Anthony Carr v. State of Mississippi

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2017-CA-01481-SCT
ANTHONY CARR
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/25/2017
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CHARLES E. WEBSTER
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: QUITMAN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF CAPITAL POST-CONVICTION
BY: ALEXANDER KASSOFF
JAMILA ALEXANDER
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JASON L. DAVIS
LADONNA C. HOLLAND
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL-POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 06/06/2019
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
CHAMBERLIN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution prohibits the execution of intellectually disabled persons. On September
20, 2017, the Circuit Court of Quitman County denied Anthony Carr’s petition for post-
conviction relief (“PCR”), finding that Carr did not prove that he was intellectually disabled.
Carr appealed the trial court’s decision. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. Anthony Carr was convicted of four counts of capital murder and sentenced to death
for each. Carr v. State, 655 So. 2d 824, 830 (Miss. 1995) (“Carr I ”).1 In Carr I, we
affirmed Carr’s conviction. Id. at 858.
¶3. In 2004, we granted Carr leave to proceed in the circuit court on his PCR claim that
he is intellectually disabled and, thus, ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins v.
Virginia.2 Carr v. State, 873 So. 2d 991 (Miss. 2004) (“Carr II ”). The trial court later
denied Carr’s petition for PCR (the “original order”), and Carr appealed. Carr v. State, 196
So. 3d 926 (Miss. 2016) (“Carr III”).
¶4. In Carr III, we reversed and remanded with directions for the trial court to make “new
factual findings applying the correct legal standard.” Id. at 944. Following the Carr III
decision, the trial court entered a revised order, again denying Carr’s petition for PCR (the
“revised order”). The trial court entered the revised order more than a year after remand. In
the interim, the trial court did not hold an additional hearing, and the parties did not request
one. Carr timely appealed.3
1
The facts surrounding Carr’s underlying offense have been discussed at length
previously by the Court and do not pertain to the issues on appeal.
2
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002).
3
Carr also filed a motion for reconsideration. Although it does not appear that the
motion for reconsideration was ever ruled on, we conclude that the instant appeal is proper.
Under Rule 6(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, the time period to file motions
under Rule 52(b) cannot be extended. Miss. R. Civ. P. 6(b), 52(b). Thus, Carr’s motion for
reconsideration was untimely filed, and, with no arguments made by either party on appeal
about it, we conclude that the motion for reconsideration has been abandoned.
2
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
¶5. On appeal, Carr raises three issues. The State raises four issues. For the sake of
clarity, we restate the issues as follows:
I. Whether the trial court erred by failing to hold a new evidentiary
hearing.
II. Whether the trial court erred in holding that Carr did not prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he suffers from an intellectual
disability that manifested prior to age eighteen.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6. The standard of review in the instant appeal is mixed. “[W]here questions of law are
raised the applicable standard of review is de novo.” Brown v. State, 731 So. 2d 595, 598
(Miss. 1998) (citing Bank of Miss. v. S. Mem’l Park, Inc., 677 So. 2d 186, 191 (Miss.
1996)). When addressing whether the trial court and the Court in Carr III applied the correct
legal standard, a de novo standard is applied. On the other hand, the Court “will not reverse
the factual findings of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous.” Walker v. State, 230
So. 3d 703, 704 (Miss. 2017) (citing Brown v. State, 731 So. 2d 595, 598 (Miss. 1999).
ANALYSIS
I. Whether the trial court erred by failing to hold a new evidentiary
hearing.
¶7. Carr argues that the trial court erred by failing to hold a new evidentiary hearing. In
support of his arguments, Carr presents evidence gathered from a new investigation that he
would like to present in a new evidentiary hearing, including expert evidence from Dr.
William Kallman. Carr maintains that the new evidence does not constitute new arguments.
3
Carr argues that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct.
1039, 197 L. Ed. 2d 416 (2017) (“Moore I”), and the Court’s decision in State v. Russell,
238 So. 3d 1105 (Miss. 2017), have “wrought significant changes to Atkins jurisprudence,”
that “[t]he 2013 hearing was conducted under a different regime” and that Carr is therefore
entitled to a new hearing.
¶8. In response, the State argues that Carr waived the issue by not raising it in the trial
court. The State asserts that Carr’s argument is an attempt to relitigate the entirety of his
intellectual-disability claim. Further, the State argues that Carr is procedurally limited to the
issues that were the subject of Carr III’s remand.
¶9. Mississippi Code Section 99-39-21 addresses waiver in PCR proceedings. It reads,
(1) Failure by a prisoner to raise objections, defenses, claims, questions, issues
or errors either in fact or law which were capable of determination at trial
and/or on direct appeal, regardless of whether such are based on the laws and
the Constitution of the state of Mississippi or of the United States, shall
constitute a waiver thereof and shall be procedurally barred, but the court may
upon a showing of cause and actual prejudice grant relief from the waiver.
(2) The litigation of a factual issue at trial and on direct appeal of a specific
state or federal legal theory or theories shall constitute a waiver of all other
state or federal legal theories which could have been raised under said factual
issue; and any relief sought under this article upon said facts but upon different
state or federal legal theories shall be procedurally barred absent a showing of
cause and actual prejudice.
(3) The doctrine of res judicata shall apply to all issues, both factual and legal,
decided at trial and on direct appeal.
(4) The term “cause” as used in this section shall be defined and limited to
those cases where the legal foundation upon which the claim for relief is based
could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence at the time of trial
or direct appeal.
4
(5) The term “actual prejudice” as used in this section shall be defined and
limited to those errors which would have actually adversely affected the
ultimate outcome of the conviction or sentence.
(6) The burden is upon the prisoner to allege in his motion such facts as are
necessary to demonstrate that his claims are not procedurally barred under this
section.
Miss. Code. Ann. § 99-39-21 (Rev. 2015).
¶10. The Court analyzes this issue in three parts.
A. Carr did not request a new hearing and thus waived the issue on
appeal.
¶11. Carr failed to timely request a new hearing in a motion before the trial court after Carr
III. Further, Carr failed to timely raise the need for a new hearing in a motion for
reconsideration after the trial court entered its revised order.4 Therefore, Carr has waived the
issue on appeal under Mississippi Code Section 99-39-21(1). See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-
21(1) (Rev. 2015). We next consider whether Carr has shown the requisite “cause” and
“actual prejudice” necessary to overcome the waiver.
B. Carr has not shown “cause” and “actual prejudice” to
overcome the waiver.
¶12. Section 99-39-21(1) requires “a showing of cause and actual prejudice.” Miss. Code
Ann. § 99-39-21(1) (emphasis added). Carr claims that caselaw handed down since the 2013
hearing and original order has significantly changed the landscape of Atkins jurisprudence,
thus requiring a new hearing. We address only the requirement of “actual prejudice,” as it
is dispositive.
4
Again, while Carr did request a new hearing in his motion for reconsideration after
the trial court entered its revised order, the motion for reconsideration was not timely.
5
¶13. Hall v. Florida was decided in May 2014. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 134 S. Ct.
1986, 188 L. Ed. 2d 1007 (2014). In Hall, the United States Supreme Court reevaluated its
Atkins jurisprudence and held that Florida’s bright-line IQ score cutoff “bars consideration
of evidence that must be considered in determining whether a defendant in a capital case has
intellectual disability.” Id. at 723. Hall made clear that an interrelated analysis was required:
“when a defendant’s IQ test score falls within the test’s acknowledged and inherent margin
of error, the defendant must be able to present additional evidence of intellectual disability,
including testimony regarding adaptive deficits.” Id.
¶14. Here, in its revised order, the trial court noted that Carr’s IQ scores—ranging from 70
to 75 —“all fall on or within the margin of error applicable to the test.” The trial court then
analyzed the testimony of multiple experts and witnesses about Carr’s adaptive deficits. In
sum, the trial court conducted an interrelated analysis between Carr’s IQ score and his
adaptive-skill deficits. An interrelated analysis is what Hall requires. Id. Moreover, the trial
court examined and relied on our opinion in Carr III, which discusses Hall at length. Carr
III, 196 So. 3d at 933–35. Thus, the trial court complied with Hall, and Carr is not entitled
to a new hearing.
¶15. Moore I was decided in March 2017. Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1039. Moore I examined
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ use of certain factors in its Atkins determinations. Id.
at 1044. The Moore I Court reiterated that “adjudications of intellectual disability should
be ‘informed by the views of medical experts’” and that the factors used by the Texas Court
6
of Criminal Appeals “‘creat[e] an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability
will be executed.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Hall, 572 U.S. at 721, 704).
¶16. Moore I reiterated Atkins and did not alter the Atkins landscape. Carr has failed to
demonstrate predudice under Moore I.5
¶17. The Court decided Russell in December 2017. Russell, 238 So. 3d at 1105. In
Russell, the Court reversed the trial court and held that the State’s request to evaluate Russell
before an Atkins hearing should have been granted. Id. at 1111. The Russell Court noted
that “our Atkins procedures clearly contemplate the State responding to the petitioner’s
evidence with its own expert opinion.” Id. Of particular importance in Russell was that the
State was not denied “a second, duplicate Atkins evaluation,” but “was requesting the Atkins
evaluation.” Id. at 1110 (emphasis in original).
¶18. Here, Carr does not claim that he was denied an Atkins evaluation. Further, Carr was
evaluated by two experts (including Carr’s expert, Dr. Gerald O’Brien), and the trial court
examined the testimony of each expert. Because, unlike in Russell, Carr was evaluated by
his own expert and was able to present testimony, Carr’s reliance on Russell fails to show
actual prejudice.
5
Following the 2017 remand to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the United
States Supreme Court has reviewed and clarified Moore I. Moore v. Texas, 139 S. Ct. 666,
670-72 (2019) (“Moore II”). The Moore I Court had provided that “[c]linicians . . . caution
against reliance on adaptive strengths developed ‘in a controlled setting.’” Moore I, 137 S.
Ct. at 1050 (quoting Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 38 (5th ed.
2013)). The Moore II Court has reiterated its warning from Moore I, specifically pointing
out that trial courts should rely on adaptive-skill deficits rather than adaptive-skill strengths.
Moore II, 139 S. Ct. at 670-72. Moore II’s reiteration does not change the analysis here.
7
¶19. On a final note, Carr analogizes the case to Thompson v. State, 208 So. 3d 49 (Fla.
2016). Even though Thompson is not binding precedent, we address it here for the sake of
conclusiveness. In Thompson, the Supreme Court of Florida remanded the case for a new
evidentiary hearing, stating that “Thompson’s previous hearing on intellectual disability was
tainted by the bright-line cutoff of 70 for IQ scores” that was later denounced by Hall. Id.
at 58 (citing Hall, 572 U.S. at 724).
¶20. In Carr III, we recognized the unconstitutionality of the bright-line IQ score cutoff
and remanded for an interrelated analysis between the significantly subaverage intellectual
function and the significant deficits in adaptive behavior. Carr III, 196 So. 3d at 933–34.
In the original order, the trial court considered the second prong and concluded that Carr had
adaptive deficits in two skill areas. However, the trial court then failed to perform an
interrelated analysis between the first and second prong. Carr III’s remand instructions,
therefore, were properly aimed at providing clarification of its findings. Further, in its
revised order, the trial court explicitly noted its adherence to Carr III and at no point
indicated it was employing a strict score cutoff. Thompson is not analogous to the facts at
hand and does not support Carr’s assertion of actual prejudice.
¶21. As stated above, Section 99-39-21(1) requires “a showing of cause and actual
prejudice.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(1) (emphasis added). Considering the recent Atkins
decisions, Carr is unable to establish actual prejudice. Without actual prejudice, the Court
need not address cause. Carr, therefore, cannot overcome that he waived a new hearing.
C. Carr III did not require a new evidentiary hearing on remand.
8
¶22. Carr III held that “a legal standard that views a full-scale IQ score as dispositive of
intellectual disability without performing and balancing an interrelated analysis of adaptive
functioning, runs afoul of the Eighth Amendment.” Carr III, 196 So. 3d at 943. Carr III
stated that reversal and remand was necessary
to provide the circuit judge an opportunity to consider whether Carr’s adaptive
functioning deficits—which the circuit judge found to exist—are so severe that
Carr should be ruled intellectually disabled through an interrelated analysis
with his IQ scores, which the circuit judge found to be between 70 and 75.
Carr III, 196 So. 3d at 944 (footnote omitted). Nothing in Carr III mandates a new hearing.
Instead, the Court examined the law, including Hall, and directed the trial court to make new
factual findings after performing the requisite interrelated analysis.
¶23. Carr also argues that the Carr III Court created a new Atkins standard. Carr argues
that, by remanding the case in 2016 “to provide the circuit judge an opportunity to consider
whether Carr’s adaptive functioning deficits—which the circuit judge found to exist—are so
severe that Carr should be ruled intellectually disabled through an interrelated analysis with
his IQ scores,” the Court created a new standard for determining whether a defendant has an
intellectual disability. Id. at 943 (emphasis added).
¶24. In Hall, the United States Supreme Court approvingly cited DSM-5 and quoted the
following language: “[A] person with an IQ score above 70 may have such severe adaptive
behavior problems . . . that the person’s actual functioning is comparable to that of
individuals with a lower IQ score.” Hall, 572 U.S. at 712 (alteration in original) (emphasis
added) (quoting Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 37 (5th ed. 2013)).
The remand order from Carr III does not conflict with the language cited approvingly in
9
Hall. Further, no material difference exists between Hall’s instruction to determine whether
a defendant has “such severe” adaptive-functioning deficits as to render him or her
intellectually disabled through an interrelated analysis and Carr III’s instruction to determine
whether a defendant’s adaptive-functioning deficits are “so severe” to support a finding of
intellectual disability. Hall and Carr III therefore provide the same or substantially similar
instruction. We see no reason for a new evidentiary hearing at this juncture.
II. Whether the trial court erred in holding that Carr did not prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that he suffers from an intellectual
disability that manifested prior to age eighteen.
¶25. The Court has recognized that Atkins exempts all intellectually disabled people from
execution, even those people who are minimally intellectually disabled. Chase v. State, 873
So. 2d 1013, 1026 (Miss. 2004) (“Chase III”) (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321). The Court
has also recognized that mild intellectual disability “may, under certain conditions, be present
in an individual with an IQ of up to 75.” Chase v. State, 171 So. 3d 463, 471 (Miss. 2015)
(“Chase V”) (quoting Chase III, 873 So. 2d at 1028 n.18). Further, in 2015, following the
Supreme Court’s guidance in Hall and accounting for “the medical community’s evolving
understanding of intellectual disability and its diagnosis,” Chase V adopted “the 2010
[American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disability (AAIDD)] and 2013
[American Psychiatric Association (APA)] definitions of intellectual disability as appropriate
for use to determine intellectual disability in the courts of this state in addition to the
definitions promulgated in Atkins and Chase.” Chase V, 171 So. 3d at 471; see also Hall,
572 U.S. at 710 (“In determining who qualifies as intellectually disabled, it is proper to
consult the medical community’s opinions.”). In Chase V, we noted that “[t]he new
10
definitions have not materially altered the diagnosis of intellectual disability but have
provided new terminology.” Id. (citing United States v. Williams, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1124, 1146
(D. Haw. 2014)).
¶26. The AAIDD articulates the skills domains as follows:
The conceptual skills domain includes “language; reading and writing; and
money, time, and number concepts.” The social skills domain includes
“interpersonal skills, social responsibility, self-esteem, gullibility, naïveté (i.e.,
wariness), follows rules/obeys laws, avoids being victimized, and social
problem solving.” The practical skills domain includes “activities of daily
living (personal care), occupational skills, use of money, safety, health care,
travel/transportation, schedules/routines, and use of the telephone.”
Chase V, 171 So. 3d at 469 (citations omitted). The APA states,
The conceptual (academic) domain involves competence in memory,
language, reading, writing, math reasoning, acquisition of practical knowledge,
problems solving, and judgment in novel situations, among others. The social
domain involves awareness of others’ thoughts, feelings, and experiences;
empathy; interpersonal communication skills; friendship abilities; and social
judgment, among others. The practical domain involves learning and self-
management across life settings, including personal care, job responsibilities,
money management, recreation, self-management of behavior, and school and
work task organization, among others.
Chase V, 171 So. 3d at 469–70 (quoting Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders 37 (5th ed. 2013)). While some differences exist in the standards articulated by
the AAIDD and APA, ‘“the exact wording of the . . . standards ‘makes little substantive
difference in the context of Atkins,’” since all “are similar and require the same three basic
elements . . . significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, significant deficits in adaptive
behavior, and manifestation before age eighteen.” Chase V, 171 So. 3d at 470 (quoting
11
Williams, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 1146). Moreover, Chase V provided specific guidance on
Mississippi’s application of “significant deficits in adaptive behavior.” Id. We stated,
For the diagnosis of intellectual disability, significant limitations in adaptive
behavior should be established through the use of standardized measures
normed on the general population, including people with disabilities and
people without disabilities. On these standardized measures, significant
limitations in adaptive behavior are operationally defined as performance that
is approximately two standard deviations below the mean of either (a) one of
the following three types of adaptive behavior: conceptual, social, or practical
or (b) an overall score on a standardized measure of conceptual, social, and
practical skills. The assessment instrument’s standard error of measurement
must be considered when interpreting the individual’s obtained scores.
Chase V, 171 So. 3d at 486 (quoting Intellectual Disability: Definition, Classification, and
Systems of Support 43 (11th ed. 2010)).
¶27. In Carr III, we followed Chase V’s guidance, reasserting Mississippi’s adoption of
both the definitions from the AAIDD and the APA. Carr III, 196 So. 3d at 933 (citing
Chase V, 171 So. 3d at 471). Further, we recognized that “significant deficits in one of the
three adaptive-functioning domains are required,” which include the conceptual-skills
domain, the social-skills domain, and the practical-skills domain. Id. at 933 (citing Chase
V, 171 So. 3d at 469).
¶28. Here, the trial court reviewed our Carr III decision and restated the correct legal
standard addressing the three prongs of the test. See Carr III, 196 So. 3d at 933. Further, the
trial court correctly noted that “[t]here is some amount of interplay between two of the
criteria: (a) significantly sub-average intellectual function, and (b) significant deficits in
adaptive behavior.” The trial court also noted that “although an individual may possess an
IQ above what is normally considered appropriate for a finding of intellectual disability, the
12
deficits in such an individual’s adaptive behavior might be so severe that a finding [of]
intellectual disability may still be made or even compelled.” We review the trial court’s
analysis of each prong of the Atkins test separately.
1. Significantly subaverage intellectual function
¶29. The trial court analyzed the first prong as follows:
[T]he three IQ tests administered to Carr resulted in IQ determinations of 70,
72, and 75. These scores all fall on or within the margin of error applicable to
the test. They are not so dramatically low or high to be strongly suggestive
either way on the issue of intellectual disability. This is significant because,
“when a defendant’s IQ test score falls within the test’s acknowledged and
inherent margin of error, the defendant must be able to present additional
evidence of intellectual disability . . . .”
The trial court did not make a specific finding as to the existence of significantly subaverage
intellectual functioning at this juncture in its analysis, because doing so was not necessary.
The only factual finding the trial court needed to make—which it did in light of the evidence
presented—was that the “scores all fall on or within the margin of error applicable to the
test.” Having done so, the trial court properly utilized the correct legal standard, and we
cannot say that its findings amounted to clear error. See Hall, 572 U.S. at 723; see also Carr
III, 196 So. 3d at 934.
2. Significant deficits in adaptive behavior
¶30. The trial court correctly described each of the three domains: conceptual, social and
practical and recognized that “[s]ignificant deficits in one of the domains is required.” The
trial court then examined the testimony of three different witnesses to determine whether
Carr exhibited significant deficits in adaptive behavior. Specifically, the trial court reviewed
13
the testimony of Dr. Gilbert Macvaugh, the State’s expert witness, Dr. O’Brien, Carr’s expert
witness and Johnnie Chaney, a childhood associate of Carr’s.
¶31. Discussing adaptive-deficit testing, the trial court stated that, “[a]ccording to Dr.
Macvaugh, such tests were not designed to assess individuals who have been incarcerated
in a heavily structured environment such as exists in jails/prison.” The trial court noted that
“[u]ltimately, Macvaugh agreed that Carr exhibited deficits in the areas of functional
academics, employment, and perhaps social.” The trial court also considered the testimoney
of Carr’s expert stating, “Dr. O’Brien found deficits in all three domains and in 8 of the 10
adaptive skills” and explicitly “addressed the areas of communication, self-direction, leisure,
social, community use and work and found deficits in all such areas.” Further, the trial court
noted Johnnie Chaney’s testimony but found it to be a “mixed bag,” ultimately determining
that “the issue came down more to the testimony and credibility of the experts.” It then
found that Carr had not shown significant adaptive-skill deficits.
¶32. Carr argues that the trial court’s original order held that Carr had at least two of the
adaptive-functioning deficits. Carr also argues that the “so severe” language has changed
the standard to require “super deficits” in adaptive functioning. We disagree.
¶33. First, as concluded above, Carr III’s “so severe” language does not create a new
standard requiring “super deficits.” See Hall, 572 U.S. at 712 (alteration in original) (“[A]
person with an IQ score above 70 may have such severe adaptive behavior problems . . . that
the person’s actual functioning is comparable to that of individuals with a lower IQ score.”
(quoting Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 37 (5th ed. 2013))).
14
¶34. Second, while the trial court did originally find that “Carr has demonstrated adaptive
skill deficits in at least two (2) of the adaptive skill areas,” the trial court did not find
significant adaptive-skill deficits. Under Chase V, adaptive-skill deficits require a showing
of “significant limitations in adaptive behavior” that “should be established through the use
of standardized measures normed on the general population, including people with
disabilities and people without disabilities.” Chase V, 171 So. 3d at 486 (quoting Intellectual
Disability: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Support 43 (11th ed. 2010)).
Specifically, Chase V provided that the “significant limitations in adaptive behavior are
operationally defined as performance that is approximately two standard deviations below
the mean . . . .” Id. (quoting Intellectual Disability: Definition, Classification, and Systems
of Support 43 (11th ed. 2010)).6
¶35. The Chase V Court also considered that none of the experts had performed the
adaptive-deficits analysis properly, noting that Dr. Macvaugh, who was one of the experts,
had written an article on the importance of using normed data. Id. (citing Macvaugh, G.S.,
& Cunningham, M.D., Atkins v. Virginia: Implications and Recommendations for Forensic
Practice, 37 J. of Psychiatry & the Law 131, 168 (2009)). The Chase V Court concluded that
because the burden rested on Chase, the trial court’s finding that Chase had failed to prove
intellectual disability did not constitute clear error. Chase V, 171 So. 3d at 486. Carr III did
6
The Moore II decision also described the clinical approach to determining the
significance of adaptive deficits: “clinicians look to whether an individual’s adaptive
performance falls two or more standard deviations below the mean in any of the three
adaptive skill sets (conceptual, social, and practical).” Moore II, 139 S. Ct. at 668 (quoting
Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1046).
15
not review Chase V’s emphasis on normed data. However, in requiring the trial court “to
consider whether Carr’s adaptive functioning deficits—which the circuit judge found to
exist—are so severe that Carr should be ruled intellectually disabled through an interrelated
analysis with his IQ scores, which the circuit judge found to be between 70 and 75,” Carr
III supported Chase V’s requirement. Carr III, 196 So. 3d at 943-44 (footnote omitted).
¶36. In sum, the trial court did as Carr III instructed. In weighing the testimony, the trial
court considered Carr’s adaptive deficits in an interrelated analysis with Carr’s IQ scores and
concluded that the deficits were not significant in nature. Further, because no expert
employed the use of normed data, we conclude, as we did in Chase V, that the trial court’s
rejecting Dr. O’Brien’s testimony and finding that Carr had not proved intellectual disability
by preponderance of the evidence was not clear error.
3. Manifestation before age 18
¶37. Carr argues that the trial court has still failed to issue a finding on the third prong.
Under the trial court’s revised analysis and findings on the second prong, analysis on the
third prong was not required. Hall, 572 U.S. at 723. However, the trial court did properly
analyze the third prong. Therefore, we disagree.
¶38. In Carr III, we stated, “Because the circuit judge found that adaptive functioning
deficits existed based on evidence which largely focused on Carr’s academic performance
before age eighteen, we instruct the trial court to review its findings on this prong upon
remand.” Carr III, 196 So. 3d at 943 n.10. The trial court considered the credibility of the
witnesses, their testimony and the evidence regarding Carr’s schooling and determined that
16
“Carr failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was suffering from an
intellectual disability that had manifested itself prior to the age of 18.”
¶39. Just as Carr III directed, the trial court considered and weighed all of the evidence
presented and made a reasoned finding that Carr had failed to meet his burden. Specifically,
the trial court did not ignore any of the testimony but weighed it. See Brown v. State, 168 So.
3d 884, 894 (Miss. 2015) (distinguishing between a trial judge’s weighing testimony and his
not ignoring it). Thus, because we “give deference to the trial judge as the ultimate finder
of fact,” we do “not reweigh the evidence on appeal,” and we conclude that no clear error
exists. Id.
CONCLUSION
¶40. Carr’s argument for a new hearing is waived on appeal and, notwithstanding the
waiver, is without merit. Further, the trial court’s rejecting Dr. O’Brien’s testimony and
finding that Carr had not proved intellectual disability by preponderance of the evidence was
not clear error. Finally, the trial court properly revisited the third prong of the Atkins test as
required by the remand order in Carr III. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court
holding that Carr is not intellectually disabled.
¶41. AFFIRMED.
RANDOLPH, C.J., COLEMAN, MAXWELL, BEAM AND GRIFFIS, JJ.,
CONCUR. KING, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION
JOINED BY KITCHENS, P.J., AND ISHEE, J.
KING, PRESIDING JUSTICE, DISSENTING:
¶42. Considering the totality of the evidence presented, I would hold that the trial court
clearly erred in its finding that Carr failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
17
he was intellectually disabled within the parameters of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122
S. Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002). Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s affirmance
of the trial court’s decision and would reverse the trial court’s ruling and render judgment
in favor of Carr.
¶43. The United States Supreme Court, in Atkins, concluded that, construing the Eighth
Amendment “in the light of our ‘evolving standards of decency,’” the capital punishment
of intellectually disabled offenders is unconstitutional and constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. Id. at 321 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 91 L.
Ed. 2d 335 (1986)). As the majority states, the Atkins decision exempts even those who are
minimally intellectually disabled from execution. Chase v. State, 171 So. 3d 463, 467 (Miss.
2015) (Chase V) (emphasis added) (quoting Chase v. State, 873 So. 2d 1013, 1026 (Miss.
2004) (Chase III)). Intellectual Disability is “characterized by significant limitations in both
intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and
practical adaptive skills.” Chase V, 171 So. 3d at 469 (quoting Intellectual Disability:
Definition, Classification, and Systems of Support 1 (11th ed. 2010)).
¶44. At the conclusion of an Atkins hearing, the trial court must determine “whether the
defendant has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant” is
intellectually disabled. Chase III, 873 So. 2d at 1029. “Preponderance of the evidence in
Mississippi, as elsewhere, simply means that evidence which shows that the fact to be proved
is more probable than not.” Gardner v. Wilkinson, 643 F.2d 1135, 1137 (5th Cir. 1981).
“This burden simply requires the greater or more convincing evidence. The burden is far less
than clear and convincing evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt.” City of Meridian v.
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Hodge, 632 So. 2d 1309, 1314 (Miss. 1994) (Smith, J., dissenting). Due to the irreversible
nature of capital punishment, “[t]horoughness and intensity of review are heightened in cases
where the death penalty has been imposed.” Irving v. State, 361 So. 2d 1360, 1363 (Miss.
1978) (citing Augustine v. State, 201 Miss. 731, 29 So. 2d 454, 454 (1947)).
I. Intellectual Functioning
¶45. Subaverage intellectual functioning is measured by intelligence quotient (IQ). Chase
III, 873 So. 2d at 1021. “[I]ntellectual disability ‘may . . . be present in an individual with
an IQ of up to 75.’” Chase V, 171 So. 3d at 468 (quoting Chase III, 873 So. 2d at 1028
n.18). Here, Carr established that his IQ scores fell within the range that can indicate
intellectual disability. Dr. William Kallman first evaluated Carr for intellectual disability in
1990, when Carr was twenty-five years old. Dr. Kallman found that Carr had a performance
IQ of 63 and a verbal IQ of 72, for a Full Scale IQ of 70. Dr. Kallman stated that Carr’s score
was in the mildly intellectually disabled range on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale–Revised (WAIS-R). Dr. Kallman concluded that Carr was functioning in the mildly
intellectually disabled range in intelligence and that Carr’s “performance on the IQ test and
the neuropsychological screening instruments are all indicative of someone who is
functioning at a relatively low level cognitively.” He found that “there were no signs of
malingering or intentional efforts to distort the data” and stated that Carr’s deficits were
spread across all areas and were nonspecific.
¶46. The Forensic Unit at Mississippi State Hospital (MSH) evaluated Carr in 2009, when
he was forty-four years old, and administered two IQ tests. The MSH report, signed by Dr.
Gilbert S. Macvaugh III, stated that Carr achieved a Full Scale IQ of 72 on the WAIS-IV. On
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the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales, Fifth Edition (SB5), Carr scored a Full Scale IQ of
75. Like Dr. Kallman, the MSH report found that Carr did not appear to be malingering
cognitive deficits. Dr. Macvaugh also stated that Carr’s IQ scores would have been even
lower had they been adjusted downward due to the Flynn Effect. The Flynn Effect “is a
phenomenon positing that, over time, standardized IQ test scores tend to increase with the
age of the test without a corresponding increase in actual intelligence in the general
population.” Thorson v. State, 76 So. 3d 667, 672 (Miss. 2011) (quoting Wiley v. Epps, 625
F.3d 199, 203 n.1 (5th Cir. 2010)). The MSH report concluded that Carr’s test scores did not
rule out the possibility of a diagnosis of mild intellectual disability. In addition, Dr. Gerald
O’Brien, a licensed psychologist, issued a report on April 6, 2012, in which he stated, with
a reasonable degree of certainty, that Carr met the intellectual-functioning prong of
intellectual disability.
¶47. Each of Carr’s IQ scores fell within the range that can indicate intellectual disability.
Because Carr proved by a preponderance of the evidence that his IQ was 75 or below, the
trial court must address the second Atkins prong—significant deficits in adaptive
functioning. Thorson, 76 So. 3d at 683.
II. Significant Limitations in Adaptive Behavior
¶48. The American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disability (AAIDD)
defines each domain of adaptive functioning. The conceptual skills domain
includes “language; reading and writing; and money, time, and number
concepts.” The social skills domain includes “interpersonal skills, social
responsibility, self-esteem, gullibility, naïveté (i.e., wariness), follows
rules/obeys laws, avoids being victimized, and social problem solving.” The
practical skills domain includes “activities of daily living (personal care),
occupational skills, use of money, safety, health care, travel/transportation,
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schedules/routines, and use of the telephone.” For a diagnosis of intellectual
disability, an individual must have significant deficits in one of the three
adaptive functioning domains.
Chase V, 171 So. 3d at 469 (citations omitted). I believe that Carr presented overwhelming
evidence that he had significant deficits in several domains of adaptive functioning.
¶49. Dr. O’Brien concluded that Carr was considered to be intellectually disabled
consistent with both Atkins and Chase. Dr. O’Brien found that Carr’s reports indicated
“significant deficits in all three adaptive types or domains defined by the AAIDD, and in
eight of the ten included skill areas. . . .” (Emphasis added.) Dr. O’Brien stated that Carr’s
deficits were “in the conceptual domain (including communication, functional academics,
and self-direction), the social domain (including leisure and social skills), and the practical
domain (including home living, health and safety, and self-care).” In addition, the MSH
report stated that Carr may have demonstrated significant limitations in at least two areas of
adaptive behavior before the age of eighteen, functional academics and work.
¶50. In the conceptual domain of adaptive deficits, competence in reading, writing, and
math reasoning become probative. Dr. Victoria Swanson, a licensed psychologist, evaluated
Carr in 2010, when Carr was forty-four years old. Even at age forty-four, Dr. Swanson found
that Carr was operating on a mostly fourth-grade level. Carr scored at a fourth-grade level
on Brief Achievement, Brief Reading, Brief Math, and Academic Skills. Carr’s highest score
was in Broad Reading and was at only a fifth-grade level.
¶51. Dr. Kallman testified that Carr’s IQ and achievement testing indicated that he
doesn’t have very good cognitive skills, he doesn’t understand a whole lot of
what goes on around him, he doesn’t have a lot of basic living skills, such as
simply arithmetic and reading abilities, and . . . Well, this person would have
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great difficulty functioning independently in the world unless it was a fairly
simple task that did not require a lot of intellectual understanding and activity.
¶52. Carr’s school records also indicate significant deficits in functional academics. Carr
failed the third, seventh, and ninth grades and dropped out of school at age seventeen after
his second attempt at ninth grade. In addition, his grades were poor throughout the whole of
his school years. As the MSH report stated, Carr’s grades as a whole ranged “from failing
to barely passing in most subjects. . . .” In the fifth grade, Carr’s standardized testing scores
mostly were at the second-grade academic level. On standard achievement tests administered
in the eighth grade, Carr obtained national percentile rankings which ranged from the first
percentile to the thirty-sixth percentile. Carr’s reading standard score in the eighth grade was
in the .8 percentile, meaning that more than 99 percent of students taking the test scored
higher in reading than Carr. Similarly, in math over 99 percent of students ranked higher than
Carr, and 99 percent of students scored higher in spelling than Carr. Thus even Carr’s best
standardized test score was lower than 64 percent of the students who took the test. Carr’s
national percentile was ten, which meant that 90 percent of students taking the test scored
higher than Carr.
¶53. The MSH report concluded that Carr probably demonstrated adaptive-behavior
deficits in the area of functional academics prior to the age of eighteen. Dr. Macvaugh found
probative that Carr had failed the third, seventh, and ninth grades. In addition, it noted that
Carr’s grades had been “quite poor, ranging from failing to barely passing in most subjects
throughout his school years.” However, Dr. Macvaugh was concerned with Carr’s absences
from school. Although the trial court also was concerned about Carr’s poor attendance, even
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when Carr repeated grades, he continually maintained poor marks in school. In addition,
Carr’s IQ scores continually have remained around the same significantly low level.
¶54. Carr also presented sufficient evidence to show significant deficits in the social-skills
domain. Dr. Kallman’s report stated that Carr’s personalty assessment suggested that he was
a “severely disturbed individual who has been in a state of extreme emotional turmoil for
most of his life.” He additionally reported that Carr’s profile was “consistent with others who
are labelled [sic] ‘dangerous psychotics.’” Although the MSH report took issue with Dr.
Kallman’s suggestion that Carr may have been exaggerating symptoms of mental illness, Dr.
Kallman repeatedly stated in his report that the evaluation was a valid indicator of Carr’s
current state of cognitive and emotional functioning. Dr. Kallman additionally stated that
“[t]here were no signs of malingering or intentional efforts to distort the data.”
¶55. Carr additionally presented testimony from Johnie Chaney, a childhood acquaintance
of Carr’s. Chaney testified that when Carr was approximately fifteen or sixteen, Chaney
would have to help him “keep his clothes right on him.” Chaney testified that he would have
to tell Carr to tie his shoes and to clean up when he had “an odor.” Dr. O’Brien testified that
Chaney’s testimony was consistent with his own opinions regarding Carr’s deficits. The trial
court found probative the portion of Chaney’s testimony in which he stated that Carr had
played softball with other young people. And Chaney did state that Carr could play softball
in the outfield, however, he additionally stated that he had to tell Carr to run and catch the
ball. Chaney also testified that Carr got along with everybody only when they were not trying
to take advantage of him or trying to make him do crazy things. Therefore, I disagree with
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the trial court’s contention that Chaney’s testimony was not helpful and would find that
Chaney’s testimony showed additional deficits in Carr’s social and practical skills.
¶56. Dr. Macvaugh stated that Carr also may have demonstrated significant limitations
relating to work. He stated that he did not have access to information to confirm the validity
of Carr’s work experience and that it was unclear whether he experienced difficulty relating
to work. However, Carr clearly could not hold a steady job. Before the age of twenty-five,
Carr’s various positions included chopping cotton, working as a janitor, working at a tire
shop performing tire rotations, reading meters with the water department, working on boat
motors, and working at service stations and clubs. Dr. Macvaugh’s lack of access to
information from Carr’s former employers did not cancel out Carr’s broken work history,
which Dr. Kallman also noted.
¶57. Considering the totality of the evidence presented, I would find that the trial court
erred in its ruling that Carr failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he
suffered from significant adaptive deficits.
III. Prior to Age Eighteen
¶58. Lastly, Carr presented sufficient evidence that his adaptive deficits did in fact manifest
prior to age eighteen. On remand, the trial court wrote that “there is no evidence that Carr
was administered an IQ test prior to age 18.” In addition, the MSH report stated that,
[i]n summary, Mr. Carr does, in our opinion, have intellectual limitations and
may very well have met the diagnostic criteria for [intellectual disability]
before the age of 18. However, we cannot be certain of this because he never
received intelligence testing or a standardized assessment of his adaptive
functioning before age 18.
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Yet Carr must not be penalized because he was not given an IQ test before his eighteenth
birthday. As Dr. O’Brien stated, “there’s almost never an IQ test in a case like this before the
age of 18. . . . But we do have what you might call collateral information about his academic
functioning which is strongly suggestive of an IQ score in the range we’re talking about.”
Thus, while Carr was not given a formal IQ test before he turned eighteen, he presented clear
evidence indicating his IQ and adaptive deficits prior to age eighteen—testimony from family
and friends and his school grades.
¶59. Dr. O’Brien reported that he definitively found that Carr’s deficits existed prior to age
eighteen. Dr. O’Brien testified that, at about the third-grade level, Carr started reaching the
end of his academic potential. Carr “reached the limit at which he could no longer keep up
with the average student in that school. . . .” Dr. O’Brien additionally found that Carr was not
considered to have been deceptive or malingering during any ability testing. Carr’s IQ scores
after he turned eighteen also present evidence of his intellectual functioning prior to his
turning eighteen. See Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349, 363 (5th Cir. 2007) (“And,
although Rivera did not take the WAIS-III test prior to age 18, the district court found that
the combination of his score of 68, other evidence of Rivera’s intellectual functioning, and
his performance in school ‘establish that Rivera had significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning prior to the age of 18.’”). Seven years after Carr turned eighteen, Dr. Kallman
established that Carr had an IQ score of 70.
¶60. Chaney testified that when Carr was approximately fifteen to sixteen, he had to tell
Carr when to tie his shoes and when he had an odor. Carr’s sister, Annette Carr, stated that
Carr was slow growing up and that he never lived independently. Carr’s sister, Sarah Carr
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Jefferson, also thought that Carr was slow and had mental-health problems. Sarah stated that
Carr would sometimes talk to dogs and that the dogs talked to him when he was young.
Carr’s former school teacher stated that she taught Carr in the fifth and sixth grades and that
Carr was a slow learner and a poor student. She attributed this to his home environment and
his attitude.
¶61. In addition, in its opinion remanding this case to the circuit court, this Court stated that
the trial court had found “that adaptive functioning deficits existed based on evidence which
largely focused on Carr’s academic performance before age eighteen . . . .” Carr III, 196
So. 3d at 943 n.10 (emphasis added). This Court then instructed the trial court to review its
findings on whether Carr’s adaptive functioning deficits existed prior to age eighteen. Id.
Thus, this Court’s own language on remand strongly indicated that Carr had in fact shown
adaptive-functioning deficits before he turned eighteen.
IV. Summary
¶62. As previously stated, Atkins prohibits the death penalty for those who are even
minimally intellectually disabled. The standard in this case was the preponderance of the
evidence. A preponderance of the evidence does not require proof beyond doubt nor does it
require even convincing proof. Producers Gin Ass’n v. Beck, 215 Miss. 263, 60 So. 2d 642,
644 (1952). A preponderance of the evidence means exactly that—the greater weight of the
evidence.
¶63. Carr presented a report and testimony from Dr. O’Brien, who found to a reasonable
degree of psychological certainty that Carr was intellectually disabled. In addition, Dr.
Kallman also found that Carr was functioning in the mildly intellectually disabled range. Carr
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presented evidence of Dr. Swanson’s testing that indicated Carr was functioning on a mostly
fourth-grade level, which was corroborated by Carr’s school records. And although Dr.
Macvaugh concluded that overall he was “unable to form an opinion to a reasonable degree
of psychological and psychiatric certainty regarding whether or not Mr. Carr is [intellectually
disabled] as defined by” Atkins and Chase, even he agreed that Carr may have demonstrated
significant limitations in at least two areas of adaptive behavior before the age of eighteen.
¶64. This is not even a case of opposing experts. The evidence showed that one expert
stated Carr could be intellectually disabled but that he was not certain. Yet Carr presented
evidence from two experts stating that he was intellectually disabled, presented school
records that showed significant academic deficits, presented testimony indicating that Carr
had to be told when to tie his shoes and when to bathe, and presented IQ tests showing
significant intellectual deficits. Because the death penalty is final and cannot be reversed, all
doubts are to be resolved in favor of the accused. Lynch v. State, 951 So. 2d 549, 555 (Miss.
2007). Resolving all doubts in favor of Carr, clearly the greater weight of the evidence
showed that Carr was intellectually disabled within the meaning of Atkins. I would find that
the trial court erred in its finding that Carr failed to prove his intellectual disability claim by
a preponderance of the evidence.
¶65. Carr established that his IQ scores each fell within the margin of error applicable to
the test, that he had significant adaptive deficits in more than one area, and that those deficits
manifested before the age of eighteen. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s ruling
on intellectual disability and would render judgment in favor of Carr.
KITCHENS, P.J., AND ISHEE, J., JOIN THIS OPINION.
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