to police
before he received a Miranda warning, (2) excluded evidence of four reverse-Spreigl
incidents involving an alternative perpetrator, and (3) excluded evidence pertaining to a
police investigator’s disciplinary matter. He also argues that the district court failed to
properly instruct the jury on accomplice liability. We affirm.
FACTS
During the late evening of March 10, 2014, J.S. died in a St. Paul apartment that
was rented to J.B. Mark Healy, Ronald Ballinger, and appellant Peter John were with J.S.
near the time of his death. J.B. was not at the apartment, and another man who had been
at the apartment earlier in the evening, M.N., left before J.S. died. J.S.’s autopsy showed
that he had multiple blunt-force traumatic injuries on his upper body and head, fractured
ribs, and fractured thyroid cartilage; the specific cause of death was a blow near the carotid
artery that caused his heart to stop. Some of the men at the apartment were chronic
alcoholics, and they were drinking heavily that night. J.S.’s alcohol concentration when
he died was 0.376.
According to Healy’s trial testimony, while he was sitting in a recliner with
headphones on waiting for J.B. to arrive home, an altercation broke out between J.S. and
appellant and a third man whom Healy described as having long black hair and wearing a
green military-style jacket. Healy testified that appellant “punched” J.S., J.S. fell to the
floor and seemed unconscious, and appellant and the other man kicked J.S. repeatedly from
the chest up. According to Healy, he pulled his headphones off and asked the other two,
“What are you doing that for?” Appellant replied that J.S. was a child molester. Healy
then went to sleep. When Healy awoke, appellant was sleeping next to him on a couch,
and J.S. was dead on the floor with a pool of blood around his head. Healy checked for
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J.S.’s pulse, realized that his body was cold, and called 911. Healy did not recall Ballinger
being at the apartment.
M.N. testified that, before he left the apartment, Ballinger arrived with J.S., and,
when he left, Healy and appellant were also there. When M.N. left, the others were all
partying and “pretty drunk.”
Ballinger testified that, at about 7:00 p.m. or 8:00 p.m., he and J.S. shoplifted some
mouthwash containing alcohol. Then they panhandled to get money for beer and walked
to J.B.’s apartment. Three or four other people that Ballinger did not know were at the
apartment, and they were all drinking alcohol. According to Ballinger, J.S. got into an
argument with appellant after appellant called J.S. “a child molester” or some other
derogatory name, and appellant began hitting J.S. J.S. ended up on the floor with appellant
hitting and kicking him, and “they were arguing about something, somebody was going to
f--k somebody’s sister.” Ballinger testified that only appellant kicked J.S. After J.S.
became unconscious, appellant asked Ballinger to help him move J.S.’s body to a dumpster,
but Ballinger refused and left. Ballinger admitted that, in the past, he and J.S. had argued
about the fact that J.S. had dated Ballinger’s girlfriend, but he testified that they “made up”
and “became friends again.”
Following Healy’s 911 call, eight police officers arrived at the scene, and one officer
came later. They had to break into the apartment because the door was locked and Healy
could not open it. When the police entered the apartment, Healy stood behind appellant
and pointed at him. Police initially questioned appellant and Healy in the apartment but
then placed them in separate squad cars. During his initial statements to police, appellant
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suggested that J.S.’s death had been caused by three black youths who J.S. said had
assaulted him before he came to the apartment.
DNA testing established that blood found on the pants worn by appellant, Ballinger,
and Healy matched J.S.’s DNA. Also, Ballinger testified that he threw his shoes away on
the day after the murder because they were old and wet, and he had been offered a new
pair. A forensic expert could not determine whether the shoe impressions on J.S.’s body
matched appellant’s, Healy’s, or M.N.’s shoes due to a lack of detail in the impressions.
Appellant was charged with aiding and abetting second-degree murder, and he was
tried in a five-day jury trial. Before trial, the district court granted the state’s motion to
exclude evidence from a police sergeant’s disciplinary record and granted in part
appellant’s motion to admit reverse-Spreigl evidence about Ballinger’s past bad acts.
Following appellant’s conviction, the district court imposed an executed 198-month prison
sentence.
DECISION
I. Evidentiary Rulings
Squad Car Statements.
Appellant argues that the district court erred by refusing to suppress statements that
he made while he was detained in Officer Dominic Dzik’s squad car before he received a
Miranda warning. According to appellant, he remained in the squad car for more than an
hour. While in the car, appellant told police what he had been doing earlier in the evening
and described what J.S. said and did when he came to the apartment, including J.S.’s
description of his attackers.
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The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that an accused has the right to be free from
compelled self-incrimination. As a safeguard for this right, the
United States Supreme Court has held that statements made by
a suspect during a “custodial interrogation” are admissible only
if the police provided a Miranda warning before the statements
were made.
State v. Sterling, 834 N.W.2d 162, 168 (Minn. 2013); see U.S. Const. amend. V.; Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966). “The issue of whether a
suspect is in custody and therefore entitled to a Miranda warning presents a mixed question
of law and fact qualifying for independent review.” Sterling, 834 N.W.2d at 167 (quotation
omitted).
In considering whether a constitutional violation occurred because a suspect was
questioned without receiving a Miranda warning, we examine whether a suspect was in
custody and subject to police interrogation. “[A] Miranda warning is required if a suspect
is both in custody and subject to interrogation.” State v. Thompson, 788 N.W.2d 485, 491
(Minn. 2010). The test for whether a suspect is in custody is whether, under all the
circumstances presented, a reasonable person “would believe that he or she was in police
custody of the degree associated with formal arrest.” State v. Champion, 533 N.W.2d 40,
43, (Minn. 1995) (emphasis added).1 Interrogation is “any words or actions on the part of
1
Factors that suggest a suspect is in custody include:
(1) the police interviewing the suspect at the police station;
(2) the suspect being told he or she is a prime suspect in a
crime; (3) the police restraining the suspect’s freedom of
movement; (4) the suspect making a significantly
incriminating statement; (5) the presence of multiple officers;
and (6) a gun pointing at the suspect.
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police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” State v.
Endrozo, 578 N.W.2d 719, 724 (Minn. 1998) (quotation omitted).
Dzik testified at the hearing on the suppression motion that police were called “to
assist medics on an unconscious male” at the apartment just after 1:00 a.m. Upon arrival,
they spoke with Healy and appellant for a minute or two to assess what had happened.
According to Officer Kong Xiong, appellant initially told them that J.S. had “stated that he
was assaulted by three males at the intersection of 7th and Payne.” Dzik testified that he
decided to put appellant in the squad car because he and other officers were gathering
information about whether a murder occurred and wanted to talk to witnesses at the scene.
Statements made while appellant was in Dzik’s squad car were recorded and later
admitted into evidence at trial. Initially, Dzik told appellant, “[W]e can’t have you in the
house right now just contaminating anything, ok? . . . Right now it’s sorta like a crime
scene. We’re just investigating exactly what happened.” Appellant responded, “Okay.”
Appellant was not handcuffed or formally placed under arrest.
Sterling, 834 N.W.2d at 168 (quotations omitted). Factors that suggest a person is not in
custody include:
(1) questioning the suspect in his or her home; (2) law
enforcement expressly informing the suspect that he or she is
not under arrest; (3) the suspect’s leaving the police station
without hindrance; (4) the brevity of questioning; (5) the
suspect’s ability to leave at any time; (6) the existence of a
nonthreatening environment; and (7) the suspect’s ability to
make phone calls.
Id. (quotation omitted).
6
As they acquired information, police began to focus on appellant as a possible
perpetrator, and they continued to hold him in the car while they went door-to-door to
interview nearby residents. Eventually, appellant began to protest the length of his
confinement, and he asked to return to the apartment and to have his identification returned.
While apparently talking to himself in the car, appellant made comments such as “[c]’mon,
let’s get the f—k outta here” that suggest that he wanted to leave and was becoming angry
about being detained. But it was not until an officer asked him how he was doing and he
was told that he must remain in the car that he said, “I want my jacket and my ID and I’m
gonna call my attorney.” At that point, appellant was moved to Xiong’s squad car, where
he asked to speak to a lawyer.
The district court concluded that appellant “was not ‘seized’ in the Fifth
Amendment sense” until he was moved to Xiong’s car reasoning that “[t]he simple act of
making an eyewitness to a possible homicide wait in the back of a squad car for a little
over an hour while police tried to piece together preliminarily what had happened in a very
complex situation did not render [appellant] in custody.”
Initially, appellant was not in custody because police needed to sort out the crime
scene and he agreed to, or at least acquiesced in, the restraint of his freedom of movement.
Although there were several officers in the vicinity, appellant was not told that he was a
suspect, and police made no show of force toward him. Also, both appellant and Healy
were taken from the crime scene and placed in squad cars. The statements that appellant
made while in the squad car about what occurred that night were no different than the
statements he had made to police while inside the apartment, and therefore not particularly
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incriminating. Considering the totality of circumstances, we conclude that appellant’s
detention became custodial only after his confinement was prolonged, he asked for his
jacket and identification, and he said he wanted to speak to a lawyer.
As to whether appellant was interrogated, police asked him to relay what J.S. said
about how he was injured, and what J.S. did after he entered the apartment. Appellant also
identified who called police and described what he was doing that night. Although some
of the questions that police asked could be characterized as interrogation, the questions
were asked at the very beginning of appellant’s detention, when he clearly was not in
custody.
In its most recent opinion addressing admission of non-Mirandized statements, the
supreme court declined to decide whether the detained suspect was in custody during an
interrogation because it concluded that any error in admission of the evidence “was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Sterling, 834 N.W.2d at 171 (noting that question
of whether suspect was in custody was “close,” but declining to answer that question after
concluding that admission of any statements “was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”).
An error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the jury verdict is “surely unattributable
to the error.” State v. Juarez, 572 N.W.2d 286, 292 (Minn. 1997) (quotation omitted). To
determine the impact of an erroneous admission of evidence, a court examines “the manner
in which the evidence was presented, whether it was highly persuasive, whether it was used
in closing argument, and whether it was effectively countered by the defendant.” State v.
Al-Naseer, 690 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Minn. 2005).
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Ultimately, even if the district court erred in admitting statements that appellant
made while in the squad car, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because
appellant’s guilty verdict was surely not attributable to that error. Statements that appellant
made while in the squad car merely repeated statements he had made inside the apartment
when the police first arrived. Because appellant’s earlier statements were properly
admitted at trial, admission of additional evidence repeating those statements had little
evidentiary value. Also, appellant was convicted of aiding and abetting second-degree
murder, and the evidence strongly supported a guilty verdict. Appellant was one of two
individuals found in a locked apartment with J.S.’s body, police heard appellant ask Healy
why he called the police, and appellant had J.S.’s blood on his pants. In addition, (1) the
witnesses in the apartment described appellant as J.S.’s main attacker; (2) medical evidence
that showed that J.S. died immediately upon receiving his injuries contradicted appellant’s
claim that J.S. was attacked before he arrived at the apartment; and (3) surveillance videos
corroborated Ballinger’s testimony about what he did before he came to the apartment,
which supported the overall credibility of his testimony despite his being under the
influence of alcohol. Any error in the district court’s admission of statements that appellant
made before he received a Miranda warning was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Reverse-Spreigl Evidence.
Appellant argues that the district court erroneously denied his motion to admit
evidence of four out of six reverse-Spreigl incidents that involved Ballinger,2 who appellant
2
There were actually seven prior incidents, but appellant concedes that the district court
properly excluded a 2011 incident involving Ballinger’s violation of a no-contact order.
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argued was an alternative perpetrator of the crime. The district court allowed appellant to
present evidence of Ballinger’s 2008 disorderly-conduct conviction and his 2011 domestic-
assault conviction. The 2008 disorderly-conduct conviction involved conduct similar to
the conduct at issue in this case, and the victim in the 2011 domestic-assault conviction
was Ballinger’s girlfriend, who also dated J.S. The reverse-Spreigl evidence that the
district court refused to admit involved Ballinger’s felony-level domestic-assault
convictions in 2012 and 2014 and a 2004 assault and 2013 domestic assault that were not
charged.
A defendant has a constitutional right to present a
complete defense, which includes the right to present evidence
that the crime was committed by another person. The purpose
of alternative-perpetrator evidence is to create a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant’s guilt. Alternative-perpetrator
evidence is admissible only when it has an inherent tendency
to connect the alternative party with the commission of the
crime. After meeting this threshold requirement, the defendant
must meet three additional requirements before introducing
evidence of other bad acts committed by the alternative
perpetrator, which is commonly referred to as reverse-Spreigl
evidence. The defendant must show (1) clear and convincing
evidence that the alleged alternative perpetrator participated in
the reverse-Spreigl incident; (2) that the reverse-Spreigl
incident is relevant and material to defendant’s case; and (3)
that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential
for unfair prejudice.
State v. Davis, 864 N.W.2d 171, 180 (Minn. 2015) (citations and quotations omitted). We
review the district court’s decision regarding the admission of reverse-Spreigl evidence for
an abuse of discretion, and “[r]eversal is warranted only when an erroneous ruling result[s]
in prejudice.” Id. at 179-80.
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The district court admitted Ballinger’s two most relevant prior convictions. The
2011 domestic assault of his girlfriend, who had dated J.S., suggested a possible rivalry
between Ballinger and J.S., which could be a motive for Ballinger to commit the current
crime. And the 2008 disorderly-conduct conviction involved a modus operandi that was
similar to the current offense: Ballinger and three others assaulted the victim with their
fists, the victim’s blood was found on Ballinger’s clothing, and Ballinger fled the scene
after the event. The remaining excluded acts involved Ballinger assaulting his girlfriend.
Because the district court admitted the most recent conviction in which Ballinger’s
girlfriend was the victim, admission of further similar acts by Ballinger was cumulative,
could confuse the jury, and could ultimately be prejudicial. The district court acted within
its discretion in ruling to exclude this evidence.
Police Disciplinary Matter.
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to admit
evidence that the police sergeant who was the lead investigator in this case was disciplined
in 2000 for filing a false police report and in 2002 for failing to follow police procedures
before removing $3,500 of confiscated money from a police property room, permitting the
money to be used in a controlled buy, and returning the money to the property room.3 The
district court denied appellant’s motion to cross-examine the sergeant about this past
conduct to undermine his credibility.
3
We disagree with appellant’s repeated characterization of this conduct as theft.
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If probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, specific instances of the conduct of a
witness may be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness concerning the witness’s
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Minn. R. Evid. 608(b)(1). Under Minn. R.
Evid. 403, the district court may exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.” If a witness’s credibility is a central issue, the need
for impeachment may be greater. See State v. Flemino, 721 N.W.2d 326, 330 (Minn. App.
2006) (addressing admissibility of prior convictions to impeach a defendant and stating
that the need for impeachment is greater “when a defendant’s credibility is crucial”
(quotation omitted)). As with other evidentiary rulings, a decision to allow the
impeachment of a witness is within the district court’s discretion and subject to reversal
only if there is an abuse of that discretion. State v. Haynes, 725 N.W.2d 524, 530 (Minn.
2007).
While evidence of the sergeant’s disciplinary matter may have been probative of his
credibility, the district court applied both rule 608 and rule 403 and considered the relevant
factors in reaching its decision to exclude the evidence. The district court found that the
sergeant’s credibility was “critical to the state’s case” because “he was responsible for
much of the physical evidence obtained in the investigation.” But the district court also
found that the isolated incidents were stale and merely demonstrated that the sergeant failed
to follow police procedures. The court also applied the balancing test of rule 403 to
conclude that the risk of prejudice from admitting the evidence outweighed its probative
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value because the evidence could cause jury confusion, mislead the jury, or delay the trial.
The district court’s ruling was not an abuse of its discretion.
II. Accomplice Instruction
The district court gave the jury the following accomplice instruction:
You cannot find [appellant] guilty of a crime on the
testimony of a person who could be charged with that crime,
unless the testimony is corroborated by other evidence that
tends to convict [appellant] of the crime. Such a person who
could be charged for the same crime is called an accomplice.
If you find that Mark Healy, [or] Ronald Ballinger . . .
could be charged with the same crime as [appellant], you
cannot find [appellant] guilty of a crime on their testimony,
unless that testimony is corroborated.
Appellant argues that the district court should have instructed the jury that Healy and
Ballinger were accomplices as a matter of law, rather than allowing the jury to decide
whether they could be charged with the same crime as appellant. 10 Minnesota Practice,
CRIMJIG 3.18 (2006).
A district court must instruct a jury on accomplice testimony in any criminal trial in
which a witness against a defendant may reasonably be considered an accomplice. State
v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 689 (Minn. 2002); see Minn. Stat. § 634.04 (2014) (stating
that a conviction may not rely on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice). A
witness is an accomplice if the witness “could have been indicted and convicted for the
crime with which the accused is charged.” State v. Lee, 683 N.W.2d 309, 314 (Minn. 2004)
(quotation omitted).
If the facts of the case are undisputed and there is only one
inference to be drawn as to whether the witness is an
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accomplice, the court should make the determination; but if the
evidence is disputed or susceptible to different interpretations,
then the question whether the witness is an accomplice is one
of fact for the jury.
Id. (quotation omitted); see State v. Pendleton, 759 N.W.2d 900, 907 (Minn. 2009)
(requiring district court “to name specific accomplices” in instructing the jury only if “the
facts are undisputed or compel but a single inference” (quotation omitted)). A district
court’s decision on whether to give a particular jury instruction is reviewed under the
abuse-of-discretion standard. Pendleton, 759 N.W.2d at 907.
The evidence regarding Healy’s, Ballinger’s, and appellant’s conduct on the night
of the murder was disputed and susceptible to different interpretations. Although the
record contains evidence that Healy and Ballinger were merely present at the scene, other
evidence indicates that they were involved in the offense. See State v. Scruggs, 822 N.W.2d
631, 640 (Minn. 2012) (noting distinction “between playing a knowing role in the crime
and mere presence at the scene, inaction, knowledge and passive acquiescence” (quotation
omitted)); Pendleton, 759 N.W.2d at 907 (stating that a witness must play a knowing role
in the crime to be an accomplice and that mere presence at the scene is insufficient). Under
these circumstances, the district court’s decision to instruct the jury on accomplice liability
as a fact question for the jury was not an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
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