Mack Arthur King v. State of Mississippi

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2014-KA-00340-SCT
MACK ARTHUR KING
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/27/2014
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LEE SORRELS COLEMAN
TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: RHONDA R. HAYES-ELLIS
STACY L. FERRARO
MERRIDA P. COXWELL, JR.
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LOWNDES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: STACY L. FERRARO
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: FORREST ALLGOOD
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: VACATED AND REMANDED - 06/18/2015
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
LAMAR, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. After a federal court declared Mack Arthur King ineligible for the death penalty under
Atkins v. Virginia,1 the Lowndes County Circuit Court sentenced him to life without parole.
King argues on appeal that he should have been sentenced to life. We agree, and we vacate
King’s sentence and remand the case for resentencing.
1
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002).
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. Lelia Patterson was found dead in her home on August 3, 1980. King v. State, 421
So. 2d 1009, 1010 (Miss. 1982). King subsequently was indicted for capital murder in her
death, and he was convicted and sentenced to death in December 1981. Id. at 1018. Since
that time, King has filed numerous appeals seeking relief from his conviction and sentence,
but those are not relevant here.2
¶3. In 2013, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi found
that King was intellectually disabled and therefore ineligible for execution. King v. Epps,
2013 WL 1291632, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Mar 26, 2013). The district court vacated King’s death
sentence and gave the State an opportunity to impose a sentence less than death. Id. at **1;
12. The State then filed a Motion to Vacate Sentence of Death and Resentence Petitioner to
Life Without Parole in the Lowndes County Circuit Court.
¶4. King filed a motion objecting to being sentenced to life without parole. He argued
that the only sentencing options available at the time he committed the crime were death and
life. He argued that the 1994 sentencing amendments which added life without parole as a
sentencing option for capital murder could not properly be applied to him, because they
would violate the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Mississippi Constitutions.
2
See King v. State, 421 So. 2d 1009 (Miss. 1982); King v. State, 503 So. 2d 271
(Miss. 1987); King v. Puckett, 1 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 1993); King v. State, 656 So. 2d 1168
(Miss. 1995); King v. State, 784 So. 2d 884 (Miss. 2001); King v. State, 960 So. 2d 413
(Miss. 2007); King v. State, 23 So. 3d 1067 (Miss. 2009).
2
He also argued that his due-process rights would be violated if the circuit court applied
Mississippi Code Section 99-19-107 to him.3
¶5. The State responded and argued that Section 99-19-107 would apply to King, as
evidenced by this Court’s decision in Foster v. State, 961 So. 2d 670 (Miss. 2007), and the
Court of Appeals’ decision in Neal v. State, 27 So. 3d 460 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). The trial
judge agreed with the State and sentenced King to life without parole, stating: “Based on the
authority of the cases of [Neal] and [Foster], the Court finds that the Defendant’s contention
that sentencing him pursuant to [Section 99-19-107] to life in prison without parole does not
constitute a violation of the United States and Mississippi constitution’s [sic] provisions
against ex post facto laws.”
¶6. King appeals, arguing that he should be resentenced to life with the possibility of
parole for two reasons:
(1) Mississippi Code Annotated § 99-19-107 does not apply to Mr. King’s case
because Atkins v. Virginia was not a “wholesale declaration” that the death
penalty was unconstitutional; and
(2) Mack Arthur King’s rights under the due process clause of the United
States Constitution were violated when the trial court resentenced him to life
without the possibility of parole because it was a retroactive imposition of
changes caused by judicial interpretation of a criminal statute that were
“unexpected” and “indefensible.”
¶7. We find the first issue dispositive, so we do not address King’s due-process argument.
3
“In the event the death penalty is held to be unconstitutional by the Mississippi
Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, the court having jurisdiction over a
person previously sentenced to death shall cause such person to be brought before the court
and the court shall sentence such person to imprisonment for life, and such person shall not
be eligible for parole.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-107 (Rev. 2007).
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ANALYSIS
¶8. This Court reviews questions of law de novo. Bell v. State, 160 So. 3d 188, 189
(Miss. 2015) (citations omitted).
¶9. King argues that Section 99-19-107’s mandate that a prisoner be sentenced to life
without parole does not apply to him and that, consequently, the only sentencing option
available to the trial judge was life. We agree, per our recent decision in Bell v. State, 160
So. 3d 188 (Miss. 2015). There, Frederick Bell made the exact arguments that King makes
here—that Section 99-19-107 did not apply to him and that a sentence of life without parole
violated his due-process rights. Id. at 189.
¶10. This Court agreed with Bell that Section 99-19-107 did not apply to him, stating:
Bell is correct that the Supreme Court’s holding in Atkins was not a wholesale
declaration that the death penalty was unconstitutional. Rather, Atkins
prohibited the imposition of death sentences on mentally retarded individuals.
Thus, an individual sentenced to death who is later determined to be mentally
retarded pursuant to Atkins should be resentenced, not automatically given a
sentence of life without parole.
...
We hold that Section 99-19-107 is inapplicable because the death penalty in
its entirety has not been declared unconstitutional. As to Bell individually,
however, his sentence of death is unconstitutional because he has been
determined to be mentally retarded. Section 99-19-107 does not apply when an
individual’s death sentence is rendered unconstitutional. That section would
apply if, and only if, the United States Supreme Court or the Mississippi
Supreme Court rendered a wholesale declaration that the death penalty as a
sentence to anyone was unconstitutional. That has not happened, and Section
99-19-107 has never been called into play. With his death sentence being
unconstitutional, Bell is entitled to a new sentence. Bell’s sentence is vacated,
and we remand the case to the Circuit Court of Grenada County for Bell to be
resentenced to life imprisonment.
Id. at 194, 196 (emphasis added).
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¶11. This Court acknowledged that it had held otherwise in Foster v. State, 961 So. 2d 670
(Miss. 2007), which is the case relied on by the State and the trial judge below and by the
State on appeal. Bell, 160 So. 3d at 191-95. But, after a thorough analysis, this Court
determined that Section 99-19-107 was ambiguous, and it returned to the interpretation of
Section 99-19-107 previously adopted by this Court in Abram v. State, 606 So. 2d 1015
(Miss. 1992), thereby implicitly overruling Foster. Bell, 160 So. 3d at 193-95.
¶12. In sum, this Court directly answered the question presented by King in Bell. And, as
in Bell, King must be sentenced to life, because death and life were the only two sentencing
options available at the time King was convicted and sentenced. See id. at 196.
CONCLUSION
¶13. Because Section 99-19-107 does not apply when an individual’s death sentence is
rendered unconstitutional, King must be resentenced to life, as death and life were the only
two sentencing options available at the time he was convicted and sentenced. King’s
sentence is vacated, and we remand the case to the Lowndes County Circuit Court for King
to be resentenced to life imprisonment.
¶14. VACATED AND REMANDED.
WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., KITCHENS,
CHANDLER, PIERCE, KING AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR.
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