Christopher Lee v. State of Mississippi

-IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2001-KA-01704-SCT
CHRISTOPHER LEE
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/10/2001
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ROBERT WALTER BAILEY
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: WAYNE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: LESLIE D. ROUSSELL
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: DEIRDRE McCRORY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: BILBO MITCHELL
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/14/2003
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE SMITH, P.J., EASLEY AND GRAVES, JJ.
GRAVES, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Christopher Lee was convicted of murder by a jury in the Circuit Court of Wayne
County, Mississippi, and sentenced to life imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections. Aggrieved by this conviction and sentence, Lee raises the
following issues on appeal:
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR BY ALLOWING THE STATE TO INTRODUCE INTO
EVIDENCE PHOTOS OF THE VICTIM.
II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR BY REFUSING TO GRANT PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS “D-2,” “D-3" AND “D-4" DEALING WITH
MANSLAUGHTER.
III. WHETHER THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY MADE “CONSCIENCE
OF THE COMMUNITY” ARGUMENTS AS WELL AS IMPLYING
GUILT BY THE DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO TESTIFY.
FACTS
¶2. On August 1, 2000, at approximately 6:30 p.m., Christopher Lee was alone and
driving his vehicle around Wayne County, Mississippi, drinking beer. While on this drive,
Lee saw Anice Smith on the side of the road, and she attempted to “flag him down.” Lee
stopped his vehicle and allowed Smith to enter it. Smith asked Lee to take her into town,
but, instead, the two rode around drinking beer together. After consuming alcohol, Smith
asked Lee to drive her to her grandfather’s house. Lee took Smith to her grandfather’s
house, and while there Smith began arguing with her grandfather. Shortly thereafter, Smith
came outside with her sister and asked that Lee give her sister a ride around the block. Lee
complied, the three got into his car, and they dropped Smith’s sister off at a designated
destination.
¶3. Afterwards, Lee and Smith continued to ride around and went to a store to purchase
more beer. Then the two went to a place in Wayne County known as “Academy Hill” and
parked the car. The two sat in the car talking, and the discussion turned to Lee's age. Smith
said that she thought Lee was a minor, and he responded that he was twenty. Lee showed
Smith his driver's license as proof of his age. About thirty minutes later, Lee asked Smith
to return his license, but she claimed she did not have it. Lee continued to ask Smith where
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his licence was, and Smith kept giving him different answers. Eventually, the two got out
of the car and looked for Lee’s license. Lee stated that he then, stuck his hand in Smith’s
pocket to look for the license and cut his hand on a knife that was in her pocket. Lee
claimed that Smith kept avoiding his questions and hollering and that he became enraged
and stabbed her repeatedly. Lee ultimately found his license in his wallet.
¶4. Smith died from her stab wounds, and Lee was tried for murder, convicted, and
sentenced to serve a term of life imprisonment.
DISCUSSION
I. PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE VICTIM ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.
¶5. Lee argues that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the State to
introduce into evidence photos of the victim, which showed either the body of the victim as
it was found or various wounds which the victim’s body received. Lee contends that he
admitted to the manner of the victim’s death; therefore, the pictures had no probative value.
Additionally, Lee argues the photographs were prejudicial and were calculated to stir the
emotions of the jury and cause prejudice, thereby preventing him from receiving a fair trial.
¶6. The record reflects that immediately after the jury was impaneled, the court excused
it and conducted a hearing on the admissibility of photographs of the victim’s body, the
crime scene, and Lee’s car. During the hearing, the State presented several photographs to
the court. Lee objected to the exhibits contending that they were not probative because he
was not contesting the fact that the victim had died as the result of repeated slashing and stab
wounds nor the fact that he had driven over the victim. Therefore, he contends, the
photographs were of no probative value. After careful review of each exhibit, the trial court
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determined that exhibits 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 17 contained evidentiary
value and were admitted into evidence.
¶7. Admissibility of photographs rests with the discretion of the trial court. Jackson v.
State, 672 So. 2d 468, 485 (Miss. 1996). Each of the photographs at issue depict different
aspects of the crime scene, Lee’s car, the victim’s body as it was found at the scene, and the
various wounds she sustained. Accordingly, they were “relevant to show the victims injuries
and to help the jury visualize the crime and crime scene.” Underwood v. State, 708 So. 2d
18, 33-34 (Miss. 1998). The exhibits in question had at the very least “some probative
value,” which “is the only requirement needed to buttress a trial judge’s decision to allow
photographs into evidence.” Parker v. State, 514 So. 2d 767, 771 (Miss.1986). Furthermore,
photographs with probative value may be admitted even when the cause of death is not
disputed. Williams v. State, 684 So. 2d 1179, 1199 (Miss.1996). For these reasons, we find
no reversible error.
II. PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS “D-2,” “D-3" AND “D-4."
¶8. Lee argues that the court committed reversible error by refusing to grant the proposed
jury instructions D-2, D-3, and D-4, all of which embodied the lesser offense of
manslaughter. Lee contends the facts in this case do not rise to the level of murder but more
accurately support a conviction for manslaughter. Lee asserts that his mental capacity at the
time the act was committed was a substantial factor. Lee argues his mental capacity was
relevant and that the trial court should have granted the proposed jury instructions D-2, D-3,
and D-4.
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¶9. Prior to considering these instructions, the trial court had granted Instruction S-3, set
out below:
The Court instructs the Jury if the State has failed to prove all of the essential
elements of the crime of murder, you may consider the lesser charge of
manslaughter. However, it is your duty to accept the law given to you by the
Court and, if the facts and law warrant a conviction for the crime of murder,
then it is your duty to make such a finding uninfluenced by your power to find
a lesser offense. This provision is not designed to prevent a failure of justice
if the evidence fails to prove the original charge but does justify a verdict for
the lesser crime.
If you find that the State has failed to prove any one or more of the essential
elements of the crime of murder, you will proceed with your deliberations to
decide whether the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt all of the
essential elements of the crime of manslaughter.
Therefore, should you find from the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable
doubt that:
1. On or about the 1st day of August, 2000 in Wayne County, Mississippi;
2. The Defendant, Christopher M. Lee, did wilfully, unlawfully and
purposely cause the death of Anice Smith, in the heat of passion, during
an argument or within such time after an argument that passions had
not had time to cool by stabbing, cutting and slashing her with a knife;
then it is your sworn duty to find the Defendant guilty of manslaughter.
Should the State fail to prove any one or more of these essential elements
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you shall find the Defendant not guilty of
manslaughter.
¶10. Instruction D-2 is reprinted as follows:
The Court instructs the Jury that if you find from the evidence in this case
beyond a reasonable doubt that Christopher Lee on August 1, 2000, in Wayne
County, Mississippi willfully killed Anice Smith without malice or
premeditation, by the use of a deadly weapon, and further that Christopher Lee
was not acting in necessary self-defense, then you shall find the defendant
guilty of manslaughter.
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¶11. The State objected to this instruction “as being an inaccurate statement of the law and
not fitting the facts of this case.” The trial court agreed, finding that Instruction S-3, rather
than D-2, fit “the factual evidence as presented by the defendant.”
¶12. Instruction D-3 is set out as follows:
The Court instructs the Jury that if you find from the evidence in this case, or
have a reasonable doubt that Christopher Lee, without any malice or
deliberation to cause the death of Anice Smith, and in in the heat of passion
or while in a struggle with Anice Smith, or upon any sudden provocation by
Anice Smith, did kill Anice Smith then you shall find the defendant not guilty.
¶13. Again, the State objected that the instruction was “an inaccurate statement of the law
and not fitting this case,” as well as being “confusing.” The trial court concluded that D-3
was “restating matters” that were “covered ... in S-3” and refused it.
¶14. Instruction D-4 reads as follows:
The Court instructs the Jury that if you find from the evidence in this case
beyond a reasonable doubt that Christopher Lee on August 1, 2001, in Wayne
County, Mississippi willfully killed Anice Smith without malice, in the heat
of passion, by the use of a deadly weapon, and further that Christopher Lee
was not acting in necessary self-defense, then you shall find the defendant
guilty of manslaughter.
This instruction was refused by the trial court as repetitive.
¶15. “The trial court enjoys considerable discretion regarding the form and substance of
jury instructions.” Higgins v. State, 725 So. 2d 220, 223 (Miss. 1998). “A defendant is
entitled to have jury instructions given which present his theory of the case; however, this
entitlement is limited in that the court may refuse an instruction which . . . is fairly covered
elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence.” Id.
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¶16. Additionally, Lee failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
refusal of repetitive instructions. This Court finds no reversible error.
III. IMPROPER ARGUMENTS MADE BY A PROSECUTOR.
¶17. Lee argues the courts have repeatedly held that a prosecutor cannot make “conscience
of the community” arguments during his closing arguments. Lee alleges in the instant case
that the State made “conscience of the community” arguments in its closing arguments.
Lee further contends that the State implied his guilt by his failure to testify which is
unconstitutionally prejudicial.
¶18. In the case at bar, the prosecutor stated:
And I am not trying to inflame your sense. I just think she deserves for y’all
to hear her speak. I mean, this is her day in court. She is looking to you for
justice and the people of Wayne County are looking to you to make this, their
streets safer. I mean we cannot have somebody that is going to do this on the
streets of Wayne County.
¶19. We find that even if the comment “the people of Wayne County are looking to you
to make this, your streets safer” was interpreted as a “conscience of the community”
argument, it was not so egregious as to require reversal based on the facts in the instant case.
As determined by this Court, the standard to warrant reversal is “whether the error affected
a trial in such a way as to bring its fairness into question.” Payton v. State, 785 So. 2d 267,
270 (Miss. 1999). Considering the overwhelming evidence of Lee’s guilt, it is inconceivable
that this remark prompted the verdict. Dancer v. State, 721 So. 2d 583, 590 (Miss. 1998).
¶20. Lee’s allegation that the State implied his guilt by his failure to testify is without
merit. The record reflects that Lee did in fact testify on his own behalf. Additionally, the
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record contains no comment by the State as to Lee’s failure to testify. Therefore, Lee’s claim
as to this issue is meritless.
¶21. Lee also alleges that the statement made by prosecutor Webb, “And I assure you he
is guilty.” The record does not reflect any such comment. Moreover, there was no one
named prosecutor Webb participating in the instant case. Therefore, Lee has no basis for this
issue.
CONCLUSION
¶22. The arguments presented by Lee are without merit, and the trial court's judgment
is affirmed.
¶23. CONVICTION OF MURDER AND SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT
IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
AND PAY COSTS OF COURT OF $248.00, AFFIRMED.
PITTMAN, C.J., SMITH , P.J., WALLER, COBB, EASLEY AND CARLSON,
JJ., CONCUR. McRAE, P.J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. DIAZ, J., NOT
PARTICIPATING.
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