Michael Deon Taylor v. State of Mississippi

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2013-CT-00305-SCT
MICHAEL DEON TAYLOR a/k/a MICHAEL D.
TAYLOR a/k/a MICHAEL TAYLOR
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/21/2012
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. WILLIAM E. CHAPMAN, III
TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: THOMAS R. MAYFIELD
GEORGE MCDOWELL YODER, III
CATOUCHE BODY
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: DAMON RAMON STEVENSON
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: STEPHANIE BRELAND WOOD
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: MICHAEL GUEST
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED-07/02/2015
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
CHANDLER, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Michael Deon Taylor was convicted in 2012 of possessing stolen property. He was
sentenced as a habitual offender to ten years in prison. Taylor testified in his own defense at
trial. During cross-examination, the State questioned Taylor extensively about his numerous
past felony convictions without objection from defense counsel. We find that defense
counsel’s failure to object to the expansive inquiry into Taylor’s prior convictions constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel apparent from the record before us on direct appeal. We
reverse Taylor’s conviction and remand for a new trial.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
¶2. Alex Walker, the owner of a tree service, called for a service technician to repair an
inoperable skid steer. The serial number reported back to the office by the technician
revealed that the skid steer was listed as stolen. The sheriff’s department went to the location
of the skid steer and questioned Walker, who initially stated that he had purchased the skid
steer from a white man with a jack-o-lantern tattoo. Meanwhile, photographs of an identical
skid steer had been found on Michael Deon Taylor’s phone while he was under arrest for an
unrelated crime. When Walker was shown a photograph of Taylor the day after Walker was
initially questioned by the authorities, he changed his story to say that he purchased the skid
steer from Taylor in exchange for a combination of cash and two vehicles. Photographs of
those two vehicles were also found on Taylor’s phone.
¶3. Taylor was tried and convicted of possessing stolen property. Prior to trial, Taylor’s
defense attorney filed a Motion in Limine requesting:
That all evidence regarding his past criminal history be excluded. The
probative value of this information is greatly outweighed by the prejudice it
would have on the defendant.
The State and its witnesses should not be allowed to in anyway solicit, induce,
entice or make know[n] to the jury any evidence concerning “his past criminal
history.”
The judge delayed a ruling on the motion until the point in the trial when Taylor made his
final decision to testify in his own defense. Immediately prior to Taylor’s testimony, Taylor’s
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attorney withdrew his previous motion regarding introduction of Taylor’s prior felony
convictions. A bench conference was held prior to the start of Taylor’s testimony:
[DEFENSE]: I was going to admit that he’s a convicted felon.
STATE: He’s got at least three. I was going to –
THE COURT: Are we at the point now? You’re moving past your
motion.
[DEFENSE]: I understand. When I put him on the stand, I made it
there.
THE COURT: He is withdrawing his motion.
STATE: Okay. That’s cool.
The defense proceeded with direct examination of Taylor, in which Taylor volunteered
information of one past felony:
...
[DEFENSE]: Why are you in Madison County’s custody?
A. Because I violated my probation.
Q. Why were you on probation?
A. A cocaine charge. I had a sale of cocaine.
Q. All right. Let’s back up to this skid steer.
...
The State opened its cross-examination with the following line of questioning:
Q. What felony crimes have you been convicted of?
A. Well, I have a – do you want the year, too?
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Q. I’ve got the year. I just want to see if you remember.
A. I have a house burglary, which was in – a house burglary and the
alteration of motor vehicle I.D., which is I changed numbers on a car
before in ’93. I have a convicted felon with a firearm.
Q. What year was that?
A. The convicted felon with a firearm was – I think I caught it like in 2000
maybe or 2001, but I got convicted of it in 2004 maybe or something
like that.
Q. What else?
A. I have a grand larceny.
Q. Where was that from?
A. Covington.
Q. Go ahead. What else?
A. I have two cocaines. Those were my last convictions, was I had two
drug charges.
Q. Okay. So let me make sure I’ve got them all here. You were convicted
of you said auto theft?
A. Yes. No changing numbers on an auto – changing VIN numbers. Let
me put it like that.
Q. Still a felony?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Then you were convicted of a felon in possession of a firearm?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. You were convicted of possession of a stolen firearm in Madison
County, Mississippi, were you not?
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A. That’s the same charge.
Q. That you were convicted of sale of cocaine?
A. Yes.
Q. Where was that?
A. Here.
Q. And you were convicted of possession of cocaine?
A. Yes.
Q. Where was that?
A. That was here.
Q. How many times is that? Twice?
A. Yeah. I understand what you’re saying. It was like under one sentence,
though.
Q. Okay. So we’ve got six felonies so far?
A. Yes.
Q. Then you got a burglary conviction in Covington County in
January 2012?
A. No, it was grand larceny.
Q. Well, let’s see what it was. Okay? I’ll specifically ask you, Mr. Taylor,
if on – Well, may I hand him this document to refresh his memory?
THE COURT: Certainly
STATE: Look at that and read particularly this up here with your name
up here. Tell the jury what you were convicted of in January of
2012 in Covington County, Mississippi?
A. It was a burglary of an automobile.
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Q. So how many felonies is that, seven or eight?
A. No, it’s either six or seven. Some of them I got at one time. It was like
two I got at one time.
Q. Mr. Taylor, when did you have time to do much of anything else?
¶4. At no point did Taylor’s attorney raise an objection to this line of questioning. Taylor
was convicted and sentenced to ten years as a habitual offender. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the merits of Taylor’s conviction and sentence while leaving the question of
ineffective assistance of counsel without prejudice for a post-conviction-relief claim.1 We
granted certiorari review to address Taylor’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
DISCUSSION
¶5. Whether a defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel is a question of
law reviewed de novo under two prongs: “[f]irst, the defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient . . . Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.
Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). While post-conviction proceedings are often the most
appropriate forum for review of ineffective assistance of counsel, we “may nevertheless
reach the merits of the ineffectiveness issue where . . . the record affirmatively shows
ineffectiveness of constitutional dimensions . . . . ” Read v. State, 430 So. 2d 832, 841 (Miss.
1983).
1
Michael Deon Taylor v. State, No. 2013-DA-00305-COA, 2014 WL 3586254(Miss. Ct. App. July 22, 2014), reh’g denied (Nov. 4, 2014), cert. granted (Feb. 3, 2015).
Judge Irving dissented, joined by Chief Judge Lee and Judges Ishee and James, in part.
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¶6. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he
acted in conformity therewith . . . .” Mississippi Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1)(B) provides that
[f]or the purpose of attacking the character of truthfulness of a witness,
evidence that a party has been convicted of [a crime punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year] shall be admitted if the court determines
that the probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect to the party . . . .
The comment to the rule provides that “convictions offered under 609(a)(1) to impeach a
party must be analyzed under the guidelines set forth in Peterson v. State, 518 So. 2d 632(Miss. 1987) to determine if the probative value is great enough to overcome the presumed
prejudicial effect to the party. And findings should be made on the record by the judge.”
M.R.E. 609 cmt.
¶7. We find that Taylor’s right to a fair trial was compromised by defense counsel’s
withdrawal of the Motion in Limine regarding Taylor’s criminal history and by failure to
object to the State’s extensive cross-examination regarding Taylor’s prior convictions. When
evaluating whether counsel’s performance was deficient, trial counsel “is entitled to the
presumption that his actions fell within the ambit of sound trial strategy, [but] that
presumption is not absolute.” Herrington v. State, 102 So. 3d 1241, 1246 (Miss. Ct. App.
2012). In a criminal trial on the lone charge of possession of stolen property, where the
State’s prime witness previously had changed his story to police about which individual he
purchased the stolen property from, we cannot conceive a trial strategy that would justify
failure to object to the introduction and detailed description of the defendant’s seven or eight
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previous felony convictions. The State’s extensive cross-examination regarding Taylor’s
numerous past felony convictions was clearly more prejudicial than probative in a case that
largely turned on the respective credibility of Taylor and the State’s main witness.
¶8. A defendant’s choice to testify in his or her own defense does not eliminate the
protection of Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b). Neither does a defendant’s willingness
to stipulate to felon status to satisfy impeachment under Rule 609(a)(1)(B). To the contrary,
the strategic goal of such stipulation is to curtail the prejudice that might arise if a more
detailed and expansive record of prior bad acts is allowed in. See Herrington v. State, 102
So. 3d 1241 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). We agree with Judge Irving’s dissent in the Court of
Appeals opinion that “ it appears that Taylor’s counsel thought that by placing Taylor on the
stand, the prosecution was entitled to inquire, without any limitation, into the details of all
of the prior convictions that Taylor had.” This erroneous assumption had a highly prejudicial
effect on Taylor’s defense. We also note the lack of a judicial finding in the record that the
impeachment evidence under Rule 609 was more probative than prejudicial.
CONCLUSION
¶9. We hold that Taylor was denied his constitutionally guaranteed right to effective
assistance of counsel due to his attorney’s failure to object to the introduction of Taylor’s
numerous past felony convictions on cross-examination. The prejudicial effect of these
admissions clearly outweighed any probative value in allowing them. We reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals, and reverse Taylor’s conviction in the Circuit Court of
Madison County and remand for a new trial.
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¶10. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON, P.J., LAMAR, KITCHENS, PIERCE, KING
AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR. RANDOLPH, P.J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY
WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
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