Frank L. Schmidt, Sr. v. Catholic Diocese of Biloxi

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-CA-00416-SCT
FRANK L. SCHMIDT, SR., AND HENRY W.
KINNEY, ET AL.
v.
CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BILOXI, THOMAS J.
RODI AND DENNIS CARVER
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/27/2008
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. THOMAS L. ZEBERT
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HARRISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: VIRGIL G. GILLESPIE
WILLIAM J. BLASS
ERIC D. WOOTEN
HENRY W. KINNEY, PRO SE
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: JULIE JARRELL GRESHAM
STEPHEN J. CARMODY
KEVIN J. NECAISE
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND
REMANDED IN PART - 09/17/2009
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE WALLER, C.J., LAMAR AND PIERCE, JJ.
WALLER, CHIEF JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. One hundred and fifty-seven former parishioners of the St. Paul Catholic Church in
Pass Christian (“Plaintiffs”) filed suit in the Chancery Court of Harrison County against the
Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, Inc., Most Reverend Thomas J. Rodi, as Bishop and President
of the Biloxi Diocese, and Reverend Dennis Carver, individually and as pastor of St. Paul
Church (hereinafter collectively“Church Defendants”). Plaintiffs sought declaratory and
injunctive relief after Bishop Rodi effectively closed the St. Paul Church, which had been
damaged in Hurricane Katrina. Plaintiffs asserted, in part, that Bishop Rodi held the St. Paul
property in trust for the members of the St. Paul Church, that any financial contributions
designated for reconstruction of the church were held in trust for that particular purpose, that
Church Defendants had violated said trusts, and that Father Carver had made
misrepresentations in soliciting donations for the rebuilding efforts. The chancellor
dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice, finding that the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction based on the church autonomy doctrine of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Plaintiffs now file this appeal.1 We affirm in part, and reverse and
remand in part.
FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. The St. Paul Catholic Church was established in 1847 in Pass Christian, by the Roman
Catholic Church. The Roman Catholic Church is a hierarchical church, meaning that local
churches are subordinate members of the general church, which maintains ultimate authority
or control. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 722-27, 13 Wall. 679, 20 L. Ed. 666 (1872).
The St. Paul campus expanded throughout the years, including the establishment of an
elementary school. According to latest estimates, its congregation numbered approximately
700 members.
1
Some of the original plaintiffs did not join this appeal.
2
¶3. On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina ravaged the Mississippi Gulf Coast. The
storm caused extensive damage to the St. Paul property. St. Paul’s gymnasium and the St.
Paul Catholic Elementary School essentially were destroyed. The actual church building was
also damaged, although the extent of the damage is disputed by the parties. Plaintiffs insist
that the church remains structurally sound, that many of its sacred articles were unharmed,
and that repair costs should be less than $2.5 million. Church Defendants maintain that the
church and its most sacred places were “destroyed in large part.” According to Church
Defendants:
[T]he altar of God[,] where the miracle of the Eucharist is celebrated[,] was
damaged[,] and the tabernacle[,] which is the repository where the Holy
Eucharist . . . is kept, was damaged. A dedicated Catholic Church loses its
blessing, and thus, is no longer a Catholic Church, if it is destroyed in large
part. Canon 1212 [of the Code of Canon Law of the Roman Catholic Church]
states, “Sacred places lose their dedication or blessing if they have been
destroyed in large part . . . .”
Because of this damage, Church Defendants claim that St. Paul ceased to be a Catholic
church on August 29, 2005.
¶4. On November 27, 2005, Bishop Rodi issued a decree merging the St. Paul and Our
Lady of Lourdes Parishes to form a new parish called the Holy Family Parish. The decree
stated that the Holy Family Parish would maintain two church edifices, St. Paul Church and
Our Lady of Lourdes Church. The decree also provided that “[i]n accordance with canon
121, Holy Family Parish obtains the goods and patrimonial rights proper to Saint Paul Parish
and Our Lady of Lourdes Parish as well as the obligations with which they were burdened
. . . .” Pursuant to this decree, plans were initiated to rebuild the St. Paul Church, and
donations were solicited and given for that purpose. More than one year later, on March 13,
3
2007, Bishop Rodi issued a second decree announcing that Our Lady of Lourdes would be
the only church in the Holy Family Parish. This decision effectively closed the doors of the
St. Paul Church. According to Father Carver, this decision was made because of a shortage
of priests, and because Our Lady of Lourdes Church, unlike St. Paul, is located in a non-
flood-zone area.
¶5. The future use of the St. Paul property remains unclear. Plaintiffs assert that Church
Defendants intend to renovate the church and convert it into a community center, a public
monument, or a memorial edifice. Church Defendants, however, claim that no decision has
been reached as to what will be done with the property.
¶6. A number of St. Paul’s former parishioners, including some of the Plaintiffs in the
subject case, filed a canonical appeal through the Roman Catholic Church’s ecclesiastical
tribunals. On November 30, 2007, the Vatican issued a decree which stated that Bishop Rodi
had acted in accordance with the requirements and procedures set forth under canon law.
¶7. As the canonical appeal process was pending, on May 1, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a thirty-
five-page complaint in the Harrison County Chancery Court against Church Defendants,
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, an accounting, and damages. Plaintiffs specified
eleven prayers for relief, which may be summarized as follows:
1) Requested adjudication of whether Church Defendants hold the St. Paul
property in trust for the benefit of Plaintiffs, and whether Church
Defendants breached such duty by failing to properly maintain the
church in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and by converting the
property for a secular use, i.e., a community center, without Plaintiffs’
consent/approval.
2) Requested adjudication of whether insurance proceeds stemming from
property damage as a result of Hurricane Katrina, and donations made
4
for the specific purpose of St. Paul’s reconstruction, are held in trust
and must be used exclusively for rebuilding efforts.
3) Requested an accounting from August 29, 2005, of all contributions
made to St. Paul Church.
4) Requested a determination as to whether Father Carver made
intentional misrepresentations by soliciting donations to rebuild St.
Paul, while having personal knowledge that the decision not to rebuild
already had been made.
Plaintiffs further sought an injunction to prevent Church Defendants from converting the St.
Paul property into a community center, or “selling, encumbering, and/or conveying” any
portion of the St. Paul property, without Plaintiffs’ approval.
¶8. On June 4, 2007, Church Defendants filed their answer and defenses, with a motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In their motion to dismiss, Church
Defendants asserted that the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction based on the
church autonomy doctrine of the First Amendment, which prohibits civil courts from
reviewing internal church disputes that involve matters of church governance, faith, and
doctrine. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116-17, 97 L. Ed. 120, 73 S. Ct.
143 (1952). For support, Church Defendants attached an affidavit from Bishop Rodi, in
which he discussed certain provisions of canon law. On June 15, 2007, this Court entered
an order appointing Judge Thomas L. Zebert as special judge to preside over the matter.
¶9. On July 20, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a motion to strike Bishop Rodi’s affidavit, or
alternatively, to conduct discovery. Plaintiffs argued that their claim was purely secular in
nature: Church Defendants had violated neutral principles of Mississippi law by seizing
assets held in trust for Plaintiffs’ benefit. They submitted that Bishop Rodi’s affidavit
5
offered no probative value because it focused solely on his ecclesiastical authority to
consolidate the two parishes; a prerogative which they had not questioned. Plaintiffs
characterized Bishop Rodi’s affidavit as “primarily consisting of unsupported conclusory
allegations” that he had complied with canon law. Bishop Rodi had not outlined pertinent
canon law procedure, and had offered no evidence that he had followed such procedure.
Plaintiffs alternatively requested that they be allowed to conduct discovery with regard to
jurisdictional facts.
¶10. A hearing was held on Plaintiffs’ motion to strike on August 3, 2007. On August 10,
2007, the chancellor issued an order denying Plaintiffs’ motion to strike, but allowing limited
discovery by way of written interrogatories. The chancellor agreed with Plaintiffs that
Bishop Rodi’s affidavit was conclusory and had limited probative value, but he refused to
strike it. The chancellor found that if Church Defendants were going to raise canon law as
a defense, they should be required to prove that they had complied with those rules. The
chancellor thus held that Plaintiffs were entitled to discovery, limited in scope to: (1) the
procedure required under canon law for closing a church; (2) documents reflecting whether
such procedure was followed in the closing of St. Paul; and (3) whether canon law required
church leaders to notify donors who had donated specifically for St. Paul’s rebuilding about
the change in plans. Thereafter, on August 29, 2007, the chancellor entered an order on
discovery issues and a scheduling order. Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of these
two discovery-related orders, as well as a motion for additional time to respond to Church
Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Following a hearing
6
on September 11, 2007, the chancellor extended the time for discovery and granted additional
time for Plaintiffs to respond to Church Defendants’ motion to dismiss.2
¶11. After conducting a hearing, the chancellor issued a final judgment of dismissal on
March 3, 2008. The chancellor characterized the case as an internal administrative matter
rather than a property dispute, and found that the issues could not be heard without excessive
entanglement with religion. He determined that canon law prescribed a specific procedure
for altering a parish, and that Church Defendants had followed such procedure. Furthermore,
the chancellor found that, even if a trust existed, Plaintiffs lacked standing. In sum, the
chancellor held that the church autonomy doctrine of the First Amendment deprived the court
of subject matter jurisdiction, and he dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice.3
2
At the beginning of the September 11, 2007, hearing, the chancellor also granted
Henry Kinney’s motion to appear pro se.
3
In their brief, Plaintiffs express bewilderment regarding what they interpret as
irreconcilable differences between the chancellor’s August 2007 order and his March 2008
final judgment. In his August 2007 order, the chancellor stated that:
The issues [Plaintiffs] bring before this Court are purely secular in nature . . .
. Nowhere in the Complaint is there any demand for the [Church Defendants]
to reopen St. Paul church. [Plaintiffs] have simply alleged that it would be a
violation of Mississippi law for [Church Defendants] to seize assets they are
holding in trust for the [Plaintiffs] and convert these assets for their own use.
But in his March 2008 final judgment, the chancellor held that Plaintiffs’ claims required
excessive entanglement with religion, which is forbidden by the First Amendment.
Even though the August 2007 order and the March 2008 final judgment reach
different conclusions about the nature of Plaintiffs’ suit, the two orders are not irreconcilable.
In his August 2007 order, the chancellor permitted the parties to engage in limited discovery.
He warned the parties, however, “not to read more into this opinion than what is written.”
He explained that he had no authority to second-guess hierarchical decisions, and that his
purpose in allowing discovery was limited to determining what steps were required under
canon law, and whether those steps had been followed. After a full hearing on the motion
7
¶12. Plaintiffs now appeal and raise three assignments of error: (I) whether the chancellor
erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (II) whether the
chancellor erred in failing to strike Bishop Rodi’s affidavit; and (III) whether the chancellor
erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. Because we find the first two issues
dispositive, we do not address Issue III.
DISCUSSION
I. Whether the chancellor erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
¶13. Subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry which must be determined before a
court may proceed to the merits. E.g., Luckett v. Miss. Wood, Inc., 481 So. 2d 288, 290
(Miss. 1985). A dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed de novo.
Robinson v. TCI/US West Commc’ns, 117 F.3d 900, 904 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing McAllister
v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 87 F.3d 762, 765 (5th Cir.1996)). Findings of fact, however, will
not be reversed if the record contains substantial evidence to support those findings. E.g., In
re Guardianship of Duckett, 991 So. 2d 1165, 1173 (Miss. 2008) (citing UHS-Qualicare,
Inc. v. Gulf Coast Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 525 So. 2d 746, 753 (Miss. 1987)).
¶14. When a plaintiff’s allegations of jurisdiction are questioned, the plaintiff bears the
burden to prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Rosemound Sand & Gravel
Co. v. Lambert Sand & Gravel Co., 469 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1972) (citing McNutt v. Gen.
Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 80 L. Ed. 1135, 56 S. Ct. 780 (1936)).
to dismiss, with further briefing by the parties, and with the benefit of the Vatican’s decree
affirming Bishop Rodi’s actions, the chancellor concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction
to hear Plaintiffs’ case.
8
¶15. Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction may be either facial or factual. Roman
Catholic Diocese v. Morrison, 905 So. 2d 1213, 1220 (Miss. 2005). “A facial attack alleges
the court lacks jurisdiction as a matter of law . . . .” Id. at 1220-21. With a facial attack,
allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint are considered true. Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit
Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,
549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)). A factual attack, on the other hand, “requires resolution
by the trial court of one or more factual disputes in order to determine subject matter
jurisdiction.” Morrison, 905 So. 2d at 1220-21. In a factual attack, matters outside the
pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits, are considered. Menchaca, 613 F.2d at 511.
Only those undisputed, well-pled factual allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint are accepted
as true. Morrison, 905 So. 2d at 1221. Otherwise, the plaintiff’s allegations are not presumed
true, and the court can decide issues of material fact in order to determine whether or not it
has jurisdiction. Montez v. Dep’t of the Navy, 392 F.3d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 2004); Williamson
v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412-13 (5th Cir. 1981) (in a factual Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the trial
court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself that it has the power to hear the case)
(quoting Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891). The trial court has discretion to devise some
evidentiary method for the limited purpose of deciding the jurisdictional issue. Moran v.
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 27 F.3d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); Paterson v.
Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1981).
¶16. The language used in Church Defendants’ motion to dismiss and their brief before this
Court suggests a facial attack, insofar as no detailed factual argument is advanced. Cf.,
Morrison, 905 So. 2d at 1221. But in support of their motion to dismiss, Church Defendants
9
attached an affidavit from Bishop Rodi. Additionally, the lower court allowed the parties to
engage in limited discovery on the issue of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we construe Church
Defendants’ motion to dismiss as a factual attack.
¶17. Plaintiffs assert that this case can be decided on neutral principles of trust and property
law; therefore, the chancellor erred in dismissing the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. According to Plaintiffs, their case consists primarily of two basic issues: (1) who
possesses title to the St. Paul property and (2) what are Church Defendants’ obligations with
regard to funds donated for the rebuilding of St. Paul Church. Church Defendants contend
that “the core” of this dispute is an internal church disagreement over the decision not to
rebuild the church, and that Plaintiffs are simply masking their claims as a property dispute.
¶18. Plaintiffs emphatically state that they do not challenge Church Defendants’ authority
to merge St. Paul Parish with Our Lady of Lourdes Parish. They insist that their
administrative and canonical concerns were satisfied through the canonical appeal to the
Vatican. The alteration of a parish is, in fact, a matter of internal church government, which
lies at the core of ecclesiastical affairs. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 721, 96 S. Ct. 2372, 49 L. Ed. 2d 151 (1976); Kedroff, 344 U.S.
at 116 (religious freedom includes the “power [of religious bodies] to decide for themselves,
free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and
doctrine.”). An affidavit from William S. Skylstad, Bishop of the Roman Catholic Diocese
of Spokane, Washington, Canon 515, Section 2, states that “[i]t is only for the diocesan bishop
to erect, suppress, or alter parishes.” In the absence of fraud or collusion, our courts must
accept the decision of a hierarchical church’s highest tribunal on such matters. See Jones v.
10
Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 609 n.8, 99 S. Ct. 3020, 61 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1979) (citing Serbian Eastern
Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 709, 713 (1976)); but see Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Church Property
Disputes: Churches as Secular and Alien Institutions, 55 Fordham L. Rev. 335, 338, 348 n.61
(1986) (postulating that a civil court’s constitutional authority to consider even claims of fraud
or collusion remains an open-ended question). There is no “arbitrariness exception” which
allows civil courts to inquire whether a hierarchical church complied with its own laws and
procedures. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 713, 715 (noting that concepts
of due process and fundamental fairness are not relevant to matters of ecclesiastical
cognizance).
¶19. With the merger of the two parishes off-limits for our review, there are essentially two
issues for which subject matter jurisdiction must be determined. First, Plaintiffs submit that,
notwithstanding the merger, Church Defendants remain obligated to hold the St. Paul property
in trust for Plaintiffs’ benefit, and may not use or dispose of the property in any manner they
choose. Second, Plaintiffs contend that all funds raised for the rebuilding of St. Paul Church
are held in trust, and that Church Defendants may not divest those funds for any other
purpose. Plaintiffs thus seek a legal determination of whether the St. Paul property and/or the
funds donated for rebuilding efforts are held in trust, and, if so, whether Church Defendants
have breached such trust(s). Third, Plaintiffs assert a claim of intentional misrepresentation
against Father Carver. They allege that Father Carver solicited donations for the rebuilding
of the church, while having knowledge that the church would not be reopened.
A. Whether our courts have subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether
the St. Paul property is held in trust.
11
¶20. States have “‘an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property
disputes, and in providing a civil forum where the ownership [and control] of church property
can be determined conclusively.’” Church of God Pentecostal v. Freewill Pentecostal
Church of God, 716 So. 2d 200, 204 (Miss. 1998) (quoting Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602). A civil
court’s authority to resolve such disputes, however, is severely circumscribed by the First
Amendment. Church of God Pentecostal, 716 So. 2d at 204 (quoting Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602).
¶21. The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment state that: “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The first
clause, referred to as the Establishment Clause, has been held to command a separation of
church and state. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 161 L. Ed. 2d
1020 (2005); Morrison, 905 So. 2d at 1224-25. The second clause, known as the Free
Exercise Clause, “requires government respect for, and noninterference with, the religious
beliefs and practices of our Nation’s people.” 4 Cutter, 544 U.S. at 719.
¶22. The First Amendment thus “forbids civil courts from resolving church property
disputes by inquiring into and resolving disputed issues of religious doctrine and practice.”
Church of God Pentecostal, 716 So. 2d at 204 (citing Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602). States are free
to adopt any method for adjudicating church property disputes, “‘so long as it involves no
4
The Mississippi Constitution affords similar protections: “no preference shall be
given by law to any religious sect or mode of worship; but the free enjoyment of all religious
sentiments and the different modes of worship shall be held sacred. The rights hereby
secured shall not be construed to justify acts of licentiousness injurious to morals or dangers
to the peace and safety of the state . . . .” Miss. Const. art. 3, § 18.
12
consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of
faith.’” Church of God Pentecostal, 716 So. 2d at 204 (quoting Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602).
¶23. Mississippi has adopted the “neutral principles of law” approach for resolving church
property disputes. Church of God Pentecostal, 716 So. 2d at 206. The neutral-principles
approach “relies on objective, traditional concepts of trust and property law . . . .” Id. at 205.
“It calls ‘for the completely secular examination of deeds to the church property, state statutes
and existing local and general church constitutions, by-laws, canons, Books of Discipline and
the like . . . .’” Id. (quoting Protestant Episcopal Church in Diocese of N.J. v. Graves, 83
N.J. 572, 417 A.2d 19, 23 (N.J. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Moore v. Protestant Episcopal
Church in Diocese of N.J., 449 U.S. 1131, 67 L. Ed. 2d 119, 101 S. Ct. 954 (1981)).
Religious documents must be carefully scrutinized in purely secular terms without relying on
religious precepts. Church of God Pentecostal, 716 So. 2d at 205-06 (citing Wolf, 443 U.S.
at 604). If a deed, corporate charter, or religious document incorporates religious concepts
in its provisions concerning ownership of the property, the court must defer to the authority
of the ecclesiastical body so as to avoid resolving any religious controversy. Wolf, 443 U.S.
at 604 (citing Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 709).
¶24. Plaintiffs assert that our courts can apply neutral principles of trust law to determine
whether the St. Paul property is held in either an express or a resulting trust. Plaintiffs base
their express-trust theory on the language contained in various deeds associated with the St.
Paul property. These deeds were described in a document attached as “Exhibit A” to
Plaintiffs’ complaint. This document was drafted by Plaintiffs, and provides a summary of
the chains of title for the eight individual parcels which comprise the St. Paul property. Only
13
four of the actual deeds referenced in this summary are included in the record. Church
Defendants do not appear to contest the accuracy of Plaintiffs’ summary. In their answer,
Church Defendants simply stated that the deeds themselves were the best evidence, and
denied any allegations that contradicted the actual terms of the deeds. Due to the absence of
any specific factual challenge, we accept Plaintiffs’ summary as true in describing the various
deeds and conveyances below. See Morrison, 905 So. 2d at 1221 (in a factual attack,
undisputed well-pled factual allegations of a plaintiff are accepted as true).
¶25. St. Paul originally was established as part of the Catholic Diocese of Natchez. In
March 1849, Father Louis Marie Stanislaus Buteux acquired a parcel of real property (Parcel
1) in Pass Christian for the construction of a church.5 Father Buteux conveyed two subparcels
of this property, Parcel 1-A and Parcel 1-B, to Right Reverend William H. Elder, Bishop of
the Natchez Diocese. Plaintiffs aver that Buteux remains the owner of the remainder of Parcel
1, less Parcels 1-A, 1-B, and a third subparcel that Buteux conveyed to another individual.6
¶26. In 1871, Rev. Peter Holton and his wife Margaret conveyed a parcel of property
(Parcel 2) to Bishop Elder. Bishop Elder later assigned/conveyed his interests to his
successor, Right Reverend Francis Janssens, through an unrecorded document. During his
tenure, Bishop Janssens was deeded additional property (Parcel 3) from Ellen Curtis, et al.
5
It is unclear when St. Paul’s Church was first built. One document in the record
states that St. Paul Church was “established” in 1847. Holy Family Parish’s website
contains a history of St. Paul Parish, which references a church built in 1844 by Father
Guillame Labbe, and another church built in 1850 by Father Antoine Paul Guerard.
Plaintiffs’ complaint states that Father Buteux completed construction of the original St. Paul
Church in 1851, and that the church was formally dedicated that same year.
6
According to Plaintiffs, Buteux died intestate in 1873, and no will has been
probated nor has any intestate estate been opened since that time.
14
Bishop Janssens eventually conveyed Parcels 1-A, 1-B, 2, and 3 to his successor, Right
Reverend Thomas Heslin. In April 1890, Bishop Heslin acquired yet another piece of
property (Parcel 4).7
¶27. On September 7, 1905, the Natchez Diocese received its charter of incorporation.
Nearly one year later, in a deed dated May 21, 1906, Bishop Heslin conveyed all the property
that he held “in trust for said Congregations, Parishes and Missions,” to the Natchez Diocese.
Bishop Heslin conveyed the property “in fee simple, and according to the trusts provided for
in the [Natchez Diocese] charter.” The Natchez Diocese charter authorized the Diocese “to
hold the titles to all of the property, real and personal[,] belonging to the several Catholic
congregations, parishes and missions in the state of Mississippi, in trust for said
congregations, parishes and missions respectively . . . .” The charter further authorized the
Natchez Diocese “to lease, mortgage or to sell and to deal with any property of said several
congregations, parishes and missions [i]n the manner and upon the conditions prescribed by
the regulations of the Catholic Diocese of Natchez in Mississippi, relating to and governing
[unidentifiable mark] power and authority of the Bishop of Natchez in respect to conveyance
by him, by lease, mortgage or sale of said property.”
¶28. In subsequent years, various individuals and organizations conveyed additional
property to St. Paul. On December 5, 1947, Wilfrida Margaret Gack, individually and as
executrix of the Estate of Jane E. Hill, conveyed certain land (Parcel 5) to the “Catholic
7
None of the actual deeds conveying Parcels 1-A, 1-B, 2, 3, and 4 are in the record.
15
Diocese of Natchez in trust for St. Paul’s congregation, in Pass Christian, Mississippi.” 8 On
April 30, 1962, the St. Joseph Alumni Association conveyed property (Parcel 6) to the
Catholic Diocese of Natchez-Jackson,9 as “Trustee for St. Paul’s Congregation or Parish in
Pass Christian.”10 On December 15, 1969, Prieur James Leary, Sr., conveyed certain property
(Parcel 7) to the Natchez-Jackson Diocese.11 Finally, on September 24, 1970, Betty G. Lutz,
et al., conveyed property (Parcel 8) to the Natchez-Jackson Diocese “in Trust for the
Congregation of St. Paul’s Catholic Church, Pass Christian, Mississippi.” 12
¶29. On March 1, 1977, the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi was established, when it was split
from the Catholic Diocese of Jackson (formerly the Catholic Diocese of Natchez-Jackson and
the Catholic Diocese of Natchez). Most Reverend Joseph L. Howze was appointed as Bishop
for the Biloxi Diocese. On June 6, 1977, Most Reverend Joseph B. Brunini, Bishop of the
Catholic Diocese of Jackson, conveyed to Bishop Howze all the property which Bishop
Brunini held “as trustee for any parish or church institution” situated in the seventeen counties
8
The actual deed conveying Parcel 5 is not in the record. The quoted language is
taken from Plaintiffs’ summary.
9
In March 1957, the Natchez Diocese amended its charter of incorporation and
changed its name to the “Catholic Diocese of Natchez-Jackson.”
10
The actual deed conveying Parcel 6 is not in the record. The quoted language is
taken from Plaintiffs’ summary.
11
On February 19, 1986, a property having the exact same description as Parcel 7
was conveyed by O. S. Montagnet, Jr., to the Bishop of the Biloxi Diocese and his
successors, in “trust for the Catholic Congregation and Parish for St. Paul’s Catholic
Church.”
12
The actual deed conveying Parcel 8 is not in the record. The quoted language is
taken from Plaintiffs’ summary.
16
which comprised the Biloxi Diocese. Bishop Brunini conveyed this property to Bishop
Howze, “as trustee for the use and benefit of the members of each such Catholic Parish or
Congregation.” That same day, via a separate deed, all of the property within the newly
formed Biloxi Diocese which was previously owned or claimed by the Catholic Diocese of
Natchez-Jackson, was conveyed to Bishop Howze, “as trustee for the use and benefit of the
members of each Catholic Parish or Congregation” located in the seventeen counties. Bishop
Howze thus held title to essentially all Catholic Church property within the Biloxi Diocese,
whether real, personal, or mixed, as trustee for any parish or church located within the
territory.
¶30. When Bishop Howze retired, Bishop Rodi was appointed to be his successor. In July
2001, Bishop Howze deeded his title to Bishop Rodi as “TRUSTEE for the use and benefit
of the members of each such Catholic Parish or Congregation in accordance with the Code
of Canon law of the Roman Catholic Church . . . .”
¶31. Notably, a number of the above-referenced deeds contain language that implicates a
trust relationship. Under the neutral-principles approach, the interpretation of deeds and trusts
is precisely the type of inquiry that is permissible in our courts. Church of God Pentecostal,
716 So. 2d at 206. Nevertheless, we find subject matter jurisdiction does not exist due to
Plaintiffs’ lack of standing.
¶32. Standing is an aspect of subject matter jurisdiction. Kirk v. Pope, 973 So. 2d 981, 990
(Miss. 2007) (citing Breeden v. Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP (In re The Bennett Funding
Group, Inc.), 336 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 2003)). A lack of standing “‘robs the court of
17
jurisdiction to hear the case.’” Pruitt v. Hancock Med. Ctr., 942 So. 2d 797, 801 (Miss.
2006) (quoting McNair v. United States Postal Serv., 768 F.2d 730, 737 (5th Cir. 1985)).
¶33. “Mississippi’s standing requirements are quite liberal.” Dunn v. Miss. State Dep't of
Health, 708 So. 2d 67, 70 (Miss. 1998). The general standing rule has been stated as follows:
“‘Mississippi parties have standing to sue ‘when they assert a colorable 13 interest in the
subject matter of the litigation or experience an adverse effect from the conduct of the
defendant, or as otherwise provided by law.’” City of Picayune v. S. Reg'l Corp., 916 So. 2d
510, 525 (Miss. 2005) (quoting State of Miss. v. Quitman County, 807 So. 2d 401 (Miss.
2001)). The “individual’s legal interest or entitlement to assert a claim . . . must be grounded
in some legal right recognized by law, whether by statute or by common law.” City of
Picayune, 916 So. 2d at 526. Stated another way, standing is determined by:
[W]hether the particular plaintiff had a right to judicial enforcement of a legal
duty of the defendant or . . . whether a party plaintiff in an action for legal relief
can show in himself a present, existent actionable title or interest, and
demonstrate that this right was complete at the time of the institution of the
action.
Id. (citing Am. Book Co. v. Vandiver, 181 Miss. 518, 527, 178 So. 598, 599 (1938)). In
Canovaro v. Brothers of The Order of Hermits of St. Augustine, 326 Pa. 76, 191 A. 140
(1937), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was confronted with a similar set of facts.
Canovaro, 191 A. at 140. In Canovaro, the Archbishop of the Diocese of Philadelphia issued
a decree dismembering the Parish of the Church of Our Lady of Good Counsel. Id. at 142-43.
Legal title to the church property was held in the name of the Brothers of the Order of St.
13
“Colorable,” when used to describe a claim or action, means “appearing to be true,
valid, or right.” Black’s Law Dictionary 212 (abridged 7th ed. 2000).
18
Augustine. Id. at 143. Former church members, claiming to be an unincorporated association
independent of the Roman Catholic Church, filed suit, alleging that the church and school
properties were impressed with a trust for their benefit. Id. After the lower court dismissed
their claims, the plaintiffs conceded on appeal that they were members of the Roman Catholic
faith. Id. at 143-44. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania relied upon a recently enacted
statute to hold that plaintiffs had no property rights in the church property. Id. at 146-47. In
dictum leading to the holding, the Canovaro court found that, “[u]nder the controlling church
law . . . appellants are no longer members of the parish in which they seek to control the
property and are without standing” to maintain suit. Id. at 146. The court explained that:
Under the church law the effect of dismemberment was to cause the parish to
cease to exist and to transfer its members to adjoining parishes. There were no
longer any members of the original parish. The order of dismemberment was
binding on the parish members. Division, dismemberment or suppression of
parishes, and the effect thereof on membership are purely ecclesiastical matters,
dependent upon the church law as administered by the appropriate authorities
and tribunals. The effect of the dismemberment of the parish and the transfer
of Plaintiffs' membership therefrom to other parishes was to deprive them of all
rights as members in the church property of the parish from which they were
transferred. Church membership is an ecclesiastical matter, not temporal.
There is no property right in membership, and there could be no property rights
in lay members except through their membership in the congregation.
Id. at 145 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Pennsylvania courts repeatedly have affirmed
this principle. Post v. Dougherty, 326 Pa. 97, 101, 191 A. 151 (1937) (stating in dictum that
“[t]he effect of the suppression of the parish was to cause the lay members to lose their
membership therein, and become members of another parish. Having lost their membership
in the parish, they have no standing.”); St. Peter's Roman Catholic Parish v. Urban
Redevelopment Auth., 394 Pa. 194, 198, 146 A.2d 724 (1958) (“a member of a parish has no
19
property right in his membership or any property right in church property save as a member”);
Croatian Roman Catholic Congregation v. Wuerl, 447 Pa. Super. 208, 211, 212, 668 A.2d
1151, 1152-53 (Pa. Super. 1995) (relying upon Canovaro and Post to preclude the exercise
of jurisdiction); see also Galich v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 75 Ill. App. 3d 538, 546, 394
N.E.2d 572, 578 (App. Ct. Ill. 1979) (quoting Canovaro to define the extent of plaintiffs’
property rights).
¶34. We find Canovaro and its progeny instructive for this case. The extent of Plaintiffs’
property or beneficial interest in the St. Paul property, if any, was inextricably tied to their
status as members of St. Paul Church or Parish.14 Because such church or parish no longer
exists, Plaintiffs have no standing to assert a claim for any interest they may or may not have
had in church property.
¶35. We note one Mississippi case in which a local church within a hierarchical church
association was dissolved by hierarchical authorities, and yet its former members were
allowed to intervene in subsequent litigation over the ownership or control of church property.
Sustar v. Williams, 263 So. 2d 537, 537-40 (Miss. 1972). In Sustar, the issue of standing was
14
Plaintiffs assert that the St. Paul congregation—which they deem to be the true
beneficiary of the trust—still exists as an identifiable beneficiary. Plaintiffs essentially
attempt to distinguish the St. Paul congregation from the St. Paul Parish by asserting that
only the parish, not the congregation, has been extinguished. We are unpersuaded. The
terms “parish” and “congregation” have been found to be essentially interchangeable. James
A. Coriden, The Parish in Catholic Tradition, 19-20 (Paulist Press 1996) (“From the sixth
century on, however, the terminology became more uniform, with local congregations called
parishes and the larger groupings of local churches within a territory and overseen by a
bishop called dioceses . . . .”); Wuerl, 668 A.2d at 1153. Thus, neither the St. Paul Parish
nor the St. Paul congregation still exists. Rather, both have merged with the Holy Family
Parish, which has, in turn, assumed the extinct parish or congregation’s property, rights, and
obligations.
20
neither raised or discussed. Sustar, 263 So. 2d 537. The former church members in that case
intervened under two statutes which allowed sixty-six-and-two-thirds percent of the
beneficiaries of a religious trust to take over and divest the mother church of trust property
if the beneficiaries determined that there existed “a deep-seated and irreconcilable”
disagreement. Id. at 539-43 (citing Miss. Code Ann. §§ 1273-01, 1273-02 (Supp. 1971)).
These statutes, however, were deemed unconstitutional, and the case was remanded. Id. at
543. It is unclear whether the former church members were permitted to remain in the suit
on remand, and, if so, on what grounds. See id. Because of its unique facts, we find Sustar
distinguishable.
¶36. Plaintiffs alternatively suggest that the St. Paul property is subject to a resulting trust
for their benefit because some of them donated money to purchase certain parcels and to build
the current church. Yet, donors who make gifts for a specific purpose, or who make general
contributions with the intent to benefit only a certain parish, do not acquire any beneficial or
ownership interest in the assets acquired by the church. Committee of Tort Litigants v. The
Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re The Catholic Bishop of Spokane), 329 B.R. 304, 329-30
(Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005). Plaintiffs thus have no legally enforceable interest in the St. Paul
property, and lack standing to assert a resulting trust, as well.
¶37. We find that Plaintiffs lack standing to assert that the St. Paul property is held in trust
for their benefit. Accordingly, we affirm the chancellor’s finding that subject matter
jurisdiction does not exist over this particular claim.
21
B. Whether subject matter jurisdiction exists to determine if donations made
for the specific purpose of rebuilding the St. Paul Church are held in
trust.15
¶38. Plaintiffs submit that Church Defendants hold any donations made for the purpose of
rebuilding the St. Paul Church in trust. They argue that these funds were given based on
Church Defendants’ promise to rebuild the church, and that the funds may not be used for any
other purpose. They assert that Church Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by merely
contacting donors for permission to use the donors’ contributions toward a different purpose.
Plaintiffs thus seek to enjoin the diversion of the funds, and request an adjudication of
whether Church Defendants’ decisions have been fiscally irresponsible, and whether those
funds must be used in a manner mutually agreeable to them or in their best interest.
¶39. The chancellor dismissed these particular claims based on an opinion from the
Supreme Court of North Carolina. Harris v. Matthews, 643 S.E.2d 566 (N.C. 2007). Harris
states that:
Determining whether actions, including expenditures, by a church’s Father,
secretary, and chairman of the Board of Trustees were proper requires an
examination of the church’s view of the role of the Father, staff, and church
leaders, their authority and compensation, and church management. Because
a church’s religious doctrine and practice affect its understanding of each of
these concepts, seeking a court’s review of the matters presented here is no
15
As previously stated, Plaintiffs also claim that Church Defendants hold in trust the
insurance proceeds stemming from the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina. This particular
issue is not fully developed in the briefs, and no authority is cited for such proposition.
Presumably, Plaintiffs seek to impose a constructive trust on the insurance proceeds. McNeil
v. Hester, 753 So. 2d 1057, 1064 (Miss. 2000) (“A constructive trust is a fiction of equity
created for the purpose of preventing unjust enrichment by one who holds legal title to
property which, under principles of justice and fairness, rightfully belongs to another.”)
(citing Allgood v. Allgood, 473 So. 2d 416 (Miss. 1985)). We find no basis for imposing a
constructive trust on any insurance proceeds in this case.
22
different than asking a court to determine whether a particular church’s grounds
for membership are spiritually or doctrinally correct or whether a church’s
charitable pursuits accord with the congregation’s beliefs. None of these issues
can be addressed using neutral principles of law.
Id. at 571.
¶40. Generally, civil courts may not second-guess church administrative or management
decisions, or substitute their judgment in place of the church’s. See id.; but see Bible Way
Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith of Washington, D.C. v. Beards, 680
A.2d 419, 428 (D.C. 1996) (stating that if a church has adopted clear, objective accounting
and reporting standards that do not implicate doctrinal decision-making in their enforcement,
then arguably a civil court can apply them). We find that the chancellor correctly determined
that our courts may not consider whether Church Defendants’ management or administrative
decisions were fiscally irresponsible, or whether those decisions were in the best interests of
parishioners. But, for the reasons set forth below, we find that the chancellor erred in
dismissing Plaintiffs’ claim(s) that Church Defendants improperly diverted designated funds.
¶41. While churches have large, almost-unfettered discretion in their administrative
decision-making, they are not entitled to violate recognized duties or standards of conduct.
See Morrison, 905 So. 2d at 1242. Morrison recognizes a church or religious organization’s
potential liability for diverting funds which have been solicited and accepted for a particular
purpose, toward an unauthorized purpose. See id. In Morrison, in dictum, this Court stated
that:
[E]ach cause of action asserted against a religious organization claiming First
Amendment protection, must be evaluated according to its particular facts. For
instance, with respect to a claim of breach of fiduciary duty, a religious
organization might enjoy First Amendment protection from claims of failure to
23
provide a certain quantity or quality of religious instruction in exchange for
tithes and offerings, but might not enjoy such protection from claims that it
solicited and accepted funds to be held in trust for a specific, stated purpose,
but spent the funds for an unauthorized purpose.
Id. (emphasis added).
¶42. The general law of contributions has been stated to be: “Where a religious society
raises a fund by subscription for a particular purpose, it cannot divert the funds to another
purpose, and, if it abandons such purpose, the donors may reclaim their contributions.”
Columbus Cmty. Hosp., Inc. v. Califano, 614 F.2d 181, 187 (8th Cir. 1980) (quoting Barker
v. The Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Barnabas Church, 176 Neb. 327, 337, 126 N.W.2d 170,
177 (1964)); Dunaway v. First Presbyterian Church, 103 Ariz. 349, 442 P.2d 93, 95 (Ariz.
1968). This principle comports with canon law standards. Church Defendants readily
acknowledge that, under canon law, “[o]fferings given by the faithful for a certain purpose
can be applied only for that purpose,” and may not be used for any other purpose without the
donor’s consent. (quoting Canon 1267 § 3); see also 1 William W. Bassett, Religious
Organizations and the Law § 5:34 (1997).
¶43. In Barker, St. Barnabas Church abandoned its new building project. Barker, 126
N.W.2d at 172. The executor of an estate filed suit against the Wardens and Vestrymen of
St. Barnabas Church to recover $1,000 that plaintiff’s decedent had given to the “St. Barnabas
Church New Building Fund.” Id. The decedent had signed a pledge card which delineated
the purpose and the amount of the contribution. Id. at 173. The Supreme Court of Nebraska
found that the executor had a viable legal claim where (1) money was pledged and paid
pursuant to a fund-raising drive to build a new church; (2) the plan was abandoned and the
24
funds were diverted for a different purpose; (3) the plaintiff demanded that the contribution
be returned; and (4) the church refused to refund the plaintiff’s donation.16 Id. at 177.
¶44. We find that subject matter jurisdiction exists over a claim that a religious entity
breached a fiduciary duty by improperly diverting designated funds. In order to establish a
viable claim, a plaintiff must prove certain facts. Both Morrison and Barker require that the
funds be solicited by the church. See id.; Morrison, 905 So. 2d at 1242. The donor must then
pledge his or her contribution for the solicited purpose. See Barker, 126 N.W.2d at 177;
Morrison, 905 So. 2d at 1242.
¶45. We do not in any way suggest that Church Defendants have improperly diverted
designated funds. The only issue before us is whether our courts may exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over such claims. We simply find that a religious entity is not exempt from these
types of suits in a court of law.
C. Whether our courts may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’ intentional-misrepresentation claim against Father Carver.
¶46. Plaintiffs allege that Father Carver made intentional misrepresentations in soliciting
contributions for the rebuilding of St. Paul. The crux of Plaintiffs’ allegation is that Father
Carver knew that the St. Paul church would be closed, but continued telling potential donors
that the church would be rebuilt.
¶47. The cloak of religion does not shield religious institutions from civil responsibility for
fraud. Morrison, 905 So. 2d at 1237 (quoting Gen. Council on Fin. And Admin. of the
16
The Nebraska Supreme Court characterized the plaintiff’s claim as an action for
money had and received, rather than for breach of fiduciary duty. Barker, 126 N.W.2d at
175.
25
United Methodist Church v. Superior Court, 439 U.S. 1355, 1372-73, 99 S. Ct. 35, 58 L. Ed.
2d 63 (1978)); see also U.S. v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 847 (9th Cir. 1981) (the First
Amendment does not protect fraudulent activity performed in the name of religion) (citing
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306, 60 S. Ct. 900, 904, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940)).
Moreover, the First Amendment does not protect fraudulent statements that concern neither
religious doctrine nor practice. Bassett, Religious Organizations and the Law § 8:5, n.1
(1997) (citing Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982);
Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 57 Or. App. 203, 644 P.2d 577 (1982)); Tilton v.
Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 678-80 (Tex. 1996).
¶48. Plaintiffs here assert a common-law tort which can be decided on neutral principles of
law without excessive entanglement in ecclesiastical affairs. Intentional or fraudulent
misrepresentation requires:
(1) a representation, (2) its falsity, (3) its materiality, (4) the speaker's
knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth, (5) his intent that it should be
acted on by the hearer and in the manner reasonably contemplated, (6) the
hearer's ignorance of its falsity, (7) his reliance on its truth, (8) his right to rely
thereon, and (9) his consequent and proximate injury.
McCord v. Healthcare Recoveries, Inc., 960 So. 2d 399, 406 (Miss. 2007) (quoting Franklin
v. Lovitt Equip. Co., Inc., 420 So. 2d 1370, 1373 (Miss. 1982)).
¶49. In Maffei v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, 449 Mass. 235 (2007), the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts asserted jurisdiction over claims that the Archbishop
and clergy members had misrepresented certain facts as they solicited gifts. Maffei, 449
Mass. at 251, 255-56. One group of plaintiffs asserted that they had transferred property to
the archbishop based on a priest’s oral representation that the property would “forever” be
26
used as a church. Id. at 251. When the church was closed years later, plaintiffs filed suit
requesting, in part, the imposition of a constructive trust based on fraud. Id. at 236, 251. The
Maffei court considered plaintiffs’ claim under neutral principles of law, but found the claim
to be without merit. Id. at 251-52. Another plaintiff asserted a claim of negligent
misrepresentation against the archbishop and a certain priest. Id. at 255-56. Similar to the
to the case before us, the plaintiff alleged that the Archbishop and priest had solicited
donations to sustain the church’s future existence, while having knowledge that the church
would soon be closed. Id. at 255-56. The Maffei court considered the merits of the claim,
but found no supporting evidence. Id. at 256.
¶50. We find that subject matter jurisdiction exists over Plaintiffs’ claim of intentional
misrepresentation; therefore, we reverse the chancellor, and remand this issue for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. By doing so, we do not suggest that Father Carver
did, in fact, act fraudulently. But “‘[w]hen considering a motion to dismiss, the allegations
taken in the complaint must be taken as true . . . .’” Scaggs v. GPCH-GP, Inc., 931 So. 2d
1274, 1275 (Miss. 2006) (quoting Lang v. Bay St. Louis/Waveland Sch. Dist., 764 So. 2d
1234 (Miss.1999)).
II. Whether the chancellor erred in failing to strike Bishop Rodi’s affidavit.
¶51. A lower court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to strike an affidavit is subject to
an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. Buchanan v. Ameristar Casino Vicksburg, Inc.,
957 So. 2d 969, 972-75 (Miss. 2007).
27
¶52. Plaintiffs allege that Bishop Rodi’s affidavit was irrelevant to the issues before the
lower court, and that it should have been stricken. They argue that the affidavit did nothing
to challenge the factual allegations in the Plaintiffs’ complaint.
¶53. We find that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in failing to grant Plaintiffs’
motion to strike. The chancellor did state that Bishop Rodi’s affidavit was laden with
“conclusory allegations,” and that it offered “limited probative value.” Nevertheless, the
affidavit was not wholly without value or relevance. The affidavit sought to clarify the nature
of the case by referencing applicable provisions of canon law. Its purpose was not to
challenge Plaintiffs’ factual claims, but to show that the chancery court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’ case.
CONCLUSION
¶54. We affirm the chancellor’s finding that subject matter jurisdiction does not exist over
Plaintiffs’ claim that the St. Paul property is held in trust. Likewise, we affirm the
chancellor’s decision not to strike Bishop Rodi’s affidavit. We reverse, however, the
chancellor’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim for the diversion of
designated funds, as well as their intentional-misrepresentation claim against Father Carver.
We remand these two claims for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand,
the chancellor retains the discretion to order an accounting, contingent upon the facts
presented. See Miss. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Miss. Cas. Ins. Co., 947 So. 2d 865, 876-77 (Miss.
2006) (chancellor’s decision to grant or deny a request for an accounting is subject to an
abuse-of-discretion standard of review); RE/Max Real Estate Partners., Inc. v. Lindsley, 840
So. 2d 709, 712 (Miss. 2003) (To be entitled to an equitable accounting, a party must show:
28
“(1) the need of discovery, (2) the complicated character of the accounts, and (3) the existence
of a fiduciary or trust relation.”) (citing Henry v. Donovan, 148 Miss. 278, 114 So. 482, 484
(1927)).
¶55. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.
CARLSON, P.J., DICKINSON, LAMAR, KITCHENS, CHANDLER AND
PIERCE, JJ., CONCUR. RANDOLPH, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN RESULT
WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED IN PART BY PIERCE, J.
GRAVES, P.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
RANDOLPH, JUSTICE, CONCURRING IN PART AND IN RESULT:
¶56. I concur with the Majority’s result, but not with the finding that the plaintiffs’ lack of
standing prohibits this Court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction. I conclude that this
Court’s inquiry into whether the St. Paul property is held in trust, vel non, is constitutionally
prohibited. Our forefathers condemned such an exercise via the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. I. That clause clearly precludes governmental
intrusion into ecclesiastical disputes. The appropriate forum for resolution of such disputes
is an ecclesiastical court, thus, no appeal should lie in a secular court. As this dispute is
between various parishioners and the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, Inc., the appropriate
jurisdictional venue lies in the Roman Catholic Church’s ecclesiastical tribunals, which
already have ruled adversely to the parishioners’ claims. Appeal of that verdict then rests with
the Bishop of Rome, the Pope, then ultimately to the “Creator” whom our forefathers referred
to as “the Supreme Judge of the world.” See Declaration of Independence ¶ 32.
29
¶57. I concur with Section B of the Majority Opinion, which finds that the chancery court
does have subject matter jurisdiction over a claim for breach of fiduciary duty regarding an
alleged diversion of monies designated for a particular purpose.
PIERCE, J., JOINS THIS OPINION IN PART.
30