State of Minnesota v. David Muniz Bustos

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1825
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
David Muniz Bustos,
Appellant.
Filed June 13, 2016
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge
McLeod County District Court
File No. 43-CR-12-305
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael Junge, McLeod County Attorney, Elizabeth Smith, Assistant County Attorney,
Glencoe, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HOOTEN, Judge
Appellant challenges his 391-month guidelines sentence for second-degree murder,
arguing that the district court abused its discretion by failing to sentence him to 326 months
as was recommended by his presentence investigation report (PSI). Because the district
court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence within the presumptive range
under the sentencing guidelines and the 391-month sentence was consistent with a
negotiated plea agreement between the state and appellant, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant David Muniz Bustos was indicted by a grand jury for first-degree murder
while committing domestic abuse and second-degree intentional murder in connection with
the February 21, 2012 stabbing death of D.L., a woman with whom Bustos was in a
romantic relationship. State v. Bustos, 861 N.W.2d 655, 658–59 (Minn. 2015). Following
a jury trial, Bustos was found guilty of first-degree domestic-abuse murder and second-
degree intentional murder, along with the lesser-included offenses of second-degree felony
murder and third-degree murder. Id. at 657. The district court adjudicated Bustos guilty
of the first-degree murder count and sentenced him to life in prison with the possibility of
release. Id. at 660.
Bustos appealed, and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the second-degree
intentional murder conviction, but reversed the first-degree murder conviction and
remanded for a new trial on that charge. Id. at 667. On remand, the parties stated on the
record that they had reached an agreement that Bustos would be sentenced to 391 months
in prison on the second-degree intentional murder conviction in exchange for the state
dismissing the first-degree murder charge. A PSI was prepared prior to sentencing, which
recommended that Bustos be sentenced to 326 months in prison, the middle of the
presumptive range of sentences for individuals with Bustos’ criminal history. In
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accordance with the parties’ agreement, the district court sentenced Bustos to 391 months
in prison on the second-degree intentional murder conviction, the top end of the
presumptive range. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Bustos argues that the district court abused its discretion by sentencing him to 391
months in prison because the PSI recommended a term of only 326 months. This court
reviews a district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. State v. Soto, 855
N.W.2d 303, 307–08 (Minn. 2014). “[A]ny sentence within the presumptive range
[specified in the sentencing guidelines] for the convicted offense constitutes a presumptive
sentence.” State v. Delk, 781 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn.
July 20, 2010). As a result, “[t]his court will generally not exercise its authority to modify
a sentence within the presumptive range absent compelling circumstances.” Id. (quotation
omitted). This court will only reverse the district court’s imposition of a presumptive
sentence in a “rare” case. Id. (quotation omitted).
In arguing that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a 391-month
sentence, Bustos points to no compelling circumstances justifying the modification of the
presumptive sentence. Instead, Bustos points out that the corrections agent who completed
the PSI, after examining Bustos’ background, criminal-history score, and offense conduct,
recommended that Bustos receive 326 months in prison, the middle of the presumptive
range.
Bustos’ argument that the district court abused its discretion overlooks established
precedent providing that any sentence within the presumptive range for the convicted
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offense constitutes a presumptive sentence. See State v. Jackson, 749 N.W.2d 353, 359 n.2
(Minn. 2008) (noting that under the sentencing guidelines presumptive sentences are
determined using a grid system, that each cell on the grid contains three numbers, and that
“[a]ll three numbers in any given cell constitute an acceptable sentence”). The presumptive
range for an individual convicted of second-degree intentional murder with Bustos’
criminal-history score of one is 278 to 391 months, with a midpoint of 326 months. Minn.
Sent. Guidelines 4 (Supp. 2011). The district court sentenced Bustos to 391 months in
prison, which was the top of the range, but was still a presumptive sentence. Because
Bustos’ sentence was not a departure and district courts have broad discretion in sentencing
a defendant within the presumptive range, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by sentencing Bustos to 391 months.
We further note that the terms of the plea agreement allowed Bustos to avoid a trial
on the first-degree murder charge and the risk of a substantially longer sentence than the
agreed-upon sentence. A plea agreement is in many ways “analogous to a contract between
the state and a defendant.” State v. Meredyk, 754 N.W.2d 596, 603 (Minn. App. 2008).
Essentially, a plea agreement “represent[s] a bargained-for understanding between the
government and criminal defendants in which each side foregoes certain rights and
assumes certain risks in exchange for a degree of certainty as to the outcome of criminal
matters.” Id. (quotation omitted). The fact that Bustos agreed to a longer presumptive
sentence than was eventually recommended by the PSI in order to gain the benefit of
avoiding another first-degree murder trial provides further support for our conclusion that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Bustos to 391 months.
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In his pro se supplemental brief, Bustos raises a sufficiency of the evidence
argument. Because his allegation is unsupported by argument or citation to legal authority,
we deem this issue to be waived. State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 22 (Minn. 2015).
Moreover, because Bustos could have raised a sufficiency argument on direct appeal of his
convictions, this claim is barred on appeal. See State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243
N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976) (providing that all matters raised or known and not raised at the
time of direct appeal will not be considered in a subsequent matter).
Affirmed.
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