Daniel Luther Beasley v. State of Mississippi

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2012-KA-01595-SCT
DANIEL LUTHER BEASLEY a/k/a DANIEL
BEASLEY a/k/a DANIEL L. BEASLEY
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/19/2012
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. FORREST A. JOHNSON, JR.
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: AMITE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES
PHILLIP W. BROADHEAD
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: STEPHANIE B. WOOD
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: RONNIE LEE HARPER
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 01/16/2014
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE WALLER, C.J., LAMAR AND PIERCE, JJ.
WALLER, CHIEF JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Daniel Luther Beasley appeals from the verdict of an Amite County jury finding him
guilty of murder. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶2. Janie Wilkinson owned a beauty salon behind her house in Liberty, Mississippi. She
converted the salon into an apartment and allowed her nephew Daniel Beasley to live there.
At a family gathering at Wilkinson’s house on Easter weekend of 2011, Wilkinson discussed
converting the apartment back into a beauty salon for her granddaughter to operate.
Wilkinson told Beasley that he would have to move out of the apartment at some point so she
could begin renovations on the salon. Wilkinson later told her son Bill Baggett that Beasley
had become very upset about having to move out of the apartment.
¶3. On May 14, 2011, Wilkinson went to Martha Kello’s house to play cards. When she
arrived, she was visibly upset about an incident with Beasley earlier in the day. Wilkinson
had locked herself out of her house earlier in the day, so she asked Beasley to crawl through
a window to retrieve the keys. Beasley had felt Wilkinson’s pockets to see if she had actually
left the keys in the house, and this apparently had upset Wilkinson. Wilkinson played cards
at Kello’s house until approximately 7:00 p.m. and then returned home. This was the last
time she was seen alive.
¶4. Kello called Wilkinson several times over the next two days, but Wilkinson never
answered the phone. Kello became concerned, because she and Wilkinson usually talked on
a regular basis, so she called Wilkinson’s sister Mary Artman. Artman had not heard from
Wilkinson either.
¶5. Kello went to Wilkinson’s house on May 16, 2011, to check on her. She knocked on
the front door and did not get an answer. The doors to the house were locked, but she
noticed that the lights were on in the back of the house. Kello then went to pick up Artman,
who had a spare key to the house, and then returned. Kello and Artman entered the house
and found Wilkinson’s dead body wrapped in a comforter in the back bedroom. She was
wearing the same clothes she had been wearing at Kello’s house two days earlier.
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Wilkinson’s head was covered in blood, and blood was splattered on the walls and furniture
in the room. Artman testified that she was so upset by the scene that she forgot to call 9-1-1.
Instead, Artman called a store where she previously had worked and told them what had
happened. An employee at the store then called 9-1-1.
¶6. Officer Sean Umbrello of the Liberty Police Department was the first to arrive on the
scene. Umbrello described the scene as follows:
Large amount of blood in that room and also the hallway leading back to that
room from the kitchen, there was drops of blood in the hall, and they stopped
in the kitchen next to a counter where there was a purse on top of the counter.
The police found Wilkinson’s dog dead in a trash can just outside the house. The police did
not find evidence of forced entry, and no items had been stolen from the house.
¶7. Anna Savrock, a crime-scene investigator with the Mississippi Bureau of
Investigation, performed an investigation of Wilkinson’s home and Beasley’s apartment
shortly after the first responders arrived. Savrock noticed that Wilkinson’s arm was hanging
in the air in an unnatural position due to rigor mortis and determined that Wilkinson’s body
probably had been moved between ten and twelve hours after her death. During her
investigation of Beasley’s apartment, Savrock found a bloody napkin in a trash can and
noticed that the counters in Beasley’s bathroom were still wet. Using a chemical called Blue
Star, Savrock found traces of what appeared to be blood in Beasley’s shower. Savrock
explained that Blue Star reacts with bleach, as well as blood, but opined that the pattern of
particles in Beasley’s shower was not consistent with a cleaning action.
¶8. Later that day, police officers found bloody clothes in a dumpster behind the local
Exxon station. LaDonna Chapman, a cashier at the Exxon station, testified that she had seen
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Beasley behind the Exxon station when she was taking trash to the dumpster. In the
dumpster, Chapman saw a jacket that Beasley had been wearing earlier. Chapman testified
that she recognized Beasley because he came to the Exxon station almost every day. The
police collected a blue hooded sweatshirt and gray sweat pants from the dumpster and sent
cuttings from each to the Mississippi Crime Laboratory for testing. Joseph Cothern, an
officer with the Liberty Police Department, testified that he had seen Beasley wearing these
same clothes while he was walking down Main Street in Liberty on May 14, 2011. The
blood found on the sweatshirt and sweat pants was determined to be consistent with a
reference DNA sample taken from Wilkinson. DNA taken from skin cells found on the
inside of the sweat pants was found to be consistent with a reference DNA sample taken from
Beasley.
¶9. Dr. Mark Levon, chief medical examiner for the State of Mississippi, performed the
autopsy of Wilkinson’s body. Dr. Levon indicated that Wilkinson’s body had undergone
“post mortem changes,” meaning that she had been dead for some time before she was
discovered. Dr. Levon determined that the cause of Wilkinson’s death was multiple sharp-
force trauma, and that the manner of death was homicide. Wilkinson had suffered multiple
blunt-force injuries, as well as sixteen “sharp force or cut or chop type injuries made to the
head and neck area,” the most severe of which resulted in actual cutting of the skull. While
no murder weapon was ever recovered,1 Dr. Levon indicated that Wilkinson’s injuries could
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Investigators found a hatchet under a bed in another room of the house, but they
determined that the hatchet had not been recently used. Investigators also noticed that a
knife was missing from the block in Wilkinson’s kitchen. The knife was never recovered.
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have been caused by a hatchet, ax, or machete. During the autopsy, Dr. Levon discovered
that Wilkinson also had sustained some defensive wounds to her hands, indicating that some
sort of struggle had taken place before her death.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
¶10. Beasley was arrested and indicted for deliberate-design murder. Beasley’s indictment
indicates that the State sought an enhanced penalty for the commission of a felony against
a victim over the age of sixty-five. Prior to trial, Beasley filed a motion for mental evaluation
to determine his competency to stand trial. The trial court granted this motion and ordered
Beasley to undergo a competency examination. After the examination had been conducted,
the trial court held a competency hearing and determined that Beasley was competent to
stand trial.
¶11. A jury trial was conducted in the Circuit Court of Amite County, Mississippi, on
September 18-19, 2012. Beasley chose to testify in his own defense. He claimed that, on
the day of the murder, he was in his apartment when he heard loud noises coming from
Wilkinson’s house. He stated that he became scared and ran into the woods behind the
apartment. After fifteen or twenty minutes, Beasley claimed that he returned to Wilkinson’s
house and went inside, where he found her dead body lying face-down. Beasley rolled her
over to identify her and then moved her away from the back door of the house. Beasley
admitted that he put Wilkinson’s dog in a trash can, but he denied killing the dog. He also
admitted that he threw his bloody clothes into the dumpster behind the Exxon station. He
claimed that he threw his clothes away because he was afraid the clothes would implicate
him in the murder. Beasley never contacted the police or medical personnel.
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¶12. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a unanimous verdict finding Beasley
guilty of murder. The court sentenced Beasley to life imprisonment. After the trial court
denied Beasley’s post-trial motions, Beasley appealed to this Court, raising the following
issues:
I. Did the trial court err in failing to conduct a hearing to determine
Beasley’s competency to stand trial?
II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting cumulative
photographs depicting the crime scene and the victim’s autopsy?
III. Did the trial court err in failing to sustain the appellant’s motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative, a
new trial?
DISCUSSION
I. Did the trial court err in failing to conduct a hearing to determine
Beasley’s competency to stand trial?
¶13. A criminal defendant has a constitutional right not to be tried while legally
incompetent. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72, 95 S. Ct. 896, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103
(1975). Putting a defendant on trial when his mental state is “so clouded that he cannot
remember and intelligently relate what occurred at the time of the commission of the offense,
is a denial of due process and contrary to public policy[.]” Emanuel v. State, 412 So. 2d
1187, 1188 (Miss. 1982). In order to be deemed competent to stand trial, a defendant must
have the “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding . . . and . . . a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him.” Dusky v. U.S., 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824
(1960) (per curiam). This Court will not overturn a trial court’s finding that a defendant is
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competent to stand trial unless such finding was “manifestly against the overwhelming
weight of the evidence.” Martin v. State, 871 So. 2d 693, 698 (Miss. 2004) (quoting
Emanuel, 412 So. 2d at 1189).
¶14. Our trial courts follow the procedures articulated in Rule 9.06 of the Uniform Rules
of Circuit and County Court Practice to determine whether a criminal defendant is competent
to stand trial. The rule provides:
If before or during trial the court, of its own motion or upon motion of an
attorney, has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is incompetent
to stand trial, the court shall order the defendant to submit to a mental
examination by some competent psychiatrist selected by the court . . . .
After the examination the court shall conduct a hearing to determine if the
defendant is competent to stand trial. After hearing all the evidence, the court
shall weigh the evidence and make a determination of whether the defendant
is competent to stand trial. If the court finds that the defendant is competent
to stand trial, then the court shall make the finding a matter of record and the
case will then proceed to trial.
URCCC 9.06. Simply put, Rule 9.06 “mandates that a competency hearing be conducted
following a court-ordered mental examination.” Hearn v. State, 3 So. 3d 722, 730 (Miss.
2008).
¶15. Beasley argues that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by failing to hold
an adequate on-the-record hearing to determine his competency to stand trial. This Court has
found reversible error where a trial court orders a criminal defendant to undergo a mental
evaluation but fails to meet the remaining requirements of Rule 9.06. See Sanders v. State,
9 So. 3d 1132, 1139 (Miss. 2009); Jay v. State, 25 So. 3d 257, 263 (Miss. 2009) (reversing
and remanding for a new trial subject to a competency hearing, where the record contained
no evidence of a competency hearing or explicit findings by the trial court regarding the
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defendant’s competency to stand trial). However, it is clear from the record that the trial
court complied with all requirements of Rule 9.06.
¶16. Prior to trial, Beasley’s attorney filed a motion for a mental evaluation to determine
whether Beasley was competent to stand trial. The trial court granted the motion, finding that
“[t]here is a legitimate question raised of the defendant’s mental competency,” and ordered
Beasley to undergo psychiatric evaluation at the Mississippi State Hospital at Whitfield.
Beasley was examined by Dr. William C. Lott on September 4, 2012. The trial court then
held a competency hearing on September 14, 2012. The trial judge indicated that Dr. Lott had
submitted a detailed report to the court and ordered a copy of the report to be admitted as an
exhibit at the hearing. In his report, Dr. Lott determined that Beasley “has the sufficient
present ability to confer with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding
and he has a good factual and rational understanding of the nature and object of the
proceedings against him.” The trial judge asked Beasley’s attorney if he had anything further
to present on the issue of competency. Beasley’s attorney replied, “No, Your Honor.” The
trial judge asked the same question to Beasley and the prosecutor. Both answered in the
negative. The trial court then held:
Let the record show that upon hearing of the – on the motion for the
defendant’s competency and the report of Dr. Lott being ordered and admitted
into evidence on this hearing, the Court finds that the defendant is competent
to stand trial for the reasons set out in Dr. Lott’s report, and therefore, he will
be found competent to stand trial.
Beasley’s trial commenced four days later.
¶17. We find that the trial court followed all requirements of Rule 9.06 in determining that
Beasley was competent to stand trial. Beasley simply chose not to present any witnesses or
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other testimony to dispute Dr. Lott’s opinion that Beasley was competent to stand trial. The
trial court’s determination was not manifestly against the overwhelming weight of the
evidence. Accordingly, Beasley’s argument is without merit.
II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting photographs
depicting the crime scene and the victim’s autopsy?
¶18. Beasley argues that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to “bombard[] the
jury with photographs of the gruesome murder,” because “this prosecutorial ploy inevitably
resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial.” Beasley argues that certain photographic exhibits
were so unnecessarily gruesome that they could only serve to inflame the passion of the jury.
¶19. We find that Beasley’s argument is procedurally barred for lack of contemporaneous
objection. Beasley did not object to the admission of any of the State’s twenty-four
photographic exhibits. Upon the State’s request to admit each of the now complained-of
exhibits, the trial court asked Beasley if he had any objection. Beasley replied, “No, Your
Honor,” each time. “This Court has repeatedly held that ‘[i]f no contemporaneous objection
is made, the error, if any, is waived.’” Walker v. State, 671 So. 2d 581, 597 (Miss. 1995)
(quoting Cole v. State, 525 So. 2d 365, 369 (Miss. 1987)). See Barfield v. State, 22 So. 3d
1175, 1180-81 (Miss. 2009) (applying the procedural bar to defendant’s claim that gruesome
photographs admitted into evidence were unfairly prejudicial; failure to object at trial barred
consideration of the issue on appeal). Beasley waived his claim of error regarding the
photographs by failing to object to their admission at trial.
¶20. Beasley admits that he failed to object to the admission of the crime-scene and
autopsy photographs at trial. Nevertheless, he argues that the trial court’s decision to admit
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these photographs into evidence was plain error. See Foster v. State, 639 So. 2d 1263, 1289
(Miss. 1994) (citing Gray v. State, 487 So. 2d 1304, 1312 (Miss. 1986) (“The defendant who
fails to make a contemporaneous objection must rely on plain error to raise the assignment
on appeal.”)). The plain-error doctrine is implicated when an error occurs at trial which
affects substantial rights and results in “a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Gray v. State, 549
So. 2d at 1316, 1321 (Miss. 1989). Thus, procedural bar notwithstanding, we will discuss
the merits of this issue to determine whether the introduction of these exhibits denied Beasley
his right to a fair trial.
¶21. This Court reviews the admission of photographs for abuse of discretion, but the trial
court’s discretion in deciding whether to allow the admission of photographs “runs toward
almost unlimited admissibility.” Williams v. State, 544 So. 2d 782, 785 (Miss. 1987). Even
if the photograph is “gruesome, grisly, unpleasant, or even inflammatory,” it still may be
admitted so long as it has “probative value and its introduction serves a meaningful
evidentiary purpose.” Noe v. State, 616 So. 2d 298, 303 (Miss. 1993) (string citation
omitted). A photograph has a “meaningful evidentiary purpose” when it aids in describing
the circumstances of the killing, describes the location of the body and cause of death, or
supplements or clarifies witness testimony. Westbrook v. State, 658 So. 2d 847, 849 (Miss.
1995) (citations omitted).
¶22. At trial, the State sought to admit a set of photographs depicting the scene of the
crime. Specifically, the State presented Exhibits 8 and 9 during the testimony of Ellis
Hollingsworth, a Mississippi Highway Patrol officer, to help describe the location and
condition of Wilkinson’s body when she was discovered. The photographs were taken at
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different angles. Exhibit 8 is a low-angle shot of Wilkinson’s upper body. Exhibit 9 was
taken from directly over Wilkinson’s body and more clearly depicts her face.
¶23. The State also introduced photographs from Wilkinson’s autopsy, depicting
Wilkinson’s specific injuries. Specifically, Exhibits 25, 26, and 27 were admitted during the
testimony of Dr. Mark Levon, the medical examiner who performed Wilkinson’s autopsy.
Exhibit 25 depicts the back of Wilkinson’s head and shows several significant gashes on her
scalp. Exhibit 26, which was taken after Wilkinson’s head had been shaved, allows a better
view of the wounds. Exhibit 27 is similar to Exhibit 26 but is more centered on the back of
Wilkinson’s head.
¶24. In support of his argument that the admission of these photographs was error, Beasley
relies on McNeal v. State, 551 So. 2d 151 (Miss. 1989), where this Court reversed a criminal
defendant’s murder conviction based on the admission of certain photographic exhibits. The
photographs introduced by the State in McNeal were described by this Court as “some of the
most gruesome photographs ever presented to this Court.” Id. at 159. Specifically, the life-
sized, full-color photographs depicted the victim’s nude and partially decomposed body,
including a full-color, close-up view of the victim’s decomposed, maggot-infested skull. Id.
This Court held that, in deciding whether to admit particularly graphic photographs into
evidence, the trial court must consider: “(1) whether the proof is absolute or in doubt as to
identity of the guilty party, as well as, (2) whether the photographs are necessary evidence
or simply a ploy on the part of the prosecutor to arouse the passion and prejudice of the jury.”
Id. While the State argued that the photographs were necessary to prove the manner of the
victim’s death, this Court found that they had little or no evidentiary value when compared
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with their tendency to inflame and prejudice the jury. Id. This Court could not say that the
admission of the photographs did not substantially and adversely affect the defendant’s right
to a fair trial. Id. at 160 (citing Miss. R. Evid. 103).
¶25. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, we find that Beasley’s claim is without merit.
While some of the photographs are particularly graphic, even the McNeal Court reasoned
that “we do not presume to conclude that every gruesome photograph admitted into evidence
constitutes an abuse of discretion[.]” Id. at 159. “Some probative value is the only
requirement needed in order to support a trial judge’s decision to admit photographs into
evidence.” Chamberlin v. State, 989 So. 2d 320, 340 (Miss. 2008) (emphasis added)
(quoting Jones v. State, 920 So. 2d 465, 476-77 (Miss. 2006)). Unlike the photographs in
McNeal, the challenged photographs in this case had probative evidentiary value, as they
described the circumstances and location of the killing, illustrated the cause and manner of
Wilkinson’s death, and supplemented the testimony of several witnesses.
¶26. Exhibits 8 and 9 described the circumstances of the killing and the location of the
body and were used to supplement the testimony of the officers who found Wilkinson’s
body. “[T]his Court has consistently allowed photographic evidence to support the testimony
of witnesses . . . who described the scene upon their respective arrivals.” McFee v. State,
511 So. 2d 130, 135 (Miss. 1987) (citations omitted). See Parker v. State, 119 So. 3d 987,
993 (Miss. 2013) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
photographs of murder scene and victim’s gunshot wounds, even though defendant admitted
to shooting the victim, since the photographs “described the location of the body” and
“supplemented or clarified” the investigating officer’s testimony). In addition, Exhibits 25,
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26, and 27 supplemented Dr. Levon’s opinions regarding the cause and manner of death.
These exhibits aided the State in proving an essential element of the crime – that Wilkinson
was murdered with deliberate design. Deliberate design may be proved or inferred from the
use of a deadly weapon. See Higgins v. State, 725 So. 2d 220, 224 (Miss. 1998) (citations
omitted). Because no murder weapon was ever recovered, Exhibits 25, 26, and 27 were
necessary to supplement Dr. Levon’s opinion that Wilkinson’s fatal injuries were caused by
a hatchet, ax, or machete, any of which the jury could have considered to be a deadly weapon
when used to inflict the wounds depicted in the photographs.
¶27. Because the challenged exhibits had evidentiary value in describing the scene of the
crime and the manner of the victim’s death, and notwithstanding the procedural bar, we find
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the State’s photographic exhibits.
III. Did the trial court err in failing to sustain the appellant’s motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative, a
new trial?
¶28. After the jury reached its verdict, Beasley filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict (JNOV), or, in the alternative, a new trial. The trial court denied this motion. On
appeal, Beasley argues that evidence presented against him was legally insufficient to
establish that he murdered Wilkinson. Alternatively, he argues that the jury’s verdict is
against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. “The standard of review for a post-trial
motion is abuse of discretion.” Dilworth v. State, 909 So. 2d 731, 736 (Miss. 2005) (citing
Howell v. State, 860 So. 2d 704, 764 (Miss. 2003)).
A. Whether Beasley is entitled to JNOV.
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¶29. “A motion for [JNOV] challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence.” Ivy v. State,
949 So. 2d 748, 751 (Miss. 2007) (citing McClain v. State, 625 So. 2d 774, 778 (Miss.
1993)). “[T]he critical inquiry is whether the evidence shows ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that
the accused committed the act charged, and that he did so under such circumstances that
every element of the offense existed[.]’” Id. (quoting Carr v. State, 208 So. 2d 886, 889
(Miss. 1968)). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court will view all evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict. Bush v. State, 895 So. 2d 836, 843 (Miss. 2005).
If this Court determines that “reasonable fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial
judgment might reach different conclusions on every element of the offense,” this Court will
hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. Edwards v. State,
469 So. 2d 68, 70 (Miss. 1985). The instant case was a “circumstantial-evidence case,” as
Beasley did not confess to the crime, nor were there any eyewitnesses to the crime. See Jones
v. State, 918 So. 2d 1220, 1234 (Miss. 2005) (citations omitted). Thus, the State had the
burden of proving Beasley’s guilt “not only beyond a reasonable doubt, but to the exclusion
of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence.” Leflore v. State, 535 So. 2d 68,
70 (Miss. 1988) (citing Guilbeau v. State, 502 So .2d 639, 641 (Miss. 1987)). A conviction
based on circumstantial evidence will not be disturbed unless it is opposed by a “decided
preponderance of the evidence.” Id.
¶30. Beasley was charged with murder in violation of Section 97-3-19(1)(a) of the
Mississippi Code, which provides “The killing of a human being without the authority of law
by any means or in any manner shall be murder . . . [w]hen done with deliberate design to
effect the death of the person killed, or of any human being . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-
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19(1)(a) (Rev. 2006). In order to convict Beasley of murdering Wilkinson, the State was
required to prove that Beasley: (1) killed Wilkinson; (2) without authority of law; and (3)
with deliberate design to effect her death. Id. See also Dilworth, 909 So. 2d at 736. It is
undisputed that the State proved that Wilkinson was the victim of a homicide. However,
Beasley argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence proving that he was
Wilkinson’s killer, or that he acted with deliberate design to effect her death.
¶31. Turning to the evidence in this case, we find that the State presented sufficient
evidence proving that Beasley killed Wilkinson. Witnesses for the State testified without
objection that Wilkinson had told them that Beasley was upset with her for making him move
out of the apartment, where he had lived rent-free for more than a year. Beasley also was
able to enter Wilkinson’s house without a key. This fact could have allowed the jury to rule
out an unknown intruder as the killer, since the doors to Wilkinson’s house were still locked
when she was found, and since there was no evidence of forced entry or theft. On the last
day she was seen alive, Wilkinson was visibly upset about a dispute with Beasley. Beasley
admitted to discarding blood-stained clothes into a dumpster at a local gas station, and a
DNA sample taken from the blood was consistent with Wilkinson’s DNA.
¶32. We also find that the State presented sufficient evidence showing that Beasley acted
with deliberate design. As previously noted, deliberate design may be proved or inferred
from the use of a deadly weapon. Higgins, 725 So. 2d at 224 (Miss. 1998) (citations
omitted). The existence of a deadly weapon is a question of fact for the jury to decide. Davis
v. State, 530 So. 2d 694, 702 (Miss. 1988) (citing Duckworth v. State, 477 So. 2d 935, 938
(Miss. 1985)). The crime-scene photographs presented by the State clearly illustrate the
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scene of a brutal murder. Dr. Levon indicated that Wilkinson had suffered sixteen separate
traumatic injuries, including several severe cutting-type injuries to the skull likely caused by
an ax, hatchet, or machete. Dr. Levon also indicated that Wilkinson had suffered several
defensive-type wounds to her hands, suggesting that a struggle had taken place. Although
the jury was instructed on manslaughter, the evidence produced at trial could lead the jury
only to the conclusion that Wilkinson was deliberately murdered.
¶33. Having reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find that
jury’s verdict is not opposed by a “decided preponderance of the evidence,” nor is it “based
on no evidence whatsoever,” which would require reversal of his conviction. Kitchens v.
State, 300 So. 2d 922, 927 (Miss. 1974). Beasley’s testimony conflicted with the scientific
evidence presented by the State. Beasley claimed that he had found and moved Wilkinson’s
body about fifteen or twenty minutes after hearing a commotion inside Wilkinson’s house.
However, after examining Wilkinson’s body, Savrock opined that the body likely was moved
after rigor mortis had set in, ten to twelve hours after Wilkinson’s death. Beasley also never
explained why he allegedly ran into the woods after hearing screams coming from
Wilkinson’s house, or why he never contacted the police or medical personnel after finding
Wilkinson’s body. Circumstantial evidence need not exclude every “probable doubt,” but
only every other “reasonable” hypothesis of innocence. Tolbert v. State, 407 So. 2d 815, 820
(Miss. 1985). After hearing the evidence, the jury reasonably could have rejected Beasley’s
testimony as an unreasonable hypothesis of innocence.
¶34. In sum, we find that the evidence presented by the State was legally sufficient to allow
the jury to find Beasley guilty of deliberate-design murder beyond a reasonable doubt and
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to the exclusion of all reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence. Accordingly, the
trial court did not err in denying Beasley’s motion for JNOV.
B. Whether Beasley is entitled to a new trial.
¶35. A motion for new trial challenges the weight of the evidence. Sheffield v. State, 749
So. 2d 123, 127 (Miss. 1999). In reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, this
Court will overturn a verdict only “when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the
evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Bush, 895
So. 2d at 844. See also Amiker v. Drugs for Less, Inc., 796 So. 2d 942, 947 (Miss. 2000)
(holding that a motion for a new trial is addressed to the discretion of the court and should
be granted only “in exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against
the verdict.”). As with challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court views all
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id. Factual disputes are properly
resolved by a jury and do not mandate a new trial. Temple v. State, 498 So. 2d 379, 382
(Miss. 1986).
¶36. While Beasley claims that the evidence presented by the State is “unsubstantiated” or
“unconvincing,” his specific arguments merely challenge the credibility of the State’s
witnesses. It is not for this Court to pass on the credibility of witnesses, for that is a jury
function. Bond v. State, 162 So. 2d 510, 512 (Miss. 1964) (citation omitted). The jury in this
case was presented with two opposing versions of the circumstances surrounding
Wilkinson’s death. The State presented significant circumstantial evidence portraying
Beasley as Wilkinson’s murderer. In response, Beasley took the stand in an attempt to
rationalize the State’s damning evidence, and his testimony is the only evidence inconsistent
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with the jury’s verdict. The jury was free to accept the testimony of some witnesses and
reject that of others, and this Court “need not determine with exactitude which witness or
what testimony the jury believed or disbelieved in arriving at its verdict.” Brown v. State,
796 So. 2d 223, 227 (Miss. 2001) (citations omitted). In this case, it is clear that the jury
accepted the State’s witnesses and evidence and rejected Beasley’s testimony. Allowing the
jury’s verdict to stand in this case would not “sanction an unconscionable injustice,” as the
evidence does not “preponderate heavily against the verdict.” Bush, 895 So. 2d at 844.
Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in denying Beasley’s motion for a new
trial.
CONCLUSION
¶37. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the jury’s verdict finding Beasley guilty of
murder and the judgment and sentence of the Amite County Circuit Court.
¶38. CONVICTION OF MURDER AND SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT
IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
WITH CONDITIONS, AFFIRMED.
DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., LAMAR, KITCHENS, CHANDLER,
PIERCE, KING AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR.
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