State of Minnesota v. Joseph Gassoway

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A13-2405
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Joseph Gassoway,
Appellant.
Filed November 10, 2014
Affirmed
Cleary, Chief Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-12-32132
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael Richardson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Chutich, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CLEARY, Chief Judge
Appellant Joseph Gassoway was charged in Hennepin County District Court with
one count of second degree criminal sexual conduct based on an alleged assault on July 5,
2012. A jury found appellant guilty in July 2013, and the district court sentenced him to
36 months to be served consecutively with another sentence. On December 30, 2013,
appellant timely filed an appeal to this court challenging the admission of Spreigl
evidence, the jury instructions, and the district court’s in camera review. Because the
district court did not abuse its discretion or commit plain error with the jury instructions,
we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant and his girlfriend, F.H., were in a relationship for approximately four
years beginning around 2008. In June 2012, appellant and F.H. moved into an apartment
in Richfield, Minnesota. F.H. has four children and numerous grandchildren—she would
frequently babysit the grandchildren. On July 5, 2012, F.H. went grocery shopping with
her daughter and four grandchildren. F.H. returned to her apartment with her
grandchildren. At the apartment, appellant began putting away the groceries while F.H.
sat in the living room with her grandchildren. One of F.H.’s grandchildren, E.D., went
into the kitchen to get something to eat. The events that then took place in the kitchen
were disputed at trial.
2
E.D. testified that appellant came up from behind her when she was bending over
to get some food from the refrigerator and “started bumping [her] butt.” E.D. said that
she turned around and told appellant to stop, at which point he grabbed her hand and put
it on his genitals. E.D. left the kitchen and told F.H. what had allegedly happened and
text messaged her mother. The text message said that “[Appellant] made me touch his
wiener.”
Appellant testified that he was putting away groceries and cutting up chicken
when E.D. came into the kitchen. Appellant said he accidently kicked E.D. in the
buttocks when E.D. snuck in between him and the refrigerator to get a snack. He said
this upset E.D., and she turned around and punched him in the genitals. Appellant
testified that he grabbed her arm and told her not to hit him.
Two days after the alleged incident in the kitchen, E.D.’s mom received a phone
call from her sister. She said that E.D.’s cousins had told her about other alleged
instances of sexual assault by appellant. When questioned, E.D. told her mom that
appellant had “humped” her.
On July 27, 2012, E.D. was interviewed at CornerHouse, which is a child abuse
evaluation center. During this interview, E.D. described two previous occasions when
appellant allegedly touched her inappropriately. E.D. stated that appellant had previously
“humped” her, which she described as appellant lying on top of her with his clothing on
and moving his body up and down so that their genitals rubbed against each other. E.D.
also said that appellant had tried to kiss her when she was helping him move things into
3
the Richfield apartment. E.D. stated that “everything happened” after her ninth birthday,
on June 25, 2012, which means all three incidents allegedly occurred between June 25
and July 5, 2012. Appellant testified that the two other incidents never occurred.
The district court held a pretrial hearing on two issues: (1) whether to admit
Spreigl evidence of a similar sexual assault for which appellant had been convicted; and
(2) whether to provide appellant with the mental health records of the Spreigl witness.
Appellant argued that Spreigl evidence should not be admitted because it was not
relevant to a common scheme or plan, modus operandi or intent under 404(b). Appellant
argued that the incidents were not similar because the alleged touching was different, one
involved penetration and one did not, there were different victims, and the assaults
occurred in different apartments and rooms. Appellant also argued that the probative
value was outweighed by the potential prejudicial effects. The respondent argued the
incidents were relevant to establish a common scheme because the victims were the same
sex and similar age, the alleged assault in both cases happened in another room while
appellant’s girlfriend was present, and appellant obtained access to the victims through
his girlfriend.
The district court initially took the matter under advisement to research cases cited
during the pretrial hearing. The district court said that it could not rule on the Spreigl
evidence until it heard the strength of the respondent’s case and the complainant’s
testimony. After the complainant and two other witnesses testified, the district court
decided to admit the Spreigl evidence to establish a common scheme or plan, and to
4
refute appellant’s contention that the victim’s testimony was a fabrication or a mistaken
perception. The district court held that there was “sufficient similarity in circumstances
to make the Spreigl [evidence] probative,” including the fact that in both cases a young
girl of the same age was involved and appellant had access to the girls through his
association with F.H.
Appellant also argued that the district court should do an in camera review of
records concerning the Spreigl witness’s mental health because of a letter the parties
received from the witness’s social worker. The district court allowed appellant to
subpoena records relating to the witness’s mental health and did an in camera review of
the records. After review, the district court released some records, sealed some, and
issued a protective order.
The Spreigl witness testified in-person at trial. She was ten-years-old at the time.
The witness said that she lived with her grandmother from June 2010 to 2011, and she
would frequently stay overnight with F.H. when her grandmother worked. The witness
testified that appellant came into the bedroom when she was alone and had sexual
relations with her while they were naked. She also testified that appellant put his mouth
on her breasts and put his penis inside her mouth. The Spreigl witness was eight and
nine-years-old at the time of abuse. The district court gave the jury cautionary
instructions before the Spreigl witness testified and at the end of trial.
Appellant also testified at trial, which led to arguments over proper impeachment.
The parties discussed whether the respondent could use appellant’s felony conviction for
5
criminal sexual conduct in the first degree in its case-in-chief or as rebuttal evidence.
The district court did not allow the conviction to come in during the respondent’s case-in-
chief. The district court held that the conviction could be admitted in three scenarios:
(1) if there was impeachment of the Spreigl witness; (2) if appellant testified that he
would never assault a child; or (3) if he insinuated that he would not let children in his
room. The district court said that if appellant testified that he had not assaulted the
Spreigl witness, then the felony conviction could be used as rebuttal evidence.
During his testimony, appellant testified that he did not “like kids in my
bedroom,” and that he does not “put [his] hands on anybody else.” On cross-
examination, appellant also denied ever being alone in a bedroom with the Spreigl
witness or ever being alone with other children in his bedroom with one exception. As a
result of this testimony, the district court permitted rebuttal through the specific mention
of the felony criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. The district court gave
cautionary instructions about the rebuttal evidence.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Spreigl evidence
Appellant argues that evidence of other bad acts was inadmissible because it was
irrelevant to intent, and even if it were relevant, it was not markedly similar to the
charged offense. Respondent argues that it was admissible to refute a claim of victim
fabrication or mistaken perception, and that the other bad act was markedly similar to the
charged offense.
6
Evidence of other crimes or bad acts is characterized as “Spreigl evidence” after
the supreme court’s decision in State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965).
The admissibility of Spreigl evidence lies within the sound discretion of the district court
and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Spaeth, 552 N.W.2d
187, 193 (Minn. 1996). If the district court erred in admitting evidence, the reviewing
court determines “whether there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted
evidence significantly affected the verdict.” State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 n.2
(Minn. 1994).
“Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). But
404(b) has an exclusionary rule whereby such evidence is admissible to prove “motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.” Id. Spreigl evidence may also be admitted to show the conduct on which the
charge was based actually occurred or to refute arguments that it was “a fabrication or a
mistake in perception by the victim.” State v. Wermerskirchen, 497 N.W.2d 235, 242
(Minn. 1993).
District courts follow a five-prong test in determining the admissibility of other
bad act evidence:
(1) the state must give notice of its intent to admit the
evidence; (2) the state must clearly indicate what the evidence
will be offered to prove; (3) there must be clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant participated in the
prior act; (4) the evidence must be relevant and material to the
7
state’s case; and (5) the probative value of the evidence must
not be outweighed by its potential prejudice to the defendant.
Angus v. State, 695 N.W.2d 109, 119 (Minn. 2005). If the admission of evidence of other
crimes or misconduct is a close call, it should be excluded. State v. Bolte, 530 N.W.2d
191, 197 (Minn. 1995). Here, the first three prongs are uncontested.
A. The evidence is relevant and material to the respondent’s case because
the two crimes are markedly similar
The first issue is whether the district court abused its discretion by finding that the
Spreigl evidence is relevant and material to refute appellant’s assertions of fabrication or
mistaken perception. If used to demonstrate that there is a common scheme or plan, the
conduct of the prior act and the charged act “must have a marked similarity in modus
operandi to the charged offense.” State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 688 (Minn. 2006). The
court should focus on the closeness of the relationship between the other crime and the
charged crime in terms of time, place, and modus operandi. Wermerskirchen, 497
N.W.2d at 240.
The district court in this case held that the two acts were substantially similar
because appellant targeted young girls of similar ages (eight or nine-years-old at the time
of alleged assault), and he had access to those girls through his association with F.H. The
assaults also allegedly took place within one to two years of each other. The nature and
location of the alleged assaults were different, but the two assaults do not need to be
identical. See State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 391 (Minn. 1998) (stating that the
“Spreigl evidence need not be identical in every way to the charged crime”). Based on
8
the closeness in time of the two assaults, the age of the victims, and appellant’s access to
the victims through F.H., the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding the acts
were “markedly similar.” See State v. Cichon, 458 N.W.2d 730, 734 (Minn. App. 1990)
(finding that Spreigl evidence was substantially similar in part because accused “used a
position of authority and as a caretaker to commit both offenses”); Wermerskirchen, 497
N.W.2d at 242 (holding that acts were highly relevant because they showed “an ongoing
pattern of opportunistic fondling of young girls within the family context”).
Appellant relies on Ness to argue that the two alleged assaults were not markedly
similar. In Ness, a teacher at a community education painting class allegedly touched an
11-year-old boy inappropriately. Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 679-80. The district court
admitted Spreigl evidence from an incident that allegedly occurred 35 years earlier when
the defendant was a school principal. Id. at 683, 688. The supreme court held that the
district court erred by admitting the Spreigl evidence, based partly on the time difference
between the alleged assaults (35 years) and partly on the diminished probative value of
the Spreigl evidence because of the strength of the state’s case, including rare eye-witness
testimony. Id. at 688-91. Given the strength of the case, the supreme court held that the
probative value was outweighed by the “potential for the evidence to persuade by
improper means.” Id. at 691.
Appellant misinterprets the holding of Ness:
Despite the fact that the victims were both male and of the
same general age, and that the touching occurred
opportunistically in the discharge of Ness’s role as an
educator, the Minnesota Supreme Court nevertheless held that
9
these incidents were not so markedly similar that they
justified the admission of the prior-acts evidence.
As the above discussion indicates, the holding in Ness was based more on the 35 year
difference between the alleged assaults with no other accusations in the intervening years,
and the limited probative value of the evidence given the strength of the state’s case. Id.
at 688-91. In contrast to Ness, the two alleged assaults here occurred within one or two
years of each other. Additionally, there is no corroborating testimony like there was in
Ness, which makes the need for the evidence greater, and thereby increases the probative
value of the Spreigl evidence.
B. The probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by the potential
for unfair prejudice to appellant
This court must next consider if the district court abused its discretion by finding
that the probative value of the Spreigl evidence to the disputed issue is not outweighed by
the potential for unfair prejudice to appellant. Although unfair prejudice is essentially
inherent with the use of Spreigl evidence in sexual abuse cases, the district court can give
cautionary instructions concerning the proper and limited role of the evidence to mitigate
the prejudice. State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 22 (Minn. 2008). The respondent’s need
for other-acts evidence should be addressed in balancing the probative value of the
evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice. Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 690.
The district court gave cautionary instructions before the Spreigl witness testified
and during the jury instructions. The district court’s instructions mitigated the potential
for prejudice. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d at 22. Additionally, the respondent’s case was based
10
principally on uncorroborated child testimony. The lack of corroboration or other
physical evidence suggests that Spreigl evidence establishing a modus operandi and
refuting appellant’s allegation of mistaken perception is probative. See State v. Fardan,
773 N.W.2d 303, 319 (Minn. 2009) (holding Spreigl evidence admissible in part because
of state’s weak case). Appellant argues that the weakness of the respondent’s case means
that the Spreigl evidence should not be admitted; however, that statement is contrary to
Minnesota law. See Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 690 (stating that the need for the Spreigl
evidence is a major factor for the court to consider in determining the probative value of
the evidence).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the Spreigl evidence
because it gave cautionary instructions and determined that there was a need for the
evidence based on the respondent’s weak case, which increased its probative value.
II. The district court did not commit plain error affecting a substantial right
Appellant argues the jury did not know which “act” to convict appellant of to
satisfy the sexual contact requirement of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree.
Appellant concedes that it did not object to the jury instructions, but argues this court can
review for plain error in the absence of an objection. Respondent argues that appellant
was only charged for one act, and the jury convicted him for that act.
In the absence of objection to jury instructions, this court has discretion to review
the issue if it is plain error affecting substantial rights. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736,
740 (Minn. 1998). Before an appellate court reviews an unobjected-to error, there must
be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) the error must affect substantial rights. Id. If those
11
three prongs are met, the court will consider whether it should address the error to ensure
the integrity of the judicial proceedings. Id.“[T]he jury must unanimously agree on which acts the defendant committed if
each act itself constitutes an element of the crime.” State v. Stempf, 627 N.W.2d 352, 355
(Minn. App. 2001). Under Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (2012), a person has
committed second degree criminal sexual conduct if they engaged in “sexual contact”
with someone under the age of 13. Sexual contact is the intentional touching by the actor
of the complainant’s intimate parts or the touching of the clothing covering the
immediate area of the intimate parts. Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 11(a) (2012). Intimate
parts include the “primary genital area, groin, inner thigh, buttocks, or breast of a human
being.” Id., subd. 5 (2012). Appellant argues that the jury could have convicted him for
one of two acts constituting sexual contact: the events that took place in the kitchen on
July 5, or the alleged humping incident that occurred before July 5.
Appellant’s arguments are undermined by the facts in the record. The jury
instructions specifically said that appellant’s act “took place on or about July 5, 2012, in
Hennepin County.” The verdict form signed by the foreperson states that appellant was
found guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree for acts that “occurred on or
about July 5, 2012, in Hennepin County, Minnesota.” The only act in question from July
5, 2012, was the alleged sexual assault in the kitchen.
In addition to the instructions from the court, the parties clearly referenced the July
5 act in their closing statements. Appellant’s attorneys said that “as of July 5 it’s he
12
said/she said versus a six year old then and [appellant] about whether he bumped into
her.” The respondent argued in its rebuttal that it was criminal sexual conduct in the
second degree “[w]hen the defendant went up behind [E.D.] in that kitchen on July 5,
2012, when she was bent over and [he] bumped and grinded his genitals against her
buttock,” and when appellant allegedly put her hand “on his genitals.”
Appellant correctly points out that evidence was presented at trial that he had
committed other sexual acts that might constitute criminal sexual conduct in the second
degree—specifically, the humping incident that occurred before July 5. However,
appellant was not charged with that act in the complaint or the jury instructions. The
humping incident was Spreigl evidence, and the district court made it clear the only act
for which he was on trial was from July 5, 2012. Thus, there was no error in the jury
instruction because the respondent charged appellant with the July 5 act, and the
respondent asked the jury to convict appellant of that act. See Stempf, 627 N.W.2d at 356(requiring the “prosecution to elect the act upon which it will rely for conviction”).
Appellant relies on State v. Stempf to contend that the district court committed
plain error, but that reliance is misplaced. In Stempf, the defendant was convicted of
violating a controlled-substance crime statute. Id. at 357. The state presented evidence
for two different acts of illegal possession and told the jury that it could convict as long
as the jurors found the defendant guilty of at least one of the acts. Id. at 357-58. The trial
court refused to issue an instruction informing the jury to evaluate the acts separately and
to reach a verdict on each act. Id. Since different jurors could have convicted the
13
defendant for different acts, there might not have been a unanimous verdict and the court
reversed. Id. at 358. In contrast to Stempf, the district court here informed the jury that it
must unanimously agree that appellant was guilty of the act that allegedly took place on
July 5, 2012. The district court therefore did not commit plain error affecting a
substantial right.
III. The district court’s admission of other crimes evidence as rebuttal to
appellant’s testimony was not a clear abuse of discretion
Appellant argues that the district court erred by permitting the respondent to
question him about his felony conviction as rebuttal evidence and that the admission was
improper under Rule 404(b) or 609. Respondent argues that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting proper rebuttal evidence.
Proper rebuttal evidence may include evidence that might not otherwise be
admissible, and the district court’s determination “of whether or not something is
appropriate rebuttal evidence rests within the discretion of the trial court and will only be
reversed upon a showing of a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Gutierrez, 667 N.W.2d
426, 435 (Minn. 2003). Rebuttal evidence is that which “explains, contradicts, or refutes
the defendant’s evidence.” State v. Swanson, 498 N.W.2d 435, 440 (Minn. 1993). Other
crimes evidence can be admitted as rebuttal evidence, instead of as Spreigl evidence.
State v. Sullivan, 502 N.W.2d 200, 203 (Minn. 1993).
Prior to appellant’s testimony, the district court heard arguments regarding the
admissibility of appellant’s felony conviction as rebuttal evidence. The district court
ruled the named-felony conviction would be admitted if appellant said that he had not
14
been alone with the Spreigl witness in his bedroom. Appellant testified on direct
examination that he does not “even like kids in [his] bedroom” and that he does not “put
[his] hands on anybody else.” On cross-examination, appellant testified that he had not
been alone in a bedroom with the Spreigl witness. Based on this testimony, the district
court permitted the respondent to cross-examine appellant about his felony conviction for
criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. The district court did not abuse its discretion
by allowing the named-felony conviction to be used as rebuttal evidence because the
conviction tended to rebut appellant’s claims that he had not abused the Spreigl witness,
did not like kids in his bedroom, and did not put his hands on other people. See Sullivan,
502 N.W.2d at 203 (admitting Spreigl evidence as proper rebuttal evidence).
Appellant also argues that evidence of the specific felony offense was
inadmissible under Rules 404(b) and 609. However, the district court admitted evidence
of the conviction as rebuttal, and it did not consider 404(b) or 609 arguments when
making that ruling. Because the district court did not base its ruling on 404(b) or 609,
appellant’s arguments on those grounds are outside the scope of review and this court
need not consider them. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating
that an appellate court will not consider matters not argued to and considered by the
district court).
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion in its in camera review of the
Spreigl witness’s mental health records
Appellant asked the district court to conduct an in camera review of documents
concerning the Spreigl witness’s mental health to determine whether they contained
15
information relevant to the witness’s ability to remember or recall events. Appellant
made a showing for the in camera review based on a letter from the witness’s social
worker. The district court conducted an in camera review, disclosed some information to
counsel, and issued a protective order for the remaining records.
The district court’s in camera review of confidential records, “like any other
determination by the trial court, is subject ultimately to judicial review.” State v.
Paradee, 403 N.W.2d 640, 642 (Minn. 1987). This court reviews the limits placed by the
district court on the release and use of protected records for an abuse of discretion. State
v. Hokanson, 821 N.W.2d 340, 349 (Minn. 2012). This court reviewed the documents
and concludes that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
Affirmed.
16