Maurice Pruitt v. State of Mississippi

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-KA-01405-SCT
MAURICE PRUITT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/20/2008
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. BILLY JOE LANDRUM
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: JONES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: BENJAMIN ALLEN SUBER
LESLIE S. LEE
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BILLY L. GORE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: ANTHONY J. BUCKLEY
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 01/28/2010
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE CARLSON, P.J., RANDOLPH AND KITCHENS, JJ.
RANDOLPH, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Maurice Pruitt was indicted for both the murder of David McMillian and the
aggravated assault of Keitho Plummer. Following his jury trial in the Circuit Court of Jones
County, Mississippi, Second Judicial District, Pruitt was found guilty of manslaughter1 and
was sentenced to serve twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of
Corrections (“MDOC”). Following denial of Pruitt’s motion for a new trial, or in the
alternative, judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”), he filed timely notice of appeal.
1
The jury acquitted Pruitt on the murder charge, but found him guilty of the lesser-
included offense of manslaughter. As to the aggravated assault charge, the jury acquitted
Pruitt.
FACTS
¶2. It is undisputed that on July 2, 2007, Pruitt shot and killed McMillian with a nine (.9)
millimeter pistol outside of the American Legion Hut in Laurel, Mississippi. Conflicting
testimony was presented at trial, not only regarding whether McMillian had his right hand
hidden behind his thigh, but also whether he was in possession of a gun as he approached
Pruitt. Melvin Sanders, a security guard at the American Legion Hut, and Plummer2 claimed
that McMillian’s right hand was not concealed and they did not see a gun. Furthermore,
Melvin Mack, the Mayor of Laurel, testified that Pruitt had admitted to him that McMillian
had no gun. Conversely, Tyrone Pearson and Pruitt testified that McMillian appeared to be
holding an object in his concealed right hand.
¶3. Sanders testified that he heard arguing in the parking lot around 12:00 a.m. and
proceeded outside. According to Sanders, he saw Pruitt holding a gun and warned Plummer,
with whom Pruitt was arguing at the time. Sanders then attempted to prevent McMillian
from approaching Pruitt, but McMillian got past him. Sanders witnessed the shooting first-
hand and testified that in no way did it appear that McMillian had a gun. After McMillian
was shot, Sanders testified that Pruitt turned the gun toward Plummer, who was unarmed, and
began firing. According to Sanders, Pruitt then jumped into a black Chevy Tahoe and fled
the scene. Plummer’s testimony was consistent with the testimony of Sanders, although his
2
This Court notes that Plummer had an unpleasant history with Pruitt. Specifically,
Plummer shot Pruitt with a pistol at the American Legion Hut on July 21, 1996. Pruitt
further claimed that Plummer attempted to shoot him again on December 31, 2006, also at
the American Legion Hut.
2
credibility was later brought into question based upon his prior altercations with Pruitt. See
footnote 2, supra.
¶4. Pruitt testified that he thought McMillian had a gun and shot him out of necessary
self-defense. According to Pruitt, McMillian was directing profanities toward him, then
McMillian and Plummer walked over to a car together. Shortly thereafter, McMillian
proceeded toward him “fast,” with his right hand hidden behind his thigh. Before McMillian
could reach him, however, Pruitt claimed that Pearson unsuccessfully attempted to stop
McMillian. After McMillian pushed Pearson out of the way with his “left hand,” Pruitt
testified that he began firing his .9 millimeter pistol at McMillian. Pruitt then left the scene
and went to Mayor Mack’s home, where he turned himself over to authorities. Mayor Mack
testified that Pruitt had admitted to him, immediately after the incident, that the man he shot
did not have a gun.
¶5. Pearson corroborated Pruitt’s testimony regarding McMillian’s use of profanity,
aggressive approach, and concealed right hand. Pearson testified that McMillian went to a
car, then walked quickly toward Pruitt while hiding his right hand behind his body. When
Pearson attempted to stop McMillian, he testified that he was pushed out of the way by
McMillian’s “shoulder.”
3
¶6. Pruitt was indicted on counts of murder 3 and aggravated assault.4 At trial, Pruitt
moved for a directed verdict following the State’s case-in-chief, which was denied.
Ultimately, the jury found Pruitt guilty of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. Pruitt
subsequently moved for a new trial, or in the alternative, JNOV, which was denied. Pruitt
now appeals.
ISSUES
¶7. On appeal, Pruitt raises the following two issues:
I. Whether the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, as the State
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Pruitt did not act in necessary
self-defense.
II. Whether the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence,
which establishes that Pruitt acted in necessary self-defense.
3
The indictment stated that Pruitt:
on or about the 2nd day of July, 2007, A.D. did willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with deliberate design to effect the death of [McMillian], did kill
and murder [McMillian], a human being, without authority of law and not in
necessary self defense, by shooting [McMillian] with a gun.
4
The indictment provided that Pruitt:
as part of a common plan or scheme or as part of the same transaction or
occurrence in said County, District and State, on or about the 2nd day of July,
2007 A.D., did purposely, knowingly or feloniously attempt to cause bodily
injury to another, [Plummer], with a gun, a deadly weapon, by attempting to
shoot [Plummer].
4
ANALYSIS
I. Whether the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict.
¶8. Pruitt made a post-trial motion for JNOV, which was denied by the circuit court. “A
motion for J.N.O.V. challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence.” Ivy v. State, 949 So.
2d 748, 751 (Miss. 2007) (citing McClain v. State, 625 So. 2d 774, 778 (Miss. 1993)). In
Bush v. State, 895 So. 2d 836 (Miss. 2005), this Court set out the standard of review for legal
sufficiency, stating:
whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction in the face of a
motion for directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the
critical inquiry is whether the evidence shows “beyond a reasonable doubt that
the accused committed the act charged, and that he did so under such
circumstances that every element of the offense existed; and where the
evidence fails to meet this test it is insufficient to support a conviction.” [Carr
v. State, 208 So. 2d 886, 889 (Miss. 1968)]. However, this inquiry does not
require a court to[:]
“ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at trial
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Instead, the
relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560
(1979) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Should the facts and
inferences considered in a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence “point
in favor of the defendant on any element of the offense with sufficient force
that reasonable men could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was guilty,” the proper remedy is for the appellate court to reverse
and render. Edwards v. State, 469 So. 2d 68, 70 (Miss. 1985) (citing May v.
State, 460 So. 2d 778, 781 (Miss. 1984)). . . . However, if a review of the
evidence reveals that it is of such quality and weight that, “having in mind the
beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof standard, reasonable fair-minded
men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions
on every element of the offense,” the evidence will be deemed to have been
sufficient. Edwards, 469 So. 2d at 70 . . . .
5
Bush, 895 So. 2d at 843.
¶9. In Mississippi, manslaughter is defined as “[t]he killing of a human being, without
malice, in the heat of passion, but in a cruel or unusual manner, or by the use of a dangerous
weapon, without authority of law, and not in necessary self-defense.” Miss. Code. Ann. §
97-3-35 (Rev. 2006). The only element in dispute in the case sub judice is whether Pruitt
shot and killed McMillian while acting in necessary self-defense.5 Pruitt asserted that he was
acting in necessary self-defense because he “thought [McMillian] had a gun.”
¶10. Interpreting the evidence in a “light most favorable” to the State, Pruitt’s first
assignment of error fails. Bush, 895 So. 2d at 843 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315). This
Court has stated that:
[i]n order to justify the appellant’s contention of self defense . . . , the record
must disclose . . . that the appellant had a reasonable apprehension of a design
or plan on the part of the deceased to kill him or to do great bodily harm, and
furthermore that there was imminent danger of such design being
accomplished. The mere apprehension that some minor battery might have
been committed upon the appellant is not sufficient to establish self-defense.
Stennis v. State, 234 So. 2d 611, 614 (Miss. 1970) (internal citations omitted). Pruitt
admitted that he never actually saw McMillian with a gun, and Mayor Mack testified that
Pruitt told him shortly after the shooting that McMillian did not have a gun. No witness
testified to seeing McMillian with a gun. Both Sanders and Plummer, witnesses to the
shooting, testified that it did not appear as though McMillian had a gun. Pruitt admitted
5
“A killing of a human being is justifiable . . . [w]hen committed in the lawful defense
of one’s own person or any other human being, where there shall be reasonable ground to
apprehend a design to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury, and there shall
be imminent danger of such design being accomplished.” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-15(f)
(Rev. 2006).
6
firing at McMillian before the victim could raise the allegedly hidden right hand. Pruitt
exercised deadly force in the absence of deadly force being used against him. Whether the
jury accepted the testimony of Sanders and Plummer or the testimony of Pruitt, the outcome
does not change. “[R]easonable fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment[,]”
Bush, 895 So. 2d at 843 (quoting Edwards, 469 So. 2d at 70), could have taken either
version into consideration and reasonably found that Pruitt’s use of deadly force was either
unnecessary or premature and was not exercised in necessary self-defense. Accordingly, this
issue is without merit.
II. Whether the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
¶11. Pruitt made a post-trial motion for new trial, which was denied by the circuit court.
“A motion for new trial challenges the weight of the evidence. A reversal is warranted only
if the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion for new trial.” Ivy, 949 So. 2d at
753 (citation omitted). In Bush, this Court set out the standard of review for weight of the
evidence, stating:
[w]hen reviewing a denial of a motion for a new trial based on an objection to
the weight of the evidence, we will only disturb a verdict when it is so contrary
to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would
sanction an unconscionable injustice. Herring v. State, 691 So. 2d 948, 957
(Miss. 1997). We have stated that on a motion for new trial:
the court sits as a thirteenth juror. The motion, however, is
addressed to the discretion of the court, which should be
exercised with caution, and the power to grant a new trial should
be invoked only in exceptional cases in which the evidence
preponderates heavily against the verdict.
Amiker v. Drugs For Less, Inc., 796 So. 2d 942, 947 (Miss. 2000). . . . [T]he
evidence should be weighed in the light most favorable to the verdict.
Herring, 691 So. 2d at 957.
7
Bush, 895 So. 2d at 844.
¶12. Viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict,” this Court cannot
conclude that the circuit court’s affirmance of the jury verdict “sanction[ed] an
unconscionable injustice.” Id. The testimony of Sanders and Plummer was that McMillian
did not appear to have a gun. Post-shooting, it was determined the victim did not have a gun.
Relying on the absence of a gun or other evidence of deadly force, the jury reasonably could
have determined that Pruitt did not act in necessary self-defense. As Pruitt’s testimony
differed from that of Pearson regarding McMillian’s actions directly before the shooting, the
jury also reasonably could have questioned the credibility of their testimony based upon these
inconsistencies. In sum, weighing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict[,]”
the jury could reasonably have found against Pruitt. Id. As this Court cannot disagree with
the jury’s conclusion, it finds that this issue is without merit.
CONCLUSION
¶13. Based upon the aforementioned analysis, this Court affirms the Circuit Court of Jones
County, Mississippi, Second Judicial District, as to Pruitt’s manslaughter conviction and
accompanying sentence.
¶14. COUNT I: CONVICTION OF MANSLAUGHTER AND SENTENCE OF
TWENTY (20) YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS, WITH CONDITIONS, AFFIRMED.
WALLER, C.J., CARLSON, P.J., DICKINSON, LAMAR, KITCHENS,
CHANDLER AND PIERCE, JJ., CONCUR. GRAVES, P.J., CONCURS IN RESULT
ONLY.
8