State of Minnesota v. Ralph Joseph Boecker

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1058
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Ralph Joseph Boecker,
Appellant.
Filed May 23, 2016
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge
Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-15-65
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Tori K. Stewart, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and
Randall, Judge.
SYLLABUS
A prior felony conviction of criminal vehicular operation under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.21, subd. 2a(2)(i) (1996), is a predicate felony under the first-degree driving while
impaired statute, Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(3) (2014).

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
OPINION
HOOTEN, Judge
On appeal from his conviction of first-degree driving while impaired (DWI),
appellant argues that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because the conviction used
to enhance the current charge—his 1998 felony criminal vehicular operation (CVO)
conviction under the 1996 version of the CVO statute1—is not included in the list of
predicate felonies delineated in the first-degree DWI statute. We affirm.
FACTS
On January 8, 1998, appellant Ralph Joseph Boecker was convicted of one count of
felony CVO for causing substantial bodily harm to another as a result of operating a motor
vehicle in a negligent manner while under the influence of alcohol. On January 6, 2015,
Boecker was charged with two counts of first-degree DWI. Both charges were enhanced
to the first degree based on Boecker’s 1998 CVO conviction. Boecker challenged whether
there was probable cause to charge him with first-degree DWI, and the district court
concluded that there was probable cause. Pursuant to a plea agreement with the state,
Boecker pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree DWI and was convicted. This appeal
followed.
1
We refer to the former statute criminalizing both criminal vehicular homicide and CVO
as “the CVO statute” because this case only involves CVO.
2
ISSUE
Is a prior felony CVO conviction under Minn. Stat. § 609.21, subd. 2a(2)(i) (1996),
a predicate felony under the first-degree DWI statute, Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(3)
(2014)?
ANALYSIS
Boecker argues that his guilty plea was inaccurate because his 1998 CVO conviction
is not a predicate felony under the first-degree DWI statute and that plea withdrawal is
therefore necessary to correct a manifest injustice. “A defendant has no absolute right to
withdraw a guilty plea after entering it.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010).
But, the district court “must” allow a defendant to withdraw his or her plea at any time if
plea withdrawal “is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05,
subd. 1. “A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at
94. A constitutionally valid guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Id.
“A defendant bears the burden of showing his plea was invalid.” Id. The validity of a plea
is a question of law, which we review de novo. Id.
Statutory interpretation is also a question of law, which we review de novo. State
v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 535 (Minn. 2014). “The object of all interpretation and
construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn.
Stat. § 645.16 (2014). “The first step in statutory interpretation is to determine whether the
statute is ambiguous on its face. A statute is ambiguous only when the statutory language
is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Jones, 848 N.W.2d at 535
(quotation and citation omitted). If the language of a statute is unambiguous, our role is to
3
apply the plain meaning of the statute. Id. But, if the language is ambiguous, we may
determine legislative intent by considering the factors set forth by the legislature for
interpreting a statute. Minn. Stat. § 645.16.
The 2014 version of the first-degree DWI statute provides, in pertinent part:
A person who violates section 169A.20 (driving while
impaired) is guilty of first-degree driving while impaired if the
person:
....
(3) has previously been convicted of a felony under:
(i) Minnesota Statutes 2012, section 609.21
(criminal vehicular homicide and injury, substance-
related offenses), subdivision 1, clauses (2) to (6);
(ii) Minnesota Statutes 2006, section 609.21
(criminal vehicular homicide and injury, substance-
related offenses), subdivision 1, clauses (2) to (6);
subdivision 2, clauses (2) to (6); subdivision 2a, clauses
(2) to (6); subdivision 3, clauses (2) to (6); or
subdivision 4, clauses (2) to (6); or
(iii) section 609.2112, subdivision 1, clauses (2)
to (6); 609.2113, subdivision 1, clauses (2) to (6),
subdivision 2, clauses (2) to (6), or subdivision 3,
clauses (2) to (6); or 609.2114, subdivision 1, clauses
(2) to (6), or subdivision 2, clauses (2) to (6).
Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(3) (emphasis added).
The 2014 version of the first-degree DWI statute delineates three versions of the
CVO statute because the CVO statute has undergone several revisions since 2007,
including reorganization and renumbering. Some of these revisions are detailed in this
court’s opinion in State v. Retzlaff, 807 N.W.2d 437, 439–40 (Minn. App. 2011), aff’d
mem., 842 N.W.2d 565 (Minn. 2012). The first-degree DWI statute has similarly
undergone several revisions since 2006, when the legislature first included prior CVO
convictions as predicate felonies, in order to track the changes to the CVO statute. See id.
4
This has not been an entirely smooth process. See id. at 440 (noting “statutory irregularity”
when 2008 version of first-degree DWI statute referenced CVO statute as reorganized in
2007, but did not reference prior organization).
Boecker argues that his prior CVO conviction in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.21,
subd. 2a(2)(i),2 cannot enhance his current DWI offense to a first-degree felony in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(3), because the 1996 version of the CVO statute is not
specifically listed as a predicate felony in the 2014 version of the first-degree DWI statute.
The state counters that Boecker’s prior CVO conviction is a predicate felony because the
relevant portion of the 2006 version of Minn. Stat. § 609.21, subd. 2a(2), which is explicitly
referenced in the 2014 version of the first-degree DWI statute, is identical to the relevant
portion of the 1996 version of Minn. Stat. § 609.21, subd. 2a(2).
We conclude that the 2014 version of the first-degree DWI statute is ambiguous as
to whether Boecker’s conviction under the 1996 version of Minn. Stat. § 609.21, subd.
2a(2)(i), is a predicate felony because there is more than one reasonable interpretation of
the statute. On the one hand, the 2014 version of the first-degree DWI statute could include
as predicate felonies only prior felony convictions under the 2006 or later versions of the
CVO statute. On the other hand, the 2014 version of the first-degree DWI statute could
include as predicate felonies all prior felony convictions under any version of the CVO
2
The parties acknowledge that the amended complaint that resulted in Boecker’s 1998
CVO conviction contained a typographical error, purporting to charge him with violating
Minn. Stat. § 609.21, subd. “2a(1)(i).” This error is of no consequence to this appeal. See
Minn. R. Crim. P. 17.02, subd. 3 (“Error in [statutory] citation or its omission is not a
ground to dismiss or reverse a conviction if the error or omission did not prejudice the
defendant.”).
5
statute, including the 1996 version, under which Boecker was convicted. To clarify this
ambiguity and ascertain legislative intent, however, we need only look to the changes to
the first-degree DWI statute and to the legislature’s intent as explicitly stated in the 2012
session law. See Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (instructing courts, when interpreting ambiguous
statutes, to ascertain legislative intent by considering, among other things, “the former law”
and “the contemporaneous legislative history”).
As noted above, the first-degree DWI statute has undergone several revisions since
the legislature first included prior CVO convictions as predicate felonies in 2006. See 2006
Minn. Laws ch. 260, art. 2, § 3, at 734. After the 2006 amendment, the first-degree DWI
statute provided:
A person who violates section 169A.20 (driving while
impaired) is guilty of first-degree driving while impaired if the
person:
....
(3) has previously been convicted of a felony under
section 609.21, subdivision 1, clause (2), (3), (4), (5), or (6);
subdivision 2, clause (2), (3), (4), (5), or (6); subdivision 2a,
clause (2), (3), (4), (5), or (6); subdivision 3, clause (2), (3),
(4), (5), or (6); or subdivision 4, clause (2), (3), (4), (5), or (6).
Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(3) (2006) (emphasis added). Boecker’s 1998 CVO
conviction is plainly a predicate felony under the 2006 version of the first-degree DWI
statute.
The legislature reorganized the CVO statute in 2007. 2007 Minn. Laws ch. 54, art.
3, §§ 7–11, at 248–49. In an attempt to track this reorganization, the legislature amended
the first-degree DWI statute in 2007. 2007 Minn. Laws ch. 54, art. 3, § 14, at 251. After
the 2007 amendment, the statute provided:
6
A person who violates section 169A.20 (driving while
impaired) is guilty of first-degree driving while impaired if the
person:
....
(3) has previously been convicted of a felony under
section 609.21, subdivision 1, clause (2), (3), (4), (5), or (6).
Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(3) (Supp. 2007) (emphasis added).
As discussed above, the 2007 version of the first-degree DWI statute only
referenced the reorganized CVO statute, not the prior organization. The legislature
corrected this in 2012, likely in response to this court’s decision in Retzlaff. See 2012
Minn. Laws ch. 222, § 3, at 686. After the 2012 amendment, the statute provided:
A person who violates section 169A.20 (driving while
impaired) is guilty of first-degree driving while impaired if the
person:
....
(3) has previously been convicted of a felony under:
(i) section 609.21 (criminal vehicular homicide
and injury, substance-related offenses), subdivision 1,
clauses (2) to (6); or
(ii) Minnesota Statutes 2006, section 609.21
(criminal vehicular homicide and injury, substance-
related offenses), subdivision 1, clauses (2) to (6);
subdivision 2, clauses (2) to (6); subdivision 2a, clauses
(2) to (6); subdivision 3, clauses (2) to (6); or
subdivision 4, clauses (2) to (6).
Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(3) (2012) (emphasis added). Significantly, in the 2012
session law, the Minnesota Legislature took the rare step of formally stating its intent
regarding the first-degree DWI statute:
The intent of the legislature in enacting this bill is to
clarify a cross-referencing change made in 2007 relating to the
criminal vehicular operation crime. It was not the legislature’s
intent in 2007 to make a substantive change regarding whether
prior criminal vehicular operation convictions would . . . be
7
considered as a predicate for the first-degree driving while
impaired crime. The legislature’s intent has always been that
criminal vehicular operation convictions under both the pre-
2007 law and the post-2007 law be used for enhancing driving
while impaired penalties consistent with the provisions of the
driving while impaired laws.
2012 Minn. Laws ch. 222, § 4, at 687 (emphasis added). In this formal statement of intent,
the legislature explicitly indicated that prior “[CVO] convictions under . . . the pre-2007
[CVO] law” would enhance a new DWI offense to a first-degree felony. Id. Boecker
essentially argues that in 2006, a pre-2006 prior CVO conviction was a predicate felony,
but in 2015, it was not, suggesting that in 2012 the legislature must have deemed a pre-
2006 prior CVO conviction to be too stale to constitute a predicate felony. But, his
argument is directly contradicted by the legislature’s formal statement of its intent.
After the CVO statute was renumbered in 2014 (from section 609.21 to section
609.2113), the first-degree DWI statute was once again amended. 2014 Minn. Laws ch.
180, §§ 3, at 282–83; 7, at 285; 9, at 288. After the 2014 amendment, the statute provided:
A person who violates section 169A.20 (driving while
impaired) is guilty of first-degree driving while impaired if the
person:
....
(3) has previously been convicted of a felony under:
(i) Minnesota Statutes 2012, section 609.21
(criminal vehicular homicide and injury, substance-
related offenses), subdivision 1, clauses (2) to (6);
(ii) Minnesota Statutes 2006, section 609.21
(criminal vehicular homicide and injury, substance-
related offenses), subdivision 1, clauses (2) to (6);
subdivision 2, clauses (2) to (6); subdivision 2a, clauses
(2) to (6); subdivision 3, clauses (2) to (6); or
subdivision 4, clauses (2) to (6); or
(iii) section 609.2112, subdivision 1, clauses (2)
to (6); 609.2113, subdivision 1, clauses (2) to (6),
8
subdivision 2, clauses (2) to (6), or subdivision 3,
clauses (2) to (6); or 609.2114, subdivision 1, clauses
(2) to (6), or subdivision 2, clauses (2) to (6).
Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(3) (2014) (emphasis added). The relevant portion of the
2014 version of the statute is identical to the 2012 version, except for the inclusion of the
new numbering of the CVO statute in subdivision 1(3)(iii). Because the relevant portions
of the two versions of the statute are identical, it is clear that the legislature still intended
that pre-2007 CVO convictions would constitute predicate felonies under the first-degree
DWI statute.
Given the legislature’s clear intent, Boecker cannot avoid liability for first-degree
DWI simply because the CVO statute and the first-degree DWI statute have been
renumbered, reorganized, and amended. Accordingly, we hold that Boecker’s 1998 felony
CVO conviction under Minn. Stat. § 609.21, subd. 2a(2)(i) (1996), is a predicate felony for
his first-degree DWI conviction under Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(3) (2014).
DECISION
Because Boecker’s prior felony CVO conviction is a predicate felony under the
first-degree DWI statute, he has not shown that the district court erred in determining that
there was probable cause for the state to charge him with first-degree DWI, and his guilty
plea is accurate. Accordingly, there is no manifest injustice, and Boecker is not entitled to
withdraw his plea.
Affirmed.
9