Donald Hales v. State of Mississippi

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2004-KA-02084-SCT
DONALD HALES
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/24/2004
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. BILLY JOE LANDRUM
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: JONES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: DANIEL KYLE ROBERTSON
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: ANTHONY BUCKLEY
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED-05/18/2006
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE SMITH, C.J., CARLSON AND DICKINSON, JJ.
SMITH, CHIEF JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Donald Hales was indicted by the grand jury of the Second Judicial District of Jones
County for the possession of a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of Miss. Code
Ann. Section 41-29-139 (Rev. 2005). Hales was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court and
found guilty of the illegal possession of cocaine. The circuit court sentenced Hales to a
sixteen-year sentence with four years suspended. Hales was then remanded to the custody
of the Mississippi Department of Corrections to serve a total of twelve years. It is from this
conviction and sentence that Hales perfected the present appeal.
¶2. After due consideration, we find no error by the trial court in this case. Accordingly,
the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
FACTS
¶3. On or about February 11, 2004, Laurel narcotics officers secured a search warrant and
arrived at an apartment occupied by Donald Hales. The officers knocked on the door and
announced their presence, but heard what they perceived to be running water emanating from
the bathroom area of the apartment. The officers then decided to breach the entryway of the
residence in order to prevent the possible destruction of evidence. The officers discovered
Hales standing in the bathroom holding some sort of towel or rag in his hand. Also, officers
found Hales’ female companion taking a shower. Both individuals were taken into custody,
and the officers commenced a search of the apartment.
¶4. During the search, officers noticed a non-working stove in one of the cluttered rooms
in the apartment. Officers lifted the top panel of the stove and saw a bag containing a rock
like substance, which appeared to be crack cocaine. In addition, two razor blades covered
in a white powdery substance were discovered on a table in the apartment. These items,
which contained the suspected illegal substance, were collected and submitted to the crime
lab for chemical analysis. After testing, the crime lab determined the substance covering the
razor blades was a cocaine residue and the bag contained 5.71 grams of cocaine.
¶5. On March 24, 2004, Hales was indicted for possession of 5.71 grams of cocaine, in
violation of Section 41-29-139. Hales was subsequently tried by a jury before the circuit
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court. At trial the State presented evidence, including photographs and officer testimony, in
an attempt to demonstrate that Hales was knowingly in possession of a controlled dangerous
substance. Hales failed to produce evidence or testimony to contradict the State’s evidence.
Instead, Hales testified on his own behalf during the hearing and admitted residing in the
apartment that was searched by the narcotics officers. Hales denied having any knowledge
of the cocaine that was recovered in his apartment by the officers. Alternatively, Hales
suggested his girlfriend’s son and a friend stashed the cocaine in his apartment without his
knowledge.
¶6. After closing arguments, the circuit court submitted the case to the jury for
deliberations. Shortly thereafter the jury returned a guilty verdict. Hales was sentenced and
subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, or in the alternative, a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. The circuit court overruled Hales’ motions. Hales now appeals
to this Court.
ANALYSIS
I. MOTION FOR MISTRIAL
¶7. Prior to commencement of the trial, Hales’ counsel motioned the trial court to exclude
any items other than the cocaine that was recovered in Hales’ apartment. The following
relevant communications took place pretrial:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: One brief thing, there’s - - I see that there is several
things that Mr. Van Syckel has in his possession that was [sic] recovered
pursuant to the search warrant. My client is charged with possession of 5.71
grams of cocaine. I would move the court for an order prohibiting the State
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from introducing anything else that was a fruit of the search warrant other than
the cocaine which he’s on charge for here today.
PROSECUTION: Well, Your Honor, there’s the cocaine.
TRIAL COURT: If it’s not pursuant to the search warrant, what was identified
to be searched for, we all know that can’t be brought in. If it’s something that
they went there to find, if there’s other contraband - -
PROSECUTION: It will all be related to cocaine, Your Honor, but so the
Court will know, they found the cocaine and then they found two razor blades,
which are used to cut cocaine, that the crime lab will identify as razor blades
with cocaine residue. That’s the only other thing that was found.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: There’s also marijuana that was found.
PROSECUTION: We’re not getting into that.
TRIAL COURT: Okay. Well, let’s go then.
¶8. This pretrial discussion left Hales, not unreasonably, with the impression the district
attorney would not divulge any evidence of the presence of marijuana to the jury. However,
during the direct examination one of the narcotics officers the district attorney admitted a
color photograph into evidence which depicts a razor blade, a cell phone, a bottle of beer, a
bag of cocaine, and what appeared to be a small plastic bag of marijuana. Hales’ attorney
insists he was unaware the color photograph contained marijuana because the prosecution
submitted a black and white copy of the photograph during pretrial discovery. Further,
defense counsel maintains the poor quality of the black and white copy rendered an
indecipherable image of the bag of marijuana at issue. Moreover, Hales’ defense counsel
maintains the only time he saw the color photograph was prior to its admission into evidence.
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Hales’ counsel did receive a disc, which would have revealed the color photo at issue had
counsel had it printed. Hales’ counsel did not print the color photo.
¶9. Hales contends this color photograph clearly violated the pretrial order because of the
marijuana it portrays. Hales also claims the only purpose for offering the color photograph
was to inflame and prejudice the jury. We note the photograph at issue is clearly suspect in
that it contained the cocaine and other items, when the record clearly reflects only the cocaine
was found in the stove. It appears the photo at the center of controversy here was clearly one
taken of all the seized items together and did not adequately demonstrate where the seized
items were physically located in Hales’ apartment when first observed by the officers. The
trial court was concerned about the color photograph and made the following remarks:
TRIAL COURT: Now, on this photograph here, I know it’s in evidence and
it’s been presented in evidence. The only thing that disturbs me about it is the
fact that it’s obvious what it is. And to put a photograph into evidence and not
be a part of the crime that’s involved here is kind of disturbing to the Court
because it’s - - I don’t know.
PROSECUTION: As I said, Your Honor - -
TRIAL COURT: It’s not a matter of what you said. It’s a matter of what you
did. You presented it to the jury, a picture of a substance there that anybody -
- I mean, I don’t know what these peoples’ common experiences are. I would
suspect that there is somebody on this injury [sic] that, taking all the statistics
that we deal with from time to time and peoples’ knowledge about what
cocaine looks like, it’s obvious that there would be somebody on the jury that
while they’re deliberating in the jury room if this picture is presented that it
would be obvious that it would be - - that’s what it would be. So I don’t know
why y’all want to put something like that in.
PROSECUTION: Well, I’m not even looking for marijuana. All my witnesses
have - -
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TRIAL COURT: It’s not a matter of what you’re looking for. It’s a matter of
something that has been presented to the jury showing that you’ve got another
substance here. You’ve got beer. You’ve got all that stuff here.
PROSECUTION: Beer is not illegal.
TRIAL COURT: And I don’t know whether it’s put in there to inflame the
minds of the jury. You got a knife and all that stuff up there in this photograph.
Was that all put there as a composite to present to the jury to inflame the minds
of the jury? I don’t know.
....
TRIAL COURT: I’m just making a record on how I feel about this kind of
tactic. And that’s all I can say.
....
TRIAL COURT: I’m not going to do anything. I’m going to let it go in just
like it is because it’s already gone to the jury. And then I’m going to let you
go to the Supreme - - let them go to the Supreme Court, and let them do what
they need to do about it. I’m just telling you that it’s my point I don’t
understand why you do these things. Period.
PROSECUTION: Well, I don’t know what these things is, Your Honor.
¶10. When the trial court allowed the prosecution an opportunity to explain why such a
photograph was admitted into evidence, the prosecution offered that it was merely an attempt
to admit a razor blade into evidence. In response, Hales maintains the color photograph at
issue was not necessary merely for the admission of a razor blade.
¶11. While we acknowledge the concerns of the trial judge regarding the photograph, this
issue is barred from consideration because defense counsel failed to contemporaneously and
timely object to the admission of the photograph. The prosecution presented the color
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photograph to defense counsel before admitting it into evidence without an objection. The
photo was admitted without objection, and only after the prosecution completed his direct
examination of the narcotics officer did the defense finally bring the alleged prejudicial
nature of the photograph to the trial court’s attention.
¶12. This Court has consistently held “that the failure to make a contemporaneous
objection at trial constitutes a waiver of any error subsequently assigned.” Moawad v. State,
531 So. 2d 632, 634 (Miss. 1998)(citing Irving v. State, 498 So. 2d 305 (Miss. 1986); Gates
v. State, 484 So. 2d 1002 (Miss. 1986)). See also Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S. Ct
2497, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594 (1997). Accord Walker v. State, 473 So. 2d 435 (Miss. 1985); Ward
v. State, 461 So. 2d 724 (Miss. 1984); Tubbs v. State, 402 So. 2d 830 (Miss. 1981). In this
case, defense counsel objected to the photograph outside the timely and contemporaneous
realm required by this Court. Therefore, this issue is not properly before this Court on direct
appeal, and we are procedurally barred from considering it.
¶13. Hales submits admission of the photograph constitutes reversible error by the trial
court, and thus his motion for a mistrial should have been granted. However, after a
thorough review of the record, we find neither the word “mistrial” nor Hales’ alleged motion
for a mistrial. This Court has stated on numerous occasions “that an appellant is responsible
for bringing to our attention and presenting to this Court a record of trial proceedings
sufficient to undergird his assignments of error.” Winters v. State, 473 So.2d 452, 457
(Miss. 1985). See, e.g., Yates v. State, 342 So.2d 312, 316 (Miss. 1977); Shelton v. Kindred,
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279 So. 2d 642, 644 (Miss. 1973). Despite the prosecution’s actions in this case, which
border on prejudicing the defendant, this Court cannot consider reversing the ruling of a trial
court when the alleged ruling is not in the record. Therefore, the trial court did not
erroneously overrule Hales’ motion for a mistrial, because there is no evidence in the record
that Hales’ ever made such a motion. Thus, this Court is procedurally barred from
considering such a claim of error.
¶14. However, this Court now calls attention to the trial court’s concerns regarding what
the trial judge referred to as the prosecutor’s “tactics” in this case. The trial judge only
allowed evidence of the cocaine, and the State agreed not to mention any marijuana. While
indeed, the prosecutor did not mention marijuana, the prosecutor’s conduct certainly raises
concerns. The color photograph at issue clearly shows a substance that a juror might
conclude is marijuana. In the interest of justice, this Court frowns upon any conduct
regarding evidence and prior court rulings which might appear suspect. To help avoid this
type of conduct this Court provided a simple prosecutorial roadmap over a century ago:
The fair way is the safe way, and the safe way is the best way in every criminal
prosecution. The history of criminal jurisprudence and practice demonstrates,
generally, that if everyone prosecuted for crime were fairly and fully conceded
all to which he is entitled, and if all doubtful advantages to the state were
declined, there would be secured as many convictions of the guilty, and such
convictions would be succeeded by few or no reversals.
Flowers v. State, 842 So. 2d 531, 564 (Miss. 2003) (citing Johnson v. State, 476 So. 2d
1195, 1215 (Miss. 1985); Hill v. State, 72 Miss. 527, 534, 17 So. 375, 377 (1895)). In
accordance with this guideline we pose the following question: was the color photograph the
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prosecutor surreptitiously slipped into evidence the lynchpin of the state’s case? After a
diligent review of the record we are certain the answer is no. Moreover, the prosecutor’s
actions unnecessarily jeopardized what was otherwise a solid evidentiary case. Therefore,
for future reference we take this opportunity to point out that prosecutors can avoid such a
quandary by taking the fair and safe route regarding inadmissible evidence during trial.
¶15. In this case, the prosecutor’s actions were not well received by the trial court, nor are
they by this Court. However, due to defense counsel’s failure to make a contemporaneous
objection, the aforementioned procedural bar prevents the Court from considering this issue
on direct appeal. Thus, this issue is without merit.
II. RIGHT TO A MEANINGFUL APPEAL
¶16. Hales argues he has been denied the right to a meaningful appeal because of
substantial omissions in the record. Hales states that the court reporter’s failure to transcribe
five bench conferences as well as a number of other courtroom utterances resulted in severe
prejudice in filing this appeal. Hales does not accept fault for the incomplete record, and
maintains reversal is required.
¶17. This very issue was presented in Simmons v. State, 805 So. 2d 452 (Miss. 2001). In
Simmons this Court stated:
Simmons did not follow the proper procedure for correcting omissions
in the record as set out in the Mississippi Rules. M.R.A.P. 10(c). The Watts
case indicates that the failure to do so acts as a procedural bar to raising the
issue on appeal. Watts v. State, 717 So. 2d 314, 317 (Miss. 1998).
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The argument that the absence of bench conference transcripts hurts the
defense’s case on appeal is meritless. Defense counsel failed to object to the
lack of transcriptions at the time; thus, he is procedurally barred from raising
the issue on appeal. Burns v. State, 729 So. 2d 203, 212 (Miss. 1998) (“It is
in poor grace for counsel to participate without objection in unrecorded bench
conferences and complain for the first time on appeal.”) (quoting Thorson v.
State, 653 So. 2d 876, 895 (Miss. 1994)).
Id. at 506.
¶18. In this case, Hales also did not follow the proper procedure for correcting the alleged
omissions in the record as set out in the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure. See
M.R.A.P. 10. Moreover, there is no evidence that Hales attempted to ensure a complete
record. Therefore, in accordance Simmons, Hales is procedurally barred from asserting this
assignment of error. Therefore, this issue is without merit.
III. SUFFICIENCY AND WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
¶19. The trial court denied Hales’ post trial motion for a new trial, or in the alternative,
motion for JNOV. Hales now submits the trial court erred by not granting a directed verdict,
peremptory instruction, JNOV, or alternatively, a new trial.
¶20. “A motion for new trial challenges the weight of the evidence. A reversal is
warranted only if the lower court abused its discretion in denying a motion for new trial.”
Dilworth v. State, 909 So. 2d 731, 737 (Miss. 2005)(citing Howell v. State, 860 So. 2d 704,
764 (Miss. 2003); Edwards v. State, 800 So. 2d 454, 464 (Miss. 2001); Sheffield v. State,
749 So. 2d 123, 127 (Miss. 1999)). “The appellate court will not order a new trial ‘unless
the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand
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would sanction ‘unconscionable justice.’” Howell, 860 So. 2d at 764(quoting McDowell v.
State, 813 So. 2d 694, 699-700 (Miss. 2002)).
¶21. Motions for directed verdicts, JVOVs, and requests for peremptory instructions
challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. Jefferson v. State, 818 So.
2d 1099, 1110-11 (Miss. 2002). Moreover, all employ the same standard of review. Id.Under this standard, this Court will consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the appellee, giving the benefit of all favorable inference that may
be reasonably drawn from the evidence. If the facts so considered point so
overwhelmingly in favor of the appellant that reasonable men could not have
arrived at a contrary verdict, we are required to reverse and render. On the
other hand if there is substantial evidence in support of the verdict, that is,
evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair minded jurors in
the exercise of impartial judgment might have reached different conclusions,
affirmance is required.
Id. at 1111.
¶22. Hales insists the jury’s verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and
the State failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, Hales alleges that taking
all of the credible evidence in the case at bar as true, reasonable and fair-minded jurors could
only have acquitted him of the possession of cocaine. We do not agree.
¶23. At trial the State demonstrated Hales was the resident of the apartment searched by
narcotics officers, pursuant to a valid search warrant. In addition, through copious testimony
and physical evidence, the State showed that 5.71 grams of cocaine, as well as razor blades
containing a cocaine residue were discovered in the Hales residence. In response to the
State’s evidence, defense counsel failed to call any witnesses to the stand other than the
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defendant himself. Hales denied any knowledge of the cocaine recovered, and insinuated his
girlfriend’s son may have actually owned the drugs. The State presented adequate evidence
to support the conclusion that Hales was in possession of the cocaine recovered.
¶24. This Court has held that “we do not reverse criminal cases where there is a straight
issue of fact, or a conflict in the facts; juries are impaneled for the very purpose of passing
upon such questions of disputed fact, and we do not intend to invade the province and
prerogative of the jury.” Hyde v. State, 413 So. 2d 1042, 1044 (Miss. 1982) (quoting Evans
v. State, 159 Miss. 561, 132 So. 563, 564 (1931)). This issue presents a straight issue of fact
and should not be reversed, for if this Court were to reverse the verdict in this matter the
province and prerogative of the jury would certainly be invaded.
¶25. After diligent review of the record, it is our opinion the reasonable juror could not
have arrived at a contrary verdict, as the facts are sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.
Therefore, the verdict is not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and must be
allowed to stand. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. This issue is without
merit.
IV. CUMULATIVE ERROR
¶26. Finally, Hales argues even if this Court somehow finds no single error calling for
reversal, it should nonetheless grant a new trial based on the cumulative effect of the errors
asserted. This Court has previously held “that individual errors, not reversible in themselves
may combine with other errors to make up reversible error.” Byrom v. State, 863 So. 2d 836,
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847 (Miss. 2003). See also Hansen v. State, 592 So. 2d 114, 142 (Miss. 1991); Griffin v.
State, 557 So. 2d 542, 553 (Miss. 1990). However, “[w]here there is ‘no reversible error in
any part, . . . there is no reversible error to the whole.’” Gibson v. State, 731 So. 2d 1087,
1098 (Miss. 1998)(quoting McFee v. State, 511 So. 2d 130, 136 (Miss. 1987)).
¶27. In this case, all of the previous issues have been considered and determined to be
without merit. Therefore, we find the cumulative effect of the errors alleged by Hales, does
not warrant reversal of the jury’s verdict. Thus, this issue is also without merit.
CONCLUSION
¶28. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court was not in error, nor did it abuse its
discretion. Further, the evidence submitted at trial was such that no reasonable juror could
have reached a contrary verdict. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
¶29. CONVICTION OF POSSESSION OF COCAINE (5.71 GRAMS) AND
SENTENCE OF SIXTEEN (16) YEARS, WITH FOUR (4) YEARS SUSPENDED, IN
THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
AFFIRMED.
WALLER, P.J., EASLEY, CARLSON, DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, JJ.,
CONCUR. GRAVES, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
COBB, P.J. AND DIAZ, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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