DocketNumber: No. 30463.
Citation Numbers: 147 So. 315, 165 Miss. 143
Judges: <bold>Anderson, J.,</bold> delivered the opinion of the court.
Filed Date: 3/27/1933
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/12/2023
Appellant brought this action in the circuit court of Union county against appellee to recover damages for personal injuries received by her, caused by a collision between a truck driven by B.J. Gray and an automobile in which she was traveling. At the conclusion of the evidence the court directed a verdict and judgment for appellee. From that judgment appellant prosecutes this appeal.
Whether the court erred in directing a verdict for appellee depends on whether Gray, the driver of the truck, was a servant of appellee or an independent contractor. The evidence out of which the question arose is undisputed. At the time of appellant's injuries and for some time prior thereto, appellee was engaged in the manufacture of lumber with its plant at New Albany in Union county. The logs which it manufactured into lumber were bought from various owners in Union and surrounding counties. It bought the merchantable timber on Porter Ray's land in Pontotoc county. Porter Ray cut the timber and hauled and piled the logs on the public highway leading to New Albany. Appellee contracted with Gray and two other persons to haul these logs to its mill, agreeing to pay them so much per thousand feet. While Gray was carrying out his part of the contract, the collision and injuries occurred. At the time of the collision, Gray's truck, driven by him, was loaded with some of the *Page 151 logs on its way to New Albany to appellee's plant. Gray was a public hauler in and around New Albany, and between that place and Memphis and other points. The contract between Gray and appellee was verbal. As stated, Gray's compensation was so much per thousand feet for all logs he hauled. He was to haul no specified number of logs, and was to haul when it suited him. The agreement was that he was to furnish his own truck and his help. In other words, he was to bear the entire expense incurred by him in hauling the logs. In making the trips he sometimes drove his truck, and sometimes he employed another to drive it. Appellee had no control whatever over the manner, method, or means of hauling the logs. The only control appellee had over Gray's operations was where he should get the logs and the place he should unload them at the mill.
One of the early cases involving this question is New Orleans, B.R., V. M. Railroad Company v. Norwood,
In Callahan Construction Co. v. Rayburn,
In Crescent Baking Co. v. Denton,
In Kisner v. Jackson,
In the present case appellee contracted with Gray for a certain net result, namely, the placing on appellee's millyard in New Albany such of the Ray logs as Gray chose to haul; the manner and means and expense of doing the work being left entirely to Gray. The relation of master and servant does not exist, unless the alleged master has some sort of substantial control over the means and methods of carrying out the contract. What logs Gray should haul and where he should place them did not constitute such control by appellee.
If appellant's contention were upheld it would lead to most mischievous and unjust consequences. For illustration: A has a trunk in a railroad baggage room; he engages a public drayman to deliver the trunk to his residence, *Page 153 for which he pays the charge of fifty cents; in making the delivery the drayman negligently injures a child on the street; the owner of the trunk would be liable.
The case of Hinton Walker v. Pearson,
Affirmed.