Antonio Daniel Wallace a/k/a Antonio Wallace a/k/a Antonio D. Wallace v. State of Mississippi

Electronic Document Feb 2 2021 14:16:42 2019-M-01279 Pages: 7
Serial: 234914
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
No. 2019-M-01279
ANTONIO DANIEL WALLACE A/K/A ANTONIO Petitioner
WALLACE A/K/A ANTONIO D. WALLACE
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI Respondent
EN BANC ORDER
Before the en banc Court are Antonio Daniel Wallace’s (1) “Motion Seeking
Leave to Proceed to File Post-Conviction Collateral Relief,” (2) “Motion to Suspend
[Judgment] on Petitioner’s Pending Application for Leave to Proceed in the Trial Court
for Post[-]Conviction Relief,” (3) “Motion to Amend Previously Filed Application for
Leave to Proceed in the Trial Court for Post[-]Conviction Relief,” and (4) “Motion for
Leave to Submit Additional Facts, Arguments and Evidence Regarding Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel.”
Wallace was convicted of armed robbery, kidnapping, and conspiracy to commit
armed robbery. Wallace v. State, 160 So. 3d 1184, 1185 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014). He was
sentenced to concurrent thirty-four-, thirty-four-, and five-year terms, respectively. Id.This Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari, Order, Wallace v. State, No. 2013-
CT-01181-SCT (Miss. Apr. 16, 2015), and the mandate issued on May 7, 2015.
Since then, he has filed one application for leave to seek post-conviction relief in
the trial court. The Court granted relief in part and denied in part. Order, Wallace v. State,
No. 2019-M-01279 (Miss. Dec. 12, 2019).
Here, Wallace again requests leave to seek post-conviction relief in the trial court.
He also moves to amend and to supplement his motion. Prior to filing his motion to
amend, he had asked the Court to suspend ruling on his request for leave to seek post-
conviction relief until he filed the motion to amend.
After due consideration, we find that the motions to amend and to supplement
should be granted. And because he has now filed his motion to amend, we find that his
motion to suspend ruling on his request for leave to seek post-conviction relief should be
dismissed as moot.
Turning to the pleadings’ merits, Wallace raises three issues.
First, he argues that he is actually innocent. Even assuming that actual innocence is
an exception to the procedural bars, we find that Wallace’s claim is insufficient to merit
waiving them. See Means v. State, 43 So. 3d 438, 442 (Miss. 2010).
Second, Wallace asserts newly discovered evidence. To merit waiving the
procedural bars, “[t]he new evidence must be ‘evidence, not reasonably discoverable at
the time of trial, that is of such nature that it would be practically conclusive that, if it had
been introduced at trial, it would have caused a different result in the conviction or
sentence.’” Havard v. State, 86 So. 3d 896, 906 (Miss. 2012) (quoting Miss. Code Ann. §
99-39-27(9) (Rev. 2007)). We find that Wallace’s claim does not meet that standard.
Finally, Wallace argues that counsel was ineffective in several respects. In
exceptional circumstances, an ineffective-assistance claim might be excepted from the
procedural bars. Chapman v. State, 167 So. 3d 1170, 1174–75 (Miss. 2015); Bevill v.
State, 669 So. 2d 14, 17 (Miss. 1996); Brown v. State, 187 So. 3d at 667, 671 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2016). Yet we find that Wallace’s claim is insufficient to merit waiving them. See
Means, 43 So. 3d at 442.
After due consideration, we find that Wallace’s request for leave to seek post-
conviction relief in the trial court should be denied. Further, Wallace is hereby warned
that any future filings deemed frivolous may result not only in monetary sanctions, but
also in restrictions on filing applications for post-conviction collateral relief (or pleadings
in that nature) in forma pauperis. See Order, Dunn v. State, No. 2016-M-01514, at *2
(Miss. Nov. 15, 2018) (warning of sanctions); see also En Banc Order, Dunn v. State,
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No. 2016-M-01514, at *2 (Miss. Apr. 11, 2019) (restricting Dunn’s in forma pauperis
status).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Wallace’s “Motion Seeking Leave to
Proceed to File Post-Conviction Collateral Relief”is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that his “Motion to Amend Previously Filed
Application for Leave to Proceed in the Trial Court for Post[-]Conviction Relief” and his
“Motion for Leave to Submit Additional Facts, Arguments and Evidence Regarding
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel” are granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that his “Motion to Suspend [Judgment] on
Petitioner’s Pending Application for Leave to Proceed in the Trial Court for Post[-
]Conviction Relief” is dismissed as moot.
SO ORDERED.
TO DENY WITH SANCTIONS WARNING: RANDOLPH, C.J., COLEMAN,
MAXWELL, BEAM, CHAMBERLIN, ISHEE AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
TO DENY: KITCHENS AND KING, P.JJ.
KING, P.J., OBJECTS TO THE ORDER IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN
STATEMENT JOINED BY KITCHENS, P.J.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
No. 2019-M-01279
ANTONIO DANIEL WALLACE A/K/A
ANTONIO WALLACE A/K/A ANTONIO
D. WALLACE
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
KING, PRESIDING JUSTICE, OBJECTING TO THE ORDER IN PART
WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN STATEMENT:
¶1. Although Antonio Daniel Wallace’s application for post-conviction relief does not
merit relief, I disagree with this Court’s warning that future filings deemed frivolous may
result in monetary sanctions or restrictions on filing applications for post-conviction
collateral relief in forma pauperis.
¶2. This Court seems to tire of reading motions that it deems “frivolous” and imposes
monetary sanctions on indigent defendants. The Court then bars those defendants, who in all
likelihood are unable to pay the imposed sanctions, from future filings. In choosing to
prioritize efficiency over justice, this Court forgets the oath that each justice took before
assuming office. That oath stated in relevant part, “I . . . solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich
. . . .” Miss. Const. art. 6, § 155.
¶3. I disagree with this Court’s warning that future filings may result in additional
monetary sanctions or restrictions on filing applications for post-conviction collateral relief
in forma pauperis. The imposition of monetary sanctions upon a criminal defendant
proceeding in forma pauperis only serves to punish or preclude that defendant from his
lawful right to appeal. Black’s Law Dictionary defines sanction as “[a] provision that gives
force to a legal imperative by either rewarding obedience or punishing disobedience.”
Sanction, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added). Instead of punishing
the defendant for filing a motion, I believe that this Court should simply deny or dismiss
motions that lack merit. As Justice Brennan wisely stated,
The Court’s order purports to be motivated by this litigant’s disproportionate
consumption of the Court’s time and resources. Yet if his filings are truly as
repetitious as it appears, it hardly takes much time to identify them as such. I
find it difficult to see how the amount of time and resources required to deal
properly with McDonald’s petitions could be so great as to justify the step we
now take. Indeed, the time that has been consumed in the preparation of the
present order barring the door to Mr. McDonald far exceeds that which would
have been necessary to process his petitions for the next several years at least.
I continue to find puzzling the Court’s fervor in ensuring that rights granted to
the poor are not abused, even when so doing actually increases the drain on our
limited resources.
In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 186–87, 109 S. Ct. 993, 997, 103 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
¶4. The same logic applies to the restriction on filing subsequent applications for post-
conviction relief. To cut off an indigent defendant’s right to proceed in forma pauperis is to
cut off his access to the courts. This, in itself, violates a defendant’s constitutional rights, for
Among the rights recognized by the Court as being fundamental are the rights
to be free from invidious racial discrimination, to marry, to practice their
religion, to communicate with free persons, to have due process in disciplinary
proceedings, and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. As a result of
the recognition of these and other rights, the right of access to courts, which
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is necessary to vindicate all constitutional rights, also became a fundamental
right.
Joseph T. Lukens, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: Three Strikes and You’re Out of
Court-It May Be Effective, but Is It Constitutional?, 70 Temp. L. Rev. 471, 474–75 (1997).
This Court must not discourage convicted defendants from exercising their right to appeal.
Wisconsin v. Glick, 782 F.2d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1986). Novel arguments that might remove
a criminal defendant from confinement should not be discouraged by the threat of monetary
sanctions and restrictions on filings. Id. As United States Supreme Court Justice Thurgood
Marshall stated,
In closing its doors today to another indigent litigant, the Court moves ever
closer to the day when it leaves an indigent litigant with a meritorious claim
out in the cold. And with each barrier that it places in the way of indigent
litigants, and with each instance in which it castigates such litigants for having
‘abused the system,’ . . . the Court can only reinforce in the hearts and minds
of our society’s less fortunate members the unsettling message that their pleas
are not welcome here.
In re Demos, 500 U.S. 16, 19, 111 S. Ct. 1569, 1571, 114 L. Ed. 2d 20 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
¶5. Instead of simply denying or dismissing those motions that lack merit, the Court seeks
to punish the defendant for the frequency of his motion filing. However, an individual who,
even incorrectly, believes that she has been deprived of her freedom should not be expected
to sit silently by and wait to be forgotten. “Historically, the convictions with the best chances
of being overturned were those that got repeatedly reviewed on appeal or those chosen by
legal institutions such as the Innocence Project and the Center on Wrongful Convictions.”
Emily Barone, The Wrongly Convicted: Why More Falsely Accused People are Being
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Exonerated Today Than Ever Before, Time, http://time.com/wrongly-convicted/ (emphasis
added) (last visited Oct. 31, 2020). The Washington Post reports that
the average time served for the 1,625 exonerated individuals in the registry is
more than nine years. Last year, three innocent murder defendants in Cleveland
were exonerated 39 years after they were convicted—they spent their entire
adult lives in prison—and even they were lucky: We know without doubt that
the vast majority of innocent defendants who are convicted of crimes are never
identified and cleared.
Samuel R. Gross, Opinion, The Staggering Number of Wrongful Convictions in America,
Washington Post (July 24, 2015), http://wapo.st/1SGHcyd?tid=ss_mail&ut
m_term=.4bed8ad6f2cc.
¶6. Rather than imposing sanctions and threatening to restrict access to the courts, I would
simply dismiss or deny motions that lack merit. Therefore, although I find no merit in
Wallace’s application for post-conviction relief, I disagree with this Court’s warning of
future sanctions and restrictions.
KITCHENS, P.J., JOINS THIS SEPARATE WRITTEN STATEMENT.
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