DocketNumber: No. 35318.
Citation Numbers: 13 So. 2d 624, 194 Miss. 746, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 101
Judges: Griffith
Filed Date: 5/10/1943
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
Appellee filed his bill to confirm a tax title to a lot or parcel of land situated within the corporate limits of the City of Laurel in Jones County, the alleged tax sale having been made on September 19, 1932. Appellants filed no answer, and suffered a decree pro confesso, upon which a final decree was rendered in accordance with the prayer *Page 750
of the bill. From this decree an appeal has been taken, and several grounds have been relied on in support of appellants' contention that the bill was insufficient to support a decree. See Pease Dwyer Co. v. Somers Planting Co.,
The sale was made to the state, and it is through a forfeited tax patent from the state that appellee claims. One of the grounds which appellants urge for a reversal is that no certified copy of the list of the sale to the state was made an exhibit to the bill. It is not necessary to exhibit with the bill a certified copy of the list of sales made to the state on a particular sales day, but, when not so done, it is necessary to allege in terms of fact and not by way of mere legal conclusion that every successive step, essential to the validity of the tax sale — alleging the facts as to each essential step — was had and taken by the taxing authorities, inclusive from the original assessment by the tax assessor down to the sale itself. See on this subject Griffith Miss. Chan. Pr., Sec. 220. One of the successive steps necessary to be taken is legal process upon or notice to the taxpayer prior to the equalization of the assessment roll. There is no allegation in the bill whatevery that this essential step was taken.
It is interesting to note in this connection that in Grant v. Montgomery,
The foregoing is enough to dispose of the appeal, but it is also observed that the allegations of the bill as to the original assessment and the proceedings subsequent thereto, so far as averred, refer to the assessment, etc., as having been made for and during the year 1932, and yet the bill proceeds further to aver that the sale was made on September 19, 1932, for the delinquent taxes of the year, 1931. This confusion and contradiction in averment may of itself be enough to render the bill insufficient to support a decree pro confesso, but since the point first mentioned requires a reversal, we do not decide the question presented in this paragraph, nor do we find it necessary to pursue the other questions argued by appellants.
Reversed and remanded.