Steve Bryan v. Mayor and Board of Alderman Madison, Mississippi

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2001-CA-01367-SCT
CONSOLIDATED WITH
NO. 97-CA-01205-SCT
STEVE BRYAN
v.
MAYOR AND BOARD OF ALDERMEN, CITY OF
MADISON, MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/07/2001
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LEE J. HOWARD
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: STEVEN H. SMITH
J. BRAD PIGOTT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: JOHN HEDGLIN
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/27/2003
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
CARLSON, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. This is the second time this case has been before us on appeal. See City of Madison v. Bryan,
763 So. 2d 162 (Miss. 2000) (Bryan I). The genesis of the appeal in Bryan I was from an adverse ruling
in the circuit court on not the first, not the second, but the third bill of exceptions filed by Steve Bryan
(Bryan), pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 11-51-75 (Rev. 2002).1 By way of his bill of exceptions, Bryan
1
Any person aggrieved by a judgment or decision of the board of supervisors,
or municipal authorities of a city, town, or village, may appeal within ten (10)
days from the date of adjournment at which session the board of
supervisors or municipal authorities rendered such judgment or decision, and
may embody the facts, judgment and decision in a bill of exceptions which
was attempting to gain the approval of the appropriate governing authorities of the City of Madison (the
City) to build an apartment complex within its corporate limits. The first two bills of exception went no
further than the circuit court. Bryan appealed to the circuit court the action of the City in refusing to
approve his site plan and issue him a building permit to construct the apartments. The circuit court held the
City waived its right to review the staging plan because of its refusal to consider the plans at the next
meeting of the Mayor and Board of Aldermen. The circuit court ordered the City to immediately issue
Bryan a building permit and approve the site plan, staging plan and development plan. However, after a
Motion for Reconsideration, the circuit court reversed its prior ruling finding the issue moot because Bryan
no longer had a valid option on the property. The circuit court preserved the rights of the parties as to
claims for damages, if any. Several months later the circuit court awarded Bryan $19,668.45 in costs and
attorney's fees pursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 11. In Bryan I, this Court reversed the award of attorney's
fees and remanded the case for a hearing regarding any award of costs and attorney's fees to Bryan.
Bryan I, 763 So. 2d at 169.
¶2. Pursuant to our mandate in Bryan I, the circuit court, on April 17, 2001, heard oral arguments
from the parties.2 On June 8, 2001, Bryan filed a Motion to Conduct Evidentiary Hearing on Damages.
shall be signed by the person acting as president of the board of supervisors
or of the municipal authorities. The clerk thereof shall transmit the bill of
exceptions to the circuit court at once, and the court shall either in term time
or in vacation hear and determine the same on the case as presented by the
bill of exceptions as an appellate court, and shall affirm or reverse the
judgment. If the judgment be reversed, the circuit court shall render such
judgment as the board or municipal authorities ought to have rendered, and
certify the same to the board of supervisors or municipal authorities. Costs
shall be awarded as in other cases. . . .
2
After Bryan I, and upon remand, Judge Lee J. Howard, Circuit Judge for the Sixteenth Circuit Court
District, was specially appointed to hear this case due to the retirement of the circuit judge in Bryan I.
2
On June 13, 2001, the circuit court denied Bryan's request for attorney's fees, and in so doing, the circuit
court correctly stated that factual findings and legal rulings made by this Court are binding on a lower court
after a case has been remanded. See Fortune v. Lee County Bd. of Sup'rs, 725 So. 2d 747, 751
(Miss. 1998); Consumer Discount Store v. Warren, 221 So. 2d 112, 113 (Miss. 1969); Colson
v. Sims, 198 So. 2d 225, 226 (Miss. 1967); Continental Turp. & Rosin Co. v. Gulf Naval Stores
Co., 244 Miss. 465, 142 So. 2d 200, 207 (1962); Holcomb v. McClure, 127 Miss. 617, 64 So. 2d
689, 690 (1953). The circuit court cited the following factual findings and legal determinations made by
this Court in Bryan I:
1. Steve Bryan did not have a valid option on the property at issue when he filed his
appeal to the circuit court. 763 So. 2d at 165.
2. The City defending its actions in circuit court and appealing to the Mississippi
Supreme Court was not frivolous. Id. at 163.
3. Only the third Bill of Exceptions was the subject of the Mississippi Supreme Court
appeal. Id.
4. When Bryan filed his Bill of Exceptions with the circuit court on June 23, 1995, the
record reveals that he was not the owner of the property, nor did he have a valid
option to purchase, a valid contract to purchase ro a mortgage or any other
encumbrance on the property. Id. at 166.
5. "Bryan did not have standing to appeal." Id.
6. The City's appeal can hardly be considered frivolous, as "clearly there was a
reasonable hope of success. . . ." Id. at 168.
The circuit court was charged with finding whether any legal basis existed for an award of attorney's fees
in favor of Bryan against the City. Because this Court determined Bryan had no standing to appeal, the
circuit court held the action was properly dismissed and the question of attorney's fees was moot. Judge
Howard opined:
Since the Mississippi Supreme Court has expressly ruled that (1) this case concerns
Bryan's Bill of Exceptions dated June 23, 1995 (Paragraphs 3 and [20], Supreme Court
opinion); and (2) Bryan never had standing to file that Bill of Exceptions (Paragraph 20,
Supreme Court opinion), then what justification is there to require the City to pay
Bryan's attorney's fees for an appeal which Bryan had no standing to file?
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(emphasis in original). Finding there was no legal basis to justify an award of attorney's fees against the
City, Judge Howard denied Bryan's request. On June 21, 2001, the circuit judge also denied Bryan's
motion to conduct an evidentiary hearing on damages as moot in light of his previous ruling.
¶3. On July 31, 2001, Bryan perfected his appeal to this Court raising the following issues for review:
I. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED ON REMAND BY
FAILING AND/OR REFUSING TO CONDUCT AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING REGARDING AN AWARD OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY
FEES TO BRYAN.
II. WHETHER THE THREE MEMORANDA OPINIONS AND
ORDERS RENDERED BY THE MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT
COURT CONSTITUTE MORE THAN SUFFICIENT BASIS, IN LAW
AND IN FACT, TO SUPPORT THE AWARD OF "COSTS,
INCLUDING ATTORNEY'S FEES" AGAINST THE CITY OF
MADISON.
III. WHETHER THE CITY OF MADISON'S ALLEGEDLY
UNLAWFUL CONDUCT WHICH ARGUABLY RENDERED MOOT
BRYAN'S RIGHT TO A BUILDING PERMIT, ALSO CREATED
BRYAN'S CLAIM TO COMPENSATORY DAMAGES UNDER
MISS. CODE ANN. SECTION 11-51-75 (1972).
IV. WHETHER BRYAN IS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING ON HIS PRESERVED CLAIM(S) FOR FULL
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES.
DISCUSSION
I. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED ON REMAND BY
FAILING AND/OR REFUSING TO CONDUCT AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING REGARDING AN AWARD OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY
FEES TO BRYAN.
¶4. Bryan argues the circuit court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing pursuant to the mandate of
this Court in Bryan I. Also, Bryan contends because this Court did not reverse and render the circuit
court's order, this Court intended to reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing. The City argues that
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there was no suggestion in Bryan I that an evidentiary hearing would be held and that the circuit court
followed the mandate of this Court by conducting a hearing only on the matter of costs and attorney's fees.
¶5. This Court's mandate is unarguably binding on the circuit court; therefore, we must look to the
actual language of that mandate to learn what the circuit court was directed to do on remand. Our holding
in Bryan I specifically stated:
This Court thus finds that the issue of the validity of Bryan’s option was indeed moot when
he filed his bill of exceptions in the circuit court. Bryan had no valid option at that time.
The circuit court ultimately on Motion for Reconsideration, found that the issue was moot.
We, therefore, affirmthe lower court’s ultimate order dismissing the case as moot, but we
reverse the lower court's award of costs and attorney's fees and remand this case for a
new hearing and decision by the lower court regarding any award of costs
and attorney's fees to Bryan.
763 So. 2d at 169 (emphasis added). Bryan claims the circuit court deviated from our mandate in Bryan
I because no evidentiary hearing was held on the issue of attorney's fees and costs. Therefore, Bryan urges
this Court to reverse and remand this case for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of attorney’s fees and
costs. Nothing in this Court's first opinion required the circuit court to conduct an evidentiary hearing
on the issue of attorney's fees and costs. This Court, in Bryan I, affirmed the circuit court in all respects
save the issue of attorney’s fees and costs, which was reversed and remanded to the circuit court.3 763
So. 2d at 163, 169.
¶6. The circuit court in the case before us today was acting on a very clear and limited mandate from
this Court in Bryan I. The circuit court was ordered by this Court to conduct a hearing on the issue of
attorney's fees and costs. The record clearly shows the circuit court accepted briefs from both sides and
3
It must be remembered that in Bryan I, the circuit court had not refused to award Bryan attorney’s
fees and costs, but instead had granted Miss. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions in favor of Bryan and had awarded
attorney’s fees and costs to Bryan in the amount of $19,668.45. In reversing the award, this Court stated that
“the [circuit] court abused its discretion in failing to cite sufficient findings of fact, conclusions of law and
clear authority in support of its award of sanctions.” 763 So. 2d at 168-69.
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by order scheduled an oral argument for April 17, 2001. On June 7, 2001, the circuit court issued its
detailed five-page opinion regarding the issue of imposition of sanctions, followed by a final judgment
consistent with the opinion issued the same day.
¶7. In its opinion, the circuit court cited several factual findings and legal determinations which this
Court announced in Bryan I. The circuit court then determined the only issue which must be decided was
what legal basis existed to award attorney's fees to Bryan in light of these factual findings and legal
determinations. The circuit court stated Bryan based his argument solely upon City of Durant v. Laws
Constr. Co., 721 So. 2d 598 (Miss. 1998). The circuit court determined Durant was not factually
consistent with Bryan's case. The circuit court concluded that because this Court found Bryan's case only
concerned the bill of exceptions dated June 23, 1995, and because Bryan never had standing to file that
particular bill of exceptions, there was no justification to require the City to pay Bryan's attorney’s fees.
¶8. Based on Judge Howard’s actions, Bryan received all to which he was entitled pursuant to the
Bryan I mandate, that being a hearing -- albeit, not an evidentiary hearing. But no where in our holding
in Bryan I can it even be inferred that we were directing the circuit court, upon, remand, to afford Bryan
an evidentiary hearing on the issue of costs and attorneys fees. Accordingly, since Judge Howard acted
consistent with this Court’s mandate and because this Court will not reverse the circuit court’s discretionary
decision on the question of attorney's fees unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion, we affirm the
finding of the circuit court that there was no legal basis upon which to justify an award of attorney's fees
against the City. See Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Cook, 832 So. 2d 474, 478 (Miss. 2002);
Mauck v. Columbus Hotel Co., 741 So. 2d 259, 269 (Miss. 1999).
II. WHETHER THE THREE MEMORANDA OPINIONS AND
ORDERS RENDERED BY THE MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT
COURT CONSTITUTE MORE THAN SUFFICIENT BASIS, IN LAW
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AND IN FACT, TO SUPPORT THE AWARD OF "COSTS,
INCLUDING ATTORNEY'S FEES" AGAINST THE CITY OF
MADISON.
¶9. Based on this Court's ruling on the above issue, this issue is without merit.
III. WHETHER THE CITY OF MADISON'S ALLEGEDLY
UNLAWFUL CONDUCT WHICH ARGUABLY RENDERED MOOT
BRYAN'S RIGHT TO A BUILDING PERMIT, ALSO CREATED
BRYAN'S CLAIM TO COMPENSATORY DAMAGES UNDER
MISS. CODE ANN. SECTION 11-51-75 (1972).
IV. WHETHER BRYAN IS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING ON HIS PRESERVED CLAIM(S) FOR FULL
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES.
¶10. Bryan argues his claims for compensatory damages were preserved by the circuit court's March
29, 1996, dismissal order. While Bryan correctly states that this Court held in Durant, 721 So. 2d at 606-
07, that the circuit court, sitting as an appellate court pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 11-51-75, could
conduct a non-jury evidentiary hearing on the issue of compensatory damages due to a city’s illegal
awarding of a construction contract to a particular bidder, the facts in Durant are clearly distinguishable
from the facts in the case sub judice.
¶11. InDurant, because there was no dispute as to whether the bid would have been awarded to Laws
if the third party had been legally disqualified, compensatory damages were determined to be an adequate
remedy pursuant to § 11-51-75. 721 So. 2d at 605-06. However, in Bryan I, this Court determined that
"[w]hether Bryan ever fully complied with required zoning and building requirements of the City has always
been in dispute." 763 So. 2d at 166. Because there was a legitimate controversy in fact, the circuit court
had no authority to substitute its discretion for the discretion of the governing authorities of the City. This
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Court determined Bryan had no standing to file suit and dismissed the action; therefore, compensatory
damages are not an appropriate remedy under § 11-51-75. Id.
¶12. Bryan focuses considerable attention on the fact that he was not afforded an evidentiary hearing
on the issue of compensatory damages and argues this Court should reverse and remand this case for an
evidentiary hearing on compensatory damages. Although the Bryan I circuit judge, in his dismissal order
of March 28, 1996, stated that “the rights of the parties as to claims for damages, if any, are hereby
preserved,” Bryan's claim for compensatory damages was extinguished when this Court, in Bryan I,
affirmed in part and reversed and remanded the case solely on the issue of attorneys’ fees and costs.4
Therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying the motion for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
compensatory damages.5
CONCLUSION
¶13. The circuit court correctly denied Bryan a hearing on compensatory damages because
compensatory damages were no longer at issue. At this very late date in this protracted litigation, Bryan
should not be allowed a second chance to plead his entire case. The issues have been decided, and it was
the ruling of this Court to affirm the dismissal of Bryan's claims, except as to attorney's fees and costs which
were remanded for a new hearing. A new hearing was held, and the circuit court determined there was no
justification in awarding such fees and costs to Bryan. Judge Howard was eminently correct in finding that
the sole issue before him on remand, based on our decision in Bryan I, was that of whether Bryan was
4
According to the record, after entry of the order of dismissal of March 28, 1996, which dismissed
the case, without prejudice, and preserved the parties’ rights as to claims for damages, the next (and final)
order entered by the Bryan I judge was the order dated August 28, 1997, and entered August 29, 1997, which
awarded Bryan the disputed attorney’s fees and costs. The record does not reveal that the Bryan I judge,
during this interim period, ever conducted a hearing on any party’s “claims for damages.”
5
This ruling came via an order dated June 20, 2001, and filed June 21, 2001.
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entitled to attorney’s fees and costs, and if so, in what amount. A close review of the record, including
the circuit judge’s five-page opinion on the sole issue before him on remand, clearly reveals that Judge
Howard was likewise eminently correct in his denial of Bryan’s request for attorney’s fees and costs.
¶14. Accordingly, for the reasons herein stated, the circuit court’s final judgment is affirmed.
¶15. AFFIRMED.
PITTMAN, C.J., COBB AND EASLEY, JJ., CONCUR. GRAVES, J., DISSENTS
WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. McRAE AND SMITH, P.JJ., WALLER
AND DIAZ, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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