State of Minnesota v. Earl Lionell Ward

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-0684
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Earl Lionell Ward,
Appellant.
Filed December 27, 2016
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge
Ramsey County District Court
File Nos. 62-CR-14-3922
62-CR-14-4920
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Erik I. Withall, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his petition for postconviction
relief, which sought to overturn his convictions for criminal vehicular operation and the
sentence imposed. Appellant argues that his guilty plea was unintelligent, his trial counsel
was ineffective, and the district court improperly imposed a sentence that was an upward
durational departure from the sentencing guidelines. Because Ward’s plea was intelligent,
he failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable,
and the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing him under the career offender
statute, we affirm.
FACTS
In the early morning hours on July 1, 2014, appellant Earl Lionell Ward drove his
van down a city street at high speed, crashing into a hole in the street and causing severe
injuries to his eight-year-old son and fourteen-year-old daughter who were riding without
seat belts. After the accident, Ward’s son’s leg was “visibly twisted unnaturally with a bone
protruding” and he sustained a displaced femur fracture, requiring surgical repair. Ward’s
daughter was “barely conscious and not moving” after the accident, her spine was almost
severed, and her injuries left her quadriplegic. Ward knew at the time that his son’s leg was
broken and that his daughter was injured, but he did not help them and instead fled the
scene of the accident before law enforcement authorities or medical assistance arrived.
The state charged Ward with two counts of criminal vehicular operation resulting
in great bodily injury (fleeing the scene) under Minn. Stat. § 609.21, subd. 1(7) (2012). 1
Before the plea hearing, the state filed three notices of its intent to seek an aggravated
sentence. The state also sent Ward’s trial counsel an e-mail stating that it would seek the
1
The current version of the statute is Minn. Stat. § 609.2113, subd. 1(7) (2014).
2
statutory-maximum sentence regardless of whether Ward pleaded guilty or was found
guilty.
According to the plea hearing transcript, Ward pleaded guilty. 2 There was no
agreement on sentencing. Ward stated that he understood that the state was seeking an
aggravated sentence, and he waived his right to have a jury decide whether aggravating
factors supported an upward durational sentencing departure, leaving that decision to the
district court. Ward provided a factual basis for the plea, answered questions from his
lawyer, the prosecution, and the district court, and submitted his signed plea petition. The
plea petition was lost from the record and is unavailable for review on appeal.
The district court accepted Ward’s plea and, later, held a two-day Blakely court-trial
to determine whether aggravating factors supported an upward durational sentencing
departure. The state argued for an upward durational departure based on two factors:
(1) Ward is a “career offender” under Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 4 (2014) 3; and
(2) Ward committed the crimes with particular cruelty by failing to render aid. Minn. Sent.
Guidelines II.D.3.b.(2) (2012); Tucker v. State, 799 N.W.2d 583, 586–87 (Minn. 2011).
On the first day of the Blakely trial, the state called Ward’s daughter and son to
testify about the accident. On the second day, the state offered evidence of Ward’s fourteen
prior felony convictions to establish that he is a career offender. Three of these prior
2
Ward also pleaded guilty to violating a domestic abuse no-contact order as it relates to
his contact with his ex-wife on the night of the accident, but the domestic-abuse guilty plea
is not at issue in this appeal.
3
The statute in effect at the time Ward committed the offenses is identical to the current
version of the statute. See Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 4 (2012).
3
convictions involved second-degree assault causing bodily harm, from which the state
argued that Ward engaged in a “pattern of criminal conduct.” The state’s theory was that
Ward’s current and prior conduct formed a pattern of causing bodily injury. On January 26,
2015, the district court sentenced Ward to two consecutive statutory-maximum, 60-month
sentences, expressly relying on the two factors identified by the state for the upward
durational departure from the sentencing guidelines.
Ward timely appealed the district court’s sentencing order. This court stayed the
appeal pending postconviction proceedings. In his postconviction petition, Ward requested
that the district court either allow him to withdraw his plea or resentence him because:
(1) the state wrongfully induced him into involuntarily pleading guilty by making a false
promise that his children would not be called to testify; (2) his plea was unintelligent
because he did not know the maximum possible sentence before pleading guilty; (3) the
district court improperly applied the career offender statute; and (4) the district court’s
more-than-double durational departure from the sentencing guidelines was unsupported by
severe aggravating factors.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Ward’s plea-withdrawal claims.
Ward’s trial counsel, the trial prosecutor, and Ward testified. Ward testified that he did not
know the maximum possible sentence before pleading guilty and that he was induced into
pleading guilty by the state’s promise that his children would not be called to testify.
Counsel and the prosecutor testified that neither of them promised Ward that his
children would not be called to testify if he pleaded guilty. Counsel stated that, before the
plea, she advised Ward of the maximum possible sentence and that the state was seeking
4
an aggravated sentence. Additionally, counsel explained that sometime after pleading
guilty but before sentencing, Ward asked her if he could withdraw his plea. She told Ward
that they would need to request a continuance so that conflict counsel could be appointed
to assist him. Counsel testified that she believed conflict counsel was necessary because
Ward’s plea-withdrawal claim was based on the advice she provided Ward about the plea.
The district court allowed the parties to submit memoranda and took the motion
under advisement. In the district court’s written order denying Ward’s motion, the district
court specifically credited counsel’s testimony and discredited Ward’s testimony. The
district court concluded that the state made no promise that Ward’s children would not be
called to testify, Ward’s plea was intelligent, the evidence sufficiently supported a finding
that Ward had engaged in a pattern of criminal conduct under the career offender statute,
and the district court properly relied on particular cruelty as an aggravated sentencing factor
based on Ward’s failure to render aid to his children. After the district court issued its order,
this court dissolved the stay and reinstated this appeal.
DECISION
I. Validity of the Guilty Plea
“When a defendant initially files a direct appeal and then moves for a stay to pursue
postconviction relief, we review the postconviction court’s decisions using the same
standard that we apply on direct appeal.” State v. Beecroft, 813 N.W.2d 814, 836 (Minn.
2012). “We review legal issues de novo, but on factual issues our review is limited to
whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the postconviction court’s
findings.” Matakis v. State, 862 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. 2015) (citation and quotation
5
omitted). When “credibility determinations are crucial, a reviewing court will give
deference to the primary observations and trustworthiness assessments made by the district
court.” State v. Aviles-Alvarez, 561 N.W.2d 523, 527 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied
(Minn. June 11, 1997).
The validity of a guilty plea is a legal issue that this court reviews de novo. State v.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). “A defendant does not have an automatic right
to withdraw a valid guilty plea.” Weitzel v. State, 883 N.W.2d 553, 556 (Minn. 2016). After
sentencing, a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea upon a timely motion and by
establishing that withdrawal is necessary “to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim.
P. 15.05, subd. 1. The defendant bears the burden of establishing manifest injustice.
Weitzel, 883 N.W.2d at 556.
A manifest injustice is shown when a guilty plea is not valid. State v. Theis, 742
N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). To be valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and
intelligent. State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). A plea is intelligent if “the
defendant understands the charges, the rights being waived and the consequences of the
guilty plea.” Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989). The maximum sentence
that may be imposed is a direct consequence of a guilty plea. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96.
“Thus, if a defendant has been advised incorrectly about the sentence flowing from a plea,
the plea may not be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” State v. Crump, 826 N.W.2d 838,
842 (Minn. App. 2013), review denied (Minn. May 21, 2013).
Ward first asserts that his plea is invalid because it was unintelligent. He contends
that, “because the district court failed to inquire at the time of the plea, there is no assurance
6
that Ward understood that the district court could impose two, consecutive, statutory-
maximum, 60-month sentences.” Ward does not argue that he was unaware of the
possibility of receiving two consecutive sentences. See State v. Ferguson, 808 N.W.2d 586,
590 (Minn. 2012) (holding that consecutive sentencing is permissible in cases involving
multiple victims); see also Minn. Stat. § 609.15, subd. 1(a) (2012). Rather, Ward asserts
that he did not know that he could receive the statutory-maximum on each sentence.
Ward and his trial counsel offered conflicting testimony on this point, and the
district court found counsel’s testimony more credible. Counsel testified that she advised
Ward that the state was seeking an aggravated sentence and that the maximum penalty for
each offense was 60 months. Counsel also explained that, while Ward’s written plea
petition could not be found, it is her practice to fill in the maximum penalty in the
appropriate blank on the plea petition form and to discuss it with her clients.
Ward’s postconviction testimony was inconsistent with his statements at the plea
hearing. He testified that he was unaware that the state would seek an aggravated sentence.
Yet, according to the transcript of the plea hearing, Ward stated that he understood that the
state was seeking an aggravated sentence. Because the district court was in the best position
to evaluate the trustworthiness of the witnesses, we defer to the district court’s credibility
determinations. Aviles-Alvarez, 561 N.W.2d at 527.
Ward next argues that this court cannot be sure that he understood the consequences
of his plea because the plea petition is missing from the record. He cites Hoagland v. State,
in which the supreme court remanded the case to the district court for a new hearing
because a state employee lost all of the trial transcripts. 518 N.W.2d 531, 537 (Minn. 1994);
7
see also, e.g., State v. Rhodes, 627 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Minn. 2001) (declining to address
appellant’s insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim due to the incomplete record).
This case is distinguishable from Hoagland because all trial transcripts are not
missing from the record. See City of Wood Lake v. Johnson, 358 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Minn.
App. 1984) (holding that remand due to an incomplete record is unnecessary if the
complaining party is not prejudiced). The transcripts from the plea hearing and the
postconviction evidentiary hearing are available for our review and are adequate for
assessing the validity of Ward’s guilty plea.
Moreover, the plea hearing transcript belies Ward’s claim that he did not know the
consequences of pleading guilty. In his testimony, Ward twice stated that he went through
the plea petition “line by line” with counsel. He agreed that he understood everything in
the plea petition and that counsel answered all of his questions before the hearing. He
further stated that he understood that the state was seeking an aggravated sentence.
Finally, Ward argues that the district court “was required [to] make a specific
inquiry to ensure that Ward understood the maximum direct consequence of his plea.” This
argument lacks merit and is unsupported by Minnesota caselaw. See Perkins v. State, 559
N.W.2d 678, 690 (Minn. 1997) (“[W]hen Perkins entered his guilty plea, the judge did not
directly ask him whether he knew that the court could depart upward to the statutory
maximum. But Perkins did not, and could not, dispute that the plea hearing transcript
reflected that his attorney informed him of the statutory maximum.”); State v. Counard,
299 Minn. 216, 217, 216 N.W.2d 908, 909 (1974) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that
the district court should have interrogated him more thoroughly on the record because the
8
plea hearing transcript showed that the defendant discussed the consequences of the plea
with counsel).
Ward relies on Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01, subd. 1(6)(i), which requires the district
court to “ensure [that] defense counsel has told the defendant and the defendant
understands [t]he maximum penalty the judge could impose for the crime charged . . . .”
The plea hearing transcript establishes that the district court adequately complied with rule
15.01. The district court ensured that Ward had spoken with counsel about the plea and
understood the plea, and counsel questioned him on the record about his understanding of
the plea. Therefore, we conclude that Ward has not established that his guilty plea was
unintelligent, and the district court did not err in denying Ward’s motion to withdraw his
guilty plea.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Ward filed a pro se supplemental brief, arguing that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to advise him that he could receive a
statutory-maximum sentence after pleading guilty and that his children could be called to
testify. The state contends that this claim is Knaffla-barred because Ward did not raise it in
his postconviction petition. See State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741
(1976) (“[W]here direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all
claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for
postconviction relief.”).
Because this is Ward’s direct appeal, Knaffla does not apply. Andersen v. State, 830
N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013) (holding that, if the trial record is sufficient for analyzing an
9
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, defendant must bring the claim on direct appeal or
it will be Knaffla-barred in future proceedings). Ward timely filed his direct appeal from
the district court’s January 2015 sentencing order, and a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel may be brought on direct appeal from a sentencing order. See Minn. R. Crim. P.
28.02, subd. 2(1) (“A defendant may appeal as of right from any adverse final judgment,”
including “when the district court enters a judgment of conviction and imposes or stays a
sentence.”). Thus, Ward’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not barred and we
will address the merits of the claim. 4
Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are reviewed de novo. Opsahl v. State, 677
N.W.2d 414, 420 (Minn. 2004). In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court provided
a two-part test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel. 466 U.S. 668, 687 104 S.
Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). First, “the defendant must prove that counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness.” State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 504
(Minn. 2013) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–96, 104 S. Ct. 2052). Second, “the
defendant must prove there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. This court “strongly presume[s]
that counsel’s performance was reasonable.” State v. Whitson, 876 N.W.2d 297, 305 (Minn.
2016). This court “need not address both prongs of the test if one is determinative.” Id.4
The state cites Perry v. State, which held that “[c]laims asserted in a second or subsequent
postconviction petition are procedurally barred under this court’s Knaffla rule if they could
have been raised on direct appeal or in a previous postconviction petition.” 731 N.W.2d
143, 146 (Minn. 2007) (emphasis added). Perry is inapposite because Ward brings his
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in his direct appeal and has not filed a “second or
subsequent postconviction petition.”
10
Ward asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for three reasons: (1) she did not
advise him of the maximum possible sentence; (2) she did not advise him that his children
might be called to testify at the Blakely court-trial; and (3) she did not allow him to
withdraw his guilty plea. 5
Ward’s trial counsel’s performance was not objectively unreasonable. As we have
discussed, counsel testified that she advised Ward of the maximum sentence before he
pleaded guilty. She also stated that she did not tell Ward “that his children would never be
called to testify,” and she testified that the state never made such a promise. Counsel further
explained that sometime after the plea hearing but before sentencing, Ward told her that he
wanted to withdraw his plea. Counsel advised him that, because his plea-withdrawal claim
“was specifically about advice” that she had or had not given him, they would have to
request a continuance so that conflict counsel could be appointed to assist Ward. See Butala
v. State, 664 N.W.2d 333, 341 (Minn. 2003) (holding that “the better procedure” in cases
where the defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea based on inadequate trial counsel is
to “afford substitute counsel for purposes of making the motion”). Ward apparently chose
not to pursue such a continuance. The credibility of this testimony was for the district court
5
Ward attaches two handwritten letters to his appellate brief, which he claims show that
his trial counsel was ineffective. We will not consider these letters because they are outside
the record on appeal. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (providing that the record on appeal
consists of all documents filed in the district court and transcripts); Plowman v. Copeland,
Buhl & Co., 261 N.W.2d 581, 583 (Minn. 1977) (“It is well settled that an appellate court
may not base its decision on matters outside the record on appeal, and that matters not
produced and received in evidence below may not be considered.”).
11
to evaluate, and we will not disturb the district court’s decision to credit counsel’s
testimony over Ward’s testimony. Aviles-Alvarez, 561 N.W.2d at 527.
Because Ward has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel’s performance was
objectively unreasonable, he does not meet the first prong of the Strickland test and we do
not address the second prong of the test. Whitson, 876 N.W.2d at 305.
III. Aggravated Sentence
This court reviews “a district court’s decision to depart from the presumptive
guidelines sentence for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Hicks, 864 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Minn.
2015). “If the reasons given for an upward departure are legally permissible and factually
supported in the record, the departure will be affirmed. But if the district court’s reasons
for departure are improper or inadequate, the departure will be reversed.” State v. Edwards,
774 N.W.2d 596, 601 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted). Thus, two requirements must be
met to support an upward sentencing departure: “(1) a factual finding that there exist one
or more circumstances not reflected in the guilty verdict or guilty plea, and (2) an
explanation by the district court as to why those circumstances create a substantial and
compelling reason to impose a sentence outside the range on the grid.” State v. Rourke, 773
N.W.2d 913, 919 (Minn. 2009). The state must prove to a factfinder beyond a reasonable
doubt that aggravating factors support an upward sentencing departure. Id.The district court based its decision to impose an upward durational departure on
two aggravating factors: (1) the state proved Ward was a career offender under the
applicable statute; and (2) Ward committed the crimes with particular cruelty by failing to
render aid to his injured children after the accident. Because we conclude that the first
12
ground independently supports the district court’s sentence, we do not address the second
ground.
The career offender statute provides:
Whenever a person is convicted of a felony, and the judge is
imposing an executed sentence based on a Sentencing
Guidelines presumptive imprisonment sentence, the judge may
impose an aggravated durational departure from the
presumptive sentence up to the statutory maximum sentence if
the factfinder determines that the offender has five or more
prior felony convictions and that the present offense is a felony
that was committed as part of a pattern of criminal conduct.
Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 4.
Thus, to establish that a defendant is a career offender, the state must prove three
elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the current crime for which the defendant is being
charged is a felony; (2) the defendant has at least five prior felony convictions; and (3) the
current crime is part of a pattern of criminal conduct. Id.; State v. Gorman, 546 N.W.2d 5,
7 (Minn. 1996).
A determination on the third element must be submitted to a factfinder; it is not a
legal conclusion. State v. Henderson, 706 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Minn. 2005). We review the
record to determine whether there is sufficient evidence supporting the factfinder’s
determination that the felony was committed as part of a pattern of criminal conduct. State
v. Outlaw, 748 N.W.2d 349, 357 (Minn. App. 2008). “In reviewing a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence, [this court is] limited to determining whether the evidence was
sufficient to support the conclusion reached by the [factfinder],” and this court views the
evidence in the light most favorable to the factfinder’s determination. Id.13
If the factfinder concludes that the state has met each element of the career offender
statute, “[t]he statute does not limit the court’s discretion [or] require any additional
findings before sentencing a defendant to the statutory maximum.” Vickla v. State, 793
N.W.2d 265, 269–71 (Minn. 2011). Thus, “the statute authorize[s] the sentence to be
increased to the statutory maximum without the presence of severe aggravating
circumstances.” Neal v. State, 658 N.W.2d 536, 545 (Minn. 2003).
Here, Ward waived his right to have a jury determine whether aggravating factors
supported an upward durational departure. See State v. Dettman, 719 N.W.2d 644, 650–51
(Minn. 2006) (holding that a defendant may waive the right to have a jury determine
whether aggravating factors exist for an upward durational departure). After hearing
evidence, the district court concluded that the state met its burden of proving each element
of the career offender statute beyond a reasonable doubt. The first two elements are not at
issue on appeal: the crime for which Ward was sentenced is a felony, and the state
submitted evidence showing that Ward has at least five prior felony convictions.
Regarding the third element, the state relies on three of Ward’s prior felony
convictions in establishing that the sentencing offense is part of a pattern of criminal
conduct: (a) second-degree assault for pointing a gun at and shooting a victim; (b) aiding
and abetting another person to commit second-degree assault by encouraging the other
person to shoot a victim; and (c) second-degree assault for hitting a victim with a board.
Ward contends that, because he did not intend to injure his children, there was insufficient
evidence for the district court to conclude that his conduct in this case forms a pattern with
his prior assault convictions, which involved intentional infliction of harm.
14
The district court determined that Ward’s convictions for criminal vehicular
operation formed a pattern of criminal conduct with his three prior assault convictions
because they “involved behavior in great disregard for human life and for public safety.”
The district court found that “[t]he similar characteristics in these crimes is, of course, the
resulting injuries upon other persons.”
Precedent instructs our review of the district court’s reasoning. In State v. Gorman,
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a pattern of criminal conduct “may be demonstrated
by proof of criminal conduct similar, but not identical, in motive, purpose, results,
participants, victims or other shared characteristics.” 546 N.W.2d at 9. Gorman specifically
rejected the argument that it is impossible to form a pattern of unintentional criminal
conduct. Id. at 8–9. Consistent with Gorman, the district court determined that Ward’s
three prior assault convictions formed a pattern of criminal conduct with his criminal
vehicular operation convictions because the conduct underlying all of Ward’s convictions
share the characteristic of causing bodily injury.
Ward argues that the “people got hurt” link is “tenuous” because it does not take
into account that his prior convictions required intent, but intent is not an element of
criminal vehicular operation. Gorman’s definition of a “pattern of criminal conduct” is not
so narrow. Gorman expressly states that a pattern can arise out of conduct similar in
“motive, purpose, result, participants, victims, or other shared characteristics.” Id. at 9
(emphasis added). Accordingly, criminal conduct that produces similar results falls within
Gorman’s definition of “pattern of criminal conduct” regardless of the defendant’s intent.
15
Finally, we assess whether the district court abused its discretion by departing from
the guidelines and sentencing Ward to two consecutive statutory-maximum sentences. The
district court did not abuse its discretion because the career offender statute alone is an
adequate legal basis for imposing two consecutive statutory-maximum sentences.
Ferguson, 808 N.W.2d at 590; Vickla, 793 N.W.2d at 269–71; see also State v. Stanke 764
N.W.2d 824, 828–29 (Minn. 2009) (remand for resentencing is not required so long as the
appellate court determines that the district court would impose the same sentence relying
on at least one proper aggravating factor). Moreover, the district court’s sentencing
decision was well-reasoned after full consideration of the presentence investigation report,
victim statements, and Ward’s statements to the district court. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s sentence based on the career offender statute, and we do not address the
district court’s reliance on particular cruelty as an aggravating factor.
Affirmed.
16