State of Minnesota v. Shawn Deangelo Jones

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-0541
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Shawn Deangelo Jones,
Appellant.
Filed March 21, 2016
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge
Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-14-4139
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Kaarin Long, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HOOTEN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of aiding and abetting simple robbery, arguing
that (1) his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence; (2) the district court
abused its discretion by admitting evidence of prior crimes and photographs of a weapon;
and (3) the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct. We affirm.
FACTS
On the evening of June 7, 2014, J.F. picked up two of his friends, Deangelo Wilson
and appellant Shawn Deangelo Jones, in his vehicle. J.F. also agreed to pick up another
individual, Deandre Robinson, who was not known to J.F. When J.F. asked Jones about
Robinson, Jones assured J.F. that he “didn’t have to question who [Jones] brought around.”
The four of them went to J.F.’s residence to hang out.
Around midnight, Wilson drove the group to a gas station in J.F.’s vehicle. Upon
arriving, Robinson went inside the gas station, approached the victim, D.L., and offered to
sell him marijuana. After D.L. agreed, Robinson and D.L. exited the gas station and got in
the vehicle.
Wilson was in the driver’s seat of the vehicle, with J.F. sitting in the front passenger
seat. D.L. was seated in the middle of the backseat with Jones and Robinson on either side.
What happened inside the vehicle is disputed, but when D.L. got out of the vehicle, he was
missing his earrings, watch, phone, and cash. D.L. then went to a restaurant and reported
to police that he had been robbed.
After D.L. exited the vehicle, Wilson, J.F., Robinson, and Jones drove away from
the gas station together. The group dropped off Robinson and returned to J.F.’s residence.
Around 2:30 a.m., J.F. drove Jones and Wilson home, but on the way there his vehicle was
stopped by police who were investigating the robbery reported by D.L. After a search of
the vehicle, the police discovered D.L.’s cell phone on the floor of the front passenger seat,
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where Jones had been sitting, and also discovered that Jones was wearing D.L.’s watch.
Jones, along with Wilson and J.F., was arrested at the scene. Approximately one month
later, a search warrant was issued for a search of Robinson’s residence, and police found a
gun and marijuana. Robinson was arrested and charged in connection with the robbery,
and Jones was charged with aiding and abetting first-degree aggravated robbery and aiding
and abetting simple robbery.
At trial, the jury heard several different versions of what occurred inside the vehicle
during the robbery. J.F. testified that when D.L. initially entered his vehicle, he heard a
baggy opening and Robinson saying, “[H]ere you go.” In response, D.L. said, “[I]t’s not
what it’s supposed to be,” and Robinson and D.L. began arguing. Robinson then demanded
D.L.’s belongings. When J.F., who was sitting in the front passenger seat, briefly turned
around, he saw D.L. taking his earrings out of his ears. J.F. testified that to his knowledge
there were no guns in the car. According to J.F., Jones was laughing at the beginning of
the robbery, and when D.L. asked for help, Jones responded, “He’s a grown man, I can’t
do nothing about this.” Jones then said, “Make sure you run his pockets.” J.F. testified
that after Robinson was dropped off, Jones put on a watch that was left in the backseat,
commenting that he had received a free watch.
Officer Matthew Sweeney, the police officer who took D.L.’s report of the robbery,
testified that D.L. had told him that the two men in the backseat of the vehicle had pointed
guns at him and demanded his belongings.
Another officer, Sergeant Thomas Arnold, who later returned some of D.L.’s
belongings to him, testified that D.L. stated he was robbed at gunpoint by both occupants
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of the backseat. D.L. told Sergeant Arnold that Jones put a gun to his side, said “run your
pockets,” and removed his watch from his wrist. D.L. told Sergeant Arnold that both Jones
and Robinson went through his pockets. Sergeant Arnold stated that when he showed D.L.
a photo of the gun recovered after Robinson’s arrest, D.L. said that he thought the gun was
one of the guns used in the robbery. Sergeant Arnold testified that when he spoke with
D.L. a few days before trial, D.L.’s statement was consistent with his first statement.
At trial, however, D.L. testified that only Robinson pulled a gun on him when he
entered the vehicle to purchase marijuana and that it was Robinson who took off his watch
and told him to take off his earrings. D.L. testified that he heard other people in the vehicle
say, “Don’t do that.” D.L. denied feeling a gun on the left side of his body, where Jones
was seated, and denied telling the police that Jones was the one who removed his
watch. D.L. denied seeing Jones with a gun during the robbery. At trial, when he was
shown a picture of the gun recovered after Robinson’s arrest, D.L. stated that it did not
look like the gun used in the robbery.
Finally, Jones testified that he remembered D.L. getting in the vehicle and talking
to Robinson, but that he was in a “liquor coma” and was “in [his] own world.” Jones denied
that he or Robinson had a gun and denied touching or speaking with D.L. Jones testified
that after D.L. left, Robinson said that he sold drugs to D.L. in exchange for some of D.L.’s
belongings. Jones testified that Robinson gave him D.L.’s watch because Robinson owed
him money.
The jury found Jones guilty of aiding and abetting simple robbery, but found him
not guilty of aiding and abetting first-degree aggravated robbery. This appeal followed.
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DECISION
I.
Jones argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he intentionally aided
Robinson in robbing D.L. “In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we review
the record in the light most favorable to the conviction to determine whether the evidence
reasonably could have permitted the jury to convict.” State v. Henderson, 620 N.W.2d
688, 704–05 (Minn. 2001).
Under the accomplice liability statute, “[a] person is criminally liable for a crime
committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires
with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.05, subd. 1 (2012). “‘Intentionally’ means that the actor either has a purpose to do
the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act performed by the actor, if
successful, will cause that result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(3) (2012). In determining
whether a defendant possessed the requisite state of mind for accomplice liability, the jury
may consider circumstantial evidence, “including the defendant’s presence at the scene of
the crime, a close association with the principal offender before and after the crime, a lack
of objection or surprise under the circumstances, and flight from the scene of the crime
with the principal offender.” State v. McAllister, 862 N.W.2d 49, 53 (Minn. 2015).
Because intent is a state of mind, it is generally proven through circumstantial
evidence. State v. Essex, 838 N.W.2d 805, 809 (Minn. App. 2013), review denied (Minn.
Jan. 21, 2014). Compared to a conviction based on direct evidence, “[a] conviction based
on circumstantial evidence . . . warrants heightened scrutiny.” State v. Al-Naseer, 788
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N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010). The heightened scrutiny comes in the form of a two-step
analysis. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013).
Under the first step of the circumstantial evidence test, we consider the
circumstances proved. Id. “[I]n determining the circumstances proved, we consider only
those circumstances that are consistent with the verdict.” Id. at 599. “As with direct
evidence, we construe conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and
assume that the jury believed the [s]tate’s witnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses.”
Id. (quotation omitted).
The relevant circumstances proved in this case are as follows. Around midnight on
June 7, 2014, Wilson drove J.F., Robinson, and Jones to a gas station. Upon entering the
gas station, Robinson approached D.L. and offered to sell him marijuana, and D.L. agreed
and got into the backseat of the vehicle. D.L. was in the middle of the backseat, with
Robinson and Jones on either side. Robinson demanded D.L.’s belongings, and D.L.
removed his earrings from his ears. During the beginning of the robbery, Jones was
laughing, and when D.L. asked for help, Jones replied, “He’s a grown man, I can’t do
nothing about this.” Jones also told Robinson, “Make sure you run his pockets.” When
D.L. exited the vehicle, he was missing his watch, phone, earrings, and cash. The group
dropped Robinson off, and shortly thereafter Jones found a watch on the backseat,
commented that he had just received a free watch, and put it on. When the vehicle was
stopped by police later that night, they found D.L.’s phone on the floor of the front
passenger seat, where Jones had been sitting, and discovered that Jones was wearing D.L.’s
watch.
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“The second step is to determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent
with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id.
(quotations omitted). Unlike the deference given to the verdict in determining the
circumstances proved, “[w]e give no deference to the fact finder’s choice between
reasonable inferences.” Id. (quotation omitted).
In order to prove that Jones was guilty of aiding and abetting simple robbery, the
state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones (1) “knew his alleged accomplice[]
[was] going to commit a crime, and . . . (2) he intended his presence and actions to further
the commission of that crime.” State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 805 (Minn. 2012). Jones
argues that because Robinson made a “split second decision” to rob D.L., he could not have
had knowledge that Robinson was going to commit a crime, as required under Milton. But,
the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that even if a defendant did not know beforehand
that a crime was about to be committed, it may be inferred “that he acquired such
knowledge” as events unfolded. McAllister, 862 N.W.2d at 55.
Jones’ alternative hypothesis that he “did not want to be involved in the crime and
had no intention to aid Robinson” is unreasonable in light of the circumstances proved.
The evidence shows that Jones was actively involved in the robbery by blocking D.L.’s
exit, refusing to help D.L., and stating, “Make sure you run his pockets.” And, after the
robbery, Jones left the scene with Robinson and put on D.L.’s watch. When viewed in its
totality, the circumstantial evidence supports Jones’ conviction and is inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The evidence is therefore sufficient to affirm his
conviction.
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II.
Jones argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his
prior aggravated robbery convictions. The district court admitted evidence of two prior
convictions, which stemmed from an incident that occurred on June 14, 2010, when Jones
and three other individuals, including Robinson, went to a basketball court. The group
began gambling with another group of individuals they did not know by wagering money
on basketball shots, which is a crime under Minn. Stat. § 609.755(1) (2008). After losing
money to the other group, Jones became angry and left the scene in order to acquire a gun.
Upon returning to the basketball court, Jones held a gun on the other individuals while
Robinson and another accomplice removed two of the victims’ belongings, including cash
and a cell phone. After being arrested for this offense, Jones pleaded guilty to two counts
of aggravated robbery.
The admissibility of evidence of other bad acts, known as Spreigl evidence, lies
within the discretion of the district court and its admission will not be reversed absent a
clear abuse of discretion. State v. Spaeth, 552 N.W.2d 187, 189 n.2, 193 (Minn. 1996); see
State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 490, 139 N.W.2d 167, 169 (1965). Evidence of the
defendant’s other bad acts is not admissible to prove that the defendant acted in conformity
with his character. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). But, such evidence may be admissible for
another purpose, including “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Id. District courts must follow a
five-step process in determining the admissibility of Spreigl evidence:
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(1) the state must give notice of its intent to admit the evidence;
(2) the state must clearly indicate what the evidence will be
offered to prove; (3) there must be clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant participated in the prior act; (4) the
evidence must be relevant and material to the state’s case; and
(5) the probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed
by its potential prejudice to the defendant.
State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 685–86 (Minn. 2006). Jones challenges only the
application of the fourth and fifth steps.
Relevance and Materiality
First, Jones argues that the district court erred by failing to identify the precise
disputed facts to which the Spreigl evidence was relevant. “In assessing the probative
value and need for the evidence, the district court must identify the precise disputed fact to
which the Spreigl evidence would be relevant.” Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 686 (quotation
omitted). The district court did not state on the record the precise disputed fact to which
the evidence of the other crimes was relevant. But, the state had represented that the Spreigl
evidence was necessary in order to prove the disputed facts of whether Jones robbed the
victim and whether he possessed a firearm. In response to the state’s identification of these
disputed facts, the district court implicitly acknowledged the identified dispute by
admitting the Spreigl evidence.
Jones also argues that the Spreigl evidence was not relevant. The state’s purpose
for introducing the Spreigl evidence was to show a common scheme or plan. “[T]he
common scheme or plan exception includes evidence only of offenses that have a marked
similarity in modus operandi to the charged offense.” Id. at 688 (quotation omitted). The
relevance of the evidence is determined by “focus[ing] on the closeness of the relationship
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between the other crimes and the charged crimes in terms of time, place, and modus
operandi.” Id. at 688–89 (quotations omitted). “[T]he closer the relationship between the
other acts and the charged offense, in terms of time, place, or modus operandi, the greater
the relevance and probative value of the other-acts evidence and the lesser the likelihood
that the evidence will be used for an improper purpose.” Id. at 688. The Minnesota
Supreme Court has held that Spreigl evidence is admissible under the common scheme
exception “to establish that the conduct on which the charged offense was based actually
occurred or to refute the defendant’s contention that the victim’s testimony was a
fabrication or a mistake in perception.” Id.
Jones argues that his prior crimes are not relevant to the disputed issues in this case
because the prior crimes were not committed in a markedly similar way to the charged
offenses. We disagree. The prior crimes were markedly similar to the charged crimes.
The prior crimes were aggravated robberies, while the charged crimes were aiding and
abetting aggravated robbery and aiding and abetting simple robbery. The prior crimes
involved Jones holding multiple victims at gunpoint while his friends, including Robinson,
relieved the victims of their belongings. The charged crimes here allegedly involved Jones
and Robinson holding the victim at gunpoint and robbing him of his belongings. The prior
crimes and the charged crimes both involved Jones and his acquaintances robbing people
whom they did not know, allegedly using firearms.1 True, the prior crimes involved a
1
Jones argues that the charged crimes were different than the prior crimes because Jones
did not possess a gun in the charged crimes. But, Jones’ possession of a gun was a disputed
fact at trial, and the state presented evidence that Jones possessed a gun during the robbery.
While the jury found Jones not guilty of aggravated robbery, this acquittal does not change
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robbery that occurred outside, while the charged crimes occurred within the confines of a
private vehicle. And, as Jones points out, in the prior crimes Jones left the basketball court
to acquire a firearm and robbed the victims upon his return approximately 11 to 12 minutes
later, while no such lapse in time occurred here. But, the prior crimes and the charged
crimes both involved Jones, Robinson, and some of their acquaintances approaching
strangers, agreeing to engage in an illegal pursuit with them, and then robbing the victims,
allegedly with firearms, when the pursuit did not go as planned.
The prior crimes here took place almost exactly four years before the charged crime.
“[T]he more distant the Spreigl act is in terms of time, the greater the similarities as to
place and modus operandi must be to retain relevance.” State v. Wright, 719 N.W.2d 910,
918 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). But, Spreigl acts that are more distant in time may
still be relevant if “the defendant spent a significant part of that time incarcerated and was
thus incapacitated from committing crimes.” Id. (quotation omitted). Jones was sentenced
to 68 months in prison for his prior aggravated robberies, was imprisoned until March 27,
2014, and committed the charged crimes approximately ten weeks after his release from
prison. Because the prior crimes were markedly similar in time and modus operandi to the
charged crimes, the prior aggravated robberies are relevant to show a common scheme.
Probative Value versus Potential Prejudice
Jones also argues that the “minimal” probative value of the Spreigl evidence was
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. In determining whether the evidence’s
the fact that Jones was alleged to have possessed a gun during the robbery at the time that
the district court ruled that the Spreigl evidence was admissible.
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probative value outweighs its prejudicial impact, we balance the relevance of the evidence
and “the [s]tate’s need to strengthen weak or inadequate proof” against the risk that the
evidence will be used as propensity evidence. State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303, 319
(Minn. 2009). Spreigl evidence may be needed because “it is not clear that the jury will
believe the state’s other evidence bearing on the disputed issue.” Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 690
(quotation omitted). “Prior bad act evidence can be unfairly prejudicial if it is used by the
jury for an improper purpose, such as proof of a defendant’s propensity to commit the
charged offense or general propensity for violence.” State v. Scruggs, 822 N.W.2d 631,
644 (Minn. 2012).
In terms of probative value, the central issues in this case were whether a robbery
occurred and whether a firearm was used to rob the victim. Jones asserted that a robbery
did not occur and that, if a robbery did occur, he was unaware of it and was uninvolved.
The Spreigl evidence had significant probative value in light of the state’s need to refute
Jones’ contention that no robbery took place or that he was unaware of the robbery and
D.L.’s testimony at trial that Jones was uninvolved with the robbery. In terms of prejudice,
because the district court read a cautionary instruction to the jury immediately before the
state presented its Spreigl evidence and once again before the jury started deliberating, the
probability that the jury would give undue weight to the Spreigl evidence was lessened.
State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 392 (Minn. 1998). Therefore, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the probative value of the
Spreigl evidence outweighed its prejudicial impact.
III.
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Jones argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence
two photographs of the gun that was recovered from the residence where Robinson was
arrested. Jones’ attorney objected to the admission of the photographs, arguing that they
were not relevant and were unduly prejudicial. We review a district court’s evidentiary
ruling for an abuse of discretion. State v. Bolstad, 686 N.W.2d 531, 541 (Minn. 2004).
Generally, relevant evidence is admissible. Minn. R. Evid. 402. Relevant evidence
is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401. Relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Minn. R. Evid. 403.
Jones contends that the photographs were irrelevant because they did not help the
jury determine whether he committed the robbery. But, the gun was relevant to the charge
of aiding and abetting aggravated robbery, which requires that a perpetrator be “armed with
a dangerous weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim to
reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon.” Minn. Stat. § 609.245 (2012). And, as
the prosecutor noted in her closing argument, the state had to prove that someone at the
scene of the crime had a gun in order for the jury to convict Jones of aiding and abetting
aggravated robbery.
Jones argues that the recovered gun was a different type of gun than the gun that
D.L. testified was used in the robbery. Sergeant Arnold testified, however, that before trial,
D.L. stated, when shown one of the photographs, that he thought the photograph showed
the gun used by Robinson in the robbery. Jones notes that the photographs are of a gun
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found at the residence where Robinson was arrested a month after the robbery, arguing that
the time between the recovery of the gun and the robbery is too distant for the gun to be
relevant, citing State v. Daniels, 361 N.W.2d 819, 828 (Minn. 1985). But, while the
supreme court in Daniels upheld the exclusion from evidence of photographs of a crime
scene taken 14 months after the crime, id., here the gun was located only one month after
the robbery. Because the use of a dangerous weapon was central to the charge of the aiding
and abetting aggravated robbery, the photographs of the gun recovered at the residence
where Robinson was arrested were relevant.
Jones also claims that the photographs were unfairly prejudicial, arguing that the
photographs “painted [him] as someone who associated with a violent criminal.” The
presence of a gun, however, was an element of one of the charged offenses, Minn. Stat.
§ 609.245, and the jury had already heard the state’s theory of Jones’ conduct through
opening statements and the testimony of J.F., D.L., and Officer Sweeney. We conclude
that the probative value of the photographs was not substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
the photographs of the gun into evidence.
IV.
Finally, in his pro se supplemental brief, Jones argues that the prosecutor engaged
in multiple incidents of misconduct at trial. Specifically, Jones argues that the prosecutor’s
references to Robinson during the trial constituted prosecutorial misconduct because
Robinson was in the courtroom.
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We review claims of prosecutorial misconduct, to which there was no objection at
trial, for plain error. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 299 (Minn. 2006). The defendant
has the burden to show that there was error and that the error was plain. Id. at 302. The
burden then shifts to the state to show that the misconduct did not affect the defendant’s
substantial rights. Id. We review claims of prosecutorial misconduct, to which there was
an objection at trial, under “a harmless-error test, the application of which varies based on
the severity of the misconduct.” State v. Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 150 (Minn. 2012).
First, Jones claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct by pointing out that
Robinson was in the courtroom. During the testimony of Sergeant Arnold, the prosecutor
asked the officer if he recognized anyone in the gallery of the courtroom. When Sergeant
Arnold responded affirmatively, the prosecutor asked whom he recognized. Before
Sergeant Arnold could testify that Robinson was in the courtroom, defense counsel
objected to the relevance of the question, and the district court sustained the objection.
Because the jury never heard that Robinson was present in the courtroom, there was no
error here.
Next, Jones notes that Sergeant Arnold pointed out Robinson a number of times
while describing the events shown on the surveillance tape of the gas station and argues
that this was “irrelevant and highly prejudicial.” Sergeant Arnold, however, pointed out
the movements of all of the individuals involved. Furthermore, Robinson’s actions were
highly relevant because the state alleged that Jones aided and abetted Robinson in
committing the robbery.
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Jones argues that he did not receive a fair trial because the prosecutor implied to the
jury that because Robinson had been convicted in connection with the robbery, Jones was
guilty as well. The prosecutor asked Sergeant Arnold whether he was familiar with the
fact that both Robinson and Wilson were charged in this case and that both of them were
convicted, and the sergeant responded affirmatively to both questions. Defense counsel
did not object. The prosecutor made no mention of Robinson and Wilson’s convictions in
closing arguments.
Because Jones did not object to the reference to the convictions of his co-defendants,
we review for plain error. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 299. “An error is plain if it is clear and
obvious . . . .” State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 548 (Minn. 2010).
As a general rule, “evidence of a plea of guilty, conviction or acquittal of an
accomplice of the accused is not admissible to prove the guilt or lack of guilt of the
accused.” State v. Cermak, 365 N.W.2d 243, 247 (Minn. 1985). But, the admission of
such evidence is not automatically barred. In Cermak, at trial a police officer referred to
the fact that three other defendants had been charged and convicted as a result of the same
investigation. Id. After acknowledging that such evidence is usually not admissible, the
supreme court held that the admission of the evidence was not erroneous because “the
evidence was clearly introduced in anticipation of defendant’s argument that the charges
against her were questionable.” Id. Here, like in Cermak, the testimony regarding the other
defendants’ convictions seems to have been elicited in order to rebut the defense argument
that no robbery had occurred, as defense counsel had argued in his opening statement.
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Therefore, there was no error in eliciting the testimony that Jones’ co-defendants had been
convicted.
Jones argues that the jury saw Robinson in the courtroom and convicted him based
on guilt by association. The trial was a public hearing, however, and Robinson had the
right to attend the trial.
Finally, Jones argues that “the judge never told the jury to disregard . . . the
prosecutor[ial] misconduct.” But, as already discussed, there was no prosecutorial
misconduct in this case.
Affirmed.
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