Eddie Lee Howard, Jr. v. State of Mississippi

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2018-CA-01586-SCT
EDDIE LEE HOWARD, JR.
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/10/2018
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LEE J. HOWARD
TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: LOUWLYNN VANZETTA WILLIAMS
ROBERT M. RYAN
WILLIAM TUCKER CARRINGTON
WILLIAM McLEOD McINTOSH
VANESSA POTKIN
M. CHRIS FABRICANT
PETER J. NEUFELD
JASON L. DAVIS
BRAD ALAN SMITH
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LOWNDES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: WILLIAM TUCKER CARRINGTON
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ASHLEY LAUREN SULSER
LADONNA C. HOLLAND
LYNN FITCH
CANDICE LEIGH RUCKER
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL-POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISPOSITION: REVERSED, RENDERED, AND
REMANDED - 08/27/2020
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
ISHEE, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Eddie Howard was sentenced to death for the rape and murder of eighty-four-year-old
Georgia Kemp. Howard was tied to the crime by Dr. Michael West, who identified Howard
as the source of bite marks on Kemp’s body. At trial, Dr. West testified that he was a
member of the American Board of Forensic Odontology (ABFO) and that he had followed
its guidelines in rendering his opinion. But since Howard’s trial, the ABFO has revised those
guidelines to prohibit such testimony, and this reflects a new scientific understanding that an
individual perpetrator cannot be reliably identified through bite-mark comparison. This,
along with new DNA testing and the paucity of other evidence linking Howard to the murder,
requires the Court to conclude that Howard is entitled to a new trial. We reverse the trial
court’s denial of postconviction relief and vacate Howard’s conviction and sentence.
FACTS
¶2. On the evening of February 2, 1992, one of Kemp’s neighbors noticed smoke coming
from her home. Howard v. State, 853 So. 2d 781, 784 (Miss. 2003). Firefighters were called
to the scene and found a small, smoldering fire in Kemp’s living room. Id. They then found
Kemp’s body on her bedroom floor. Id. The firefighters confirmed that Kemp was deceased
and noticed that her legs were bloody and that she was partially exposed. Id. They further
noticed a bloody knife on the bed and a telephone with its line cut. Id.
¶3. An autopsy was performed by Dr. Steven Hayne on February 3, 1992. The autopsy
concluded Kemp had been beaten, strangled, stabbed, and raped. Id. at 785. Specifically,
bruises and scrapes were found on Kemp’s face, head, and neck, and multiple bruises were
found on her left shin. Id. Injuries consistent with forced vaginal intercourse were noted to
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both sides of her vaginal vault, and there were also injuries consistent with manual
strangulation. Id. The cause of Kemp’s death was two stab wounds to the left side of her
chest that caused severe internal bleeding. Id.
¶4. Although the autopsy report did not note any bite marks, Dr. Hayne requested an
additional study of Kemp’s body on February 6, 1992, because, according to Dr. Hayne,
“[t]here was some question that . . . there could be injuries inflicted by teeth.” As a result,
Kemp’s body was exhumed. Id. Howard agreed to have dental impressions taken, which
showed that Howard had a removable partial denture replacing his upper four front teeth.
Id. at 784-85.
¶5. On February 7, 1992, Dr. Michael West, a forensic odontologist, examined Kemp’s
body and, using an ultraviolet light, determined there were otherwise invisible marks on
Kemp’s right breast, the right side of her neck, and her right arm. Id. Dr. West found these
marks to be human bite marks, and he used molds of Howard’s teeth to perform a “[w]ound
duplication test with ink” or direct comparison between the bite mark and Howard’s teeth.
Dr. West found that the marks on Kemp’s neck and arm were “consistent with” Howard’s
teeth. He further opined (at the time) that the bite mark on Kemp’s right breast was “indeed
and without doubt inflicted by . . . Howard.”
¶6. Howard was arrested on February 8, 1992. Id. Howard had lived two blocks away
from Kemp. On February 13, 1992, Howard advised Detective David Turner that he
“need[ed] to see [Turner] as soon as possible . . . in relation to [his] case.” Id. When Turner
3
met with Howard, Howard stated that “the case was solved.” Id. Howard then stated he
“had a temper and that’s why this happened.” Id.
¶7. Howard was indicted on the charge of capital murder with the underlying felony of
rape. Id. Howard, who represented himself at trial, was convicted in 1994 and sentenced to
death. Id. In 1997, Howard’s conviction and sentence were reversed and remanded for a
new trial. Howard v. State, 701 So. 2d 274 (Miss. 1997).
¶8. Howard’s second trial began on May 22, 2000. Howard, 853 So. 2d at 785. At trial,
Dr. West testified that the bite marks on Kemp’s neck and arm were “consistent with”
Howard’s teeth. Regarding the bite mark on Kemp’s right breast, Dr. West found that it was
an “identical” match to Howard’s dental impressions and testified to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty that Howard had inflicted that bite mark, although he also averred that he
had “no doubt” Howard had left the mark. Howard was convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to death. Id. at 786.
¶9. On appeal, Howard raised thirteen assignments of error. Id. at 786-87. This Court
found no reversible error and affirmed Howard’s conviction and death sentence. Id. at 799.
The United States Supreme Court denied Howard’s petition for writ of certiorari. Howard
v. Mississippi, 540 U.S. 1197, 124 S. Ct. 1455, 158 L. Ed. 2d 113 (2004).
¶10. In 2003, the Mississippi Office of Capital Post-Conviction Counsel was appointed to
represent Howard in his postconviction collateral-relief proceedings. Howard v. State, 945
So. 2d 326, 335 (Miss. 2006). Howard later filed his first petition for postconviction relief.
Id. The petition included “four issues in which Howard attack[ed] the bite mark evidence
4
used against him at trial and Dr. West’s expert opinion.” Id. at 348. This Court found no
meritorious claims and denied the petition for postconviciton relief. Id. at 332, 371.
Specifically, the Court stated, “Howard asserts that his conviction and sentence are
constitutionally and procedurally flawed and should be vacated. We find the issues raised
by Howard are either procedurally barred and/or without merit.” Id. at 371.
¶11. On December 2, 2010, this Court granted Howard’s request for postconviction DNA
testing. Howard v. State, 49 So. 3d 79, 80 (Miss. 2010). All other issues raised by Howard,
including his claims of newly discovered evidence, were dismissed without prejudice to be
refiled with the DNA test results. Id.
¶12. In August 2015, this Court granted Howard leave to file his petition for postconviction
collateral relief in the trial court and ordered the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing
on the following issue:
Whether the newly discovered evidence presented in Howard’s Motion to
Vacate Conviction, including the results of his post-conviction DNA testing,
is of such a nature that it “will probably produce a different result or induce a
different verdict[] if a new trial is granted.” Crawford v. State, 867 So. 2d
196, 204 (Miss. 2003) (citing Meeks v. State, 781 So. 2d 109, 112 (Miss.
2001)).
Howard v. State, 171 So. 3d 495 (Miss. 2015). As a result, Howard filed a motion to vacate
conviction and a supplemental memorandum in support of postconviction relief in the trial
court. In his motion, Howard asserted that “[o]ver the past decade, the field of bite-mark
identification has devolved from a favored forensic science . . . to a craft of forensic
charlatanism. It has proved to be completely unreliable, inadmissible, and little more than
5
speculation.” “In light of this newly discovered information,” Howard requested that the trial
court vacate his conviction.
¶13. At the evidentiary hearing, Howard also offered new evidence regarding the forensic
and DNA testing on the physical evidence left at the scene of the crime. The nightgown
Kemp was wearing at the time of her death tested negative for semen. While human DNA
was detected on the inside of the nightgown, male DNA was not. As with the nightgown,
no semen or male DNA were detected on either of Kemp’s stockings. Kemp’s bedroom
slippers were tested for the presence of blood. No blood was detected on the left slipper. The
right slipper tested presumptively positive for blood, but no male DNA was detected. Both
the bottom and top bedsheets were tested for the presence of semen. No semen was detected
on the bottom sheet. The testing from the top sheet was either negative or inconclusive for
semen. No semen was detected in the sexual-assault kit. Human DNA was detected in
Kemp’s fingernail scrapings, but no male DNA was detected on either sample.
¶14. Finally, a blood test was performed on the knife. Of the five areas tested, one was
positive for blood. That area was located near the tip of the blade. The knife blade and
handle were tested for touch DNA. Male DNA was detected on the knife blade, but Howard
was excluded as the source.
¶15. After concluding the evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order denying
Howard’s petition for postconviction relief. Specifically, the trial court found that there had
been no DNA evidence at the original trial and that Howard had not “present[ed] any new
evidence regarding Dr. West or his bite-mark identification that would constitute ‘newly
6
discovered evidence [that would] probably produce a different result or induce a different
verdict, if a new trial [wa]s granted . . . .’” (alterations in original) (quoting Crawford, 867
So. 2d at 204). Howard timely appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶16. In Chamberlin v. State, this Court held that
[t]his Court has recognized that post-conviction-relief actions have become
part of the death-penalty appeal process. The standard of review for capital
convictions and sentences is “one of ‘heightened scrutiny’ under which all
bona fide doubts are resolved in favor of the accused.” “This Court recognizes
that ‘what may be harmless error in a case with less at stake becomes
reversible error when the penalty is death.’”
Chamberlin v. State, 55 So. 3d 1046, 1049-50 (Miss. 2010) (citations omitted).
¶17. Also, our standard of review provides that “[w]hen reviewing a [trial] court’s decision
to deny a petition for post-conviction relief this Court will not disturb the trial court’s factual
findings unless they are found to be clearly erroneous.” Loden v. State, 971 So. 2d 548, 572
(Miss. 2007) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown v. State,
731 So. 2d 595, 598 (Miss. 1999)). “[T]his Court must examine the entire record and accept
‘that evidence which supports or reasonably tends to support the findings of fact made below,
together with all reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom and which favor the
lower court’s findings of fact . . . .’” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mullins
v. Ratcliff, 515 So. 2d 1183, 1189 (Miss. 1987)). “That includes deference to the [trial] judge
as the ‘sole authority for determining credibility of the witnesses.’” Id. at 572-73 (quoting
Mullins, 515 So. 2d at 1189). “However, ‘where questions of law are raised the applicable
7
standard of review is de novo.’” Doss v. State, 19 So. 3d 690, 694 (Miss. 2009) (quoting
Brown, 731 So. 2d at 598).
¶18. “The burden of proof at an evidentiary hearing on a [postconviction-relief] case is on
the petitioner to show ‘by a preponderance of the evidence’ that he is entitled to relief.” Id.
(quoting Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(7) (Rev. 2007)).
DISCUSSION
¶19. The issue before us is “[w]hether the newly discovered evidence presented in
Howard’s [m]otion . . . is of such a nature that it ‘will probably produce a different result or
induce a different verdict[] if a new trial is granted.’” Crawford v. State, 867 So. 2d 196,
204 (Miss. 2003) (quoting Meeks v. State, 781 So. 2d 109, 112 (Miss. 2001)); Howard v.
State, 171 So. 3d 495 (Miss. 2015). “This requires a showing that the evidence is material
and is not merely cumulative or impeaching.” Crawford, 867 So. 2d at 204 (citing Meeks,
781 So. 2d at 112). “Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability (i.e.,
‘probability sufficient enough to undermine confidence in the outcome’) that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Crawford, 867 So. 2d at 203 (citing De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So. 2d 547,
572 (Miss. 1997) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 681, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 87
L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985))).
¶20. As to the serological and DNA testing, the trial court accepted it as newly discovered
evidence but found that it did not warrant a new trial because it did not find DNA that
“pointed to a different perpetrator.” On this point, we disagree: a reasonable juror could
8
surely conclude that the presence of another man’s DNA on the knife blade “point[s] to a
different perpetrator.” And while it is true that there was no DNA evidence linking Howard
to the crime at the time of his trial, the fact that no DNA links Howard to the crime after
DNA testing is surely new and material. We also observe that the trial court appeared to
consider the new DNA testing separately from Dr. West’s bite-mark testimony, but the issues
are, in fact, intertwined because the new testing did not find Howard’s DNA in places it
might have been left had Howard bitten the victim as Dr. West concluded.
¶21. As to Dr. West’s bite-mark comparison testimony, the circuit court found that the
criticism of Dr. West is “very familiar territory” and that “[t]his very familiarity . . . means
that this is not new evidence.” The circuit court pointed out that Dr. West was aggressively
voir dired and cross-examined at trial and has been a controversial figure since before the
trial in 2000. Dr. West’s methodology was also attacked in his direct appeal, see Howard
v. State, 853 So. 2d 781, 799-809 (Miss. 2003) (McRae, J., dissenting), and in his first
postconviction-relief case, see Howard v. State, 945 So. 2d 326, 368-71 (Miss. 2006). The
circuit court concluded by quoting this Court’s admonition that newly discovered evidence
must be “material and . . . . not merely cumulative or impeaching.” Crawford v. State, 867
So. 2d 196, 204 (Miss. 2003) (citing Meeks, 781 So. 2d at 112).
¶22. We cannot agree with this conclusion either. At Howard’s trial, Dr. West testified
that he was a diplomate (member) of the American Board of Forensic Odontology (ABFO).
Dr. West testified that the community of forensic odontologists was quite small and that the
ABFO was the only way one could become “board certified” as a forensic odontologist, as
9
he was. Dr. West also testified and that he had followed the ABFO’s Guidelines as to the
acceptable conclusions he could present to a jury.
¶23. Dr. West went on to testify that he had made a direct comparison between a bite mark
on the victim’s breast and a mold of Howard’s teeth and that this was a generally accepted
and ABFO-approved methodology. Dr. West explained that he could reach one of four
conclusions from a bite-mark comparison: he could exclude the suspect, he could not exclude
the suspect, he could identify the suspect as the source of the bite mark, or he could reach no
conclusion.
¶24. Dr. West testified that the bite marks found on Kemp’s neck and arm were “consistent
with” Howard’s teeth, which meant it was “possible” that the bite marks were made by
Howard. But Dr. West testified to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the bite mark
on Kemp’s breast was an “identical” match to Howard’s teeth. He went on to reaffirm his
initial conclusion that Howard “indeed and without doubt” inflicted the bite mark on Kemp’s
breast. In other words, Dr. West identified Howard as the biter or the single individual who
could have been responsible for the bite mark on Kemp’s breast. As we shall explain in due
course, this was the only evidence that strongly linked Howard to the crime.
¶25. In 2000, Dr. West’s testimony was consistent with the ABFO guidelines, which
approved the following descriptions to relate a suspected biter to a bite mark: the biter, the
probable biter, not excluded as the biter, excluded as the biter, and inconclusive. In 2013,
however, the ABFO revised its guidelines to prohibit individualization testimony in “open
population” cases like this one, in which the number of potential suspects is unknown. And
10
in 2016, the ABFO again revised its guidelines and eliminated individualization entirely.
The 2016 revisions only allowed the following conclusions: excluded as having made the bite
mark, not excluded as having made the bite mark, or inconclusive. At the hearing on
Howard’s postconviction- relief motion, Howard presented three experts who explained that
while the reliability was not unquestioned, experts in the field widely accepted Dr. West’s
conclusions as permissible at the time of trial in 2000. The 2013 and 2016 changes to the
ABFO Guidelines had resulted from a dramatic change in the scientific understanding and
acceptance of the reliability of individualizations in bite-mark analysis in the intervening
years. This was newly discovered evidence not available at the time of Howard’s trial in
2000. See Ex parte Chaney, 563 S.W.3d 239, 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); State v. Fortin,
No. A-5929-17T2, 2020 WL 3406451, at *13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 22, 2020);
State v. Hill, 125 N.E.3d 158, 162 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018).
¶26. According to Howard’s experts, these changes to the ABFO’s Guidelines were
prompted by a growing number of wrongful convictions (several of which involved
individualization testimony by Dr. West himself), a study published in 2009 by the National
Academy of Sciences Report reporting the lack of scientific basis for bite-mark evidence, and
research concluding that even board-certified forensic dentists could not reliably identify a
human bite mark on human skin, much less compare and accurately match an alleged bite
mark to the teeth of a single individual to the exclusion of all others. Therefore, the
conclusion that Dr. West proffered to the jury, his identification of Howard as “the biter”
(i.e., the only person on the planet who could have created the alleged bite marks) with
11
“reasonable medical certainty” has not been permitted by the ABFO’s Guidelines since 2013
and would not be admissible in a new trial today. See M.R.E. 702(c). Were Dr. West, or any
other forensic dentist, to testify again, he would not be able to offer the individualization
testimony Dr. West gave at trial or offer any type of probabilistic opinion about a suspected
match; at most, he or she would be limited to opining that Howard “could not be excluded”
as the source of the bite marks.
¶27. We note also that at the trial, Dr. West testified that it was not possible to compute a
margin of error for his methods. But in the intervening years, a growing body of scientific
research suggests that the error rate for forensic odontologists may be quite high. And Dr.
West could be cross-examined concerning his apparent errors in two notable death-penalty
cases, that of Levon Brooks and Kennedy Brewer, which were revealed after Howard’s trial
in 2000.
¶28. At the postconviction-relief hearing, Dr. West maintained that he was confident about
his methodology and the reliability of his conclusions. He did not agree with the changes to
the ABFO’s guidelines regarding individualization conclusions; he “believe[d] a good bite
mark can be used to identify an individual.” But Dr. West admitted he was no longer an
active practitioner and had not been a member of the ABFO since 2006. And he conceded
that “you can’t do [identification through bite-mark comparison] in the courtroom anymore
due to the actions of the [ABFO] and the way the system works.” Dr. West averred that he
would not testify again, although he attributed this to frustration with the legal system rather
than unreliability of his methods. Dr. West denied or explained prior statements he had made
12
under oath suggesting bite-mark analysis was not reliable, but he offered no serious dispute
to Howard’s experts’ testimony that the present ABFO Guidelines reflected a change in the
view of the scientific community at large. Nor did any other witness for the State.
¶29. The State does argue that it was suggested the ABFO guidelines are “just guidelines”
and are nonbinding, but this is not an accurate summary of the evidence. It was noted that
deviation from the guidelines, without justification, would result in discipline or expulsion
of the ABFO diplomate. Dr. West himself testified he had been suspended from the
organization for violating its guidelines by overstating the confidence of his conclusions in
bite-mark matching. And there was no suggestion that individualization testimony would be
allowed by the ABFO based on mere disagreement with the guidelines. We also reiterate that
at Howard’s trial, Dr. West repeatedly emphasized his membership in the ABFO, averred that
there was no comparable certifying organization for forensic dentists, and testified that he
followed the ABFO Guidelines.
¶30. Finally, we observe that Dr. West testified at Howard’s trial that he was “stunned” that
a colleague (Dr. Richard Souviron) had suggested bite-mark comparison was generally only
reliable to exclude suspects—this is essentially all the current ABFO Guidelines permit. Dr.
West added that “twenty years ago [Dr. Souviron] was the top of the profession . . . now he’s
not.” If Dr. West was correct, things appear to have come full circle in the intervening
twenty years. The present scientific understanding of the invalidity of identification through
bite-mark comparison is a new, material fact that constitutes newly discovered evidence
under Crawford. See Crawford, 867 So. 2d at 203-04.
13
¶31. After reviewing the record, we conclude that Howard’s evidence as to the change in
the scientific understanding of the reliability of identification through bite-mark comparisons
was almost uncontested. Based on this record, we agree with Howard that a forensic dentist
would not be permitted to identify Howard as the biter today as Dr. West did at Howard’s
trial in 2000.
¶32. We also conclude that Dr. West’s identification of Howard as the source of bite marks
on the victim’s body was by far the State’s most important evidence at Howard’s trial. The
other evidence indicating Howard’s guilt is limited to the following: that Howard had lived
two blocks away from victim, that his former girlfriend testified that he liked to bite her on
the breast and neck during intercourse, that Howard had smelled of burnt wood or clothes the
day after the murder, and that Howard had made cryptic comments to a detective a few days
after he was arrested.
¶33. While we acknowledge that Howard’s statements were peculiar and suspicious, they
revealed no details about the crime and do not amount to a confession when viewed in their
full context. Howard had sent the detective a note asking to speak with him. Howard told
the detective “the case was solved,” then asked to go by the crime scene because it “might
bring back some memories.” The detective drove Howard past Kemp’s home twice, but both
times Howard said it did not bring back any memories. After they returned to the jail,
Howard again said the “case was solved” and that the detective should continue investigating
because there were “five or six other individuals involved.” Howard then asked whether the
14
detective believed Howard was “crazy,”1 and, after the detective denied that he did, Howard
stated, “Well, I’m not. I’m not crazy.” Howard then said that he “had a temper and that’s
why this happened.” Howard did not say what “this” was or how his temper had caused it
happen. We note also that the statement was not recorded, that the detective was the only
witness to it, and that the detective did not ask Howard to put it to writing.
¶34. The issue before us is “[w]hether the newly discovered evidence presented in
Howard’s [m]otion . . . is of such a nature that it ‘will probably produce a different result or
induce a different verdict, if a new trial is granted.’” Crawford v. State, 867 So. 2d 196, 204
(Miss. 2003) (quoting Meeks v. State, 781 So. 2d 109, 112 (Miss. 2001)). We consider
Howard’s new evidence under the heightened-scrutiny standard required in death-penalty
cases. See Smith v. State, 499 So. 2d 750, 756 (Miss. 1986) (“In cases where the death
penalty has been imposed, thoroughness and intensity of review are heightened.”); Flowers
v. State, 773 So. 2d 309, 317 (Miss. 2000).
¶35. Given the inadmissibility of Dr. West’s identification of Howard as the biter, the
absence of forensic or eyewitness evidence putting Howard at the scene of the crime, and the
newly discovered presence of another man’s DNA on the murder weapon, we conclude that
1
Although we do not rely on the record from the first trial to reach the result today,
we observe that Howard’s first conviction was reversed after this Court found that Howard
should not have been permitted to represent himself without the trial court’s first holding a
competency hearing, given Howard’s “strange comments” and “numerous instances of
paranoid behavior” at trial. Howard v. State, 701 So. 2d 274, 282-83 (Miss. 1997). This
Court observed that Howard’s defense was “at best incoherent and deluded”; Howard’s
theory of his defense was that he had been framed by a “conspiracy” including members of
his own family. Id. at 282. And during his closing argument, Howard “argued to the jury
that one of the jurors might have committed the crime.” Id.
15
Howard met his burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that in light of his newly
discovered evidence, a jury would probably not find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Crawford, 867 So. 2d at 204.
¶36. The circuit court’s decision denying Howard’s motion for postconviction relief is
reversed and rendered. Howard’s conviction and sentence are vacated, and we remand this
case to the circuit court with directions that it grant Howard a new trial in his criminal case
consistent with this opinion.
¶37. REVERSED, RENDERED, AND REMANDED.
RANDOLPH, C.J., KING, P.J., COLEMAN, BEAM AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ.,
CONCUR. KITCHENS, P.J., SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN
OPINION JOINED BY KING, P.J.; ISHEE, J., JOINS IN PART. MAXWELL, J.,
CONCURS IN PART AND IN RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN
OPINION. GRIFFIS, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
KITCHENS, PRESIDING JUSTICE, SPECIALLY CONCURRING:
¶38. I concur fully with the majority that Howard’s motion for post conviction relief should
be granted and that his conviction and sentence should be vacated. I write separately to call
attention to additional reasons this Court’s decision to grant Howard’s petition and vacate
his conviction and sentence is correct.
I. When Howard’s new evidence is construed in his favor, as
Mississippi law demands, it creates reasonable doubt about
whether Howard stabbed Georgia Kemp.
¶39. This Court has produced a plethora of case law recognizing that, when a person is
sentenced to death, we are to review the case with “‘heightened scrutiny’ under which all
bona fide doubts are resolved in favor of the accused.” Chamberlin v. State, 55 So. 3d 1046,
16
1049-50 (Miss. 2010) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Flowers v. State, 773 So.
2d 309, 317 (Miss. 2000)); see also Evans v. State, 226 So. 3d 1, 13 (Miss. 2017); Cox v.
State, 183 So. 3d 36, 44 (Miss. 2015); Corrothers v. State, 148 So. 3d 278, 293 (Miss. 2014);
Balfour v. State, 598 So. 2d 731, 739 (Miss. 1992); Fisher v. State, 481 So. 2d 203, 211
(Miss. 1985); Gambrell v. State, 92 Miss. 728, 736, 46 So. 138, 139 (1908). Because of the
severity and finality of a death sentence, “what may be harmless error in a case with less at
stake becomes reversible error when the penalty is death.” Lynch v. State, 951 So. 2d 549,
555 (Miss. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Balfour, 598 So. 2d at 739);
see also Chandler v. State, 242 So. 3d 65, 68 (Miss. 2018) (“Heightened scrutiny is reserved
for death-penalty cases due to the unique and irreversible nature of that punishment.”);
Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 732, 118 S. Ct. 2246, 141 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1998)
(“Because the death penalty is unique ‘in both its severity and its finality,’ we have
recognized an acute need for reliability in capital sentencing proceedings.” (citation
omitted)). Thus, if an accused in a death penalty case presents evidence that creates bona fide
doubts about his or her conviction, this Court must give the accused the benefit of those
doubts rather than accepting the evidence and inferences that favor the lower court’s
findings.
¶40. Additionally, this Court has expounded upon the importance of the application of the
heightened scrutiny standard in death penalty cases:
While there may be legitimate differences of opinion as to just
when and how “heightened scrutiny” works in death penalty
cases, it would seem clear that this approach is most needed and
most applicable in cases resting upon circumstantial evidence
17
and where the matter of whether the defendant is guilty at all is
by no means free of all doubt.
Fisher, 481 So. 2d at 211. Howard’s case provides an example of cases in which heightened
scrutiny review is most needed because the conviction “rest[s] upon circumstantial evidence”
and whether Howard “is guilty at all is by no means free of all doubt.” Id. Dr. West’s
testimony identifying Howard as the biter “was the only evidence that strongly linked
Howard to the crime.” Maj. Op. ¶ 24. Without West’s testimony, which itself was
circumstantial, the State’s remaining evidence also is circumstantial, and, in my view, is
speculative.
¶41. None of Kemp’s clothing that was tested produced a match for Howard’s DNA. See
Maj. Op. ¶ 13. Neither the fingernail scrapings nor the sexual assault kit yielded a match for
Howard’s DNA. See id. As rightly observed by the majority, “[m]ale DNA was detected on
the knife blade, but Howard was excluded as the source.” Maj. Op. ¶ 14. The discovery of
an unknown man’s DNA alone could produce a different result or verdict because “a
reasonable juror could surely conclude that the presence of another man’s DNA on the knife
blade ‘point[s] to a different perpetrator.’” Maj. Op. ¶ 20. The DNA results do not place
Howard at the crime scene, and those results put the murder weapon within the reach of
another male.
¶42. Because the changes in the standards of the forensic science community regarding
bite-mark evidence favor Howard, Dr. West’s testimony is eliminated from the State’s case.
At the time of Howard’s trial in 2000, the American Board of Forensic Odontology (ABFO)2
2
The ABFO is the leading governing organization in the field of forensic odontology.
18
guidelines permitted an expert to identify a suspect as either “the biter, the probable biter, not
excluded as the biter, excluded as the biter, [or] inconclusive.” Maj. Op. ¶ 25. In 2013, the
ABFO revised its guidelines “to prohibit individualization testimony in ‘open population’
cases.” Id. But the 2013 guidelines continued to permit the use of the above classifications
for identification purposes in certain cases. The ABFO revised its guidelines again in 2016.
Sixteen years after Howard’s trial, the ABFO recognized the unreliability of the use of bite
marks for identification purposes in all cases and revised its guidelines to that effect. The
ABFO guidelines no longer permit an expert to identify a suspect as the biter, but only to
opine whether a person is “excluded as having made the bite mark, not excluded as having
made the bite mark, or inconclusive.” Id. This extreme revision of guidelines by the ABFO
precludes Dr. West’s identification testimony at a retrial of this case. Without that testimony,
the State cannot place Howard at the scene of the crime. Courts in other states have
recognized the doubts created by the change in the forensic science community regarding
bite-mark evidence by reversing those convictions that relied heavily on bite-mark
identifications. See Commonwealth v. Kunco, 173 A.3d 817, 821 (Pa. 2017); Ex Parte
Chaney, 563 S.W.3d 239, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
II. On PCR, the trial court erred by holding Howard to an evidentiary
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt rather than to the correct
preponderance of the evidence standard.
¶43. In denying Howard’s petition for post conviction relief, the trial judge determined that
“[w]hile no DNA evidence was found that implicated the Petitioner in the crime, no DNA
evidence was found that pointed to a different perpetrator.” The effect of the judge’s logic
19
is that, in order for Howard to satisfy his burden, he would have to do the job of the police
and find Kemp’s real killer. Thus, the trial judge would require him to prove his innocence.
Of course, Howard is not required to solve the case. He needs only to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the new DNA results and the change in the forensic
science community’s standards regarding bite-mark identification likely would produce a
different verdict or outcome. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(7) (Rev. 2015) (“No relief
shall be granted under this article unless the petitioner proves by a preponderance of the
evidence that he is entitled to the relief.”).
¶44. The DNA results showed that Howard’s DNA was not found on any of the items
tested. The results showed also that another male, not Howard, had been in contact with the
murder weapon. This new evidence amplifies the reality that nothing—no evidence
whatsoever—connects the knife to Howard.
¶45. Howard has shown also that the revision of the ABFO guidelines regarding bite-mark
identification nullifies Dr. West’s testimony. In addition, Howard called three experts in the
field of forensic odontology to testify at the evidentiary hearing. They refuted West’s
methodology and his conclusions and presented the current view of bite-mark identification
in the forensic science community.
¶46. Dr. Iain Pretty discredited Dr. West’s testimony for the following reasons: (1) new
research shows that an expert cannot reliably distinguish a human bite mark from other
injuries; (2) there were no visible bite marks on Kemp’s body from the autopsy photos; (3)
the alleged bite marks were not photographed; (4) the facts that Kemp’s body had been
20
unembalmed and buried had a negative impact on the ability to assess an injury, particularly
in “terms of distortion, in term[s] of the ability to collect evidence, in terms of the
postmortem changes”; and (5) Dr. West’s observation of the supposed bite marks under
ultraviolet light is questionable due to there not having been the usual “overlying injury on
the [victim’s] skin[.]” Dr. Mary Bush testified that, based on her research, “[t]he skin is just
not a reliable recording medium” because it fails to record the uniqueness of a human bite
mark.
¶47. Judge Christopher Plourd3 testified that he had administered a blind proficiency test4
on bite-mark analysis to Dr. West in 2001. According to Judge Plourd, Dr. West failed the
blind proficiency test because he identified the wrong perpetrator and “his procedures, his
methods that he used to evaluate this bite mark with the known dentitions were unreliable
and did not properly identify the individual.”
¶48. Therefore, Howard has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the presence
of an unknown male’s DNA on the murder weapon and the forensic science community’s
current disapproval of bite-mark identification provide reasonable doubt about Howard’s
guilt.
3
Judge Plourd has been a superior court judge in the state of California since 2011.
At the time of his testimony, Judge Plourd testified that he was the chairman of the
“Organization of Scientific Area of Committees, which is part of the Forensic Science
Standards Board operated by the United States Department of Justice and NIST [National
Institute of Standards and Technology].”
4
Judge Plourd testified that the “blind proficiency test is designed to evaluate the
reliability of the method that is of interest[]” and that the test is administered in a way “to
try to make it as close as possible to a real life case[.]”
21
III. This Court should not uphold a conviction and death sentence on
the testimony of a proven unreliable witness, Dr. West.
¶49. Not only have the ABFO guidelines changed, but Dr. West’s credibility also has been
destroyed since Howard’s trial. In the intervening years, West and his methodology have
plunged to overwhelming rejection by the forensics community to the point that today his
methodology is not at all supported by mainstream forensic odontologists. In fact, West’s
methods are wholly contradicted and disqualified by today’s ABFO guidelines.
¶50. Dr. West testified that it was not possible to compute his margin of error because his
craft is “a subjective art and science.” But we know now that Dr. West’s work is fraught with
error because his history includes trial testimony that has led to the conviction of the
innocent. Most notable are the cases of Levon Brooks and Kennedy Brewer. See Brooks v.
State, 748 So. 2d 736 (Miss. 1999); Brewer v. State, 819 So. 2d 1169 (Miss. 2002); Brewer
v. State, 725 So. 2d 106 (Miss. 1998); see also Maj. Op. ¶ 27. In those capital murder cases
West had claimed that each victim had been bitten by a human and that he was able to
identify each suspect as the biter in his case by comparing dental impressions to the wounds.
It later was proved that the bite marks examined by Dr. West had been made by insects, not
humans. Post-conviction DNA testing and a subsequent confession from the real perpetrator5
provided confirmation that the two men were innocent. The methods used by Dr. West in the
Brooks and Brewer cases are the same methods he employed in Howard’s case.
5
Post conviction DNA testing identified the true perpetrator, Justin Albert Johnson,
who confessed to both murders and volunteered detailed accounts of his crimes, including
kidnaping the victims, raping them, murdering them, and then disposing the bodies. Johnson
said that he acted alone and that he never bit the victims.
22
¶51. The circumstances surrounding Dr. West’s discovery of the alleged bite marks on Ms.
Kemp’s corpse and the way in which his testimony was presented to the jury are concerning
as well. An autopsy was performed by Dr. Steven Hayne the day after the murder, February
3, 1992. Howard v. State, 945 So. 2d 326, 333 n.1 (Miss. 2006). Hayne had found that there
were no “injuries to Kemp’s right forearm, right side of her neck, or to her right breast.” Id.After Kemp’s body was buried and three days after the autopsy, Dr. Hayne had the body
exhumed because “[t]here was some question that . . . there could be injuries inflicted by
teeth.” Even though the autopsy report made no mention of possible bite marks, Kemp’s
body was exhumed on February 7, 1992. Id. The already-decomposing body then was
examined by Dr. West, who, “using an ultraviolet light, determined there were otherwise
invisible marks on Kemp’s right breast, the right side of her neck, and her right arm.” Maj.
Op. ¶ 5. Only with the use of ultraviolet light could Dr. West, and he alone, observe these
alleged bite marks. Despite Dr. West’s claims that he took photographs of these alleged bite
marks he claimed to have found, the photographs appeared to have vanished.6 But there were
autopsy photographs taken and admitted into evidence. After examining the autopsy
photographs, Dr. Pretty could not find any “photographic evidence for [the bite marks]
whatsoever” or any “overlying injury” on the body.7 This is significant because Dr. Pretty
6
No such photographs were admitted into evidence at trial or at the PCR hearing. Dr.
Pretty testified that of the photographs that were provided him, none were ultraviolet light
photographs.
7
When asked if the lack of photographs invalidated Dr. West’s testimony, Dr. Pretty
responded:
Well, I’m unable to verify. We talked about the reliability of science. We
23
testified that generally, in cases in which ultraviolet light is used, “there is an overlying injury
on the skin that alerts an individual to the presence of that injury. So it’s not a piece of
completely uninjured skin that we’re just going to randomly photograph with [ultraviolet
light] and, hey, look, there’s something there.”
¶52. Since Dr. West’s trial testimony was presented without photographs of the alleged bite
marks, the jury was left to make its decision on the basis of the flawed opinions of a witness
who since has been proved to have given false and misleading testimony. The jury was left
to rely also on testimony that would not be allowed in courts today. See M.R.E. 702.
¶53. The circuit court determined that the discrediting of Dr. West and his methods “is not
new evidence” and “Dr. West was aggressively voir dired and cross-examined at trial[.]”
Maj. Op. ¶ 21. But when Dr. West testified against Howard in 2000, the ABFO guidelines
at that time provided his testimony considerable protection on cross-examination. Current
ABFO guidelines would not protect or even permit the same testimony today. See M.R.E.
702. The ABFO has revised its guidelines from allowing the use of bite marks to identify a
person to using them only for the purpose of excluding a person. The new guidelines would
result in the exclusion of West’s testimony at a new trial.
talked about how science should be [reproducible]. We’ve been denied the
opportunity to assess the bite mark because there’s no photograph of it. We’ve
been denied the opportunity to examine the characteristics and features that
Dr. West describes that he saw because we have no photograph of [the bite
mark]. We’ve been denied the opportunity to repeat any analysis on the
comparison between the cast of the bite mark because we have no photograph
of it. So one is unable to verify what Dr. West did or didn’t see because there
is no documentation of it in existence.
24
¶54. The State contends that “the ABFO Guidelines are ‘just guidelines’ and are
nonbinding[.]” Maj. Op. ¶ 29. But according to Mississippi Rule of Evidence 702,
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the
case.
The rule requires the testimony to be “the product of reliable principles and methods.”
M.R.E. 702(c). The current ABFO guidelines and the forensic science community have
determined that bite-mark evidence should not be used for identifying a suspect due to its
unreliability. See Maj. Op. ¶¶ 25, 26. Thus, Dr. West’s trial opinions were based on
unreliable principles and methods. This is demonstrated by Judge Plourd’s blind proficiency
test, which Dr. West failed.
IV. Howard’s new evidence brings the State’s other evidence into
question.
¶55. We have held that, when reviewing a trial court’s denial of a post-conviction relief
claim, this Court is to consider the entire record. Loden v. State, 971 So. 2d 548, 572 (Miss.
2007); see also Goodin v. State, 102 So. 3d 1102, 1113 (Miss. 2012) (“After careful
examination of the entire record . . . .”). Therefore, we consider how Howard’s new evidence,
25
which was not available at the time of Howard’s direct appeal, affects the State’s other
evidence.
¶56. In Howard’s last appeal, the record before this Court contained no DNA evidence and
Dr. West’s bite-mark testimony still was accepted by the forensic science community and
was the only evidence that could physically place Howard at the crime scene. See Howard
v. State, 853 So. 2d 781, 788 (Miss. 2003); Howard v. State, 945 So. 2d 326, 338, 369 (Miss.
2006). The elimination of Dr. West’s opinions calls into question the sufficiency of the
State’s remaining evidence. Howard’s new evidence casts a different light on the State’s
other evidence and, resolving any bona fide doubts in Howard’s favor, a comparison of the
State’s remaining evidence to the new evidence likely would lead a jury to produce a
different verdict. Howard’s new evidence seriously undermines his conviction.
¶57. The other evidence on which the State relied consists of an ex-girlfriend’s testimony
about how Howard smelled of smoke and how he enjoyed biting her during intercourse,
Howard’s having resided two blocks from the victim, and Howard’s statements to police that
“the case was solved” and that he “had a temper and that’s why this happened.” Howard, 853
So. 2d at 785.
¶58. Having tried capital murder cases for many years as a prosecutor and as a defense
attorney, I am not convinced that a jury still would find Howard’s so-called confession
incriminating when considered in conjunction with the new DNA results and in the absence
of Dr. West’s identification testimony. Police Investigator Turner testified that Howard told
him
26
that the case was solved and . . . that there was-uh-five or six other individuals
involved and to keep investigating the case, that I would [] find out [] their
roles [] in this case. Uh-and he asked me if I thought he was [] crazy. I looked
at him and I said, [“]no, man-you know, I don’t think you’re crazy[”] and he
said [“]well I’m not. I’m not crazy[”] and he said [“]I had a temper and that’s
why this happened.[”] And when he said that, I mean shock just went across
my body and I felt like at that point this was the guy that had actually
committed the murder.
Id. at 785. Turner was the only witness to Howard’s statement, which was not recorded, and
“Turner did not ask Howard to write and sign a statement.” Howard, 945 So. 2d at 334 n.3.
Howard’s statement lacked details of the crime, which usually are present in a confession.
In fact, Justice James Graves wrote in his separate opinion that
I find that the affidavits provided by Howard, combined with the legitimate
skepticism regarding the testimony of Dr. West and the fact set out by the
majority that “[t]he only evidence linking Howard to the crime scene was his
alleged statement to Detective Turner that the case was ‘solved’ and the bite
mark identification” are clearly “sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.”
Howard, 945 So. 2d at 372 (Graves, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Similarly,
I find it unlikely that the discovery of some unknown man’s DNA at the crime scene and the
elimination of Dr. West’s scientifically unsound bite-mark identification would be overcome
by the curious and cryptic statement allegedly made by Howard to a lone police officer who
failed to record it.
¶59. While it may be true that Howard’s residence was two blocks from Kemp’s, no
witnesses, no DNA, and no physical evidence placed Howard at the scene of the crime on
the day of the murder. If residing two blocks from a crime scene and a nonsensical,
27
unrecorded statement to a policeman are enough to affirm a death sentence, this Court has
redefined its duty to review death sentences with heightened scrutiny.
¶60. The absence of Dr. West’s testimony not only affects the sufficiency of the State’s
other evidence but impacts its relevance as well. Without West’s testimony to support the
existence of the bite marks, the ex-girlfriend’s testimony regarding Howard’s purported
tendency to bite her during intercourse would lose its relevance and likely would be deemed
inadmissible.
V. Conclusion
¶61. When the DNA results and the revised forensic odontology standards applicable to
bite-mark identifications are considered together, reasonable doubt is created, and the State
no longer has evidence that connects Howard to the murder. Howard has shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that his new evidence probably would lead to a different
verdict. For these reasons and the reasons stated by the majority, I would grant Howard’s
petition for post conviction relief, vacate his conviction and sentence, and remand this case
for a new trial.
KING, P.J., JOINS THIS OPINION. ISHEE, J., JOINS THIS OPINION IN
PART.
GRIFFIS, JUSTICE, DISSENTING:
¶62. Because the newly discovered evidence presented in Howard’s petition for
post-conviction relief is not of such a nature that it would “probably produce a different
result or induce a different verdict[] if a new trial is granted,” I respectfully dissent.
28
Crawford v. State, 867 So. 2d 196, 204 (Miss. 2003) (citing Meeks v. State, 781 So. 2d 109,
112 (Miss. 2001)).
I. DNA Testing
¶63. Howard argues that “the newly discovered results of DNA testing on the nightgown,
the knife, and [the] knife blade would probably produce a different result or verdict in a new
trial.” Regarding the nightgown, Howard claims that “the DNA analysis failed to identify
biological material that one would expect to find had the victim in fact been bit.”
Specifically, he explains,
The DNA laboratory screened the nightgown that Ms. Kemp was wearing
when her body was discovered. Given the number and location of the claimed
bite marks, one could expect to find the presence of amalyse, an enzyme found
at high levels in saliva, on areas of the clothing on or around the marks’
locations, namely the shoulder, neck, and right breast. After collecting
swabbings and cuttings from the relevant areas and performing tests, no saliva
was detected. Nor was any male DNA detected at all.
Regarding the knife, Howard argues that because he was “conclusively excluded as the
source of the male DNA,” the results offer exculpatory evidence. I disagree.
¶64. We must begin with the trial court’s conclusion. The trial court made the following
findings and conclusion about the DNA testing:
Concerning the issue of DNA evidence, the Court finds that the absence of the
Petitioner’s DNA in the items tested is not new evidence that would “produce
a different result or induce a different verdict.” Crawford v. State, 867 So. 2d
196, 204 (Miss. 2003). While no DNA evidence was found that implicated the
Petitioner in the crime, no DNA was found that pointed to a different
perpetrator. The lack of evidence linking Howard to the crime scene[8] was
8
Footnote 8 in the trial court’s opinion stated,
DNA testing was not originally done on any crime scene items since the
29
used in argument to the jury by Petitioner’s defense counsel in his second trial,
and the Court granted a defense jury instruction that instructed the jury to find
Howard not guilty if there was reasonable doubt he was not present and did not
commit the crime. Therefore, the Court finds that a new trial should not and
will not be granted on the issue of lack of DNA evidence linking Petitioner to
crime scene.
The trial court determined that although the DNA test results were newly discovered
evidence, the fact that there was no DNA evidence linking Howard to the crime was not new.
¶65. The majority finds that “a reasonable juror could surely conclude that the presence of
another man’s DNA on the knife blade ‘point[s] to a different perpetrator.’” Maj. Op. ¶ 20.
I agree that the presence of another male’s DNA on the knife is significant. But the fact that
the DNA was on the blade and not the handle is also significant. This evidence certainly
would provide a reasonable inference to the jury that another male was involved. But the
presence of another male’s DNA on the knife blade does not exonerate Howard or
conclusively establish that the other male murdered Kemp.
¶66. The record reflects that the knife had been examined for latent fingerprints and
handled numerous times since the 1992 murder. DNA analyst Barbara Leal agreed that the
fact that the murder weapon had been handled by multiple individuals could have affected
the testing of the knife because DNA could have been deposited from those individuals who
handled the knife during the intervening decades. She testified that it “depend[ed] on how
it was handled.”
Mississippi Crime Lab did not have that capability in 1992; rather they
checked for fingerprints, seminal fluid, blood type, and ethnic make-up of
hairs. Leave was given to the MOCPCC to seek DNA testing in preparation
for Howard’s first petition for postconviction relief, but no testing was done
at that time.
30
¶67. While I agree with Howard that the DNA results are newly discovered and are
significant, I agree with the trial court that the newly discovered results will probably not
“produce a different result or induce a different verdict[] if a new trial is granted.”
Crawford, 867 So. 2d at 204 (citing Meeks, 781 So. 2d at 112). Instead, the DNA results
simply confirm what was already established at trial—a lack of DNA evidence linking
Howard to the crime scene. Accordingly, I do not find that the trial court clearly erred by
denying Howard’s motion on this ground.
II. Bite-Mark Evidence
¶68. Howard’s arguments regarding the bite-mark evidence include the following:
(1) “[t]he American Board of Forensic Odontology’s [ABFO] rejection of
both individualization conclusions (i.e. conclusions that a person could
definitely be identified as ‘the biter’) and probabilistic conclusions (i.e.
conclusions that a particular person was the ‘likely’ or ‘probable’ biter)
is newly discovered evidence requiring a new trial,” and
(2) “[t]he change in the scientific community’s view and understanding of
bite mark evidence is newly discovered evidence requiring a new trial.”
¶69. At Howard’s trial in 2000, Dr. West testified that the bite marks found on Kemp’s
neck and arm were “consistent with” Howard’s teeth, which meant it was “possible” that the
bite marks were made by Howard. But Dr. West testified that the bite mark on Kemp’s
breast was an “identical” match to Howard’s teeth and opined that Howard “indeed and
without doubt” inflicted the bite mark on Kemp’s breast. In other words, Dr. West identified
Howard as the biter or the single individual responsible for the bite mark on Kemp’s breast.
¶70. In 2000, ABFO guidelines approved the following descriptions to relate a suspected
biter to a bite mark: the biter, the probable biter, not excluded as the biter, excluded as the
31
biter, and inconclusive. In 2013, the ABFO revised its guidelines and still approved of the
use of the term “the biter” but not in open population cases in which the universe of potential
suspects is unknown. In 2016, the ABFO again revised its guidelines and eliminated the use
of the term “the biter.” Instead, the 2016 revisions only allowed the following terms to relate
a questioned dentition to a bite mark: excluded as having made the bite mark, not excluded
as having made the bite mark, or inconclusive.
¶71. Howard asserts that these changes to the ABFO guidelines are “newly discovered,
material evidence” that “reflect the current consensus of the scientific community that bite
mark evidence is unreliable and unfit for court.” Howard contends that due to the changes
in the ABFO guidelines and in the scientific community’s understanding of bite-mark
evidence, Dr. West’s testimony, particularly his identification of Howard as the biter or the
only source of the alleged bite mark, “would plainly be inadmissible today.” As a result, he
argues that the newly discovered evidence would produce a different outcome if a new trial
was granted. I disagree.
¶72. The record reflects that while the ABFO guideline changes are new, the criticism of
Dr. West and his methodology as well as the validity and reliability of bite-mark evidence
are not new.
¶73. During Howard’s trial in 2000, defense counsel extensively cross-examined Dr. West
regarding his qualifications as an expert and the validity of bite-mark evidence in general.
Defense counsel questioned Dr. West regarding his suspension from the ABFO due, in part,
to Dr. West’s “fail[ure] to act in a impartial manner,” and defense counsel further discussed
32
Dr. West’s resignation from the American Academy of Forensic Science due to an allegation
that he had lied in court. Moreover, defense counsel questioned Dr. West about his
methodology and how other experts in his field disagreed with his methods. Notably, when
asked whether he had ever “computed [his] margin of error as a forensic odontologist,” Dr.
West replied, “[t]hat’s not possible because it’s a subjective art and science.” Defense
counsel concluded during closing arguments as follows:
[Bite mark identification] is a tool of exclusion, not - not reliable for
identification. You know, he’s got some other problems even on top of that.
He, ug-I’d heard this one before, but it-it astounds me every time I think about
it-is when he’s asked about his . . . margin of error rate . . . and he said there
is none, and in Louisiana, as he told you today, he told the court down there
that it was something less than Jesus Christ. Ego; that’s not ego, ladies and
gentlemen, that is arrogance, and it’s arrogance that translates into a so-called
scientist who is not a scientist. . . . The problem with this case . . . comes back
to Doctor Michael West.
¶74. Additionally, the criticism of Dr. West and bite-mark identification were noted in
Presiding Justice McRae’s dissenting opinion on direct appeal. Howard, 853 So. 2d at 799-
807 (McRae, P.J., dissenting). Specifically, Presiding Justice McRae stated, in part, as
follows:
The “expert odontology testimony” of Dr. West should not have been
submitted to the jury as it is “junk science” and not generally accepted by the
scientific community as required by then Rule 702 of the Mississippi Rules of
Evidence and Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Likewise,
neither Dr. West nor his “junk science” meet the standards and requirements
for admission under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), and revised Rule 702 of the
Mississippi Rules of Evidence.
Bite mark identification is not a reliable discipline and lacks generally
recognized criteria or methodology. This Court has recognized that there are
serious disagreements in the forensic scientific community about whether a
33
defendant can be uniquely identified on the basis of teeth marks. See Brooks
v. State, 748 So. 2d 736, 739 (Miss. 1999); Howard v. State, 701 So. 2d 274,
288 (Miss. 1997). Critics of bite mark identification have found that the
forensic odontology community is not convinced of the reliability or credibility
of such science. State v. Ortiz, 198 Conn. 220, 502 A.2d 400, 403 (1985);
People v. Milone, 43 Ill. App. 3d 385, 2 Ill. Dec. 63, 356 N.E.2d 1350, 1356
(1976); Howard, 701 So. 2d at 288; Spence v. Texas, 795 S.W.2d 743, 750-51
(Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Faigman, Kaye, Saks & Sanders, Modern Scientific
Evidence: The Law And Science Of Expert Testimony, § 24-1.0, at 157-58
(West 1997). Areas of bite mark identification which are still the subject of
disagreement in the forensic odontology community include: (1) the timing of
the bite mark injury; (2) enhancement procedures and techniques (such as the
use of ultraviolet light); (3) the type of material for test bites or the accuracy
of test bites under various mockup conditions; (4) the pressure necessary to
produce the various levels of tissue injury under normal and unusual
circumstances; (5) manipulation of and various types of distortion to produce
correction; (6) whether in fact another set of teeth could have produced the
same or similar marks; (7) no universal agreement on which injuries are bite
mark related; and (8) research on the minimum number of points of
concordance or the minimum number of teeth marks needed in a bite mark for
certainty is also not well established. Brooks, 748 So. 2d at 748 n.2 (citing
Faigman, Modern Scientific Evidence, § 24-2.3, at 178-80).
Additionally, Dr. West himself has been a controversial character in the
field of forensic odontology. On several occasions, Dr. West has been held to
have exaggerated the reliability of his disciplines and has proceeded to testify
outside the scope of his expertise. See Stubbs v. State, 845 So. 2d 656, 669
(Miss. 2003); Brooks, 748 So. 2d at 749-50; Brewer v. State, 725 So. 2d 106,
126 (Miss. 1998). In fact, in 1994, the American Academy of Forensic Science
instituted an ethics investigation against Dr. West with regard to testimony he
had given during a murder trial here in Mississippi. Ultimately, Dr. West was
given the opportunity to resign from the organization before being expelled.
Since that time, Dr. West has been allowed to re-enter the organization. . . .
....
. . . Dr. West’s testimony should not have been admitted, since the
methodology and procedure employed for bite mark identification are not
generally accepted. As stated earlier, the scientific community, specifically the
forensic odontology community, has not accepted Dr. West’s methodology and
testing techniques. See Brooks, 748 So. 2d at 739; Howard, 701 So. 2d at 288;
Faigman, Modern Scientific Evidence, §§ 24-1.0 at 157-58, 24-2.3 at 178-80.
34
This Court has recognized that the methodology and techniques used by Dr.
West are criticized and scrutinized by the scientific community. See Brooks,
748 So. 2d at 739; Howard, 701 So. 2d at 288. With these revelations, how can
this Court stand by and allow Dr. West to testify and give an opinion as an
expert to procedures, methodology, and testing which have not been adopted
by his own scientific community?
Howard, 853 So. 2d at 799-807 (McRae, P.J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
¶75. Moreover, the attacks on Dr. West and the validity of bite-mark evidence were
discussed in this Court’s opinion denying Howard’s first petition for post-conviction
collateral relief. Howard, 945 So. 2d at 348-71. This Court found Howard’s trial counsel
was not ineffective by failing to obtain a bite-mark expert to counter Dr. West’s testimony.
Id. at 352. We held that while the failure to call an expert witness was deficient
performance, Howard “ha[d] not proven prejudice to his defense . . . .” Id. We explained,
In support of his post-conviction claim, Howard has offered numerous expert
affidavits and other documents which attack Dr. West, his testimony, and bite
mark evidence in general. These affidavits and other documents point out how
many times Dr. West has been proven wrong and they discuss how unscientific
his methods are. One affidavit even states that Dr. West made a mis-diagnosis
in Howard’s case, but, it does not go on and opine that Howard did not bite
Kemp. Just because Dr. West has been wrong a lot[] does not mean, without
something more, that he was wrong here. Howard has failed to sufficiently
prove that there is “a reasonable probability” that the “result of the proceeding
would have been different.” [Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694,
104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)].
Id.
¶76. This Court further rejected Howard’s assertion that Dr. West’s testimony was
improperly admitted. Id. at 368-69. Similar to his arguments before us now, Howard argued
that “Dr. West’s methods in the field of forensic odontology lack[ed] relevancy and
35
reliability, [were] not grounded in the methods and procedures of science, [were] not
supported by appropriate validation, [were] not derived from the scientific method, and
[were] not scientifically valid.” Id. at 368. Howard claimed his due-process rights were
violated as a result of Dr. West’s testimony. Id. But this Court found that Howard’s
argument had been considered and rejected on direct appeal and, as a result, was barred from
relitigation by the doctrine of res judicata. Id. at 368-69.
¶77. Additionally, various articles and reports that predate Howard’s trial have discussed
opinions similar to those of Howard’s expert witnesses, Drs. Mary Bush and Iain Pretty. For
instance, Dr. Bush opined that “[e]ven if you assume that the human dentition is unique[,]
the skin does not faithfully record that uniqueness.” In other words, “[t]he skin is . . . not a
reliable recording medium.” But an article published in 1969 entitled Forensic Odontology
found that
[b]itemarks can never be taken to reproduce accurately the dental features of
the originator. This is due partially to the fact that bite marks generally include
only a limited number of teeth. Furthermore, the material (whether food stuff
or human skin) in which the mark has been left is usually found to be a very
unsatisfactory impression material with shrinkage and distortion characteristics
that are unknown.
S. Keiser-Nelson, Forensic Odontology, 1 U. Tol. L. Rev. 633, 636 (1969).
¶78. Notably, at Howard’s trial in 2000, defense counsel questioned Dr. West regarding
this exact issue—whether the skin was a good medium for recording bite marks—noting
factors such as distortion, mechanics of a bite, varying thickness of skin, whether there is
bone underneath the skin, and the positioning of the body at the time the bite is inflicted. Dr.
West explained to the jury that there was “a lot of work and a lot of discussion” regarding
36
“how good an impression skin is.” He acknowledged that “there’s always going to be
inherent distortion in the bite mark on human skin.”
¶79. Dr. Pretty criticized Dr. West’s methodology and testified regarding the scientific
invalidity of bite-mark identification. He explained that unlike Dr. West, he had never
identified an individual in a bite-mark case; he had only excluded individuals. Dr. Pretty
discussed a study he presented in 2015 regarding the validity of bite-mark analysis.
According to Dr. Pretty, the study exposed the unreliability of bite-mark analysis and added
further doubt to the use of bite marks in criminal cases. But a report published in 1975
entitled Some Laboratory Studies on the Accuracy of Bite Mark Comparison found that
identification from bites in non-vital pig skin was unreliable and suggested that similar
difficulties may be encountered in the assessment of bites in human skin. D.K. Whittaker,
Some Laboratory Studies on the Accuracy of Bite Mark Comparison, 25 Int’l Dental J. 166-
71 (1975). The report concluded that “[e]xpert witnesses involved in presenting evidence
on bite marks in a court of law should be aware of the difficulties of making valid
comparisons even under standardized laboratory conditions.” Id.
¶80. Importantly, as with Dr. Bush’s opinions, Dr. Pretty’s position was noted by defense
counsel at Howard’s trial. Specifically, defense counsel argued to the jury that bite-mark
identification was “a tool of exclusion, not . . . reliable for identification.”
¶81. In support of his argument regarding the invalidity of bite-mark evidence, Howard
relies on various cases including Commonwealth v. Kunco, 173 A.3d 817 (Pa. 2017), Ex
37
parte Chaney, 563 S.W.3d 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018), and State v. Sheila Denton, No.
04R-330 (Ware County, Ga., Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 2020).
¶82. In Kunco, the State presented two expert witnesses who testified regarding bite-mark
evidence. Kunco, 173 A.3d at 824. Both expert odontologists testified to a reasonable
degree of dental certainty that Kunco’s teeth made the bite mark on the victim’s shoulder.
Id. Approximately twenty-five years after his conviction, Kunco petitioned for
post-conviction relief and for DNA testing. Id. at 820. The trial court did not address the
petition for post-conviction relief but granted Kunco’s request for DNA testing “[d]ue to the
questionable nature of the Commonwealth’s evidence . . . .” Id. at 824-25. In doing so, the
trial court relied heavily on the fact that both of the State’s expert witnesses stated that they
would no longer testify as they had at trial because the scientific knowledge and
understanding on which their conclusions were based had changed significantly since trial.
Id. at 821. On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court’s grant of post-conviction DNA
testing “[s]ince the Commonwealth’s case [wa]s not overwhelming . . . .” Id. at 824-25. The
appellate court explained that the Commonwealth’s bite-mark evidence was “a crucial
component of the Commonwealth’s trial evidence” and that its other evidence, while relevant
and probative, was “nowhere close to overwhelming evidence of guilt.” Id. at 824.
¶83. In Denton, the State presented expert testimony from a forensic dentist who testified
that an injury found on the defendant was a bite mark to a reasonable scientific certainty and
that an injury found on the victim was probably a bite mark. Denton, No. 04R-330, at *4.
The expert forensic dentist opined that “[the defendant] was the probable source of the bite
38
mark on [the victim] and that [the victim] was the probable source of the bite mark on [the
defendant].” Id. The defendant was convicted of murder and her conviction was affirmed
on direct appeal. Id. at *1. More than ten years later, the defendant filed a motion for a new
trial and alleged that developments in the understanding of bite-mark analysis and
comparison showed that the expert testimony today would no longer be inculpatory. Id. at
*2. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for a new
trial. Id. at *25. In doing so, the trial court relied on expert testimony from two forensic
dentists who both opined that the testimony presented at trial would no longer be permitted
or would be inconsistent with the current scientific understanding of bite marks. Id. at *8-9.
¶84. In Chaney, the State presented expert testimony from two forensic odontologists who
testified that the mark found on the victim’s body was a human bite mark made by the
defendant at the time of the murder. Chaney, 563 S.W.3d at 250. One of the expert
witnesses testified that the defendant’s dentition was a “perfect match” to the bite mark made
on the victim’s body and that there was only a “[o]ne to a million” chance that someone other
than the defendant bit the victim. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The other expert
witness testified that he was “certain” that the defendant was the person who bit the victim.
Id. The defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. at 244.
After his conviction, the defendant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus based on a change
in science relied on by the State at trial. Id. at 255. In support of his petition, the defendant
relied on various reports and affidavits including an affidavit from Dr. Bush, an odontology
report and affidavit from Dr. Pretty, and an affidavit from one of the expert witnesses who
39
testified at trial. Id. at 257. The court found that “[t]he body of scientific knowledge
underlying the field of bite-mark comparisons ha[d] evolved since [the defendant’s] trial in
a way that contradicts the scientific evidence relied on by the State at trial.” Id. at 260. The
court granted the defendant’s petition and concluded that the defendant “ha[d] shown by
clear and convincing evidence that ‘no reasonable juror would have convicted [him] in light
of the new evidence.’” Id. at 278 (second alteration in original) (quoting Ex parte
Kussmaul, 548 S.W.3d 606, 636-37 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)).
¶85. Despite Howard’s reliance on these cases, Chaney, Kunco, and Denton are
distinguishable. In Chaney, the defendant relied on a criminal statute that allowed a
defendant to move for post-conviction relief based on a change in science relied on by the
State at trial. Id. at 255. The State conceded that forensic science related to bite-mark
comparison had evolved since trial. Id. at 258. But in addition to the change in science, the
State further conceded that its expert had presented “false wound-aging testimony”: the
expert had testified at trial that the bite was inflicted at the time of death but later opined that
the bite was inflicted days before the murder. Id. at 261, 262, 264-65. Additionally, the
State’s expert admitted that his trial testimony was knowingly false. Id. at 264. Specifically,
the expert “confesse[d] that he knew at the time of trial that the body of science did not
support his ‘one to a million’ testimony.” Id. Moreover, the State had suppressed favorable
evidence material to the defendant’s guilt in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). Chaney, 563 S.W.3d at 274.
40
¶86. Here, unlike in Chaney, there is no evidence of false testimony or of any Brady
violation, and Dr. West has not recanted his trial testimony. Instead, Dr. West stated there
was nothing presented during the evidentiary hearing that would change or alter his prior
testimony given in this case.
¶87. Additionally, in Chaney, the court noted that without the bite-mark evidence, the
State’s case “would have been exceedingly feeble because the State could no longer place
Chaney at the scene of the crime at the time of the murders.” Id. at 265. Similarly, in
Kunco, the court noted the “crucial” nature of the State’s bite-mark evidence. Kunco, 173
A.3d at 824. And in Denton, the court found that “[a]side from the bite mark evidence, the
State presented little other incriminating evidence.” Denton, No. 04R-330, at *4.
III. Other Evidence of Howard’s Guilt
¶88. But here, even without the bite-mark evidence, sufficient evidence established
Howard’s guilt. At trial, the evidence showed that at the time of the murder, Howard lived
just two blocks away from Kemp. Howard, 853 So. 2d at 785. Howard’s former girlfriend
testified that on the morning after the murder, Howard smelled “like burnt clothes or . . .
wood, like smoke.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). She further testified that
Howard liked to bite her on her neck and breast during intercourse.9 Id. at 788. Moreover,
shortly after his arrest, Howard advised law enforcement that the “case was solved” and then
confessed to law enforcement that he “had a temper and that’s why this happened.” Id. at
9
Dr. Hayne, who performed Kemp’s autopsy, testified that “there could be injuries
inflicted by teeth.”
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785. Thus, unlike in Chaney, Kunco, and Denton, sufficient evidence other than bite-mark
evidence was presented to support the murder conviction.
¶89. Both the majority and the specially concurring opinion challenge the sufficiency of
the other evidence of guilt that was presented to support Howard’s murder conviction. Maj.
Op. ¶¶ 32, 33; Sp. Con. Op. ¶¶ 20, 21. But Howard makes no such argument. Instead,
Howard focuses solely on the newly discovered evidence regarding DNA and bite-mark
science. The other evidence of guilt is not new evidence. In fact, Howard asserted a
sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument on direct appeal in 2003. Howard, 853 So. 2d at 788.
This Court found sufficient evidence was presented to support his murder conviction. Id.
Specifically, this Court found,
the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction even in the absence of
fingerprint and DNA evidence. Howard’s dentition matched the bite marks
found on Kemp’s body, he lived two blocks away from Kemp, his former
girlfriend testified that he liked to bite her on the breast and neck during
intercourse, he smelled of burnt wood or clothes the morning after the murder,
and he confessed to Turner that “I had a temper and that’s why this
happened.”
Id. (emphasis added).
¶90. The sufficiency of the other evidence of guilt against Howard has been previously
considered and addressed by this Court. Sufficient evidence other than bite-mark evidence
was presented to support the murder conviction.
¶91. I recognize that a change in the ABFO guidelines and in the scientific community’s
understanding of bite-mark evidence has occurred since Howard’s trial in 2000. The trial
court properly noted, “[a]s science and technology have progressed in the twenty-six years
42
since this crime occurred, the standards for bite mark identification have changed also.” I
further recognize that as a result of these changes, Dr. West would be unable to testify today
as he did in 2000. But this does not negate the fact that Dr. West’s conclusions at trial were
within the guidelines in place at that time. Indeed, even Dr. Pretty acknowledges that “Dr.
West’s analysis and testimonial conclusions in this case” were “consistent with ABFO
guidelines at the time.” Dr. West’s analysis and conclusions as well as bite-mark science as
a whole were questioned and challenged at trial. In other words, although the jury did not
hear about the newly discovered evidence Howard relies on in his petition, it did hear about
the criticisms of Dr. West and his methodology as well as the unreliability of bite-mark
identification.
¶92. Moreover, as previously discussed, other evidence besides bite-mark evidence was
presented during trial in support of Howard’s guilt. Thus, despite the changes in the ABFO
guidelines and in the scientific community’s understanding of bite-mark evidence, the newly
discovered evidence presented in Howard’s petition for post-conviction relief is not of such
a nature that it would “probably produce a different result or induce a different verdict[] if
a new trial is granted.” Crawford, 867 So. 2d at 204 (citing Meeks, 781 So. 2d at 112). As
a result, I find that the trial court properly denied Howard’s petition for post-conviction relief
and would therefore affirm.
43