Carl Smith v. Cassandra L. Holmes

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2004-CA-01920-SCT
DEMARCUS SMITH, A MINOR,
AND KIARA SMITH, A MINOR,
AND TEVON SMITH, A MINOR,
DECEASED AND/OR ESTATE OF
TEVON SMITH BY CARL SMITH,
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE,
NATURAL FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND,
ALL BY THEIR NATURAL FATHER AND
NEXT FRIEND, CARL SMITH, INDIVIDUALLY,
AND AS A WRONGFUL DEATH BENEFICIARY OF
TEVON SMITH, AND CARL SMITH ON BEHALF OF
ALL OF TEVON SMITH’S WRONGFUL DEATH
BENEFICIARIES
v.
CASSANDRA L. HOLMES, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS NATURAL GUARDIAN AND NEXT
FRIEND OF DEMARCUS HOLMES AND
KIARA HOLMES, AND AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF
TEVON HOLMES, DECEASED;
AND BOONE EXPRESS, INC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/28/2004
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LARRY O. LEWIS
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: TUNICA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS: DANIEL A. SEWARD
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: B. HUMPHREYS McGEE, III
MICHAEL N. WATTS
TODD B. MURRAH
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - WRONGFUL DEATH
DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 12/15/2005
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
CONSOLIDATED WITH
NO. 2004-CA-02116-SCT
DEMARCUS SMITH, A MINOR,
AND KIARA SMITH, A MINOR,
AND TEVON SMITH, A MINOR,
DECEASED AND/OR ESTATE OF
TEVON SMITH BY CARL SMITH,
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE,
NATURAL FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND,
ALL BY THEIR NATURAL FATHER
AND NEXT FRIEND, CARL SMITH,
INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS A
WRONGFUL DEATH BENEFICIARY OF
TEVON SMITH, AND CARL SMITH
ON BEHALF OF ALL OF TEVON SMITH’S
WRONGFUL DEATH BENEFICIARIES
v.
BOONE EXPRESS, INC. AND MICHAEL DALE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/28/2004
TRIAL JUDGE: LARRY O. LEWIS
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: TUNICA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS: DANIEL A. SEWARD
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES: TODD B. MURRAH
NATURE OF THE CASE: WRONGFUL DEATH
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 12/15/2005
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
WALLER, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. These consolidated appeals raise issues of parental immunity, priority jurisdiction, a
fiduciary’s conflict of interest, and joinder of wrongful death beneficiaries. We find that (1)
Glaskox ex rel. Denton v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906, 909 (Miss. 1992), abrogated the doctrine
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of parental immunity for a parent who negligently causes injuries to his or her child in an
automobile accident; (2) under Long v. McKinney, 897 So. 2d 160 (Miss. 2005), only one
wrongful death complaint may be filed – the one that is first filed; (3) under Long, all wrongful
death beneficiaries have a right to be joined in the wrongful death lawsuit; (4) under Long, the
personal representative of an estate in a wrongful death suit has a fiduciary relationship to the
wrongful death beneficiaries; and (5) a fiduciary should not have any conflicts of interest.
FACTS
¶2. An automobile accident occurred in Tunica County, Mississippi, between an automobile
operated by Cassandra L. Holmes and an eighteen-wheeler truck owned by Boone Express, Inc.,
and operated by Michael Dale. Witnesses to the accident aver that Cassandra turned left in
front of oncoming traffic. Cassandra’s children, Demarcus Smith, Kiara Smith and Tevon
Smith, were injured in the accident, and Tevon was killed.
¶3. Cassandra filed a wrongful death and personal injury lawsuit against Boone Express and
Dale on September 18, 2002. On October 21, 2002 , Carl Smith, the natural father of all of
the children, filed his own wrongful death lawsuit and a separate motion to intervene and/or
join in Cassandra’s lawsuit. Finding that Carl was not a necessary party, the circuit court
denied the motion to intervene and/or join. The circuit court dismissed Carl’s wrongful death
lawsuit on the basis that only one wrongful death action can be filed. From these two orders,
Carl appeals.1
1
Case number 2004-CA-01920-SCT is the appeal from the denial of the motion to
intervene and/or join. Case number 2004-CA-02116-SCT is the appeal from the dismissal of
Carl’s wrongful death complaint. These two appeals are consolidated.
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DISCUSSION
I. PARENTAL IMMUNITY.
¶4. The circuit judge denied Carl’s motion to intervene on the basis that Carl wished to
raise negligence and wrongful death claims against Cassandra and that such claims would be
barred due to parental immunity. We find that the circuit judge erred. The principle of parental
immunity, which bars an unemancipated minor from suing his or her parent for injuries caused
by the negligence of the parent, has been abrogated in this State, insofar as the negligent
operation of motor vehicles is concerned. Glaskox ex rel. Denton v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d
906, 909 (Miss. 1992); see also Ales v. Ales, 650 So. 2d 482, 486 (Miss. 1995). The
Glaskox court held as follows: “We hold that the judicially created doctrine of parental
immunity has outlived its purpose and adopt the majority view abrogating the principle as it
applies to the negligent operation of a motor vehicle.” Glaskox, 614 So. 2d at 912.
Accordingly, we find that the circuit court erred in denying Carl’s motion to intervene.
II. MOTION TO JOIN OR INTERVENE.
¶5. The denial of a motion to intervene is an appealable final order. Cohen v. Cohen, 748
So. 2d 91, 93 (Miss. 1999) (citing Guar. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 501 So. 2d 377, 380
(Miss. 1987)). Rule 24(a)(2) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure provides that anyone
who “is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede
his ability to protect that interest” may intervene by right “unless the applicant’s interest is
adequately represented by existing parties.”
¶6. The circuit court denied Carl’s motion to join Cassandra’s lawsuit because, as a
wrongful death beneficiary, Carl’s interests would be protected in Cassandra’s lawsuit. We
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have recently held that, if a wrongful death beneficiary wishes to join a wrongful death lawsuit,
his motion to join should be granted: “[I]n wrongful death litigation, all claims shall be joined
in one suit.” Long v. McKinney, 897 So. 2d 160, 174 (Miss. 2005). Therefore, under Long,
Carl should have been joined as a party plaintiff because he is a wrongful death beneficiary.
We note that the Long case was handed down after these appeals were filed, so the circuit
court did not have the benefit of our holding when it denied the motion.
III. RACE TO THE COURTHOUSE.
¶7. There is no question that Cassandra filed a wrongful death complaint before Carl filed
his own complaint. Both are Tevon’s natural parents and are therefore wrongful death
beneficiaries who are entitled to bring a wrongful death lawsuit under Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-
13 (Rev. 2004).2
¶8. It is clear under our jurisprudence that only one of the wrongful death beneficiaries may
bring a wrongful death lawsuit. Long, 897 So. 2d at 168. See also Jones v. Steiner, 481 F.2d
392 (5th Cir. 1973). Because only one wrongful death lawsuit may be filed, and two such
lawsuits have been filed, the rule of prior jurisdiction comes into play:
It is fundamental that a plaintiff is not authorized simply to ignore a prior action
and bring a second, independent action on the same state of facts while the
original action is pending. Hence a second action based on the same cause will
generally be abated where there is a prior action pending in a court of competent
jurisdiction within the same state or jurisdictional territory, between the same
parties, involving the same or substantially the same subject matter and cause of
action, and in which prior action the rights of the parties may be determined and
adjudged.
2
Although the current version of the wrongful death statute was not in effect at the time
of the accident (January, 2002), the list of those persons who may sue thereunder has not
changed since 2002, even though the most recent amendment thereto was enacted in 2004.
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Long, 897 So. 2d at 172 (quoting Lee v. Lee, 232 So. 2d 370, 373 (Miss. 1970)); accord
Harrison County Dev. Comm’n v. Daniels Real Estate, Inc., 880 So. 2d 272, 276 (Miss.
2004), overruled on other grounds, City of Jackson v. Estate of Stewart ex rel. Womack,
908 So. 2d 703 (Miss. 2005). Here, the two complaints pertain to the same state of facts,
subject matter and cause of action – the infant child’s death. Cassandra’s lawsuit was pending
in a court of competent jurisdiction within the same state as Carl’s, and the two complaints
involved the same parties – all of Tevon’s wrongful death beneficiaries and the alleged third-
party tortfeasor. Because Carl’s wrongful death complaint was filed after Cassandra’s, we find
that the circuit court’s dismissal of Carl’s complaint was eminently correct.
IV. PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE AS FIDUCIARY.
¶9. One of the issues raised by Carl is that Cassandra allegedly has a conflict of interest
which bars her from serving as personal representative for the wrongful death beneficiaries.
This issue -- that is, whether Cassandra’s role as an alleged tortfeasor would prejudice in any
way the other wrongful death beneficiaries’ claims – was raised in Carl’s motion to intervene
which was denied by the circuit court. Since the best interests of the minor children are
involved, the conflict of interest issue must be considered.
¶10. One who brings a wrongful death suit as the personal representative acts in a fiduciary
capacity:
The [wrongful death statute] speaks in terms of a litigant bringing
the suit "for the benefit of all persons entitled under law to
recover . . .” and "for the benefit of all parties concerned . . . .”
Thus, bringing suit in such a representative capacity renders the
named plaintiff a fiduciary to all he or she proposes to represent,
much the same as in litigation instituted by the executor or
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executrix of an estate. Those being represented must trust the
named plaintiff to properly prosecute the litigation, enter into fair
settlement negotiations, and handle all funds recovered as trust
funds for the benefit of those entitled to them.
Long, 897 So. 2d at 169 (footnote omitted). If a trustee has a conflict of interest, “he has a
duty to refuse the trust, resign, or remove the conflicting personal interest.” Estate of
Bodman v. Bodman, 674 So. 2d 1245, 1249 (Miss. 1996); see also Jackson v. Jackson, 732
So. 2d 916, 921 (Miss. 1999) (applying same duty to a conservator).
¶11. Because Cassandra is a fiduciary by way of her being the personal representative of the
wrongful death beneficiaries, and Carl has raised a claim of conflict of interest, this issue must
be considered by the circuit court. We therefore remand this issue to the circuit court for a
determination of whether Cassandra should remain as personal representative and whether the
children’s interests would be best represented by a guardian ad litem or the appointment of
another person as personal representative. The circuit court should consider the fact that cases
with unnamed defendant tortfeasors are tried regularly and, seemingly, without jury confusion.
See, e.g., Classic Coach, Inc. v. Johnson, 823 So. 2d 517 (Miss. 2002). Moreover, Miss.
Code Ann. § 11-7-15 (Rev. 2004) provides that a person who “may have been guilty of
contributory negligence” is not barred from recovery. This principle may be extrapolated so
that a person who “may have been guilty of contributory negligence” is not barred from filing
suit against other tortfeasors.
¶12. The circuit court should also consider any conflicts between Cassandra and Carl and
whether Carl’s interests would be prejudiced if Cassandra remains the personal representative.
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CONCLUSION
¶13. We reverse the circuit court’s denial of Carl Smith’s motion to join, and we remand this
case, No. 2004-CA-01920-SCT, to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. We affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of Carl Smith’s complaint.
¶14. CASE NUMBER 2004-CA-01920-SCT: REVERSED AND REMANDED.
¶15. CASE NUMBER 2004-CA-02116-SCT: AFFIRMED.
SMITH, C.J., COBB, P.J., CARLSON, DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, JJ.,
CONCUR. EASLEY, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITHOUT
SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. DIAZ AND GRAVES, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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